Nimrod MRA.4
"...A wing design problem would appear to be a more realistic issue but if true a damning indictment of BAE's design skills...."
If true, but why at all, would an Airbus designed wing be a damning indictment of BAE's design skills?
If true, but why at all, would an Airbus designed wing be a damning indictment of BAE's design skills?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
According to that font of all knowledge
As these were completely separate divisions from Woodford I think we can assume there was not cooperation or transfer of knowledge. Remember Nimrod would have been a classified military project and Airbus a secure civilian project which would militate against cooperation and cross-fertilisation.
BAE Systems inherited British Aerospace's share of Airbus Industrie, which consisted of two factories at Broughton and Filton. These facilities manufactured wings for the Airbus family of aircraft.
The MR2 conversions began in 1975, with only 35 conversions ordered, as the decision makers had forecast three hull losses by that time.
Clearly, if a predicted loss did not occur, this was good news for the aircrew, but meant extra staffing by what are today called Requirements Managers (in those days, junior civil servants, in the grade before they’d be promoted to the most junior MoD(PE) grade). These staffs prepared the Board Submissions (a more understandable, sensible and concise equivalent of what today is called a Business Case). Each Submission would have options should we lose more, or less, than predicted. MoD(PE) would translate this into a suitable contract, with optional quantities. Those individuals had the unique authority to amend LTC Instructions using their engineering judgement.
The same staffs further broke the programme down into Programme Element Costings.
This detailed work isn’t done anymore – it stopped in about 1988. Doing this job for two LTC rounds, by hand (no computers in those days), led to a deeper understanding of how procurement works than perhaps anyone today learns in a lifetime. Not having this experience explains very many Time, Cost and Performance failures.
Remember Nimrod would have been a classified military project and Airbus a secure civilian project which would militate against cooperation and cross-fertilisation.
Again, this process ceased in the early 90s, the mandated instructions (CA Instructions) were cancelled without being replaced by an alternative, and the entire process fell into disuse on the orders of the RAF Chief Engineer. The mandated Def Stan laying down the procedures to be used was eventually cancelled, without replacement, 3 years ago, not having been amended for nearly 20 years.
The above Organisational Failures were notified to DPA’s 3 Star Deputy Chief Executive in a report dated 11th January 2000. He did not reply. It was copied to the Nimrod RMPA/2000/MRA4 2 Star, who, to be fair, did reply. He said the failure of his staffs to implement mandated regulations was of no concern to him. In the process of tearing me a new ****hole for daring to highlight critical failures, he assured all present that he had spoken to the Nimrod 1 Star that very morning and been assured the ISD (2002 at the time) would be met. A Sqn Ldr piped up “Oh, so he didn’t mention the 4 year slip?”
Which gets me to Dervish’s post, above. Yes, the “Who?” is well known.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
So Mr Who benefited, but what caused the delay and why was the delay so long on what, on the face of it, was an easy option?
PN,
Probably several reasons but one of them was the support contract. I understand that BAES wanted £200mil per year guaranteed for 5 years. i.e, another £1bil in their coffers to look after 9 brand new aircraft.
As good as the aircraft could have been operationally, it's maintenance was it's achilles heel. By that, I mean BAES had the potential to hold UK MoD to ransom. 'Grunge bracket broken - of course we can fix it. That will be £1mil please. Take it or leave it'
Conversely, that is one of the best arguments for the P8. Grunge brackets would be readily available all around the world and at very competitive prices.
What exactly cause the MRA4 to be cancelled twelve years after Nimrod 2000?
As good as the aircraft could have been operationally, it's maintenance was it's achilles heel. By that, I mean BAES had the potential to hold UK MoD to ransom. 'Grunge bracket broken - of course we can fix it. That will be £1mil please. Take it or leave it'
Conversely, that is one of the best arguments for the P8. Grunge brackets would be readily available all around the world and at very competitive prices.
PN, I’m afraid in this case there is no single answer. Many opinions have been offered here and all have merit. As an engineering programme manager at the time, I know the reason why other equally complex programmes succeeded despite having the very same risks. The mandated regulations I speak of were implemented by people who had been taught to use them. In particular, early Risk Assessment and Mitigation.
