Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
I understood that the crew were in one of the armed services, and therefore expected to obey orders, unless those orders were clearly illegal under International law. That may have affected their decision, however reluctantly, to undertake the mission.
I have been hoping that someone whose name and titles would indicate authority to speak on the matter would reply to the CAS' self serving letters to the Times, etc. From the tone of their leader, I would expect it o be published.
I have been hoping that someone whose name and titles would indicate authority to speak on the matter would reply to the CAS' self serving letters to the Times, etc. From the tone of their leader, I would expect it o be published.
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Chinook helicopter crash
Is it possible for somebody to tell me when the joystick controls where changed in the above helicopters????
If somebody can tell me then I will reveal why there was a problem.
Up to now I have been given the cold shoulder to the above question.
This is not a crank and I would be willing to go further with my finding, as it could have other serious problems on another disaster
If somebody can tell me then I will reveal why there was a problem.
Up to now I have been given the cold shoulder to the above question.
This is not a crank and I would be willing to go further with my finding, as it could have other serious problems on another disaster
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Chinook revisited
8 Jan 2010 - I wrote the following letter to The Times, The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. It may or not be published. Nonetheless, I felt I should share it with thePPrune readership, in case it was not.
7 Jan 2010 - To the Editor, The Times - Chinook revisited
We are pleased Air Chief Marshall Stephen Dalton chose to reply to the recent BBC coverage of the “positively dangerous” software implementation in the Chinook fuel computers in The Guardian, letters, 6th January 2010 and The Times (7 Jan 2010) as it gives us the opportunity to respond. This letter also replies to ACM Graydon’s letter to The Daily Telegraph (7 Jan 2010) and is complementary to our last letter to The Minister for Defence, as copied to ACM Dalton.
ACM Dalton makes three main claims and admissions.
1. The “positively dangerous” status of the software was well known at the time. That being so, perhaps MoD would care to say what corrective action was taken and why, given this was safety critical software, was it not corrected before the Assistant Chief of Air Staff signed the Release to Service in November 1993 ? Such failures in the MoD’s safety management system have been noted before, most recently by Mr Charles Haddon-Cave, QC in his coruscating condemnation of MoD’s “systemic failings”.
2. That the above status was “factored into the operating instructions”. These instructions are, primarily, the Aircrew Manual (from which the aircrews derive their understanding of the aircraft) and the Flight reference Cards (used by the aircrews in flight to operate the aircraft). Successive inquiries, including the MoD’s own Board of Inquiry, heard irrefutable evidence of the immaturity of these documents. Indeed, the evidence of one Chinook Flight Commander at the time described them as “incomprehensible to aircrew operating the aircraft”. That is, they were not fit for purpose, a failing that endangered both aircrew and their passengers. Again, why did Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) sign the Release to Service (RTS) given such a fundamental breach of the airworthiness regulations?
3. That the “positively dangerous” software issue was discounted following the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) investigation. This is quite wrong. A simple search of the AAIB report shows no mention of “positively dangerous”, or even the word “software”. However, it does state, clearly, that the (fuel computer) “operating program” was “not altered from delivery”. That is, it remained in the “positively dangerous” state advised by MoD’s own experts at Boscombe Down. In fact, Boscombe Down’s opinion had hardened, as they grounded their own aircraft shortly before the crash.
We submit that the aircraft was demonstrably not airworthy. ACM Dalton’s letter, far from protecting the MoD’s position, actually admits they knew of the problems and adds weight to our submission. It is now time for the MoD to say why this decision was made – their own regulations demand such a record be kept. Who, we ask, would sign to say an aircraft was safe in the face of world-leading, expert advice that the fuel computer software implementation was “positively dangerous”?
And, perhaps more to the point, why would they do this before taking corrective action?
Finally, as ACM Graydon was the superior of Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS), was he aware of his signing the Release to Service / Air Force Department Release (RTS/AFDR) and why he (and Controller of Aircraft (CA)) disregarded the advice of Boscombe Down (A&AEE)?
