Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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Oilcan,
I believe that the leak on XV230 2 weeks before the accident, as referred to by the Coroner, was a No1 tank blow-off event. The air eng and AGE both gave evidence clearly proving the fuel loss to be a blow off valve. The Coroner and the families' counsel called it a leak.
The residual fuel stain, still visible after flight, commencing near to the blow-off exit, did not run near to the 7 tank dry bay, but ran underneath the fuselage, which broadly supports 2 lines of thinking:
1. Fuel from that blow-off did not enter the SCP duct shroud.
2. That stain was not evidence of a leak from the 7 tank dry bay.
I am led to believe that a BAe engineer later supported the case, on oath, that blow-off fuel wouldn't enter the SCP duct shroud. Brave call
Conclusion: The Coroner, with the evidence given, quite reasonably discounted No1 tank blow-off as the source of fuel in the dry bay. However, in fairness to the BOI team, the valve is directly ahead of the SCP duct (at the bottom of the dry bay) and the BOI team were correct to identify the possibility that fuel from the blow-off exit could track into the SCP duct shroud.
The video showed a fuel leak from the 7 tank refuel valve coupling, that failed during a ground refuel. It clearly supports the case for a refuel pipe coupling leak during AAR.
I strongly disagree with the Coroner's diagnosis that the leak probably came from a feed pipe further ahead on the Rib 1. Pressure in any Nimrod fuel feed pipe cannot exceed 25 psi, because that is the maximum pressure of all of the pumps. It is a sustained pressure, without spikes. The Coroner suggested that, while the crew used standard AAR techniques that caused aggravating pressure spikes, another totally unrelated failure, without aggravation, occurred somewhere else.
I ask this of anyone:
Which of the 2 fuel sub-systems was most likely to fail during the 10 minutes of AAR? The fuel feed system, while working under normal loads without aggravation, as it had been for the last 1 hr 40 min, or the refuel system, which lay dormant, exposed to an adjacent very hot pipe radiating 450C, which is suddenly working under pressure from 2 carter pumps? I don't understand how the Coroner can think the former scenario is more likely. I agree that it was possible. Clearly, any fuel leak is possible at any time, but we must consider that it would have been the most incredible co-incidence. In fact, it is so unlikely that the BOI team didn't consider it a possibility in that particular circumstance. Neither do I.
Incidentally, if the Coroner is to be believed, the cause of the accident was not related to AAR. Do you believe him? I don't.
However, I do strongly believe that the cause of the accident (fuel onto a hot pipe) and, also importantly, the potential for another similar tragedy, has been isolated. Yes, there might be fuel leaks and yes, there will be hot air pipes and they, too, might occasionally leak. But where the fuel might leak it will not now ignite in an area not protected by fire warning and suppression. Where hot air might leak, it will be sensed by overheat detectors, as it always has been (which discounts the BOI's 3rd possibility). Both of these possibilities exist throughout the world of aviation. They are necessary evils if human beings want to fly. I suggest this makes the Nimrod as safe as (or, no less dangerous than; you can spin it whichever way you like) any other aircraft in the world in this respect.
Ed
I believe that the leak on XV230 2 weeks before the accident, as referred to by the Coroner, was a No1 tank blow-off event. The air eng and AGE both gave evidence clearly proving the fuel loss to be a blow off valve. The Coroner and the families' counsel called it a leak.
The residual fuel stain, still visible after flight, commencing near to the blow-off exit, did not run near to the 7 tank dry bay, but ran underneath the fuselage, which broadly supports 2 lines of thinking:
1. Fuel from that blow-off did not enter the SCP duct shroud.
2. That stain was not evidence of a leak from the 7 tank dry bay.
I am led to believe that a BAe engineer later supported the case, on oath, that blow-off fuel wouldn't enter the SCP duct shroud. Brave call
Conclusion: The Coroner, with the evidence given, quite reasonably discounted No1 tank blow-off as the source of fuel in the dry bay. However, in fairness to the BOI team, the valve is directly ahead of the SCP duct (at the bottom of the dry bay) and the BOI team were correct to identify the possibility that fuel from the blow-off exit could track into the SCP duct shroud.
The video showed a fuel leak from the 7 tank refuel valve coupling, that failed during a ground refuel. It clearly supports the case for a refuel pipe coupling leak during AAR.