There are certain standing risks on any aircraft upgrade/modification programme. One, never assume the legacy build standard has been maintained or is airworthy. Two, never assume the “Support Authority” has (a) any authority or (b) will support you. Three, always assume AMSO/AML (at the time) will be hostile to what you are trying to achieve. Fourth, in that area of MoD(PE), completely ignore your 2 and 4 Stars, because they will always support 1, 2 and 3 (above).
This last was a hard and fast rule. I once stood toe to toe with the former and my 1 Star while they asked for reassurance that I would not deliver to Time or Performance, that I would trade out Safety to reduce cost, and that I would not deliver a Simulator (without which one cannot declare operational capability or demonstrate airworthiness). With a straight face I lied, assuring them I would indeed commit such a fraud. At the same time I had the Simulator under contract and my fifth aircraft production set was being delivered. You just hid these embarrassing facts from them, as they didn’t like the bar being raised. THAT is “Smart” procurement.
I’d say that the first two risks in the RMPA Risk Register would be (a) that notified by almost every competent engineer on the programme – that the original mainplanes were hand built, and (b) that the aircraft was not airworthy. In the mid-90s this last was not a huge problem as the order not to maintain airworthiness was only a few years old and the risk reduction contract (to regain airworthiness) would be relatively simple; and simultaneously identify and mitigate many other risks that were only recognised many years later. Other concurrent programmes did this successfully. (This simple fact illustrates the problems were well known in the early 90s, and renders much of what Haddon-Cave said completely wrong). But as time marched on, regression became ever more difficult and costly – as noted in the NART report of 1998.
However, (a) was the elephant in the room. I know what one mooted mitigation was – buy Orion P(3, 8?? – not sure). This was the preferred option of many in the RAF; to many in MoD(PE) who understood the risks it was the ONLY option. If honest, I’m sure many in BAeS would agree. Therefore, I think it was largely a “political” decision to continue with Nimrod. Certainly, other concurrent programmes were subject to severe political interference at this time, by which I mean local MPs would be lobbying for “industrial impact” to be taken into account. Automatically, this process would exclude all but MoD(PE)’s three most senior staffs, the 2, 3 and 4 Stars. The PM would simply be informed what his procurement strategy was, told to get on with it or step aside for some yes-man who would. In 1994 it was a well known fact that "RMPA" could not possibly meet even a 2005 ISD.
However, if the Materiel and Financial provisioning process I speak of, and related Requirement Scrutiny, had been carried out properly, and taken heed of the risks, the costings would have reflected the need to buy a new platform. As it was, the apparent cost was driven down by the notion it was a “simple” upgrade. Remember, Chinook Mk1 > Mk2, and the later Mk3 programme, suffered from the same inexperience. Not the "conspiracy of optimism" so often mooted in the press; just plain old lack of practical experience stemming from overly rapid promotion and grade skipping system without attaining and demonstrating, across many programmes, previously mandated competencies.
I do not believe RMPA undertook any mitigation for the airworthiness problem. I knew a few people on the programme and they certainly raised it often enough, but this is where it comes down to individuals. Successful programmes ignored the politics and career minded policies of senior staffs (both serving and civilian); RMPA didn’t. If you ask me as a programme manager what I’d have done, the answer is simple. Declare Planning Blight as soon as any part of the programme failed Requirement Scrutiny. (As so many parts of it did). This is not optional, it is actually mandated. But, it is also a disciplinary offence, something confirmed as recently as last month by Min(AF). I think this was the final straw. Post XV230, I don't think anyone was keen to put their name to an RTS. It matters not that the MRA4 was 90% "new"; the audit trail was irretrievably broken.
Rock and a hard place I’m afraid. Well worth a public inquiry! But when all this was advised to the Public Accounts and Defence Select Committees, both ignored it. Both like to criticise and make political capital, but neither likes the truth.
