Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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If a RN pilot goes Chinook, he already is experienced in his own service. If he is an aircraft captain, he will be qualified to do the job. I flew government ministers as a young pilot.
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Shy Torque,
"What input did GFSO have before the accident?"
I was not there at that time but it would have been minimal because of the workload of the other 13(?) BOI's in progress at that time + some Unit Inquiries.
SFFP
GFSO was a Tornado Pilot - what have they to do with Catering?
Jayteeto
As a Flight Instructor/ Training Captain/ IRE on 32 Sqn for many years I can assure you that your statement is wishful thinking and not borne out by my experience.
"What input did GFSO have before the accident?"
I was not there at that time but it would have been minimal because of the workload of the other 13(?) BOI's in progress at that time + some Unit Inquiries.
SFFP
GFSO was a Tornado Pilot - what have they to do with Catering?
Jayteeto
As a Flight Instructor/ Training Captain/ IRE on 32 Sqn for many years I can assure you that your statement is wishful thinking and not borne out by my experience.
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Caz,
Can you please stop throwing your teddies out of the pram? Amusing though it is, it doesn't do you any favours. That said, you are as entitled to your say along with the rest of us, its just that I don't think you are seeing a bigger picture here.
Look, everyone has a different view about what was, or wasn't, important in the events leading up to the crash of ZD 576, whether they be about breakfast times, flight planning, poor weather, a crew-change, turning point choices, icing limitations, safety altitudes, a lack of HC1s because the HC2 is rushed into service with clear design and airworthiness issues, possible distractions in-flight, or unplanned LZs etc etc. However, I am sure that many, if not all, of the points we raise here had an influence on the pilots' operations that day. Sadly, the slices of cheese were too few and with too many holes. But as JT2 said, echoing the thoughts of many, many others (including the original BOI)
NO-ONE KNOWS FOR SURE.........FACT!
The ROs, by overturning this assessment, showed immoral, weak and subjective leadership because such a ruling was unsubstantiated by the facts, then or as now.
My lasting regret is that had the BOI uncovered the true state of affairs at Boscombe and MoD(PE) and why it was going downhill rapidly, then other more recent accidents involving design/airworthiness issues would almost certainly have been prevented.
Can you please stop throwing your teddies out of the pram? Amusing though it is, it doesn't do you any favours. That said, you are as entitled to your say along with the rest of us, its just that I don't think you are seeing a bigger picture here.
Look, everyone has a different view about what was, or wasn't, important in the events leading up to the crash of ZD 576, whether they be about breakfast times, flight planning, poor weather, a crew-change, turning point choices, icing limitations, safety altitudes, a lack of HC1s because the HC2 is rushed into service with clear design and airworthiness issues, possible distractions in-flight, or unplanned LZs etc etc. However, I am sure that many, if not all, of the points we raise here had an influence on the pilots' operations that day. Sadly, the slices of cheese were too few and with too many holes. But as JT2 said, echoing the thoughts of many, many others (including the original BOI)
NO-ONE KNOWS FOR SURE.........FACT!
The ROs, by overturning this assessment, showed immoral, weak and subjective leadership because such a ruling was unsubstantiated by the facts, then or as now.
My lasting regret is that had the BOI uncovered the true state of affairs at Boscombe and MoD(PE) and why it was going downhill rapidly, then other more recent accidents involving design/airworthiness issues would almost certainly have been prevented.
flipster:
That just about sums up this can of worms for me as well flip, and the common denominator here is Gross Negligence in my view, not of the two deceased pilots but of the MOD. A botched RTS followed by a botched BOI. Both of these functions need to be in much much safer hands, independent of the politicians and Air Marshals that presided over this and other such tragedies.
a lack of HC1s because the HC2 is rushed into service with clear design and airworthiness issues....My lasting regret is that had the BOI uncovered the true state of affairs at Boscombe and MoD(PE) and why it was going downhill rapidly, then other more recent accidents involving design/airworthiness issues would almost certainly have been prevented.
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flipster,
No teddies, just a certain irritation in respect of an ALM contributor who feels that he is the sole repository of experience in operating with Special Forces such as the "Hooligans from Hereford". Some of us were doing that 40 years ago in a slightly different "sandpit" from the one in use today. IIRC, Sir John Day was operating around that time with the Gurkhas (and some Hooligans) in the jungles of the Far East.