Yours sincerely,
Captain Ralph KOHN FRAeS
Retired Airline pilot and Regulatory Authority inspector (Ret) - Compiler of the Macdonald report (April 2000)
Stoney Cross, Heathway, Camberley, Surrey, GU15 2EL Tel 01276 65642
and
Captain Ron MACDONALD FRAeS - Retired Air Canada pilot &. Qualified aircraft accident investigator
Co-author of the Macdonald Report (April 2000),
Shepherd’s Cottage, The Lane, Thursley, Godalming, Surrey, GU8 6QB
Also
Richard K J HADLOW FRAeS - Retired RAF Squadron Leader & Support Helicopter squadron commander (with 20 years service) & Retired Airline pilot. - Co-author of the Macdonald Report (April 2000).
1, The Oaks, Westbury Road, Warminster, Wiltshire, BA12 0AN
7 Jan 2010 - To the Editor, The Times - Chinook revisited
We are pleased Air Chief Marshall Stephen Dalton chose to reply to the recent BBC coverage of the “positively dangerous” software implementation in the Chinook fuel computers in The Guardian, letters, 6th January 2010 and The Times (7 Jan 2010) as it gives us the opportunity to respond. This letter also replies to ACM Graydon’s letter to The Daily Telegraph (7 Jan 2010) and is complementary to our last letter to The Minister for Defence, as copied to ACM Dalton.
ACM Dalton makes three main claims and admissions.
1. The “positively dangerous” status of the software was well known at the time. That being so, perhaps MoD would care to say what corrective action was taken and why, given this was safety critical software, was it not corrected before the Assistant Chief of Air Staff signed the Release to Service in November 1993 ? Such failures in the MoD’s safety management system have been noted before, most recently by Mr Charles Haddon-Cave, QC in his coruscating condemnation of MoD’s “systemic failings”.
2. That the above status was “factored into the operating instructions”. These instructions are, primarily, the Aircrew Manual (from which the aircrews derive their understanding of the aircraft) and the Flight reference Cards (used by the aircrews in flight to operate the aircraft). Successive inquiries, including the MoD’s own Board of Inquiry, heard irrefutable evidence of the immaturity of these documents. Indeed, the evidence of one Chinook Flight Commander at the time described them as “incomprehensible to aircrew operating the aircraft”. That is, they were not fit for purpose, a failing that endangered both aircrew and their passengers. Again, why did Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) sign the Release to Service (RTS) given such a fundamental breach of the airworthiness regulations?
3. That the “positively dangerous” software issue was discounted following the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) investigation. This is quite wrong. A simple search of the AAIB report shows no mention of “positively dangerous”, or even the word “software”. However, it does state, clearly, that the (fuel computer) “operating program” was “not altered from delivery”. That is, it remained in the “positively dangerous” state advised by MoD’s own experts at Boscombe Down. In fact, Boscombe Down’s opinion had hardened, as they grounded their own aircraft shortly before the crash.
We submit that the aircraft was demonstrably not airworthy. ACM Dalton’s letter, far from protecting the MoD’s position, actually admits they knew of the problems and adds weight to our submission. It is now time for the MoD to say why this decision was made – their own regulations demand such a record be kept. Who, we ask, would sign to say an aircraft was safe in the face of world-leading, expert advice that the fuel computer software implementation was “positively dangerous”?
And, perhaps more to the point, why would they do this before taking corrective action?
Finally, as ACM Graydon was the superior of Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS), was he aware of his signing the Release to Service / Air Force Department Release (RTS/AFDR) and why he (and Controller of Aircraft (CA)) disregarded the advice of Boscombe Down (A&AEE)?