There are certain standing risks on any aircraft upgrade/modification programme. One, never assume the legacy build standard has been maintained or is airworthy. Two, never assume the “Support Authority” has (a) any authority or (b) will support you. Three, always assume AMSO/AML (at the time) will be hostile to what you are trying to achieve. Fourth, in that area of MoD(PE), completely ignore your 2 and 4 Stars, because they will always support 1, 2 and 3 (above).
This last was a hard and fast rule. I once stood toe to toe with the former and my 1 Star while they asked for reassurance that I would not deliver to Time or Performance, that I would trade out Safety to reduce cost, and that I would not deliver a Simulator (without which one cannot declare operational capability or demonstrate airworthiness). With a straight face I lied, assuring them I would indeed commit such a fraud. At the same time I had the Simulator under contract and my fifth aircraft production set was being delivered. You just hid these embarrassing facts from them, as they didn’t like the bar being raised. THAT is “Smart” procurement.
I’d say that the first two risks in the RMPA Risk Register would be (a) that notified by almost every competent engineer on the programme – that the original mainplanes were hand built, and (b) that the aircraft was not airworthy. In the mid-90s this last was not a huge problem as the order not to maintain airworthiness was only a few years old and the risk reduction contract (to regain airworthiness) would be relatively simple; and simultaneously identify and mitigate many other risks that were only recognised many years later. Other concurrent programmes did this successfully. (This simple fact illustrates the problems were well known in the early 90s, and renders much of what Haddon-Cave said completely wrong). But as time marched on, regression became ever more difficult and costly – as noted in the NART report of 1998.
However, (a) was the elephant in the room. I know what one mooted mitigation was – buy Orion P(3, 8?? – not sure). This was the preferred option of many in the RAF; to many in MoD(PE) who understood the risks it was the ONLY option. If honest, I’m sure many in BAeS would agree. Therefore, I think it was largely a “political” decision to continue with Nimrod. Certainly, other concurrent programmes were subject to severe political interference at this time, by which I mean local MPs would be lobbying for “industrial impact” to be taken into account. Automatically, this process would exclude all but MoD(PE)’s three most senior staffs, the 2, 3 and 4 Stars. The PM would simply be informed what his procurement strategy was, told to get on with it or step aside for some yes-man who would. In 1994 it was a well known fact that "RMPA" could not possibly meet even a 2005 ISD.
However, if the Materiel and Financial provisioning process I speak of, and related Requirement Scrutiny, had been carried out properly, and taken heed of the risks, the costings would have reflected the need to buy a new platform. As it was, the apparent cost was driven down by the notion it was a “simple” upgrade. Remember, Chinook Mk1 > Mk2, and the later Mk3 programme, suffered from the same inexperience. Not the "conspiracy of optimism" so often mooted in the press; just plain old lack of practical experience stemming from overly rapid promotion and grade skipping system without attaining and demonstrating, across many programmes, previously mandated competencies.
I do not believe RMPA undertook any mitigation for the airworthiness problem. I knew a few people on the programme and they certainly raised it often enough, but this is where it comes down to individuals. Successful programmes ignored the politics and career minded policies of senior staffs (both serving and civilian); RMPA didn’t. If you ask me as a programme manager what I’d have done, the answer is simple. Declare Planning Blight as soon as any part of the programme failed Requirement Scrutiny. (As so many parts of it did). This is not optional, it is actually mandated. But, it is also a disciplinary offence, something confirmed as recently as last month by Min(AF). I think this was the final straw. Post XV230, I don't think anyone was keen to put their name to an RTS. It matters not that the MRA4 was 90% "new"; the audit trail was irretrievably broken.
Rock and a hard place I’m afraid. Well worth a public inquiry! But when all this was advised to the Public Accounts and Defence Select Committees, both ignored it. Both like to criticise and make political capital, but neither likes the truth.
NaB
"BAE has been spiritually moving home across the Atlantic since the formation of Airbus proper in 2001 changed its status from owner of Airbus's British factories to a mere 20% shareholder in the unified European airframer." (Murdo Morrison)
Above about sums it up without going into too much detail of who owned what & when. The MRA4 wing was designed by Airbus at Filton. The design was transferred to BAE Systems in 2001.