You may have noticed that no-one has attempted to answer the question as to how the BOI was able to state that Flt Lts Tapper and Cook flew the fatal sortie because "Detatchment crews preferred to operate on a day on/ day off rota" when all the "evidence" posted on this thread suggests that Flt Lts Tapper and Cook took over the task from Lt K and Flt Lt T because the weather forecast was such that it was unsuitable for someone with the limited experience on type of Lt K operating as the sole Pilot.
I was not there so I do not know which version of events is correct; what I do know is that they cannot BOTH be correct. The corollary is, of course, that if the version aired on this thread is correct; some people gave perjured evidence to the BOI.
No teddies, just a certain irritation in respect of an ALM contributor who feels that he is the sole repository of experience in operating with Special Forces such as the "Hooligans from Hereford". Some of us were doing that 40 years ago in a slightly different "sandpit" from the one in use today. IIRC, Sir John Day was operating around that time with the Gurkhas (and some Hooligans) in the jungles of the Far East.
You may have noticed that no-one has attempted to answer the question as to how the BOI was able to state that Flt Lts Tapper and Cook flew the fatal sortie because "Detatchment crews preferred to operate on a day on/ day off rota" when all the "evidence" posted on this thread suggests that Flt Lts Tapper and Cook took over the task from Lt K and Flt Lt T because the weather forecast was such that it was unsuitable for someone with the limited experience on type of Lt K operating as the sole Pilot.
I was not there so I do not know which version of events is correct; what I do know is that they cannot BOTH be correct. The corollary is, of course, that if the version aired on this thread is correct; some people gave perjured evidence to the BOI.
Last edited by cazatou; 13th May 2009 at 18:34.
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Sir John Day was operating around that time with the Gurkha's
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cazatou
Quote:
I was not there so I do not know which version of events is correct; what I do know is that they cannot BOTH be correct. The corollary is, of course, that if the version aired on this thread is correct; some people gave perjured evidence to the BOI.
With the greatest respect, sir, both can indeed be correct.
Evidence to BOI: Normal practice was for crews to do day on/day off
This thread: Because of deteriorating weather (could have been for a host of other reasons, too) less experienced single RN pilot was replaced by crew of two highly experienced RAF pilots.
Where is the inconsistency in that? Suggest you promptly withdraw your holier-than-thou allegation of perjury - and soon, before you find yourself being sued for libel by whoever it was gave that testimony to the BOI.
Finally, please don't lose sight of the sole purpose of this thread - to right a gross injustice.
I was not there so I do not know which version of events is correct; what I do know is that they cannot BOTH be correct. The corollary is, of course, that if the version aired on this thread is correct; some people gave perjured evidence to the BOI.
With the greatest respect, sir, both can indeed be correct.
Evidence to BOI: Normal practice was for crews to do day on/day off
This thread: Because of deteriorating weather (could have been for a host of other reasons, too) less experienced single RN pilot was replaced by crew of two highly experienced RAF pilots.
Where is the inconsistency in that? Suggest you promptly withdraw your holier-than-thou allegation of perjury - and soon, before you find yourself being sued for libel by whoever it was gave that testimony to the BOI.
Finally, please don't lose sight of the sole purpose of this thread - to right a gross injustice.
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Caz,
I have never been SF but I do listen to, respect and invariably believe facts from those who have been
Now imagine how you could have saved yourself from looking oh so silly a little while back if only you had believed a couple of folk who gave you chapter and verse on in flight catering
I have never been SF but I do listen to, respect and invariably believe facts from those who have been
Now imagine how you could have saved yourself from looking oh so silly a little while back if only you had believed a couple of folk who gave you chapter and verse on in flight catering
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SFFP
So you have never been on SF.
That explains a lot!!!
Well, as I understood it - and with the exercises we did in the Middle East and Europe - my War role in the 60's was to operate with the "Hooligans from Shhh-you know where".
I even met some of them (unexpectedly) when they were "deployed" some years later. I got a nice "thank you" from the CSM after their deployment was over. I obeyed rule 1 - you never acknowledge them!!
But then you knew that, didn't you?