I strongly disagree with the Coroner's diagnosis that the leak probably came from a feed pipe further ahead on the Rib 1. Pressure in any Nimrod fuel feed pipe cannot exceed 25 psi, because that is the maximum pressure of all of the pumps. It is a sustained pressure, without spikes. The Coroner suggested that, while the crew used standard AAR techniques that caused aggravating pressure spikes, another totally unrelated failure, without aggravation, occurred somewhere else.
I ask this of anyone:
Which of the 2 fuel sub-systems was most likely to fail during the 10 minutes of AAR? The fuel feed system, while working under normal loads without aggravation, as it had been for the last 1 hr 40 min, or the refuel system, which lay dormant, exposed to an adjacent very hot pipe radiating 450C, which is suddenly working under pressure from 2 carter pumps? I don't understand how the Coroner can think the former scenario is more likely. I agree that it was possible. Clearly, any fuel leak is possible at any time, but we must consider that it would have been the most incredible co-incidence. In fact, it is so unlikely that the BOI team didn't consider it a possibility in that particular circumstance. Neither do I.
Incidentally, if the Coroner is to be believed, the cause of the accident was not related to AAR. Do you believe him? I don't.
However, I do strongly believe that the cause of the accident (fuel onto a hot pipe) and, also importantly, the potential for another similar tragedy, has been isolated. Yes, there might be fuel leaks and yes, there will be hot air pipes and they, too, might occasionally leak. But where the fuel might leak it will not now ignite in an area not protected by fire warning and suppression. Where hot air might leak, it will be sensed by overheat detectors, as it always has been (which discounts the BOI's 3rd possibility). Both of these possibilities exist throughout the world of aviation. They are necessary evils if human beings want to fly. I suggest this makes the Nimrod as safe as (or, no less dangerous than; you can spin it whichever way you like) any other aircraft in the world in this respect.
Ed
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clearly the rant that bouy 15 has highlighted a few things about himself so here goes....
he is extremely out of touch, especially as a retired senior officer.
i am thankful that he is retired as it is a travesty that someone with such a closed mind and so little worth for human life should be seen as a leader.
possibly, the dellusions of grandeur have caught up with him and the dementia has well and truly set in. if this is not the case, i simply suggest you either get yourself a stronger pair of glasses to be able to actually read the facts. get yourself a stronger hearing aid to ensure you can hear properly and shame we haven't figured out a way of taking out your brain for a damn good polish so it's working properly then popping it back in. then hopefully you can then actually understand, or take on board what has been said to you....oh, wait a minute, that's right you clearly don't have brain,oops, sorry!
i was posting much stronger rants but then why would i come down to your level.
as families we can hold our head high and we know what is true and we do not have to reply, nor try to convince you or anyone about compensation.
mods, please do something about this user. he is not just insulting me and other family memebers and colleagues but the memory of our lost loved ones.
per ardua ad astra
he is extremely out of touch, especially as a retired senior officer.
i am thankful that he is retired as it is a travesty that someone with such a closed mind and so little worth for human life should be seen as a leader.
possibly, the dellusions of grandeur have caught up with him and the dementia has well and truly set in. if this is not the case, i simply suggest you either get yourself a stronger pair of glasses to be able to actually read the facts. get yourself a stronger hearing aid to ensure you can hear properly and shame we haven't figured out a way of taking out your brain for a damn good polish so it's working properly then popping it back in. then hopefully you can then actually understand, or take on board what has been said to you....oh, wait a minute, that's right you clearly don't have brain,oops, sorry!
i was posting much stronger rants but then why would i come down to your level.
as families we can hold our head high and we know what is true and we do not have to reply, nor try to convince you or anyone about compensation.
mods, please do something about this user. he is not just insulting me and other family memebers and colleagues but the memory of our lost loved ones.
per ardua ad astra
Last edited by chappie; 26th May 2008 at 10:21. Reason: to correct punctuation and spelling as not so upset now!
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Buoy 15:
I'm sure you're right about his view and that of his colleague. However, I'm also sure they would not want to be associated with the manner in which you are contributing to this discussion.
