Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Walter .. the whole of your diatribe above is pointless in the context of this thread.
It is not necessary to show any reasoning as to why/what/where or any other of your fantasies.
The Pilots can and must be cleared of blame (as you put it) for one simple reason - and simplicity seems to be lost by many folks - and I capitalise this on purpose.
THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.
Therefore the Pilots cannot be blamed because NO ONE KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED
Simple. End of.
.....that surely clears the pilots of blame
The Pilots can and must be cleared of blame (as you put it) for one simple reason - and simplicity seems to be lost by many folks - and I capitalise this on purpose.
THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.
Therefore the Pilots cannot be blamed because NO ONE KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED
Simple. End of.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
WK,
You have yet again failed to spot some of the best advice that the various experts in here have to offer, namely, in this instance the venerable John Blakeley who offers this absolute pearl........and I suspect this sadly will also be ignored
" Like everyone else you are entitled to your views, but, for example, I suggest that you could start a new thread which would allow you and others to expound your theories without detracting from the purpose of this thread which I believe still has one simple factual based objective - to clear the pilots of the unjust and unjustified charge of gross negligence. Your ideas, in the absence of proof, do not help this objective in any way."
I for one, as would many others I believe love the opportunity to debate your theory in another thread whilst leaving this thread for it's one and only fairly explicit intention, so why not man up and accept JB's challenge.
Come on man start a new thread and lets thrash this out elsewhere
You have yet again failed to spot some of the best advice that the various experts in here have to offer, namely, in this instance the venerable John Blakeley who offers this absolute pearl........and I suspect this sadly will also be ignored
" Like everyone else you are entitled to your views, but, for example, I suggest that you could start a new thread which would allow you and others to expound your theories without detracting from the purpose of this thread which I believe still has one simple factual based objective - to clear the pilots of the unjust and unjustified charge of gross negligence. Your ideas, in the absence of proof, do not help this objective in any way."
I for one, as would many others I believe love the opportunity to debate your theory in another thread whilst leaving this thread for it's one and only fairly explicit intention, so why not man up and accept JB's challenge.
Come on man start a new thread and lets thrash this out elsewhere
Last edited by Seldomfitforpurpose; 16th May 2008 at 11:06.
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: BATH
Posts: 375
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chinook
OmegaV6. My goodness, how this thread has strayed! Meanwhile, you say that 'there is no proof of wrong doing' ie by the crew. I thought it had been established that they were below their Safety Altitude in IMC conditions. Is that not crew error? JP
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It could be crew error, Mr Purdey, but we can't say that it was with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, as per the requirements of the Regulations and laws in place at the time.
Hopefully we are now sufficiently back on topic for you.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Hopefully we are now sufficiently back on topic for you.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
OmegaV6
Pls refer post #3463 – still don’t give a damn?
Not worth contemplating that deliberate turn that got them into trouble?
Can you not see the implications of the course setting matching the a/c track on that last leg?
Let me describe a very simple process:
Let us say you have a nav mode selected that is giving you a bearing on your #1 pointer on your HSI;
If at some point you want to go straight to it you turn your course selector knob until your course pointer is pointing at the #1 bearing pointer – while you turn in that direction;
If you have done this quickly enough, the CDI will not be much displaced from the centre of line of the course pointer;
A little bit of manoeuvring so your CDI is in line with your course pointer and you are going straight for that waypoint or ground navaid.
.
How does this fit with what is known about this crash?
They had been going along 027 mag for 40 miles with a valid waypoint (A) still directly ahead;
It would have been normal for the nhp to have had his HSI set up for this and the hp’s CDI slaved to this (and on such a long leg, the hp may also have had 027 set on his course selector);
At less than a mile from the crash site – with waypoint A still directly ahead – waypoint A is dumped on the SuperTANS;
The a/c turns 8 deg right onto 035 mag which it maintains right up to the last seconds before impact when a sudden evasive manoeuvre was initiated – and 035 was found set on the hp’s HSI course selector;
Does this not suggest that the hp was referring to another navaid?