Yours sincerely,
Captain Ralph KOHN FRAeS
Retired Airline pilot and Regulatory Authority inspector (Ret) - Compiler of the Macdonald report (April 2000)
Stoney Cross, Heathway, Camberley, Surrey, GU15 2EL Tel 01276 65642
and
Captain Ron MACDONALD FRAeS - Retired Air Canada pilot &. Qualified aircraft accident investigator
Co-author of the Macdonald Report (April 2000),
Shepherd’s Cottage, The Lane, Thursley, Godalming, Surrey, GU8 6QB
Also
Richard K J HADLOW FRAeS - Retired RAF Squadron Leader & Support Helicopter squadron commander (with 20 years service) & Retired Airline pilot. - Co-author of the Macdonald Report (April 2000).
1, The Oaks, Westbury Road, Warminster, Wiltshire, BA12 0AN
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Graydon,
"This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded."
One hopes that Graydon is equally impressed by the independent and authoritative response, posted above. Graydon and his ilk kicked off the flurry of letters to the media, let us see if they are honourable enough to respond in kind to the views of the three fellows.
"This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded."
One hopes that Graydon is equally impressed by the independent and authoritative response, posted above. Graydon and his ilk kicked off the flurry of letters to the media, let us see if they are honourable enough to respond in kind to the views of the three fellows.
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New Look.?
"What does emerge from the Inquiry however, is that there is no evidence whatever of any combination of possible minor problems,"
NOT SO.........the combined errors in the superTANS guided them to the wrong place , and the RAD/ALT gave insufficient warning to take avoiding action ........
I agree with John Purdey and several others......they thought they were safely overflying the lighthouse and did not realise they were inland.....
NOT SO.........the combined errors in the superTANS guided them to the wrong place , and the RAD/ALT gave insufficient warning to take avoiding action ........
I agree with John Purdey and several others......they thought they were safely overflying the lighthouse and did not realise they were inland.....
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"What does emerge from the Inquiry however, is that there is no evidence whatever of any combination of possible minor problems,"
NOT SO.........the combined errors in the superTANS guided them to the wrong place , and the RAD/ALT gave insufficient warning to take avoiding action ........
I agree with John Purdey and several others......they thought they were safely overflying the lighthouse and did not realise they were inland.....
NOT SO.........the combined errors in the superTANS guided them to the wrong place , and the RAD/ALT gave insufficient warning to take avoiding action ........
I agree with John Purdey and several others......they thought they were safely overflying the lighthouse and did not realise they were inland.....
Should that not read
" I agree with John Purdey and several others......I think they thought they were safely overflying the lighthouse and did not realise they were inland....."
Makes a bit more sense like that as with no adr or cvr no one actually knows what occured
BOAC - good move! I presume you know that Capt Ralph Kohn is one of the most highly knowledgeable people in the world of aviation that there is? He signs his letter with characteristic modesty - he is far, far more than a 'Retired Airline pilot and Regulatory Authority inspector (Ret)'.
I sincerely hope that his letter will be published AND that Today will contact him.
I sincerely hope that his letter will be published AND that Today will contact him.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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I felt the opportunity to put such a powerful critique in the public domain was not to be missed. I guess it all depends on 'other news' and any other 'pressures'?
By their actions ye shall know them...
Just finished watching yet again that film, you know: "Don't you yell at me Mr Warwick!", on Film4. I could not but dwell upon the contrast with the RAF High Command then and the awe in which they forever will be held, and their successors today who put their names to the disingenuous letters published in the national press. It seems their slogan is "united we can never be defeated". We shall see. The Royal Air Force cries out for leadership and I am sure will eventually find it. So far it has taken Her Majesty's Coroners, a Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry, a House of Lords Committee and now three illustrious Fellows of the Royal Aeronautical Society to tell the present incumbents that they are greatly in error. We shall see if their arrogance might yet be swayed. In the meantime the baton passes to a most unlikely and often derided part of the RAF, the Provost Branch. They are charged with investigating matters arising from the Hadon-Cave Report. Will they take their cue from their seniors and emulate their peers by booking a ferry trip and disembark minus the evidence, or show themselves to be, above all, Good Coppers and follow that evidence wherever it takes them? Again, we shall see.
