Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Olive
Believe the track change was even smaller - 14 deg IIRC and yes, the BOI said they were using 'Tac Steer' at the time of impact.
Flip
ps Does anyone have any idea where and when the 70 deg deflection of the rudders was first mentioned? TVM.
Believe the track change was even smaller - 14 deg IIRC and yes, the BOI said they were using 'Tac Steer' at the time of impact.
Flip
ps Does anyone have any idea where and when the 70 deg deflection of the rudders was first mentioned? TVM.
caz,
Day's first supposition confuses me - OK I'm easily confused.
He says that, having seen the high ground that "no reasonable pilot would have then flown straight on towards the rapidly rising high ground before intending to turn left along the line of the cliffs whilst remaining below the cloud base".
I really enjoy looking at the amazing photographs elsewhere on pprune which show military aircraft doing just that in the valleys of Wales and, in many cases, going very much faster than is possible in a Chinook. I always used to look forward to driving across Penrith on my frequent business trips to Scotland because there was a good chance of seeing a Jaguar or Tornado ripping through the valley, even in poor visibility. Incidentally, I don't recall seeing the two F15 pilots criticised for flying into a mountain in snow. There, they tried unsuccessfully to pin it on the poor RAF ATCO in a similar shoddy action. At least he was alive to defend himself.
Are all fast jet pilots who do this unreasonable? Why is there a distinction? Why is it unreasonable for a Chinook pilot to do it? Is it because they were carrying passengers? Why, especially, does it suddenly and uniquely become "grossly negligent"?
If it is because of the passengers, it would seem to me that airworthiness should have been much more of a factor before the flight. If the truth be known, and one day it will, I am sure this will become obvious, just like it has on the C130 and the Nimrod.
Incidentally, looking for the Wratten Pilot link I came across reminders of the concerns expressed by Fl Lt Tapper to his father about the state of the Mk 2 Chinook only days before the accident. It made me wonder how some concerns that I know about for other aircraft can be addressed to prevent the next accident.
Day's first supposition confuses me - OK I'm easily confused.
He says that, having seen the high ground that "no reasonable pilot would have then flown straight on towards the rapidly rising high ground before intending to turn left along the line of the cliffs whilst remaining below the cloud base".
I really enjoy looking at the amazing photographs elsewhere on pprune which show military aircraft doing just that in the valleys of Wales and, in many cases, going very much faster than is possible in a Chinook. I always used to look forward to driving across Penrith on my frequent business trips to Scotland because there was a good chance of seeing a Jaguar or Tornado ripping through the valley, even in poor visibility. Incidentally, I don't recall seeing the two F15 pilots criticised for flying into a mountain in snow. There, they tried unsuccessfully to pin it on the poor RAF ATCO in a similar shoddy action. At least he was alive to defend himself.
Are all fast jet pilots who do this unreasonable? Why is there a distinction? Why is it unreasonable for a Chinook pilot to do it? Is it because they were carrying passengers? Why, especially, does it suddenly and uniquely become "grossly negligent"?
If it is because of the passengers, it would seem to me that airworthiness should have been much more of a factor before the flight. If the truth be known, and one day it will, I am sure this will become obvious, just like it has on the C130 and the Nimrod.
Incidentally, looking for the Wratten Pilot link I came across reminders of the concerns expressed by Fl Lt Tapper to his father about the state of the Mk 2 Chinook only days before the accident. It made me wonder how some concerns that I know about for other aircraft can be addressed to prevent the next accident.
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Pulse 1
You got it in one!!
It was the Station Commander at RAF Odiham (as the first Reviewing Officer) who stated that Flt Lt Tapper, as the Aircraft Captain, had a Duty of Care towards his passengers and he had failed in that Duty. Chamber's Dictionary - "negligence" = "omission of duty,especially such care for the interests of others as the law may require."
AOC 1 Gp concurred and extended that finding to the Co-Pilot (the incoming Detatchment Commander). AOC in C STC and CAS concurred with that viewpoint.
There have been 4 other Chief's of the Air Staff since then and they concur with the views of the Reviewing Officers. Moreover, MRAF Lord Craig (the most Senior Officer still Serving) signalled his views in the speech he made in the House of Lords debate on the issue.
All you have to do is to assemble a selection of Aircrew Air Marshal's; whose total number of stars exceeds 33 (including at least two 5-star Aircrew Officers); to mount a legal challenge to overturn the finding.