Something that disagreed with the SuperTANS?
Some point reference that was intrinsically accurate that helo pilots would trust?
Flt Lt Tapper had reservations about the accuracy of the SuperTANS, especially after a water crossing, and perhaps would not have been surprised at a discrepancy of ½ a mile or so – hence if opting for a local point reference would it not make sense to move on from waypoint A in the nav computer to avoid confusion?;
The only candidate I can think of is a PRC112 that should have been at the LZ (for which waypoint A was an obvious inner marker) but may have been ½ mile or so up the hill – it would have given accurate range to the LZ had it been in the right position;
Given that they had started to slow down, a baro alt was set to give zero on the ground at the elevation of that LZ (QF whatever), and a RADALT warning was set at min consistent with an imminent landing in poor conditions – and that Chinooks had landed there before, and that that was what some local authority figures thought they were going to do this time – it rather looks like they were heading in there but the local aid was out of position by accident or design;
Even their tactical call sign was consistent with an exercise of this kind – in fact, everything that is known about this crash fits this scenario.
.
Don’t tell me this is fantasy – and it has not been working through this analysis on this forum has delayed the objective for 13 ½ years.
.
SFFP/MasterofNone
Still no constructive technical feedback from you good people? Come on! - how did data get from ARS6 to HSI in the later HC2 Chinooks? Too much to ask?
.
JP
One thing I think I have contributed here is local knowledge of the weather conditions (numerous earlier posts) - they were not in IMC, they were below local orographic cloud and approaching fog that was right on the slopes. I have always maintained that they had, in the absence of visual clues, been misled as to their range to go.
A/c do crash by flying into terrain while in (perhaps marginal) VFR conditions when that terrain is featureless - eg was it a Chinook in the Falklands hit a ridge simply because of visual judgement of how far away it was? - more recently, a US Chinook in Afghanistan, the tail end of a few of them, hit a sand dune because the terrain was "featureless" (clear night but dark so using NVG). These examples in situations where they were just making their way along VFR style - imagine going to a specific spot in such conditions but with an instrument that you had faith in telling you that you had 1/2 a mile further to go to the obstacle - very easy to come unstuck?
Pls refer post #3463 – still don’t give a damn?
Not worth contemplating that deliberate turn that got them into trouble?
Can you not see the implications of the course setting matching the a/c track on that last leg?
Let me describe a very simple process:
Let us say you have a nav mode selected that is giving you a bearing on your #1 pointer on your HSI;
If at some point you want to go straight to it you turn your course selector knob until your course pointer is pointing at the #1 bearing pointer – while you turn in that direction;
If you have done this quickly enough, the CDI will not be much displaced from the centre of line of the course pointer;
A little bit of manoeuvring so your CDI is in line with your course pointer and you are going straight for that waypoint or ground navaid.
.
How does this fit with what is known about this crash?
They had been going along 027 mag for 40 miles with a valid waypoint (A) still directly ahead;
It would have been normal for the nhp to have had his HSI set up for this and the hp’s CDI slaved to this (and on such a long leg, the hp may also have had 027 set on his course selector);
At less than a mile from the crash site – with waypoint A still directly ahead – waypoint A is dumped on the SuperTANS;
The a/c turns 8 deg right onto 035 mag which it maintains right up to the last seconds before impact when a sudden evasive manoeuvre was initiated – and 035 was found set on the hp’s HSI course selector;
Does this not suggest that the hp was referring to another navaid?
Something that disagreed with the SuperTANS?
Some point reference that was intrinsically accurate that helo pilots would trust?