Above about sums it up without going into too much detail of who owned what & when. The MRA4 wing was designed by Airbus at Filton. The design was transferred to BAE Systems in 2001.
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Sticking with the wing theory, I recall taking a jet to Filton in the early stages of the program (Dec 96) so that the team down there could see an actual airframe that they were/would be designing and building a new wing for.
The response from several on the team back then was that designing a wing with root mounted engines was a crazy idea and that a podded solution was a better option. Off the record there were comments ranging from 'it'll never work in a month of Sundays' to 'what idiot decided to stick with a 50+ year old airframe design!' That a root mounted design was forced on them obviously didn't help, especially when the wing had to be significantly enlarged to take the chosen engines and new undercarriage. Changes which any junior aerospace engineer will tell you fundamentally changes all of the airframe dynamics.
Getting back to the question raised about the wing design - I guess we may never truly know, but having been involved in the program during the final 5 years (got out about a year before it all went south) there were a huge number of other issues that could have been used as the reason for the final nail in the coffin. That's not to say that it was all bad though as there were some aspects that actually worked very well, its just a shame that those were eclipsed by the ones that didn't.
The response from several on the team back then was that designing a wing with root mounted engines was a crazy idea and that a podded solution was a better option. Off the record there were comments ranging from 'it'll never work in a month of Sundays' to 'what idiot decided to stick with a 50+ year old airframe design!' That a root mounted design was forced on them obviously didn't help, especially when the wing had to be significantly enlarged to take the chosen engines and new undercarriage. Changes which any junior aerospace engineer will tell you fundamentally changes all of the airframe dynamics.
Getting back to the question raised about the wing design - I guess we may never truly know, but having been involved in the program during the final 5 years (got out about a year before it all went south) there were a huge number of other issues that could have been used as the reason for the final nail in the coffin. That's not to say that it was all bad though as there were some aspects that actually worked very well, its just a shame that those were eclipsed by the ones that didn't.
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tucumseh,
I found your explanation fascinating but thoroughly perplexing. I have many times gone into (forum) print about the shocking inadequacies of our procurement process. I am not close enough to know what they are or who is to blame, but the fact that we all too frequently make such a balls-up is disheartening. It is a shocking indictment of the procurement process. The country loses a valuable defence asset, the forces lose people, communities lose bases and therefore employment and income, the defence industry loses credibility as well as future work for its staff, £3.6bn of our taxes have been wasted and the winners can only be those who wish us ill.
My solution (from a distance) was that ".... projects need tough, and I mean really tough, management to make sure that despite all the conflicting pressures and interests, the right system is delivered at the right price at the right time. That will require a project 'supremo' capable of saying 'No' to everyone at some time, including the military. If this doesn't happen then we will continue to get reports from future Public Accounts Committees that we have once more over-paid for too little and got it too late."
I'm not now sure if that is enough in view of what you say. Your explanation has left me even more aghast than when I was less informed.
Even though you cannot be reassuring, thanks for sharing.
LF
I found your explanation fascinating but thoroughly perplexing. I have many times gone into (forum) print about the shocking inadequacies of our procurement process. I am not close enough to know what they are or who is to blame, but the fact that we all too frequently make such a balls-up is disheartening. It is a shocking indictment of the procurement process. The country loses a valuable defence asset, the forces lose people, communities lose bases and therefore employment and income, the defence industry loses credibility as well as future work for its staff, £3.6bn of our taxes have been wasted and the winners can only be those who wish us ill.
My solution (from a distance) was that ".... projects need tough, and I mean really tough, management to make sure that despite all the conflicting pressures and interests, the right system is delivered at the right price at the right time. That will require a project 'supremo' capable of saying 'No' to everyone at some time, including the military. If this doesn't happen then we will continue to get reports from future Public Accounts Committees that we have once more over-paid for too little and got it too late."
I'm not now sure if that is enough in view of what you say. Your explanation has left me even more aghast than when I was less informed.
Even though you cannot be reassuring, thanks for sharing.
LF
Tuc
..."Post XV230, I don't think anyone was keen to put their name to an RTS. It matters not that the MRA4 was 90% "new"; the audit trail was irretrievably broken."...