PS
The fast jets you see low flying in Wales are NOT carrying the cream of the Intelligence and Counter Insurgency Experts in the fight against Terrorism.
I have done "low Flying" on Active service - authorised as "Not above 100 ft" - in VIP aircraft because it was necessary in the circumstances pertaining at the time.
There was no operational requirement for the crew of ZD 576 to be at that height, in that place and in that weather!!
You got it in one!!
It was the Station Commander at RAF Odiham (as the first Reviewing Officer) who stated that Flt Lt Tapper, as the Aircraft Captain, had a Duty of Care towards his passengers and he had failed in that Duty. Chamber's Dictionary - "negligence" = "omission of duty,especially such care for the interests of others as the law may require."
AOC 1 Gp concurred and extended that finding to the Co-Pilot (the incoming Detatchment Commander). AOC in C STC and CAS concurred with that viewpoint.
There have been 4 other Chief's of the Air Staff since then and they concur with the views of the Reviewing Officers. Moreover, MRAF Lord Craig (the most Senior Officer still Serving) signalled his views in the speech he made in the House of Lords debate on the issue.
All you have to do is to assemble a selection of Aircrew Air Marshal's; whose total number of stars exceeds 33 (including at least two 5-star Aircrew Officers); to mount a legal challenge to overturn the finding.
PS
The fast jets you see low flying in Wales are NOT carrying the cream of the Intelligence and Counter Insurgency Experts in the fight against Terrorism.
I have done "low Flying" on Active service - authorised as "Not above 100 ft" - in VIP aircraft because it was necessary in the circumstances pertaining at the time.
There was no operational requirement for the crew of ZD 576 to be at that height, in that place and in that weather!!
Last edited by cazatou; 30th May 2009 at 19:52.
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Vertico
Sorry about the delay. I'm not claiming that it was CFIT. The 'beyond doubt' was not about the cause but just of the weather at the crash site in response to an earlier post.
I am perplexed about the argument that says because you can't prove that something didn't happen, it may have done even if there's no evidence to suggest that it did. One for the philosophers.
Just one more point for the thread. The main argument throughout has been that since there is no absolute proof, the verdict cannot stand. Strange that the same standards don't seem to apply to the conduct of Messrs Day and Wratten upon whose heads it seems acceptable to heap any accusation and calumny and please, if the cap doesn't fit, don't wear it. Easy from the anonymity of the Internet.
Sorry about the delay. I'm not claiming that it was CFIT. The 'beyond doubt' was not about the cause but just of the weather at the crash site in response to an earlier post.
I am perplexed about the argument that says because you can't prove that something didn't happen, it may have done even if there's no evidence to suggest that it did. One for the philosophers.
Just one more point for the thread. The main argument throughout has been that since there is no absolute proof, the verdict cannot stand. Strange that the same standards don't seem to apply to the conduct of Messrs Day and Wratten upon whose heads it seems acceptable to heap any accusation and calumny and please, if the cap doesn't fit, don't wear it. Easy from the anonymity of the Internet.
caz,
Thanks I think I understand now. To fly at high speed close to high, visible ground with no passengers, but with a crew, is OK.
To fly close to high, visible ground with passengers is deemed "unreasonable" (by Day's supposition) or negligent (by various Senior Officers).
But now I'm confused again. Surely, some of these Senior Officers would have known that the Mk2 Chinook was not airworthy. At least one would have known that Tapper had requested a Mk1 for this reason, before the event.
And yet they insisted that this aircraft was used to carry those same passengers. One rule for them, another for the rest. Who does that remind you of?
Thanks I think I understand now. To fly at high speed close to high, visible ground with no passengers, but with a crew, is OK.
To fly close to high, visible ground with passengers is deemed "unreasonable" (by Day's supposition) or negligent (by various Senior Officers).
But now I'm confused again. Surely, some of these Senior Officers would have known that the Mk2 Chinook was not airworthy. At least one would have known that Tapper had requested a Mk1 for this reason, before the event.
And yet they insisted that this aircraft was used to carry those same passengers. One rule for them, another for the rest. Who does that remind you of?