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You really are going to have to think about what they may have been doing near the Mull because if they had not been tasked to go there, the captain had already been irresponsible (to say the least) well before they got close – in the prevalent conditions, crossing the Antrim Hills was putting the passengers, etc at risk unnecessarily when there was a safer route already planned.
Had they bumped into Sleamish, it would have been more to be expected than the isolated low hill that the Mull of Kintyre was – the verdict would have been more acceptable to you, I suggest, in that case – and almost anyone else.
I have previously compared the two routes apparent from the waypoints stored and heading data and so briefly here again:
Route 1: Aldergrove across the low population countryside across the top of Lough Neagh to Curran (wpt H); thence on 028 mag all the way to the start of the Great Glen at Corran (wpt B), a close “handrail” along the clear shores of Islay/Jura – low and clear all the way with no high lumps to bump into;
Route 2 (which they had started on): Aldergrove to Mull (wpt A) across 10 miles of Antrim hills with bad weather on them (dist/time calcs have it that they very much had to have done this in a straight line of 027 – plot it on topo maps and boggle), towards Mull with bad local weather on it; thereafter, had it not been for the crash, I have it that they intended tracking roughly NW until rejoining 028 and then the rest as per route 1 – the “official” version and seemingly popular understanding is that they were then to have gone up the coast of the Mull which is very irregular (for what has been described as a fuel critical flight), with higher ground further north than the Mull itself, and with very bad weather along it (not to mention the fogged in Campbeltown airport whose approach they would have had to cross).
Ask yourself this: why would Flt Lt Tapper have chosen route 2 above if his task was only to get the passengers to Inverness?
If the choice of route was his and his alone, he would have had something to answer for even if they had not crashed – what was it about this sortie that, as he said to Lt K, he and his crew had been training intensively for?
Had they bumped into Sleamish, it would have been more to be expected than the isolated low hill that the Mull of Kintyre was – the verdict would have been more acceptable to you, I suggest, in that case – and almost anyone else.
I have previously compared the two routes apparent from the waypoints stored and heading data and so briefly here again:
Route 1: Aldergrove across the low population countryside across the top of Lough Neagh to Curran (wpt H); thence on 028 mag all the way to the start of the Great Glen at Corran (wpt B), a close “handrail” along the clear shores of Islay/Jura – low and clear all the way with no high lumps to bump into;
Route 2 (which they had started on): Aldergrove to Mull (wpt A) across 10 miles of Antrim hills with bad weather on them (dist/time calcs have it that they very much had to have done this in a straight line of 027 – plot it on topo maps and boggle), towards Mull with bad local weather on it; thereafter, had it not been for the crash, I have it that they intended tracking roughly NW until rejoining 028 and then the rest as per route 1 – the “official” version and seemingly popular understanding is that they were then to have gone up the coast of the Mull which is very irregular (for what has been described as a fuel critical flight), with higher ground further north than the Mull itself, and with very bad weather along it (not to mention the fogged in Campbeltown airport whose approach they would have had to cross).
Ask yourself this: why would Flt Lt Tapper have chosen route 2 above if his task was only to get the passengers to Inverness?
If the choice of route was his and his alone, he would have had something to answer for even if they had not crashed – what was it about this sortie that, as he said to Lt K, he and his crew had been training intensively for?
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Well done chaps.
What concerns me about the letters of Dalton and Graydon is that they were unequivocal. They gave themselves absolutely NO wiggle room. That is highly unusual.
An attempt to draw the line?
No politician would ever give an absolute no.
What is going on here? Were these letters inspired by MoD politicos or just hopeless personal efforts?
In my view, Dalton has shown himself to be extremely foolish to write to a newspaper in such a way. I and I guess many others, now see him through a very different light.