Hammer, nail, head.
Hammer, nail, head.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
. . . we all too frequently make such a balls-up is disheartening. .... projects need tough, and I mean really tough, management to make sure that despite all the conflicting pressures and interests, the right system is delivered at the right price at the right time.
In a fairly small contract the winning bidder had submitted the lowest bid with the lowest risk factor. Later, in the latter years of the contract actual inflation exceeded the contractor's estimates and his margins were squeezed. By going hardnosed that contractor, in the least bad outcome, would not have bid for a renewed contract leaving the field to the previous losing companies.
To quote the contracts officer, "We are not in the business of putting the contractor out of business."
Now of course what we are talking of here is a virtual non-competitive bid with only the ministry trying to drive down the cost. As time drags on the contractor could be forced into a loss and either renege or actually go in to liquidation. The latter outcomes would be highly improbable with BAE and even a loss would be politically unacceptable.
I guess it is the outcome of the aerospace industry rationalisation of the 60s and an attempt to have BAE as a major global player with no in-country competition.
Now had the MRA contract been opened to competitive tender from Boeing, Lockheed, BAE and Airbus without prejudging the airframe what outcome would have resulted?
That a root mounted design was forced on them obviously didn't help, especially when the wing had to be significantly enlarged to take the chosen engines and new undercarriage. Changes which any junior aerospace engineer will tell you fundamentally changes all of the airframe dynamics.
Now look at how these two basic and mandated components of project management were addressed at the time under the aforesaid 2 Star. First, he is on record as stating that it is acceptable to waive Design Reviews and pay off the associated milestone in full, despite all parties acknowledging serious and often insurmountable Time, Cost and Performance (which includes Safety) risks being ignored. To sign off a Design Review and make full payment, without even conducting the Review, is fraud; pure and simple. Second, he is also on record as decreeing that it is sufficient to record risks, but you shall not spend money mitigating them. (You’d be astonished how many in DE&S practice this; it explains many cock ups). I mentioned above that successful programmes in PE at the time shared one common feature – they ignored these edicts and implemented mandated regulations.
His primary role as 2 Star was to provide Management Oversight; in practice, conduct a review of the top 10 risks each month. Even if the mainplane issue had somehow been mitigated to 99% probability, and proper approval sought and granted to proceed (which almost certainly didn’t happen, because the same 2 Star ruled such Scrutiny a disciplinary offence), it would easily be in the top 10. So, what was said at these monthly reviews? From personal experience, the better question is why weren’t they conducted. It isn’t just this one postholder. His edicts were fully supported by his boss, CDP and, subsequently, Ministers (and still are). The PAC refused to name him, claiming the postholder was unknown; which is ludicrous. More senior people are being protected here.
But there must also have been collusion or backsliding at a lower level, and at BAeS. One would like to think no reputable company would proceed under the circumstances I describe. However, I think BAeS did, in fact, highlight these major risks; although perhaps not very robustly. They would know for sure that the notional ISD could never be met, and costs would escalate. This could easily explain why they were handed blank cheques to keep digging bigger and deeper holes, year after year, while largely escaping censure. (They took a minor hit at one point, but nowhere near the £4Bn+ loss the taxpayer took). Somewhere in the early paperwork there will be a note to Ministers from their CEO spelling this out; and an uninformed decision from Minister accepting the risk on behalf of the MoD/Government, thus providing protection for BAeS. This is routine. The RMPA Programme Managers in MoD may have suspected this, but they’d be excluded from discussions and just told to get on with it. That’s why they have all advanced without a stain on their record.