Caz:
Your faith, nay absolute belief, in the infallibility of RAF Air Marshals is both predictable and depressing, Caz. To your trump card that:
I can only refer you to an answer that Ms. Mandy Rice Davies gave earlier. The RAF Higher Command has decided to close ranks and endorse the ROs' finding. So be it, they must look to their own conscience and reputations. What is at stake here is far greater than that. The self inflicted deconstruction of the RAF Flight Safety system, that you yourself served, has cost 24 lives that we know about so far, ie the Hercules and Nimrod tragedies. To those I suspect we shall soon be adding the 29 that died on Mull. I fear that there are many more that have been the subject of BoI's that, like this one, have failed to pinpoint the real accident cause, that of lack of airworthiness. All these accidents might well have been avoided if the MOD, as the UK Military Airworthiness Authority had not deliberately and systematically started in the early 90's to cease enforcing its own regulations. Like a ticking time bomb the effects took their time, but were both predictable and devastating. 33 stars? Just lumps of tin and certainly not worth the cost.
All you have to do is to assemble a selection of Aircrew Air Marshal's; whose total number of stars exceeds 33 (including at least two 5-star Aircrew Officers); to mount a legal challenge to overturn the finding
There have been 4 other Chief's of the Air Staff since then and they concur with the views of the Reviewing Officers.
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I always thought something really stank about this as this sort of decision never ever happens but if you consider how someone got his his 30 pieces of silver from this
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Day_(RAF_officer)
considering Mr Bliar went straight into bat for him.....................
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Day_(RAF_officer)
considering Mr Bliar went straight into bat for him.....................
Last edited by Seldomfitforpurpose; 31st May 2009 at 09:37. Reason: Biblical accuracy.
The fact that most, if not all, the senior posts mentioned are "political postings" (characterised by the ability to forget all previous training and make politically motivated decisions) merely serves to highlight one of the main features of this saga - the political imperative to introduce Chinook Mk2 and be seen to use it.
Regardless of the demonstrable fact it was not airworthy.
That fact makes for a rather impressive list of Stars who are complicit in this failure of Duty of Care, amounting to Gross Negligence.
Regardless of the demonstrable fact it was not airworthy.
That fact makes for a rather impressive list of Stars who are complicit in this failure of Duty of Care, amounting to Gross Negligence.
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Chugalug 2
You are, of course, entitled to your opinion.
My viewpoint is based on the evidence contained in the BOI which showed a blatent disregard for the Orders and Instructions which governed the operation of Support Helicopters.
Perhaps you could give us your opinion as to why emergency power was not pulled in an attempt to maximise the rate of climb; and why no attempt was made to yaw the aircraft away from danger until the last 4 seconds?
While you are about it, could you also explain how it is that the versions of events given to the BOI and those postulated on this thread are totally different?
You are, of course, entitled to your opinion.
My viewpoint is based on the evidence contained in the BOI which showed a blatent disregard for the Orders and Instructions which governed the operation of Support Helicopters.
Perhaps you could give us your opinion as to why emergency power was not pulled in an attempt to maximise the rate of climb; and why no attempt was made to yaw the aircraft away from danger until the last 4 seconds?
While you are about it, could you also explain how it is that the versions of events given to the BOI and those postulated on this thread are totally different?
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Caz,
Your logic never fails to amaze me.
There were serious concerns about airworthiness at the time of the accident.
If the blame is removed from the pilots it has to be moved far higher up the food chain. Almost certainly to Air Rank.
For the "Band of Brothers", voting to reverse the verdict on the pilots would be akin to turkeys voting for Christmas or MPs voting to scrap "self regulation" for expenses.
Because of the self interest here, the opinion of the Senior Officers has considerably less weight than yours or mine.
Your logic never fails to amaze me.
There were serious concerns about airworthiness at the time of the accident.
If the blame is removed from the pilots it has to be moved far higher up the food chain. Almost certainly to Air Rank.
For the "Band of Brothers", voting to reverse the verdict on the pilots would be akin to turkeys voting for Christmas or MPs voting to scrap "self regulation" for expenses.
Because of the self interest here, the opinion of the Senior Officers has considerably less weight than yours or mine.
Just a numbered other
Caz:
Pray tell how they were expected to carry out the mission any other way, once having been refused a Mk1.
They had no icing clearence to continue at medium level, the weather was suitable off the coast for Low level transit.
Why they wound up at the point of impact cannot be positively determined.
There was no operational requirement for the crew of ZD 576 to be at that height, in that place and in that weather!!
They had no icing clearence to continue at medium level, the weather was suitable off the coast for Low level transit.
Why they wound up at the point of impact cannot be positively determined.