Flt Lt Tapper had reservations about the accuracy of the SuperTANS, especially after a water crossing, and perhaps would not have been surprised at a discrepancy of ½ a mile or so – hence if opting for a local point reference would it not make sense to move on from waypoint A in the nav computer to avoid confusion?;
The only candidate I can think of is a PRC112 that should have been at the LZ (for which waypoint A was an obvious inner marker) but may have been ½ mile or so up the hill – it would have given accurate range to the LZ had it been in the right position;
Given that they had started to slow down, a baro alt was set to give zero on the ground at the elevation of that LZ (QF whatever), and a RADALT warning was set at min consistent with an imminent landing in poor conditions – and that Chinooks had landed there before, and that that was what some local authority figures thought they were going to do this time – it rather looks like they were heading in there but the local aid was out of position by accident or design;
Even their tactical call sign was consistent with an exercise of this kind – in fact, everything that is known about this crash fits this scenario.
.
Don’t tell me this is fantasy – and it has not been working through this analysis on this forum has delayed the objective for 13 ½ years.
.
SFFP/MasterofNone
Still no constructive technical feedback from you good people? Come on! - how did data get from ARS6 to HSI in the later HC2 Chinooks? Too much to ask?
.
JP
One thing I think I have contributed here is local knowledge of the weather conditions (numerous earlier posts) - they were not in IMC, they were below local orographic cloud and approaching fog that was right on the slopes. I have always maintained that they had, in the absence of visual clues, been misled as to their range to go.
A/c do crash by flying into terrain while in (perhaps marginal) VFR conditions when that terrain is featureless - eg was it a Chinook in the Falklands hit a ridge simply because of visual judgement of how far away it was? - more recently, a US Chinook in Afghanistan, the tail end of a few of them, hit a sand dune because the terrain was "featureless" (clear night but dark so using NVG). These examples in situations where they were just making their way along VFR style - imagine going to a specific spot in such conditions but with an instrument that you had faith in telling you that you had 1/2 a mile further to go to the obstacle - very easy to come unstuck?
Last edited by walter kennedy; 16th May 2008 at 12:57. Reason: addition
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: NZ
Posts: 308
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.
Now WK, I handed over as rear crew to GF and KH and I look at these postings, but have refrained from commenting (for 13 plus years). I am totally disgusted with the way you have tried to move this thread away from its purpose.
This thread is here to clear the names of a very competent, skilled SF crew that met with; what anyone that still has an arsehole knows; an untimely death.
As this will be my only post on this thread, I might add, Firstly, a crew of the highest capability, secondly, an HC mk2 that probably was not, and thirdly a sad loss to all. Let the truth be known!
Finally...whilst this is pprune, lets just speculate that both pilots ate the same prawn volovants (sp)!
Brian Dixon...Keep up the excellent work...
THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.
Now WK, I handed over as rear crew to GF and KH and I look at these postings, but have refrained from commenting (for 13 plus years). I am totally disgusted with the way you have tried to move this thread away from its purpose.
This thread is here to clear the names of a very competent, skilled SF crew that met with; what anyone that still has an arsehole knows; an untimely death.
As this will be my only post on this thread, I might add, Firstly, a crew of the highest capability, secondly, an HC mk2 that probably was not, and thirdly a sad loss to all. Let the truth be known!
Finally...whilst this is pprune, lets just speculate that both pilots ate the same prawn volovants (sp)!
Brian Dixon...Keep up the excellent work...
THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: Anywhere that pays
Posts: 117
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SffP and others - the question is:
If WK is on so many people's ignore list, would we see if he does start a new thread? Interesting question..........................
It would be a shame really, as his topic certainly has merit as a subject to be looked at - at the appropriate time and place, of course.
If WK is on so many people's ignore list, would we see if he does start a new thread? Interesting question..........................
It would be a shame really, as his topic certainly has merit as a subject to be looked at - at the appropriate time and place, of course.
WK,
As many others have said, your ideas are pure speculation. But we do KNOW something - they changed the TANS waypoint to Coran BEFORE they reached the Mull. Why on earth would they do that if they were planning to land near the Mull?
