Chinook - Hit Back Here
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Letter published in today's Scotsman:
Buck-Passing
If the RAF top brass are to be believed regarding the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre, what they are really telling us is that 2 of the best trained pilots, flying a state-of-the-art helicopter carrying important VIPs, were so badly disciplined and irresponsible that they flew too fast and too low right into a hill.
If that is the case, what does it say about the selection and training of pilots? No wonder planes seem to be falling out of the sky every month.
No, those of us who have been in the forces know the buck is always passed down the ranks to those who cannot defend themselves!
J Simpson
Inverness
Buck-Passing
If the RAF top brass are to be believed regarding the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre, what they are really telling us is that 2 of the best trained pilots, flying a state-of-the-art helicopter carrying important VIPs, were so badly disciplined and irresponsible that they flew too fast and too low right into a hill.
If that is the case, what does it say about the selection and training of pilots? No wonder planes seem to be falling out of the sky every month.
No, those of us who have been in the forces know the buck is always passed down the ranks to those who cannot defend themselves!
J Simpson
Inverness
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Swashplate,
Yep. Funny old word that 'evidence' isn't it??
With regard to the 'black boxes' have a look at my posts on page 10 dated 24 Nov. From memory I think there has been at least three BoIs that have recommended they be fitted.
Mr Wratten.
I am no expert. However I would very much like to discuss your interpretation of the evidence presented. What is it that has convinced you to reach a different opinion to everyone else who has read the same documentation? My e-mail is on this post. I look forward to hearing from you. No tricks. Straight, but honest dialogue.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Yep. Funny old word that 'evidence' isn't it??
With regard to the 'black boxes' have a look at my posts on page 10 dated 24 Nov. From memory I think there has been at least three BoIs that have recommended they be fitted.
Mr Wratten.
I am no expert. However I would very much like to discuss your interpretation of the evidence presented. What is it that has convinced you to reach a different opinion to everyone else who has read the same documentation? My e-mail is on this post. I look forward to hearing from you. No tricks. Straight, but honest dialogue.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Brian - I can understand you wanting to find out what goes on in the mind of Wratten by asking him to converse by e-mail. When the overwhelming opinion is so against his views then human nature and curiosity make us want to know what makes Wratten tick.
However, a very BIG however, you want a "Straight, but honest dialogue." I and many others don't believe he can be straight OR honest.
[This message has been edited by Scatterling (edited 09 December 2000).]
However, a very BIG however, you want a "Straight, but honest dialogue." I and many others don't believe he can be straight OR honest.
[This message has been edited by Scatterling (edited 09 December 2000).]
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I don't think that the worthy cause of re-examining the Chinook tragedy to establish the sustainability of the verdict will be served by pesonal abuse directed at Air Chief Marshal (Retd) Sir William Wratten. Whilst everyone is entitled to an opinion, pointless insults will be of no help in this matter. Libel and misinformation will be a distinct hindrance to Brian Dixon's well-intentioned campaign for truth, not a help.
Personally I wish to see the burden of proof 'beyond any reasonable doubt whatsoever' being laid at the feet of the reviewing officers; should there be ANY lingering doubt as to the single absolute cause, then, ipso facto, there is surely INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE for the verdict which the reviewing officers reached to be supportable.
Personally I wish to see the burden of proof 'beyond any reasonable doubt whatsoever' being laid at the feet of the reviewing officers; should there be ANY lingering doubt as to the single absolute cause, then, ipso facto, there is surely INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE for the verdict which the reviewing officers reached to be supportable.
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MrPloppy, this went to The Times yesterday:
***************
Sir, Sir William Wratten has at last agreed to have his decision to find the Chinook pilots guilty of gross negligence opened to scrutiny (letters December 8). This is a somewhat surprising yet extremely welcome development.
Sir William says that his interrogator (having been interrogated by professionals, I find this an interesting choice of phrase) must be in possession of all of the details. One hopes that this includes the former serving RAF Officers and Special Forces pilots, the fellows of the Royal Aeronautical Society, computer specialists, aerospace engineers and other aviation professionals he describes as “wilfully ignorant” (The Sunday Times June 18) because their views differ to his.