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Ark Royal
Hope you are well.
From the BOI - the bits nobody seems to have read.
Para 16e
"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre"
Para 32c
" In the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."
Para 45b
"The Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."
Para 51
"The Board assessed that the possibility of the crew visually acquiring the lighthouse was remote, given the fact that it was in fog at the time.
Furthermore, any visual contact with the Mull or Lighthouse in the prevailing weather conditions should have prompted a reduction in height and speed well below those at impact."
Hope you are well.
From the BOI - the bits nobody seems to have read.
Para 16e
"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre"
Para 32c
" In the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre."
Para 45b
"The Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."
Para 51
"The Board assessed that the possibility of the crew visually acquiring the lighthouse was remote, given the fact that it was in fog at the time.
Furthermore, any visual contact with the Mull or Lighthouse in the prevailing weather conditions should have prompted a reduction in height and speed well below those at impact."
Caz, the problem about quoting chunks of the BoI to me or Arkroyal or anyone is that they are now tarred with the same brush that your 33 glittering stars are. They were all part of an organisation that had airworthiness issues (to put it at its mildest) with the brand new Chinook Mk2 yet pushed the aircraft into a premature though admittedly restricted RTS over the voluble protests of BD, who in normal circumstances would have been expected to have given the green light only after all such issues had been addressed and resolved. Yet the BoI brushed those issues aside and ignored the elephant in the room on the dubious basis that there was no positive evidence that such issues had been a factor in this accident. This in the absence of CVR or ADR and the one man who had more personal experience of the unpredictable and dangerous nature of that particular gen. elephantos, the RAF Odiham Test Pilot. Basic stuff that the AAIB Inspector could have reminded them of, ie the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence would have helped, but the cosy incestuous procedures of RAF BoI's protects them from such unwelcome inputs. He could only attend to those matters that the BoI wished and simply answer the questions that they put. It is as if my only inputs into this thread would be answering your never ending questions, caz. I suspect that the thorny issue of breakfast would be as far as we would have got, satisfactory for you perhaps but not for me. This accident has raised fundamental issues regarding the MOD and the RAF. The record of both organisations with respect to accident prevention and investigation has been shown to be woeful. Both need to be divested of those responsibilities forthwith to a seperate MAA and MAAIB as with civilian aviation.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 31st May 2009 at 16:12.
I wonder how many of Caz's glittering stars have received Salmon letters.
Caz, I must say that your blind loyalty to the BOI and your ex masters is quite touching, especially as their world seems to be crashing down before the sword of truth wielded by Haddon Cave.
Caz, I must say that your blind loyalty to the BOI and your ex masters is quite touching, especially as their world seems to be crashing down before the sword of truth wielded by Haddon Cave.
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Cazatou,
My 4539. Lord Craig, Day or Burke. Who was the only true "expert witness"?
Whose evidence did the HOL chose to accept?
Straightforward questions, straightforward answers please.
My 4539. Lord Craig, Day or Burke. Who was the only true "expert witness"?
Whose evidence did the HOL chose to accept?
Straightforward questions, straightforward answers please.
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dalek
According to my dictionary an "expert witness" is one who is a "specialist or professional witness".
Now, if I recall correctly, I first met Sir John Day when he was a Flt Lt Student at the School of Refresher Flying at RAF Manby (where I was instructing) in 1971 - he was accompanied on his Course by a Flt Lt Steve George. As I understood it the two of them had served together in the Far East. They were there (as I recall) to do a fixed wing refresher prior to going to CFS.
Sir John and I met in passing a couple of times over the years (I believe I flew him at least once when I was on 32 Sqn) and he remembered me when I was posted to HQ 1 Gp.
Now, how many years Service did Sqn Ldr Burke have in the "front line" in 1994? Had he operated Piston Engined Helicopters into Jungle Clearings to extract troops under fire? Had he commanded a Flight, a Squadron or a Station?
Who gave him the authority to decide, by himself - without consultation, if a particular type of helicopter was "Fit for Service"?
Let us face facts, his evidence was his opinion: it was not carved in tablets of marble delivered from on high. Unfortunately his "opinion" is "manna from heaven" for the conspiracy theorists like yourself.
PS Which evidence was correct - was it true that Flt Lt's Tapper & Cook preferred to operate on a "day on- day off" basis which is why they did both tasks. Or was it that the "other crew" pleaded with them to do the VIP task because of the weather?