Sincerely,
Ed
I played golf today with one of the 2 best Air Engineers in the fleet who attended the inquest - what he doesn't know about Nimrod systems you can write on the back of a stamp, and he is happy to keep flying
Sincerely,
Ed
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Something that has not yet been reported or mentioned on here is that I asked Group Captain Hickman Nimrod IPT leader if they had done a Battle Damage Assesment on the Nimrod as required in Def Stan 00-970. He replied NO as it was a legacy aircraft and fly's too high. I had to point out to him that Nimrods have to take off and land at very low levels especially in that northern DOB .
When the transcript of Mr Walkers summing up comes out you will be able to read this.
So you not only are the RAF flying un-airworthy ac but they have not even concidered any protection against battle damage.!!!!!!!
Chappie ring any alarm bells with your Hercules case ?
Buoy 15:
Unfortunatly it is not air engineers who decide the airworthiness of the Nimrod but Group Captain Hickman ( Perhaps someone could tell me if he is an engineer?)
DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5
SECTION 9
68
9.9 REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY TO BATTLE DAMAGE
INTRODUCTION
9.9.1 This Clause contains design aims and requirements which enhance the survivability of the aeroplane and its crew by reducing their vulnerability to battle damage.
9.9.2 See Leaflet 21 for general background information on Reduction of Vulnerability to Battle Damage, Design Aims, Vulnerability Analysis, Protection Measures, Battle Damage Repair, and Kill Categories. Refer to Clause 4.22 for Crash Landing and Ditching requirements and Clause 9.10 for Protection Systems for Aircrew.
9.9.3 Table 4 gives the Defined Threat Effects and also contains some data which may be used in a Vulnerability Analysis if more specific information is not available.
9.9.5 See Part 0 - Definitions for: SURVIVABILITY, VULNERABILITY, SUSCEPTABILITY, THREATS, THREAT EFFECT, SPECIFIED THREAT
EFFECTS, DEFINED THREAT EFFECTS, SORTIE, MISSION, BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR, and PROBABILITY OF OCCURANCE (TABLE 4).
NOTE: These definitions apply to terms used in this Clause and in the Leaflet 21. They may not be the same as definitions of the same terms
When the transcript of Mr Walkers summing up comes out you will be able to read this.
So you not only are the RAF flying un-airworthy ac but they have not even concidered any protection against battle damage.!!!!!!!
Chappie ring any alarm bells with your Hercules case ?
Buoy 15:
Unfortunatly it is not air engineers who decide the airworthiness of the Nimrod but Group Captain Hickman ( Perhaps someone could tell me if he is an engineer?)
DEF STAN 00-970 PART 1/5
SECTION 9
68
9.9 REDUCTION OF VULNERABILITY TO BATTLE DAMAGE
INTRODUCTION
9.9.1 This Clause contains design aims and requirements which enhance the survivability of the aeroplane and its crew by reducing their vulnerability to battle damage.
9.9.2 See Leaflet 21 for general background information on Reduction of Vulnerability to Battle Damage, Design Aims, Vulnerability Analysis, Protection Measures, Battle Damage Repair, and Kill Categories. Refer to Clause 4.22 for Crash Landing and Ditching requirements and Clause 9.10 for Protection Systems for Aircrew.
9.9.3 Table 4 gives the Defined Threat Effects and also contains some data which may be used in a Vulnerability Analysis if more specific information is not available.
9.9.5 See Part 0 - Definitions for: SURVIVABILITY, VULNERABILITY, SUSCEPTABILITY, THREATS, THREAT EFFECT, SPECIFIED THREAT
EFFECTS, DEFINED THREAT EFFECTS, SORTIE, MISSION, BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR, and PROBABILITY OF OCCURANCE (TABLE 4).
NOTE: These definitions apply to terms used in this Clause and in the Leaflet 21. They may not be the same as definitions of the same terms
Last edited by Tappers Dad; 26th May 2008 at 09:36. Reason: To include Def Stan
Champagne anyone...?
bouy15 - ever the chiseller, hits new low
buoy15. Wow. As someone who's been a Ppruner for about 13 years I thought I'd pretty much seen it all. Good drills fella, you've set a new low.
We all have strong opinions about these matters but to simply accuse the bereaved, on an open forum, of just being money grabbers is pretty sickening. If that's the sort of person you really are then the military is certainly better off without you.
Time to get back to the golf course to reminisce about great and important you never were.
We all have strong opinions about these matters but to simply accuse the bereaved, on an open forum, of just being money grabbers is pretty sickening. If that's the sort of person you really are then the military is certainly better off without you.