Excuse me for expanding the link, thought the letters deserved it;
Letters
More questions than answers on Chinook crash
The Guardian, Saturday 9 January 2010
In his reply to recent coverage of the "positively dangerous" software implementation in Chinook fuel computers (Letters, 6 January), Air Chief Marshal Stephen Dalton makes three main claims and admissions.
1. The "positively dangerous" status of the software was well known at the time. That being so, perhaps the MoD would say what corrective action was taken, and why it wasn't corrected before the assistant chief of air staff signed the release to service (RTS) in November 1993?
2. That the above status was "factored into the operating instructions". These instructions are, primarily, the aircrew manual and the flight reference cards. Successive inquiries, including the MoD's own board of inquiry, heard irrefutable evidence of the immaturity of these documents. Indeed, the evidence of one Chinook flight commander at the time described them as "incomprehensible to aircrew operating the aircraft". Again, why did assistant chief of the air staff sign the RTS, given such a fundamental breach of the airworthiness regulations?
3. That the software issue was discounted after the Air Accident Investigation Branch report. This is quite wrong. A search of the report shows no mention of "positively dangerous", or even the word "software". However, it does state that the (fuel computer) "operating program" was "not altered from delivery". That is, it remained in the "positively dangerous" state advised by the MoD's own experts at Boscombe Down.
ACM Dalton's letter, far from protecting the MoD's position, actually admits they knew of the problems and adds weight to our submission that the aircraft was demonstrably not airworthy. It is now time for the MoD to say why this decision was made. Who, we ask, would sign to say an aircraft was safe in the face of world-leading, expert advice that the fuel computer software implementation was "positively dangerous"? And why would they do this before taking corrective action?
Finally, as ACM Graydon was the superior of the assistant chief of the air staff, was he aware of his signing the RTS/air force department release (RTS/AFDR) and why he (and controller of aircraft) disregarded the advice of Boscombe Down?
Captain Ralph Kohn, Captain Ron Macdonald and Richard KJ Hadlow
Compiler and co-authors of the Macdonald Report (April 2000)
• What does Air Chief Marshal Dalton think constitutes the definition of "new evidence"? The evidence concerning the lack of airworthiness of the Chinook HC Mk2 in 1994 has never been discussed or addressed at any of the numerous official inquiries since the crash. These include the investigations carried out by the RAF's board of inquiry, the senior reviewing officers thereof, the Scottish sheriff's fatal accident inquiry, the public accounts committee and the House of Lords select committee. Surely this then merits the classification of the evidence as "new"?
The evidence unearthed by the BBC regarding the airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 clearly indicates that the aircraft should never have been given controller of aircraft release nor military release to service by the assistant chief of the air staff because the trials experts at RAF Boscombe Down expressly did not recommend such release. How is it that the senior individuals involved have never been questioned on their reasons for ignoring one of the world's foremost authorities on aircraft testing?
In sum, the aircraft should never have been allowed to carry the 25 passengers that day because it was officially, by definition, not guaranteed safe to fly such a sortie. I would argue that it is quite clear that this is, indeed, new evidence and very much undermines the assumption by the senior reviewing officers of "gross negligence" on the part of the pilots. Perhaps any negligence may have occurred long before ZD576 took off on the afternoon of 2 June 1994?
It is high time that this ludicrous verdict was overturned because it casts a stain on the reputations of the pilots, who have had no means of self-defence, and also on the reputation and standing of the services as a whole.
CT Seal
Squadron Leader RAF (Retired), Wiltshire
• The protestations of Air Chief Marshal Dalton about the correctness of the findings of the Chinook court of inquiry are quite untenable. The Chinook was unflyable under the existing operating procedures – indeed, Boscombe Down test pilots refused to fly it until they were modified – and to accuse both the very experienced pilots of being guilty of gross negligence at the same time is beyond the bounds of credence. The true culprits were the unnamed Northern Ireland officials who insisted, for their own reasons, that all 25 senior police, army and MI5 intelligence personnel travel together on the same dodgy helicopter known to have serious software flaws in its Fadec engine system. That this is a cover-up of monumental proportions to save the skins of these officials at the price of blaming two dedicated pilots who were doing their professional best under appalling conditions is nothing short of a crying scandal.