According to my dictionary an "expert witness" is one who is a "specialist or professional witness".
Now, if I recall correctly, I first met Sir John Day when he was a Flt Lt Student at the School of Refresher Flying at RAF Manby (where I was instructing) in 1971 - he was accompanied on his Course by a Flt Lt Steve George. As I understood it the two of them had served together in the Far East. They were there (as I recall) to do a fixed wing refresher prior to going to CFS.
Sir John and I met in passing a couple of times over the years (I believe I flew him at least once when I was on 32 Sqn) and he remembered me when I was posted to HQ 1 Gp.
Now, how many years Service did Sqn Ldr Burke have in the "front line" in 1994? Had he operated Piston Engined Helicopters into Jungle Clearings to extract troops under fire? Had he commanded a Flight, a Squadron or a Station?
Who gave him the authority to decide, by himself - without consultation, if a particular type of helicopter was "Fit for Service"?
Let us face facts, his evidence was his opinion: it was not carved in tablets of marble delivered from on high. Unfortunately his "opinion" is "manna from heaven" for the conspiracy theorists like yourself.
PS Which evidence was correct - was it true that Flt Lt's Tapper & Cook preferred to operate on a "day on- day off" basis which is why they did both tasks. Or was it that the "other crew" pleaded with them to do the VIP task because of the weather?
Caz, can we all agree that you knew lots of very important people and one of those very important people was ACM Sir John Day? Unfortunately what the BoI was in urgent need of was not very important people but evidence pertaining to the airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 both generically and of course the one whose accident was being investigated in particular. Are you seriously suggesting that the AOC-in-C was better qualified for that task than Sqn Ldr Burke whose daily duty was to test fly them following servicing before they could be tasked? Are you also suggesting that he did that purely off his own bat, without authority? A builder friend of mine has a phrase that fits the bill quite well: "You're having a laugh, aint 'cher?"
But Caz, it wasn't his opinion on the serviceability of the Chinook which is the main issue here. It is the information which he imparted to the HoL which had not been available to the BOI.
I remind you:
"He also spoke to problems with the multi-point connectors which went from the engines into the DECU. These were of bad design and liable to be displaced by vibration which then produced a power interruption. Although there was a back-up system this did not always work and on two or three occasions pilots had lost control of the engine condition lever. As a result squadrons introduced a procedure whereby crewmen every quarter of an hour checked that the connections had not been displaced in flight (QQ 677-9)."
Everything except his comment on the quality of the connector design are not based on opinion. They are either true or not.
And please tell me how being able to fly a piston engine helicopter into a jungle clearing qualifies you to know anything about the performance of electrical connectors. tucumseh is not a pilot and he understands it very well. I have never even been in a helicopter and I also understand it very well.
So, tell me, honestly if you can:
If you were about to depart on one of your VIP flights, or even any flight in any aeroplane, and you were handed an instruction to check a vital connector every 15 minutes. Would you take that flight knowing that a connection failure could mean loss of engine control? As I have said before, I have yet to find any pilot who has said yes.
Strangely, I just had a phone call from a friend of my sister who has many, many hours on Lightnings. I took this opportunity to read out this post to him and asked him the same question. He gave an emphatic NO.
I remind you:
"He also spoke to problems with the multi-point connectors which went from the engines into the DECU. These were of bad design and liable to be displaced by vibration which then produced a power interruption. Although there was a back-up system this did not always work and on two or three occasions pilots had lost control of the engine condition lever. As a result squadrons introduced a procedure whereby crewmen every quarter of an hour checked that the connections had not been displaced in flight (QQ 677-9)."
Everything except his comment on the quality of the connector design are not based on opinion. They are either true or not.
And please tell me how being able to fly a piston engine helicopter into a jungle clearing qualifies you to know anything about the performance of electrical connectors. tucumseh is not a pilot and he understands it very well. I have never even been in a helicopter and I also understand it very well.
So, tell me, honestly if you can:
If you were about to depart on one of your VIP flights, or even any flight in any aeroplane, and you were handed an instruction to check a vital connector every 15 minutes. Would you take that flight knowing that a connection failure could mean loss of engine control? As I have said before, I have yet to find any pilot who has said yes.
Strangely, I just had a phone call from a friend of my sister who has many, many hours on Lightnings. I took this opportunity to read out this post to him and asked him the same question. He gave an emphatic NO.