Time to get back to the golf course to reminisce about great and important you never were.
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TD:
It is a military jet, TD. So, when necessary, we have to do military things and we move into a different category of risk analysis. There's not much more that can be said about this on this forum.
Gp Capt Hickman is an engineer. He is not an air engineer. They are two different specialisations, with different skill sets.
Ed
I had to point out to him that Nimrods have to take off and land at very low levels especially in that northern DOB .
Gp Capt Hickman is an engineer. He is not an air engineer. They are two different specialisations, with different skill sets.
Ed
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Incidentally, if the Coroner is to be believed, the cause of the accident was not related to AAR. Do you believe him? I don't.
I've stayed away from this thread for a while but if this is the coroners conclusion the whole process was pretty much useless.(if flight safety was the issue)
I don't know the flight profile but I'm pretty sure the differential pressure across the fuel feed lines was lower at the AAR altitude than it had been for other phases of the flight and therefore a leak occurring at that time from a feed line was less likely than during the previous 1:40 flight time.
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Bout15 said:
And before you know-alls get on your high horses - I played golf today with one of the 2 best Air Engineers in the fleet who attended the inquest - what he doesn't know about Nimrod systems you can write on the back of a stamp, and he is happy to keep flying
And what about the other Air Engineers and in fact other aircrew who have quit already due to their fears of safety?
Surely out of all on a crew the Air Eng knows more about the aircraft systems than most on the crew (dependent upon experience obviously as there are some very knowledgeable guys flying the jet), therefore they would be deemed to be in the best position to make such a judgment.
You are a horses ass and, in my own opinion, typical of your kind. Arrogant, know it all and brash beyond comprehension.
Go away small man and don't come back.
And before you know-alls get on your high horses - I played golf today with one of the 2 best Air Engineers in the fleet who attended the inquest - what he doesn't know about Nimrod systems you can write on the back of a stamp, and he is happy to keep flying
And what about the other Air Engineers and in fact other aircrew who have quit already due to their fears of safety?
Surely out of all on a crew the Air Eng knows more about the aircraft systems than most on the crew (dependent upon experience obviously as there are some very knowledgeable guys flying the jet), therefore they would be deemed to be in the best position to make such a judgment.
You are a horses ass and, in my own opinion, typical of your kind. Arrogant, know it all and brash beyond comprehension.
Go away small man and don't come back.
Oilcan
I should reiterate that I am neither a Nimrod person nor an engineer. But I have been hearing some of the evidence. This is my view of some of what you ask.
Yes, but running engines suggests refuelling, which would keep the AAR/refuel gallery wetted. I suppose in the absence of that, you could insert a requirement to defuel and refuel after a certain period of inactivity. (Merely a suggestion on my part)
I'm not really able to comment sensibly on your other point
Except to say that the 'drying out after 5 days' evidence came from the coupling manufacturer, FRS. I don't think 'antidet' procedures came up in evidence, but Gp Capt Hickman (ex IPTL and current airworthiness delegation holder for MR2) did talk about checks on the seals every 30 days which involved visual checks and, where pipes are empty, blowing air thorough them and listening for whistling leaks. This was greeted with a certain amount of derision.
I hope that helps - I'd love to spend more time on it, but I'm way behind on my day job after the days at the inquest..... sorry.
airsound
PS I think EdSet answered your query on the video.
I should reiterate that I am neither a Nimrod person nor an engineer. But I have been hearing some of the evidence. This is my view of some of what you ask.
Running engines will use the ‘feed’ gallery, how can this prevent seals in the AAR/refuel gallery from drying out? They are completely separate galleries.
I'm not really able to comment sensibly on your other point
Prolonged maintenance beyond 5 days is a regular occurrence. Any degradation of seals in the AAR/refuel gallery would become apparent during the next ground refuel and/or preparation for the next flight. Fuel feed seals would remain submersed because the tank isolation cocks are closed afterthe engines have been shut down, thereby trapping fuel in the feed gallery. After a certain period of inactivity (7 days ISTR), then a procedure of antidet runs, or in the case of scheduled maintenance, post recovery checks are required specifically to guard against such degradation. I fail to see how any ‘dried’ seals would go undetected.
I hope that helps - I'd love to spend more time on it, but I'm way behind on my day job after the days at the inquest..... sorry.
airsound
PS I think EdSet answered your query on the video.