Tony Cheney
Ipswich, Suffolk
• Your article about the June 1994 Chinook accident is needlessly reticent (MoD knew of Chinook flaws before fatal crash, says father, 5 January). It is a matter of open record that the MoD was actually suing the contractors responsible for the engine control systems at the time of the crash. Similarly, a company evaluating the software for the system had given up their analysis having found over 500 "anomalies" after looking at less than 20% of the code. But ultimately all the technical questions are irrelevant. The rule is that you do not blame an accident on the aircrew unless there is clear evidence that they were at fault. As the original inquiry found, there was no evidence pointing to any particular cause. So the reputations of Flight Lieutenants Tapper and Cook should not have been destroyed.
Antony Waterman
Bristol
What concerns me about the letters of Dalton and Graydon is that they were unequivocal. They gave themselves absolutely NO wiggle room. That is highly unusual.
An attempt to draw the line?
No politician would ever give an absolute no.
What is going on here? Were these letters inspired by MoD politicos or just hopeless personal efforts?
In my view, Dalton has shown himself to be extremely foolish to write to a newspaper in such a way. I and I guess many others, now see him through a very different light.
Excuse me for expanding the link, thought the letters deserved it;
Letters
More questions than answers on Chinook crash
The Guardian, Saturday 9 January 2010
In his reply to recent coverage of the "positively dangerous" software implementation in Chinook fuel computers (Letters, 6 January), Air Chief Marshal Stephen Dalton makes three main claims and admissions.
1. The "positively dangerous" status of the software was well known at the time. That being so, perhaps the MoD would say what corrective action was taken, and why it wasn't corrected before the assistant chief of air staff signed the release to service (RTS) in November 1993?
2. That the above status was "factored into the operating instructions". These instructions are, primarily, the aircrew manual and the flight reference cards. Successive inquiries, including the MoD's own board of inquiry, heard irrefutable evidence of the immaturity of these documents. Indeed, the evidence of one Chinook flight commander at the time described them as "incomprehensible to aircrew operating the aircraft". Again, why did assistant chief of the air staff sign the RTS, given such a fundamental breach of the airworthiness regulations?
3. That the software issue was discounted after the Air Accident Investigation Branch report. This is quite wrong. A search of the report shows no mention of "positively dangerous", or even the word "software". However, it does state that the (fuel computer) "operating program" was "not altered from delivery". That is, it remained in the "positively dangerous" state advised by the MoD's own experts at Boscombe Down.
ACM Dalton's letter, far from protecting the MoD's position, actually admits they knew of the problems and adds weight to our submission that the aircraft was demonstrably not airworthy. It is now time for the MoD to say why this decision was made. Who, we ask, would sign to say an aircraft was safe in the face of world-leading, expert advice that the fuel computer software implementation was "positively dangerous"? And why would they do this before taking corrective action?
Finally, as ACM Graydon was the superior of the assistant chief of the air staff, was he aware of his signing the RTS/air force department release (RTS/AFDR) and why he (and controller of aircraft) disregarded the advice of Boscombe Down?
Captain Ralph Kohn, Captain Ron Macdonald and Richard KJ Hadlow
Compiler and co-authors of the Macdonald Report (April 2000)
• What does Air Chief Marshal Dalton think constitutes the definition of "new evidence"? The evidence concerning the lack of airworthiness of the Chinook HC Mk2 in 1994 has never been discussed or addressed at any of the numerous official inquiries since the crash. These include the investigations carried out by the RAF's board of inquiry, the senior reviewing officers thereof, the Scottish sheriff's fatal accident inquiry, the public accounts committee and the House of Lords select committee. Surely this then merits the classification of the evidence as "new"?