When his views are put to the test as a civilian rather than simply being stated as a senior officer I’m sure he will see what most people involved in the case have known for over six years. Without the evidence of “black boxes” Sir Williams hypothesis is just that, an unproven idea of what may have happened; I do not say that Sir William’s theory is wrong, I simply point out that there is not a shred of evidence that he is right.
***************
Don't know if they will use it but we can always hope.
Lord Chalfont has also sent something on similar lines. He has also tabled a motion in the Lords calling for the setting up of a Select Committee to investigate the matter. If it gets through expect to see Sir Bill basking in the media spotlight.
***************
Sir, Sir William Wratten has at last agreed to have his decision to find the Chinook pilots guilty of gross negligence opened to scrutiny (letters December 8). This is a somewhat surprising yet extremely welcome development.
Sir William says that his interrogator (having been interrogated by professionals, I find this an interesting choice of phrase) must be in possession of all of the details. One hopes that this includes the former serving RAF Officers and Special Forces pilots, the fellows of the Royal Aeronautical Society, computer specialists, aerospace engineers and other aviation professionals he describes as “wilfully ignorant” (The Sunday Times June 18) because their views differ to his.
When his views are put to the test as a civilian rather than simply being stated as a senior officer I’m sure he will see what most people involved in the case have known for over six years. Without the evidence of “black boxes” Sir Williams hypothesis is just that, an unproven idea of what may have happened; I do not say that Sir William’s theory is wrong, I simply point out that there is not a shred of evidence that he is right.
***************
Don't know if they will use it but we can always hope.
Lord Chalfont has also sent something on similar lines. He has also tabled a motion in the Lords calling for the setting up of a Select Committee to investigate the matter. If it gets through expect to see Sir Bill basking in the media spotlight.
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Presumably Sir Bill's sudden conversion to debate with his opponents is something to do with the fact that he might just find himself trying to explain his former reticence in front of a Lords Select Committee. Hope they televise the whole lot. I guess it'll be standing room only in the public section.
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Good one, John. The choice of the word "interrogator" by the Wratten mindset would seem to indicate that he holds some piece of information that he knows he must not divulge, strange ....
A small typo in your post - I would expect to see Wratten basting (not basking) in the spotlight if Lord Chalfont gets his way!
A small typo in your post - I would expect to see Wratten basting (not basking) in the spotlight if Lord Chalfont gets his way!
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Chocks
In answer to your questions
Question: Several people mentioned Rick's intercom being in the "Emergency" position - as a humble civvy spam-can pilot, can someone
explain the significance of this?
Answer: This may have indicated a fault with the intercom box on Rick's side of the cockpit. The switch allows the i/c box on the other side of the cockpit to provide an alternative means of i/c. On the other hand it may have just been an inadvertent switch selection. I doubt it is significant unless John's box also failed.
Question: What is the normal cruising speed of a loaded Chinook? Would you cruise at the same speed at low level?
Answer: Normally 140 kts. No reason why not in VMC conditions where there are no obstructions.
Question: How close to fully loaded was it?
Answer: Not even close.
Question: Arkroyal asked if the waypoint change was manual or automatic - this point doesn't seem to have been answered - does anyone know?
Answer: In route steer mode the RNS-252 changes automatically to the next WP on the route when within a short (unspecified) distance of the WP, to permit corner cutting. If required this may be disabled by a number of key presses.
Keep up the good work Brian, you're doing a wonderful job.
In answer to your questions
Question: Several people mentioned Rick's intercom being in the "Emergency" position - as a humble civvy spam-can pilot, can someone
explain the significance of this?
Answer: This may have indicated a fault with the intercom box on Rick's side of the cockpit. The switch allows the i/c box on the other side of the cockpit to provide an alternative means of i/c. On the other hand it may have just been an inadvertent switch selection. I doubt it is significant unless John's box also failed.
Question: What is the normal cruising speed of a loaded Chinook? Would you cruise at the same speed at low level?
Answer: Normally 140 kts. No reason why not in VMC conditions where there are no obstructions.
Question: How close to fully loaded was it?
Answer: Not even close.