Last edited by airsound; 26th May 2008 at 11:04. Reason: Forgot the video.... doh
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Im shocked by bouy15 comments and I apoligise from all the people at ISK for one persons harsh view of the situation. As a senior officer retired, it is probably one of you lot that have got ISK to where it is now, and rather than stay in have balls to fight changes you sit and mock people who have done nothing personally to you. Hang head in shame
I think an unexpected fuel dump over a certain golf course may change your views
I think an unexpected fuel dump over a certain golf course may change your views
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Ed Set, you said before that if Hickman described the fleet risk as tolerable but not ALARP then you were in trouble. You suggested that his evidence was being misrepresented. Well, you now know that, this is exactly what he said, and there is no regulation which allows for the fleet to be described as airworthy. ( Sunday Times would have run that article through their lawyers). I have read transcripts of Hickman's evidence and he appeared to confuse tolerable risk with tolerably safe.
In your view, now that you can be assured that the fleet is not ALARP and will not be until the end of the year at the earliest, would you agree that the fleet cannot be described as airworthy?
TD's point, I believe, is that he understands the need for Nimtod to continue live ops, but he cannot support the stance taken by Torpy, Thornton, Ainsworth and Browne, that the Nimrod is safe to fly and airworthy.
We all want honesty here and many do not believe we are getting it.
If Nimrod crews are happy to fly with increased risk then so be it, but do not ignore 3 weeks worth of evidence in doing so and falsely representing the position with regard to military airworthiness regulations.
In your view, now that you can be assured that the fleet is not ALARP and will not be until the end of the year at the earliest, would you agree that the fleet cannot be described as airworthy?
TD's point, I believe, is that he understands the need for Nimtod to continue live ops, but he cannot support the stance taken by Torpy, Thornton, Ainsworth and Browne, that the Nimrod is safe to fly and airworthy.
We all want honesty here and many do not believe we are getting it.
If Nimrod crews are happy to fly with increased risk then so be it, but do not ignore 3 weeks worth of evidence in doing so and falsely representing the position with regard to military airworthiness regulations.
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Re the ALARP issue, which given the fact that AAR is not taking place and the source of ignition in the No 7 Tank dry Bay has been isolated, is surely the most immediate issue, ppruners might be interested in this press release from Angus Robertson:
NIMROD MP WRITES TO MOD DEMANDING SAFETY UPDATE
The Westminster SNP leader Angus Robertson MP, who represents the home base of the Nimrod fleet RAF Kinloss, has written to the Ministry of Defence demanding a safety update on the aircraft.
His letter to Defence Secretary Des Browne follows a Coroners Inquest recommending that the fleet be grounded owing to safety concerns in the wake of the tragic loss of Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan.
Last week Mr Browne confirmed in writing to Angus Robertson MP that not all safety requirements for the Nimrod aircraft had been implemented.
Now Mr Robertson has asked for a status report from the MOD to establish which safety requirements had been implemented, which have not and when they will be completed.
Speaking about his call for an update Mr Robertson said: "Despite the findings of a Coroner the Ministry of Defence has decided not to ground the Nimrod fleet and Ministers say they are satisfied with safety arrangements.
"They have said this although they know that the risk levels to the aircraft are not as low as is reasonably practicable.
"The MOD must now confirm which of 30 key safety recommendations have been implemented in full, which have not and when all safety measures are scheduled to be completed in full.
"Defence Ministers must get a grip of the situation and restore confidence in their own assessments.
"The talented and hardworking military and civilian staff at RAF Kinloss and their families deserve better leadership and management from the MOD."
Background - Letter to Defence Secretary Des Browne MP (26 May 2008)
Many thanks for your letter of 19th May 2008 relating to the QinetiQ report Nimrod Fuel System Safety Review Report dated October 2007 which was recently released under the Freedom of Information Act.
Under the rules of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), for an aircraft to be safe the risk must have been 'reduced to a level that is ALARP (as low as is reasonably practicable) and broadly acceptable or tolerable'.
According to the QinetiQ report only half this condition was in place in the Nimrod fleet - while the risk associated with the aircraft was tolerable "the level of risk present to the fuel system is not ALARP".