So you have never been on SF.
That explains a lot!!!
Well, as I understood it - and with the exercises we did in the Middle East and Europe - my War role in the 60's was to operate with the "Hooligans from Shhh-you know where".
I even met some of them (unexpectedly) when they were "deployed" some years later. I got a nice "thank you" from the CSM after their deployment was over. I obeyed rule 1 - you never acknowledge them!!
But then you knew that, didn't you?
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This thread does seem to wander about a bit but can I ask what the problem would be in using an "inexperienced" RN pilot on a low level flight over the sea? Surely he would have some relevant experience.
DL
DL
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Instead of constructive comment, sarcastic remarks and obfuscation are the norm here.
I thought some of Cazatou's points were relevant - let me try and rephrase them:
What the hell was the captain doing while his crew were having their meal (that was usually taken together?)?:
If the expected, routine rostering had not been the case, what was the reason actually given for the crew change? (I would assume that someone on the ground knew/made the decision.) and was this reason made clear at the BOI?
As for my theory being wacky, does anyone have anything better that fits all that is known?
I thought some of Cazatou's points were relevant - let me try and rephrase them:
What the hell was the captain doing while his crew were having their meal (that was usually taken together?)?:
If the expected, routine rostering had not been the case, what was the reason actually given for the crew change? (I would assume that someone on the ground knew/made the decision.) and was this reason made clear at the BOI?
As for my theory being wacky, does anyone have anything better that fits all that is known?
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SFFP
My 31 years, 1 month and 20 days Service is a matter of record.
Yours is, of course (and rightly) , subject to security restrictions. Feel free to investigate my record and I will sign any disclosure form that you will require.
Pity we don't have AQM's like Don Hayward any more.
My 31 years, 1 month and 20 days Service is a matter of record.
Yours is, of course (and rightly) , subject to security restrictions. Feel free to investigate my record and I will sign any disclosure form that you will require.
Pity we don't have AQM's like Don Hayward any more.
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ALERT, ALERT Thread drift ALERT
(including the catering which, I'm sorry to say Caz, is a large red-herring ---ahem!)
Walter - your theory IS whacky but you are perfectly entitled to it. However, I do not believe that any crew would have attempted an unplanned/unauthorised LZ in poor weather - especially as their time was tight. But like everything we discuss, it cannot be proven one way or t'other......FACT! Which is why the burden of proof to the level of 'no doubt whatsoever' has not been, nor cannot ever be, met.
(including the catering which, I'm sorry to say Caz, is a large red-herring ---ahem!)
Walter - your theory IS whacky but you are perfectly entitled to it. However, I do not believe that any crew would have attempted an unplanned/unauthorised LZ in poor weather - especially as their time was tight. But like everything we discuss, it cannot be proven one way or t'other......FACT! Which is why the burden of proof to the level of 'no doubt whatsoever' has not been, nor cannot ever be, met.
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Flipster
We do not know that any such activity was unplanned indeed, it would have had to have been in my scenario what we do know is that the usual planning and outbrief that would have been expected for a simple ferry flight was not the case here, was it? Perhaps there was an opportunity for the captain to have been attending such a planning meeting before the flight why don't we try and detail the known movements and activities of the crew for the day leading up to the departure? Who else was in the Ops area that day whose presence may have been somehow unusual?
The weather was ideal for a demo of the system (I proposed) to have been demonstrated.
Timewise, it would have been an insignificant addition to the overall journey and it had a real benefit a touch and go, however brief, outside the operational area got them off the limitation on duty hours they would not have exceeded the duty hours by the time they had got to the Mull (even as far as Campbeltown) and the subsequent journey would have been outside the op area the CO of Aldergrove made this point very clearly at the FAI the duty hours limitation did not apply to flights outside the operational area.
That they were doing something extraordinary can indeed be proved the proof is in the procedures and actions they took it just takes people with relevant experience and authority to recognise them and advise the interested parties accordingly I am talking about, for starters: the callsign and radio call that suggested an exercise; the line up to a known LZ with altimeters set for a landing there; their slowing down.
Regarding the mantra of ... the burden of proof to the level of 'no doubt whatsoever' has not been, nor cannot ever be, met. - if the establishment set them up as patsys you are not going to change their mind as long as it suits their objectives of course there is never going to be proof of their negligence if they were not negligent you have to try and establish how this a/c was crashed.