Question: Arkroyal asked if the waypoint change was manual or automatic - this point doesn't seem to have been answered - does anyone know?
Answer: In route steer mode the RNS-252 changes automatically to the next WP on the route when within a short (unspecified) distance of the WP, to permit corner cutting. If required this may be disabled by a number of key presses.
Keep up the good work Brian, you're doing a wonderful job.
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Thank you for your comments Capt. T
Thanks also for supplying the answers to the questions.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Thanks also for supplying the answers to the questions.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
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Here's a few more selective quotations for you Mr Wratten:
'There....................'
'......is.................'
'...no....................'
'...............evidence..'
'........to...............'
'...............support...'
'..a......................'
'......verdict............'
'................of.......'
'..............negligence.'
'spose the man has a point really!!
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
'There....................'
'......is.................'
'...no....................'
'...............evidence..'
'........to...............'
'...............support...'
'..a......................'
'......verdict............'
'................of.......'
'..............negligence.'
'spose the man has a point really!!
Brian
[email protected]
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Hope I haven't been neglecting you all recently, but I thought I may be able to help on a couple of points;
1) The right hand seat pilot (Co-pilots) Intercom station box, Norm/fail selector, was indeed found in the FAIL position. However, as with all cockpit indications, the AAIB Technical report awards this a score relating to how reliable this evidence is thought to be. In this specific case, the score was 4, In other words, the switch position was " likely to be readily affected by accident effects, and no reliable evidence of position at impact was available."
2) As far as the nav computer, RNS252 SuperTANS, was concerned,the manufacturer, Racal Avionics Ltd, produced a report which states a Tactical steer page was being displayed at impact, in the form;
^Tac:B
' <<25*M
'Dis
6.7Nm
'vTTG:32.0
The implication being that in Tactical steer mode the SuperTANS requires the operator to manually select the waypoint, rather than the automatic transfer associated with Route steer.
Hope this helps.
I for one would love the opportunity of an open and frank discussion with Sir Wratten.
Watch this space.
1) The right hand seat pilot (Co-pilots) Intercom station box, Norm/fail selector, was indeed found in the FAIL position. However, as with all cockpit indications, the AAIB Technical report awards this a score relating to how reliable this evidence is thought to be. In this specific case, the score was 4, In other words, the switch position was " likely to be readily affected by accident effects, and no reliable evidence of position at impact was available."
2) As far as the nav computer, RNS252 SuperTANS, was concerned,the manufacturer, Racal Avionics Ltd, produced a report which states a Tactical steer page was being displayed at impact, in the form;
^Tac:B
' <<25*M
'Dis
6.7Nm'vTTG:32.0
The implication being that in Tactical steer mode the SuperTANS requires the operator to manually select the waypoint, rather than the automatic transfer associated with Route steer.
Hope this helps.
I for one would love the opportunity of an open and frank discussion with Sir Wratten.
Watch this space.
Guest
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Phew, a couple of days away and two new pages to read.
John Nichol, excellent letter to the Times. I came across Wratten’s letter at 35000 ft over the North Sea and damn nearly crashed the airplane. The arrogance of the man knows no bounds. I couldn’t wait to get home to pen a response, but no need now, and it wouldn’t have been as good as yours anyway. I’ll use the address given with the letter instead! Yes the safety altitude question is very relevant as Wratten uses the fact that they did not climb as a factor in his findings. Scroggs demonstrated the usual fixed wing misapprehensions about helicopters in his post. In a plank you always have the option to climb, but Jon and Rick did not. It’s interesting that Wratten made his calculation of SALT based on the Mull itself and came up with a figure 2800ft which was still above the calculated aircraft limit of 2500ft. The actual SALT was 5900ft, a figure accepted by the defence committee.