In your letter you confirmed that: "Of the 30 safety recommendations contained in the QinetiQ report: 21 have been accepted and are being implemented; 3 are being considered for implementation and a further 6 are on hold as they relate to Air-to-Air Refuelling. Following the leak incident on Nimrod XV235 on 5 November 2007, all Air-to-Air Refuelling on the Nimrod fleet was suspended. This suspension remains in force".
Please could you make a status report on all 24 recommendations which do not relate to Air-to-Air refuelling? How many have been implemented in full already? When specifically do you expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?
The answer to these questions will be of relevance to the independent review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the Royal Air Force Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006 being conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC and I have sent him a copy of this correspondence.
The Westminster SNP leader Angus Robertson MP, who represents the home base of the Nimrod fleet RAF Kinloss, has written to the Ministry of Defence demanding a safety update on the aircraft.
His letter to Defence Secretary Des Browne follows a Coroners Inquest recommending that the fleet be grounded owing to safety concerns in the wake of the tragic loss of Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan.
Last week Mr Browne confirmed in writing to Angus Robertson MP that not all safety requirements for the Nimrod aircraft had been implemented.
Now Mr Robertson has asked for a status report from the MOD to establish which safety requirements had been implemented, which have not and when they will be completed.
Speaking about his call for an update Mr Robertson said: "Despite the findings of a Coroner the Ministry of Defence has decided not to ground the Nimrod fleet and Ministers say they are satisfied with safety arrangements.
"They have said this although they know that the risk levels to the aircraft are not as low as is reasonably practicable.
"The MOD must now confirm which of 30 key safety recommendations have been implemented in full, which have not and when all safety measures are scheduled to be completed in full.
"Defence Ministers must get a grip of the situation and restore confidence in their own assessments.
"The talented and hardworking military and civilian staff at RAF Kinloss and their families deserve better leadership and management from the MOD."
Background - Letter to Defence Secretary Des Browne MP (26 May 2008)
Many thanks for your letter of 19th May 2008 relating to the QinetiQ report Nimrod Fuel System Safety Review Report dated October 2007 which was recently released under the Freedom of Information Act.
Under the rules of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), for an aircraft to be safe the risk must have been 'reduced to a level that is ALARP (as low as is reasonably practicable) and broadly acceptable or tolerable'.
According to the QinetiQ report only half this condition was in place in the Nimrod fleet - while the risk associated with the aircraft was tolerable "the level of risk present to the fuel system is not ALARP".
In your letter you confirmed that: "Of the 30 safety recommendations contained in the QinetiQ report: 21 have been accepted and are being implemented; 3 are being considered for implementation and a further 6 are on hold as they relate to Air-to-Air Refuelling. Following the leak incident on Nimrod XV235 on 5 November 2007, all Air-to-Air Refuelling on the Nimrod fleet was suspended. This suspension remains in force".
Please could you make a status report on all 24 recommendations which do not relate to Air-to-Air refuelling? How many have been implemented in full already? When specifically do you expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?
The answer to these questions will be of relevance to the independent review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the Royal Air Force Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006 being conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave QC and I have sent him a copy of this correspondence.
Last edited by Mick Smith; 26th May 2008 at 13:45.
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Nimrod fleet has faults, MoD admits in private
Nimrod fleet has faults, MoD admits in private
By Andy Bloxham
Last Updated: 9:42PM BST 25/05/2008
The Ministry of Defence has privately acknowledged that the RAF's ageing Nimrod fleet is riddled with faults despite its public insistence that the aircraft is safe.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2028...n-private.html
By Andy Bloxham
Last Updated: 9:42PM BST 25/05/2008
The Ministry of Defence has privately acknowledged that the RAF's ageing Nimrod fleet is riddled with faults despite its public insistence that the aircraft is safe.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2028...n-private.html
The ALARP debate & therefore the accusation of being misleading about safety appears to have been caught up in some of the statements in the QQ report recommendations. To take one quoted above, relating to the Min Master Eqt List (MMEL) recommendation, you could argue that whilst this is an important activity, the impact on the current aircraft risk whether this is done now, or say in Dec 2008 is zero. You can argue this should not impact your decision to fly or not.
It should be remembered that I don't think SoS ever mentioned ALARP when saying it way safe, and I don't think anyone from the MoD has stated ALARP=safe, or not ALARP=unsafe. To say not ALARP=unsafe is a potentially misleading overly simple interpretation of the quoted safety guidance which has a table which states "not ALARP = unacceptable". An important factor that has not been discussed much here, but as Tuc has posted above, relates to "can you fly when you don't (yet) comply?"