A crash of this a/c type in such circumstances is a rare event indeed and it just happened to occur when the whole anti-terrorist team for NI was packed on board who represented an obstacle to the peace process how bloody convenient.
We do not know that any such activity was unplanned indeed, it would have had to have been in my scenario what we do know is that the usual planning and outbrief that would have been expected for a simple ferry flight was not the case here, was it? Perhaps there was an opportunity for the captain to have been attending such a planning meeting before the flight why don't we try and detail the known movements and activities of the crew for the day leading up to the departure? Who else was in the Ops area that day whose presence may have been somehow unusual?
The weather was ideal for a demo of the system (I proposed) to have been demonstrated.
Timewise, it would have been an insignificant addition to the overall journey and it had a real benefit a touch and go, however brief, outside the operational area got them off the limitation on duty hours they would not have exceeded the duty hours by the time they had got to the Mull (even as far as Campbeltown) and the subsequent journey would have been outside the op area the CO of Aldergrove made this point very clearly at the FAI the duty hours limitation did not apply to flights outside the operational area.
That they were doing something extraordinary can indeed be proved the proof is in the procedures and actions they took it just takes people with relevant experience and authority to recognise them and advise the interested parties accordingly I am talking about, for starters: the callsign and radio call that suggested an exercise; the line up to a known LZ with altimeters set for a landing there; their slowing down.
Regarding the mantra of ... the burden of proof to the level of 'no doubt whatsoever' has not been, nor cannot ever be, met. - if the establishment set them up as patsys you are not going to change their mind as long as it suits their objectives of course there is never going to be proof of their negligence if they were not negligent you have to try and establish how this a/c was crashed.
A crash of this a/c type in such circumstances is a rare event indeed and it just happened to occur when the whole anti-terrorist team for NI was packed on board who represented an obstacle to the peace process how bloody convenient.
Olive Oil
I'm no pilot, but does this answer your question?
I'm no pilot, but does this answer your question?
The Board, determined from this information that, in the forecast conditions, the Chinook HC2 icing clearance would most likely have precluded flight in IMG above safety altitude over the Hiqhlands of Scotland, and that Fit Lt TAPPER'S decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct.
I agree it is important to stick to known facts and be consistent.
I therefore twitch violently when the BoI report notes that ZD576 was a Mk1 converted to Mk2, having flown only 57 hours since delivery, but did not mention the long list of technical problems in that period which, conservatively speaking, gave the aircraft an MTBF of not-a-lot. And thats just on safety critical items.
And then, in complete contrast, Minister (AF) claimed in 2005 (to an MP, in writing) that Mk2 Chinooks were new, as of November 1993, so could not have suffered from any legacy problems such as Mk1 defects or documentation not being corrected or maintained. His letter specifically refers to ZD576, stating problems with any other RAF Chinook are irrelevant, which rather negates the concept of fault reporting and trend failures a bit of a giveaway that his staffs were completely out of touch with the obligations placed upon them by JSP553, Ch. 5.
As someone said earlier, both statements cant be right, but I guess its important to twist the facts to fit the political imperative.
I therefore twitch violently when the BoI report notes that ZD576 was a Mk1 converted to Mk2, having flown only 57 hours since delivery, but did not mention the long list of technical problems in that period which, conservatively speaking, gave the aircraft an MTBF of not-a-lot. And thats just on safety critical items.
And then, in complete contrast, Minister (AF) claimed in 2005 (to an MP, in writing) that Mk2 Chinooks were new, as of November 1993, so could not have suffered from any legacy problems such as Mk1 defects or documentation not being corrected or maintained. His letter specifically refers to ZD576, stating problems with any other RAF Chinook are irrelevant, which rather negates the concept of fault reporting and trend failures a bit of a giveaway that his staffs were completely out of touch with the obligations placed upon them by JSP553, Ch. 5.
As someone said earlier, both statements cant be right, but I guess its important to twist the facts to fit the political imperative.
Olive Oil:
Ah, if only that stricture had been observed by the Messrs. Wratten and Day! A great deal of angst since could then have been avoided.
Answers only please, no speculation.