Chocks, thanks for reminding me about the Waypoint change, and thanks to Capt Tercrue for the answer. Again Wratten has used the fact that the waypoint had been changed as ‘evidence’ that all must have been well. I quote once again from his article:
‘When it was less than one nautical mile from what was to be the point of impact, a waypoint change was made. This selection on the navigation equipment caused it then to display heading and distance to the next point on the route. Specifically, the pilots changed waypoint to one 87 nautical miles beyond the fogbound lighthouse that was their next planned turning point’. [Ark’s words: Corran, in the mouth of Loch Ness, which would have been reached without needing to climb, as an over water route was available. Wratten’s emphasis that it lay ‘beyond’ the mull is misleading. It lay around the Mull]
‘Activity in the cockpit of this nature proved that the pilots were in control of their aircraft at that moment. It also showed that, rather than ensure they were at safety altitude well before landfall, they had flown into the bad weather at low level and at speed, in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre where the board of inquiry itself had concluded that the prevailing conditions "would have required flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules".’
In Wratten’s version of evidence ‘beyond any doubt whatsoever’ of negligence, the waypoint change shows that all was well. He goes on to postulate that this waypoint change demonstrates a decision to negligently enter bad weather rather than climb. Had this waypoint change been automatic (and it quite possibly, was); then no such assumption that all was well is safe.
Yodason, good point re the focus of this campaign. The more fanciful and technical arguments take second place to the simple fact that the findings of Sirs John Day and William Wratten are flawed in law, common sense and material fact.
Good letter Grey area. Now I’m off to write one to 14 College Road, Cheltenham, GL53 7HX, which, in case anyone missed the Times letter, is Wrattens drum.
John Nichol, excellent letter to the Times. I came across Wratten’s letter at 35000 ft over the North Sea and damn nearly crashed the airplane. The arrogance of the man knows no bounds. I couldn’t wait to get home to pen a response, but no need now, and it wouldn’t have been as good as yours anyway. I’ll use the address given with the letter instead! Yes the safety altitude question is very relevant as Wratten uses the fact that they did not climb as a factor in his findings. Scroggs demonstrated the usual fixed wing misapprehensions about helicopters in his post. In a plank you always have the option to climb, but Jon and Rick did not. It’s interesting that Wratten made his calculation of SALT based on the Mull itself and came up with a figure 2800ft which was still above the calculated aircraft limit of 2500ft. The actual SALT was 5900ft, a figure accepted by the defence committee.
Chocks, thanks for reminding me about the Waypoint change, and thanks to Capt Tercrue for the answer. Again Wratten has used the fact that the waypoint had been changed as ‘evidence’ that all must have been well. I quote once again from his article:
‘When it was less than one nautical mile from what was to be the point of impact, a waypoint change was made. This selection on the navigation equipment caused it then to display heading and distance to the next point on the route. Specifically, the pilots changed waypoint to one 87 nautical miles beyond the fogbound lighthouse that was their next planned turning point’. [Ark’s words: Corran, in the mouth of Loch Ness, which would have been reached without needing to climb, as an over water route was available. Wratten’s emphasis that it lay ‘beyond’ the mull is misleading. It lay around the Mull]
‘Activity in the cockpit of this nature proved that the pilots were in control of their aircraft at that moment. It also showed that, rather than ensure they were at safety altitude well before landfall, they had flown into the bad weather at low level and at speed, in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre where the board of inquiry itself had concluded that the prevailing conditions "would have required flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules".’
In Wratten’s version of evidence ‘beyond any doubt whatsoever’ of negligence, the waypoint change shows that all was well. He goes on to postulate that this waypoint change demonstrates a decision to negligently enter bad weather rather than climb. Had this waypoint change been automatic (and it quite possibly, was); then no such assumption that all was well is safe.
Yodason, good point re the focus of this campaign. The more fanciful and technical arguments take second place to the simple fact that the findings of Sirs John Day and William Wratten are flawed in law, common sense and material fact.
Good letter Grey area. Now I’m off to write one to 14 College Road, Cheltenham, GL53 7HX, which, in case anyone missed the Times letter, is Wrattens drum.
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I fully support the case to have the verdict on this accident changed. The legal and non defamatory route appears to be the best.
One thing that may be worthy of investigation is the fact the Wratten is now employed by Boeing who have some big money tied up with current procurement projects.
Is there Government collusion with Wratten and Boeing? If the verdict is changed Wratten would have a rather large amount of egg on his face, this would also reflect on Boeing and the Government, hence my suspicion of collusion.