I'm not a military pilot but I would have put in a waypoint or IP for the landing site and used it as additional back up if I was testing a new system.
As many others have said, your ideas are pure speculation. But we do KNOW something - they changed the TANS waypoint to Coran BEFORE they reached the Mull. Why on earth would they do that if they were planning to land near the Mull?
I'm not a military pilot but I would have put in a waypoint or IP for the landing site and used it as additional back up if I was testing a new system.
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: BATH
Posts: 375
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chinook
Walter. We really should not reopen the discussion as to IMC or VMC conditions over the Mull at that time, but do take note of the numerous witnesses who were on the ground at the time, several of whom were professionally qualified to give an assessment. Enough now!!. Regards JP
I thought it had been established that they were below their Safety Altitude in IMC conditions. Is that not crew error? JP
If it was because if a mistake .. yes
If it was through a mechanical fault .. NO
No-one knows the cause .. which of those 3 reasons apply ?? as there is doubt .. they must be cleared ..
As said before ... let us try and keep it simple
THERE IS NO PROOF OF WRONG DOING, NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE AN ERROR, THE CAUSE IS, AND REMAINS, UNKNOWN.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JP,
Take out the safety alt part but on the more than one occasion when you did it it was it because of a,b,or c as suggested by Omega ?.......... and just tell us again where it was established as to what the crew could see from the flight deck windows
Take out the safety alt part but on the more than one occasion when you did it it was it because of a,b,or c as suggested by Omega ?.......... and just tell us again where it was established as to what the crew could see from the flight deck windows
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Oxon
Age: 66
Posts: 1,942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JP,
"Seldom (if ever!)"
Dear oh dear, I know it really irritates but when you make sweeping generalisations I am am bound to ask the obvious questions so, just to repeat myself
"and just tell us again where it was established as to what the crew could see from the flight deck windows"....................which of course you cant answer
And with regards to the IMC thing, was it crew error when you did it?
"Seldom (if ever!)"
Dear oh dear, I know it really irritates but when you make sweeping generalisations I am am bound to ask the obvious questions so, just to repeat myself
"and just tell us again where it was established as to what the crew could see from the flight deck windows"....................which of course you cant answer
And with regards to the IMC thing, was it crew error when you did it?
Last edited by Seldomfitforpurpose; 17th May 2008 at 01:21.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Seldomfitforpurpose in post #3467 has the best suggestion for a long, long time - WK start a new thread to allow people to expound their theories on the causes [like the 2 Nimrod threads]. That will leave this thread to concentrate on the original aim - to help to get the original verdict overturned.
Which is why, although I have been following the thread, I have refrained from posting for a long time - IMHO there is too much irrelevance which is distracting from the main aim....
Which is why, although I have been following the thread, I have refrained from posting for a long time - IMHO there is too much irrelevance which is distracting from the main aim....
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
SFFP
I realise how much you enjoy your little digs at JP, but you really should get your head around the fact that recognised procedures were much different in the early 50's. They had been evolved from hard earned experience since 1939 to facilitate the completion of the mission in the face of enemy operations involving aircraft with a much superior performance. Bear in mind that in July 1953 no fewer than 216 Meteor F.8s flew in the Coronation Review at RAF Odiham - an aircraft that 77Sqn RAAF had found wanting against Mig 15 opposition in Korea 2 years earlier. De Havilland Hornets were not replaced in the Far East (45 Sqn) until June 1955.
When I was operating in the big sand pit (that todays generation of aircrew is learning to love so well) back in the 60's there was a hached line on the map corresponding to somewhere around 30 - 40 NM from the coast which bore the legend "end of reliable relief information". Would you care to inform me what our Safety Altitude was if we were forced to climb?