The evidence unearthed by the BBC regarding the airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 clearly indicates that the aircraft should never have been given controller of aircraft release nor military release to service by the assistant chief of the air staff because the trials experts at RAF Boscombe Down expressly did not recommend such release. How is it that the senior individuals involved have never been questioned on their reasons for ignoring one of the world's foremost authorities on aircraft testing?
In sum, the aircraft should never have been allowed to carry the 25 passengers that day because it was officially, by definition, not guaranteed safe to fly such a sortie. I would argue that it is quite clear that this is, indeed, new evidence and very much undermines the assumption by the senior reviewing officers of "gross negligence" on the part of the pilots. Perhaps any negligence may have occurred long before ZD576 took off on the afternoon of 2 June 1994?
It is high time that this ludicrous verdict was overturned because it casts a stain on the reputations of the pilots, who have had no means of self-defence, and also on the reputation and standing of the services as a whole.
CT Seal
Squadron Leader RAF (Retired), Wiltshire
• The protestations of Air Chief Marshal Dalton about the correctness of the findings of the Chinook court of inquiry are quite untenable. The Chinook was unflyable under the existing operating procedures – indeed, Boscombe Down test pilots refused to fly it until they were modified – and to accuse both the very experienced pilots of being guilty of gross negligence at the same time is beyond the bounds of credence. The true culprits were the unnamed Northern Ireland officials who insisted, for their own reasons, that all 25 senior police, army and MI5 intelligence personnel travel together on the same dodgy helicopter known to have serious software flaws in its Fadec engine system. That this is a cover-up of monumental proportions to save the skins of these officials at the price of blaming two dedicated pilots who were doing their professional best under appalling conditions is nothing short of a crying scandal.
Tony Cheney
Ipswich, Suffolk
• Your article about the June 1994 Chinook accident is needlessly reticent (MoD knew of Chinook flaws before fatal crash, says father, 5 January). It is a matter of open record that the MoD was actually suing the contractors responsible for the engine control systems at the time of the crash. Similarly, a company evaluating the software for the system had given up their analysis having found over 500 "anomalies" after looking at less than 20% of the code. But ultimately all the technical questions are irrelevant. The rule is that you do not blame an accident on the aircrew unless there is clear evidence that they were at fault. As the original inquiry found, there was no evidence pointing to any particular cause. So the reputations of Flight Lieutenants Tapper and Cook should not have been destroyed.
Antony Waterman
Bristol
Last edited by nigegilb; 9th Jan 2010 at 08:26.
Wwyvern:
As with so much with this saga, it's all been covered to exhaustion (well mine anyway) in this and preceding threads. I assume he is quoting the AM's Messrs Wratten and Day who, inter alia, contended that as they crashed in IMC and were thus infringing Visual Flight Rules, ipso facto they were Grossly Negligent. They then went further, back plotting the flight profile using a defective (the Mk2 was incapable of flying it) Boeing IT model. They then went further still and contended that the aircraft was already in IMC at the start of that unflyable profile. All contention and surmise and as the then SoS, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, points out all unacceptable as proof in a UK Court. That the aircraft was IMC when it crashed is beyond dispute I think. Why it was there and if it was still under control is what has fuelled this thread. Now that we know the type suffered from uncommanded power excursions from nil to full power, and jamming of flight controls in one, two or all three axis one might be tempted to offer ones own contention and surmise to answer those two questions.
In his letter to The Times, CAS refers to the crew breaking their operating rules. What were these rules?
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Chinook
Re the above I am trying to contact anybody who flew the above prior to the crash and anyone who knows when the joystick controls where changed.
Would be thankful for any information.
Would be thankful for any information.
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Changed in what way? Function modified, parts replaced by modified ones, old parts exchanged for exactly similar new parts. Are you asking about all Chinooks of all Marks or the specific aircraft which crashed on the Mull?