One thing that may be worthy of investigation is the fact the Wratten is now employed by Boeing who have some big money tied up with current procurement projects.
Is there Government collusion with Wratten and Boeing? If the verdict is changed Wratten would have a rather large amount of egg on his face, this would also reflect on Boeing and the Government, hence my suspicion of collusion.
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You are very probably right, GICASI. I can't remember the exact wording in the AP however, 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' requires an even higher level of evidence than 'beyond any reasonable doubt whatsoever'.
In either case there appears to be considerable doubt as to whether the verdict reached by the reviewing officers was sustained by sufficient proof positive; however, the onus should surely be upon Sir William Wratten to produce sufficient proof showing that there was 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', if his verdict is not to be quashed and the investigation re-opened.
[This message has been edited by BEagle (edited 10 December 2000).]
In either case there appears to be considerable doubt as to whether the verdict reached by the reviewing officers was sustained by sufficient proof positive; however, the onus should surely be upon Sir William Wratten to produce sufficient proof showing that there was 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', if his verdict is not to be quashed and the investigation re-opened.
[This message has been edited by BEagle (edited 10 December 2000).]
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There is an interesting parallel-ish case that might go some way to illustrating the need for caution when a finding of negligence is considered.
In 1999 an Army Lynx crashed. 3 of the 4 crew/passengers were killed and 1 survived with critical injuries. I have not had sight of the BOI, but I understand there was a massive hydraulic leak, mist or fire in the cockpit that induced the pilot to attempt a rapid forced landing. Unfortunately, conditions in the cockpit were so bad that he was unable to carry out successful landing.
The point is, had there not been a survivor who was able to describe the conditions in which they found themselves, the BOI would have perhaps been in an identical position to Andy Pulford, with no evidence to indicate the cause of the crash. Or at least if evidence of the hydraulic problem came to light, conditions in the cockpit would have been speculative at best.
And so it could have been in the cockpit of the Chinook; something so catastrophic could have occurred with the airframe, ac or engine systems or cockpit conditions sufficient enough to distracted the crew to the extent that they were unable to control the ac to avoid impacting the ground. Hence the reason why the BOI was entirely correct in its findings and the 2 senior officers were wrong.
Furthermore:
1. To be authorised to carry such a VIP load one must assume that the crew were highly qualified and experienced. I find it impossible to accept that in this day and age where CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) and SA (Safety Altitude) feature so regularly in this flight safety conscious world, that this crew would not have avoided the Mull if they could. For heaven's sake, even if they inadvertently found themselves IMC, they must have been aware that all they had to do was turn 90 left to remain over the sea.
2. The waypoint switch question also contains a bit of a red herring. The original track switch was to be, I am told, only a few degrees. They could have been reprogramming a new waypoint that would have taken them up the West Side of the Mull; is there any evidence to show that this might be the case?
3. Finally, it may come as a surprise to many that the reaction time to major emergencies can be startlingly long. For example, dealing with a major emergency will elicit first action response within about 3 seconds. However, an insidious failure, or a set of circumstances not covered by the FRCs or practised in the simulator could lead to significantly longer reaction times. First the crew would have to recognise that something was wrong. Then they would have to diagnose the problem and finally work out what to do about it. And if the failure was giving them massive problems, then they may have been seriously distracted enough to be drawn away from rule no 1 - first fly the ac. In these circumstances, a BOI could reasonably argue that a finding of negligence would be inappropriate.
(Edited to clarify abbreviations)
[This message has been edited by FJJP (edited 10 December 2000).]
In 1999 an Army Lynx crashed. 3 of the 4 crew/passengers were killed and 1 survived with critical injuries. I have not had sight of the BOI, but I understand there was a massive hydraulic leak, mist or fire in the cockpit that induced the pilot to attempt a rapid forced landing. Unfortunately, conditions in the cockpit were so bad that he was unable to carry out successful landing.
The point is, had there not been a survivor who was able to describe the conditions in which they found themselves, the BOI would have perhaps been in an identical position to Andy Pulford, with no evidence to indicate the cause of the crash. Or at least if evidence of the hydraulic problem came to light, conditions in the cockpit would have been speculative at best.