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"This fact (and it is fact) highlights the issue of Design Reviews; on a programme such as RMPA there would be scores of such reviews. This is the opportunity to raise the red flag on the entire programme. At the Preliminary Design Review, which should have been held before the contract was even let, the basic mainplane risks would be aired. The Risk Managers (MoD and BAeS) would be sitting furiously filling in their registers, assessing the probabilities of occurrence. As “100%” would feature heavily, you are NOT allowed to proceed until this is reduced. Look at any Risk software; you can’t enter the figure 100%. If it is 100%, it is not a risk, it is a certainty which you must avoid before approval is granted to proceed. Simple regulations. Avoid the avoidable, manage the unavoidable."
all well and good but when you've only got one supplier, and one type of airframe, and the politicians want it to go ahead and the customer wants it badly what you put in your risking software is a bit moot really
all well and good but when you've only got one supplier, and one type of airframe, and the politicians want it to go ahead and the customer wants it badly what you put in your risking software is a bit moot really
HH
I see your point, but it is always important to make decisions within your remit, and seek them outwith your remit. That is the definition of what a project manager does. You must set out the risks or problems requiring a high level decision, so that decision may be properly informed. If you do not, then (a) you're not fit for purpose and (b) you give the proper pay grade an "out". Too often on pprune we talk of this lack of audit trail.
The practical problem is the ethos which militates against this. The bearer of bad news is castigated, even though he is simply doing his job and it is manifestly not his fault. Very soon you have a decision to make. Become deeply unpopular and kill your career, or hide the problems and make sure you move on before they become too apparent. I'm afraid the MoD hierarchy is almost entirely full of the latter.
Being a Risk Manager in MoD is a poisoned chalice, because by definition you are assessing potential problems. Industry see the value of someone who can foresee such problems, and their RMs are invariably the same grade and in every way equal to the Programme Manager. They know a good RM is worth his weight in gold. In MoD, the opposite is true, if someone is stupid enough to apply for the job in the first place. It is many years since MoD staffs were assessed on their ability to "foresee and deal with problems successfully". It became "foresee" only, with it being deemed an attribute not to actually know how to deal with them. Now it's all about woolly "competencies".
I see your point, but it is always important to make decisions within your remit, and seek them outwith your remit. That is the definition of what a project manager does. You must set out the risks or problems requiring a high level decision, so that decision may be properly informed. If you do not, then (a) you're not fit for purpose and (b) you give the proper pay grade an "out". Too often on pprune we talk of this lack of audit trail.
The practical problem is the ethos which militates against this. The bearer of bad news is castigated, even though he is simply doing his job and it is manifestly not his fault. Very soon you have a decision to make. Become deeply unpopular and kill your career, or hide the problems and make sure you move on before they become too apparent. I'm afraid the MoD hierarchy is almost entirely full of the latter.
Being a Risk Manager in MoD is a poisoned chalice, because by definition you are assessing potential problems. Industry see the value of someone who can foresee such problems, and their RMs are invariably the same grade and in every way equal to the Programme Manager. They know a good RM is worth his weight in gold. In MoD, the opposite is true, if someone is stupid enough to apply for the job in the first place. It is many years since MoD staffs were assessed on their ability to "foresee and deal with problems successfully". It became "foresee" only, with it being deemed an attribute not to actually know how to deal with them. Now it's all about woolly "competencies".
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I agree - but then we're dealing with a system that clearly is almost pointless - it's the sort of thing you can have in say a big oil or motor company where you have real alternatives but when you have a single buyer, a single seller and the seller only has one product ........................................... 
If anyone has access to their website version, the latest Janes Navy International has quite a good 2 page spread on the UK's maritime surveillance and MPA gap. It doesn't mention UAVs until post-2030.
PN:
HH:
When you read the shocking revelations of tuc, the above comments seem to lead to one inexorable conclusion, and that is to buy all our kit off the shelf. No fancy do-dahs to shoe horn in, just buy the complete OEM product. If we want British engines, British wings, British Avionics, or whatever to be included then make sure that they are available as standard OEM fit from the chosen supplier. Of course it will mean compromise, of course it will mean the traditional Defence prop to British industry being removed, of course it will mean that our Forces will be supplied with generic rather than tailor made kit, but at least they'll get the kit and at a fixed price (if we can at least manage to arrange that!). This isn't just about MRA4, it's about every other project that has gone over budget, over time, and under spec. We used to be able to do this stuff once, now we can't and we must face up to that one simple fact.
Perhaps what made the Mk 1 such a success was the kit was all off the shelf.
when you have a single buyer, a single seller and the seller only has one
product ...........................................
product ...........................................