I realise how much you enjoy your little digs at JP, but you really should get your head around the fact that recognised procedures were much different in the early 50's. They had been evolved from hard earned experience since 1939 to facilitate the completion of the mission in the face of enemy operations involving aircraft with a much superior performance. Bear in mind that in July 1953 no fewer than 216 Meteor F.8s flew in the Coronation Review at RAF Odiham - an aircraft that 77Sqn RAAF had found wanting against Mig 15 opposition in Korea 2 years earlier. De Havilland Hornets were not replaced in the Far East (45 Sqn) until June 1955.
When I was operating in the big sand pit (that todays generation of aircrew is learning to love so well) back in the 60's there was a hached line on the map corresponding to somewhere around 30 - 40 NM from the coast which bore the legend "end of reliable relief information". Would you care to inform me what our Safety Altitude was if we were forced to climb?
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: NZ
Posts: 308
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
And it started with...
Why, then, have I changed my mind and called for the verdict to be set aside? . .The main reason is the substantial volume of evidence that has since emerged concerning the technical faults that the Chinook was experiencing at the time -- the problems with the computer software and other difficulties that had, on occasion, led to the Chinook helicopters being grounded.
Remeber these words?
Now get out of here...!
Why, then, have I changed my mind and called for the verdict to be set aside? . .The main reason is the substantial volume of evidence that has since emerged concerning the technical faults that the Chinook was experiencing at the time -- the problems with the computer software and other difficulties that had, on occasion, led to the Chinook helicopters being grounded.
Remeber these words?
Now get out of here...!
FJJP: re your
If you can be bothered to go all the way back to #1689 you'll see I asked, in November 2005:
- somehow, I doubt whether being reasonable with Walter will ever persuade him. Sad, really.
Seldomfitforpurpose in post #3467 has the best suggestion for a long, long time - WK start a new thread to allow people to expound their theories on the causes [like the 2 Nimrod threads]. That will leave this thread to concentrate on the original aim - to help to get the original verdict overturned.
I look forward to seeing you move your contributions to somewhere appropriate. Thankyou.
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: BATH
Posts: 375
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chinook
Seldom (if ever). You ask ....tell us again where it was established as to what the crew could see from the flight deck windows"....................which of course you cant answer.
Noone will ever know exactly what the crew could see out of the cockpit, but I can imagine only two broad possibilities
1. They could clearly see the terrain ahead of them, but continued towards it at a goodly forward speed and then hit it.
2. They could not see clearly ahead (mist, fog, cloud, dead bird on the windcreen or whatever), in which case the rules of airmanship would have told them to turn away.
Which do you prefer? Meanwhile, I'm sure followers of this thread would be interested in your third, fourth, and nth possibilities if you have them, but if you do not have any then may I respectfully suggest that you follow the advice given at post number 3480.
Regards. JP
Noone will ever know exactly what the crew could see out of the cockpit, but I can imagine only two broad possibilities
1. They could clearly see the terrain ahead of them, but continued towards it at a goodly forward speed and then hit it.
2. They could not see clearly ahead (mist, fog, cloud, dead bird on the windcreen or whatever), in which case the rules of airmanship would have told them to turn away.
Which do you prefer? Meanwhile, I'm sure followers of this thread would be interested in your third, fourth, and nth possibilities if you have them, but if you do not have any then may I respectfully suggest that you follow the advice given at post number 3480.
Regards. JP
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Winch-control,
The members of the BOI and the Air & Eng Staff at HQ1 Gp and HQSTC (including AOC 1Gp and CinC STC) were aware of these concerns; as were the Air Staff at MOD.
The main reason for the length of time taken to produce the completed BOI was the diligence shown at all levels of the BOI process to ensure that all avenues of inquiry were followed and properly assessed.
The members of the BOI and the Air & Eng Staff at HQ1 Gp and HQSTC (including AOC 1Gp and CinC STC) were aware of these concerns; as were the Air Staff at MOD.
The main reason for the length of time taken to produce the completed BOI was the diligence shown at all levels of the BOI process to ensure that all avenues of inquiry were followed and properly assessed.