And so it could have been in the cockpit of the Chinook; something so catastrophic could have occurred with the airframe, ac or engine systems or cockpit conditions sufficient enough to distracted the crew to the extent that they were unable to control the ac to avoid impacting the ground. Hence the reason why the BOI was entirely correct in its findings and the 2 senior officers were wrong.
Furthermore:
1. To be authorised to carry such a VIP load one must assume that the crew were highly qualified and experienced. I find it impossible to accept that in this day and age where CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) and SA (Safety Altitude) feature so regularly in this flight safety conscious world, that this crew would not have avoided the Mull if they could. For heaven's sake, even if they inadvertently found themselves IMC, they must have been aware that all they had to do was turn 90 left to remain over the sea.
2. The waypoint switch question also contains a bit of a red herring. The original track switch was to be, I am told, only a few degrees. They could have been reprogramming a new waypoint that would have taken them up the West Side of the Mull; is there any evidence to show that this might be the case?
3. Finally, it may come as a surprise to many that the reaction time to major emergencies can be startlingly long. For example, dealing with a major emergency will elicit first action response within about 3 seconds. However, an insidious failure, or a set of circumstances not covered by the FRCs or practised in the simulator could lead to significantly longer reaction times. First the crew would have to recognise that something was wrong. Then they would have to diagnose the problem and finally work out what to do about it. And if the failure was giving them massive problems, then they may have been seriously distracted enough to be drawn away from rule no 1 - first fly the ac. In these circumstances, a BOI could reasonably argue that a finding of negligence would be inappropriate.
(Edited to clarify abbreviations)
[This message has been edited by FJJP (edited 10 December 2000).]
Guest
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Something else I remember from my training (Years ago), in any emergency, you fly the aircraft, you deal with the emergency and then you think about telling someone about it.
When it comes to authorisation, I always though one picked your best and most reliable pilots for a VIP flight, which also must say something about the caliber of the pilots concerned. When you consider the manifest, surely this was no ordinary VIP flight either.
Wratten surely has lost the bubble.
When it comes to authorisation, I always though one picked your best and most reliable pilots for a VIP flight, which also must say something about the caliber of the pilots concerned. When you consider the manifest, surely this was no ordinary VIP flight either.
Wratten surely has lost the bubble.
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There are a number of aspects of the official story that don't seem to add up.
1. A flightpath from Aldergrove via Carnlough to the crashsite near the South Point lighthouse is a bit east of north and approximately 50 miles. The take-off time is given as 5.42 pm and the power-down as 5.59 pm. This gives an average speed of about 150 knots; the upper cruising speed of a Chinook is 135 knots. Lord Rathcavan (House of Lords - 1 December 1999) made the following observation about the Chinook seen near Carnlough: 'From all accounts it might have been on an unlikely sightseeing trip. It did not appear to have any regular or determined flight path during those several minutes. Evidence suggests that it took a number of low turns. Some witnesses thought that it might have been trying to slow down and land before heading out to sea.' Was this Chinook trying to draw attention to itself'?
2. It is reported that the pilots inserted a 14 degree shift to port as they approached the lighthouse, from a southerly direction. This would have taken the Chinook to the west of the lighthouse; the actual flightpath was about half-a-mile to the east of the lighthouse. If the Chinook was heading to Corran then it would have needed a change of waypoint to port of less that 5 degrees. Also, the Chinook crashed to the east of the lighthouse whereas a change to port would have taken it past on the west side.
3. Mark Holbrook, the yachtsman, gave his location as about 2 miles south-west of the lighthouse where he was able to see it and the Chinook. He is reported in Jack Holland's book 'Phoenix - Policing the Shadows' as seeing the starboard side of the Chinook. If the Chinook came from Carnlough to the south, he should have seen the port side.
4. No mention is made of the other Chinook which was sighted about 5.30 pm four miles east of Coleraine and about 35 miles from the crash site. It was also flying very low in a northerly direction. Perhaps it was the one that crashed.