You can see this can easily apply to the MMEL issue as it doesn't directly impact safety. Indeed in the case of TWA800 etc. many aircraft continued to fly with extant risks and 10+ years have passed with some recommendations not having been implemented in civil aircraft. To me the MMEL is not really an ALARP issue, and this I think is making things more complicated than they need to be.
The one area where it seems you could have a debate on extant risks relates to the seals issue. At the moment I'm not convinced either way on the seal debate to be honest as there is not enough information around. That is not to say the IPT don't have enough information to make that call - I assume they do.
On the one hand you can say any seal can leak at any time, so the aircraft design must take this into account, which it now appears to - on this basis the aircraft can be considered safe (as long as its maintained correctly which no-one seems to be doubting etc.).
On the other hand there are all these snippets of information about EATON said this wasn't safe, IPTL ignored and took BAES advice etc. Care must also be taken as these companies will be extremely risk averse and will not want to be associated with any percieved mistakes in this case. If you look on the EATON website they go to great lengths to say how they have fuel rigs and can help aircraft manufacturers design systems etc. Who's to say they didn't do that with Nimrod/BAES and but now want to distance themselves from any liability?
It should be remembered that I don't think SoS ever mentioned ALARP when saying it way safe, and I don't think anyone from the MoD has stated ALARP=safe, or not ALARP=unsafe. To say not ALARP=unsafe is a potentially misleading overly simple interpretation of the quoted safety guidance which has a table which states "not ALARP = unacceptable". An important factor that has not been discussed much here, but as Tuc has posted above, relates to "can you fly when you don't (yet) comply?"
I have touched on this before and I can offer what I have done when faced with similar situations. The general principle is that you are given a “reasonable time” to comply.
The one area where it seems you could have a debate on extant risks relates to the seals issue. At the moment I'm not convinced either way on the seal debate to be honest as there is not enough information around. That is not to say the IPT don't have enough information to make that call - I assume they do.
On the one hand you can say any seal can leak at any time, so the aircraft design must take this into account, which it now appears to - on this basis the aircraft can be considered safe (as long as its maintained correctly which no-one seems to be doubting etc.).
On the other hand there are all these snippets of information about EATON said this wasn't safe, IPTL ignored and took BAES advice etc. Care must also be taken as these companies will be extremely risk averse and will not want to be associated with any percieved mistakes in this case. If you look on the EATON website they go to great lengths to say how they have fuel rigs and can help aircraft manufacturers design systems etc. Who's to say they didn't do that with Nimrod/BAES and but now want to distance themselves from any liability?
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Nigegilb:
Thats because Def Stan 00-56 Part 2/4 (Tuc's message #590) indicates that the risk cannot be signed off.
yes.
On the face of it, yes.
Which is regrettable if that is the case.
I would agree, if Gp Capt Hickman was correct with his risk assessment. IMHO, the risk meets the "Broadly Acceptable" standard, as defined in the JSP, due to additional aircrew measures in place, as indicated by Air Cdre Beber. This means that while ALARP is not satisfied, attempts must be made to make it so, in order to sign it off. This is what we are doing.
Ed
Ed Set, you said before that if Hickman described the fleet risk as tolerable but not ALARP then you were in trouble.
Well, you now know that, this is exactly what he said
and there is no regulation which allows for the fleet to be described as airworthy. ( Sunday Times would have run that article through their lawyers).
he appeared to confuse tolerable risk with tolerably safe.
would you agree that the fleet cannot be described as airworthy?
Ed
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Nimrod fleet has faults, MoD admits in private
Ed
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Thanks Ed, we are in agreement. Hickman also suggested that money was an issue. Comes down to who has been advising CAS.
Ainsworth's reply to the Coroner's verdict was insultingly fast, something he might regret.
Clarity is now needed from Mod.
The reason I have quoted newspapers ranging from The Sun to the Guardian is because they represent the full range of political opinion.
Many people are coming to the conclusion that the MoD cannot be trusted-period. The RAF is now being damaged in the same way.
Someone needs to take the big picture view concerning the damage being done to the military here. The MoD appears to have blood on its hands and it is still in denial. Many mothers and fathers will be watching and deciding that they do not wish to place the lives of their sons and daughters in the hands of the RAF or MoD.