5. The 1993 meeting was held at RAF Machrihanish from June 24 - 26. Why would they have been going to Fort George?
1. A flightpath from Aldergrove via Carnlough to the crashsite near the South Point lighthouse is a bit east of north and approximately 50 miles. The take-off time is given as 5.42 pm and the power-down as 5.59 pm. This gives an average speed of about 150 knots; the upper cruising speed of a Chinook is 135 knots. Lord Rathcavan (House of Lords - 1 December 1999) made the following observation about the Chinook seen near Carnlough: 'From all accounts it might have been on an unlikely sightseeing trip. It did not appear to have any regular or determined flight path during those several minutes. Evidence suggests that it took a number of low turns. Some witnesses thought that it might have been trying to slow down and land before heading out to sea.' Was this Chinook trying to draw attention to itself'?
2. It is reported that the pilots inserted a 14 degree shift to port as they approached the lighthouse, from a southerly direction. This would have taken the Chinook to the west of the lighthouse; the actual flightpath was about half-a-mile to the east of the lighthouse. If the Chinook was heading to Corran then it would have needed a change of waypoint to port of less that 5 degrees. Also, the Chinook crashed to the east of the lighthouse whereas a change to port would have taken it past on the west side.
3. Mark Holbrook, the yachtsman, gave his location as about 2 miles south-west of the lighthouse where he was able to see it and the Chinook. He is reported in Jack Holland's book 'Phoenix - Policing the Shadows' as seeing the starboard side of the Chinook. If the Chinook came from Carnlough to the south, he should have seen the port side.
4. No mention is made of the other Chinook which was sighted about 5.30 pm four miles east of Coleraine and about 35 miles from the crash site. It was also flying very low in a northerly direction. Perhaps it was the one that crashed.
5. The 1993 meeting was held at RAF Machrihanish from June 24 - 26. Why would they have been going to Fort George?
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Perhaps the investigation was too tightly focussed on the crash. Perhaps a wider focus - including the second Chinook and the orders issued to the pilots - would give a better perspective. It certainly would be fairer to the pilots though possibly embarrassing to the authorities.
We had an engineer in the house a few months ago who lives in Glenshesk on the east side of Knocklayd in north-east Co. Antrim and roughly due west of the crash site. He saw something that I hadn't seen reports of and he had discussed it with a friend who lives in Wales, has worked with Chinooks and served in the Falklands.
He said that after the crash there was a flight of three military attack helicopters flying up and down the glens of North Antrim, line astern. The interpretation put on this activity was that these helicopters were deployed in the hope that they would come under missile attack and if this happened troops would flood the area. The implication was that the Chinook may have brought down by a ground-to-air missile - or some other means - and the purpose of the exercise was to flush out those who fired it by tempting them with a follow-up target. It seems that the authorities suspected some form of sabotage.
We had an engineer in the house a few months ago who lives in Glenshesk on the east side of Knocklayd in north-east Co. Antrim and roughly due west of the crash site. He saw something that I hadn't seen reports of and he had discussed it with a friend who lives in Wales, has worked with Chinooks and served in the Falklands.
He said that after the crash there was a flight of three military attack helicopters flying up and down the glens of North Antrim, line astern. The interpretation put on this activity was that these helicopters were deployed in the hope that they would come under missile attack and if this happened troops would flood the area. The implication was that the Chinook may have brought down by a ground-to-air missile - or some other means - and the purpose of the exercise was to flush out those who fired it by tempting them with a follow-up target. It seems that the authorities suspected some form of sabotage.
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Arkroyal,
Mark Holbrook could clearly see individual structures on the Chinook from his yacht. He was also able to clearly see the lighthouse and its white perimeter wall and he said that the cloud localisation on the Mull was behind and above the lighthouse.
This would suggest that the pilots had a clear view of the lighthouse and so something must have prevented them from making a small change to port to take them up the west side of the Mull and on to Corran (or Machrihanish). Why would they have wanted to climb?
Mark Holbrook could clearly see individual structures on the Chinook from his yacht. He was also able to clearly see the lighthouse and its white perimeter wall and he said that the cloud localisation on the Mull was behind and above the lighthouse.
This would suggest that the pilots had a clear view of the lighthouse and so something must have prevented them from making a small change to port to take them up the west side of the Mull and on to Corran (or Machrihanish). Why would they have wanted to climb?