I hope the SNP MP gets an honest answer to his well pitched questions.
An awful lot depends on it.
Ainsworth's reply to the Coroner's verdict was insultingly fast, something he might regret.
Clarity is now needed from Mod.
The reason I have quoted newspapers ranging from The Sun to the Guardian is because they represent the full range of political opinion.
Many people are coming to the conclusion that the MoD cannot be trusted-period. The RAF is now being damaged in the same way.
Someone needs to take the big picture view concerning the damage being done to the military here. The MoD appears to have blood on its hands and it is still in denial. Many mothers and fathers will be watching and deciding that they do not wish to place the lives of their sons and daughters in the hands of the RAF or MoD.
I hope the SNP MP gets an honest answer to his well pitched questions.
An awful lot depends on it.
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It's not so much that AAR was ruled, it's just that through the evidence several experts stated that fuel coming into contact with the SCP pipe would be unlikely but not impossible.
The coroner had to try and define as the most probable cause what events led to the loss of 230. He began with the possibility of the blow off from 1 tank, however all evidence suggested this was not likely to track along and enter 7 dry bay, but it was not ruled in factors which sustatined the fire.
If there were a pool fire caused by fuel from the blow off this would have burned for approximately 100 seconds and then gone out as the fuel would have been burnt away, there had to have been a further cause which was needed to sustain the fire. When looking at a possible leak from the refuel/defuel system, it was stated that this would not be likely as those pipes are below the SCP and would not come into contact with the pipe. If it had been a spurt of fuel it would need to have soaked into the lagging on the pipe, but again the problem comes in that once AAR had been completed, the amount of fuel in that system would not be enough to sustain the fire.
It was asked, by a family member, if the fire burned for 100 seconds would this be enough to heat the fuel in 7 tank to a point where it would boil and pressurise, the answer was yes. Then they asked if 7 tank pressurised would this have caused a vent or blow off, again the answer was yes. 7 tank feeds to 1 tank, it was proved that as well as venting, fuel would have been fed to 1 tank due to the pressure. The vent and feed pipes are above the SCP and it was shown that fuel at this time would be in a constant flow through those systems and was most likely where the fuel to sustain the fire came from. It was also agreed by experts present and by members of the BoI panel, that the vented fuel would have ignited as the flames would be in contact with that area, that the feed system to 1 tank from 7 tank would likely to have been breached and with fuel feeding to 1 tank, if that had over pressurised and blown off it would now be venting at a constant rate, so also able to fuel the fire.
I doubt I've explained that too well at the moment, forgive the fact as I have a mad 3 year old wanting my attention.
The misalignment of pipes was listed by Eaton Aerospace as highest fuel leak cause with failed coupling or seal at the bottom. Pipes are aligned by hand and as was stated by a witness it can be difficult to do so when reaching high above the head and into an area with a great deal of pipes and cables. It was not specified which pipes had been found misaligned, it was found that two pipes on one plane were misalinged after 230 when all Nimrods were checked.
The actual definition GP CPT Hickman gave for the Nimrod now is not ALARP at present but they are working towards that standard by the end of year and it is tolerably safe.
The coroner had to try and define as the most probable cause what events led to the loss of 230. He began with the possibility of the blow off from 1 tank, however all evidence suggested this was not likely to track along and enter 7 dry bay, but it was not ruled in factors which sustatined the fire.
If there were a pool fire caused by fuel from the blow off this would have burned for approximately 100 seconds and then gone out as the fuel would have been burnt away, there had to have been a further cause which was needed to sustain the fire. When looking at a possible leak from the refuel/defuel system, it was stated that this would not be likely as those pipes are below the SCP and would not come into contact with the pipe. If it had been a spurt of fuel it would need to have soaked into the lagging on the pipe, but again the problem comes in that once AAR had been completed, the amount of fuel in that system would not be enough to sustain the fire.
It was asked, by a family member, if the fire burned for 100 seconds would this be enough to heat the fuel in 7 tank to a point where it would boil and pressurise, the answer was yes. Then they asked if 7 tank pressurised would this have caused a vent or blow off, again the answer was yes. 7 tank feeds to 1 tank, it was proved that as well as venting, fuel would have been fed to 1 tank due to the pressure. The vent and feed pipes are above the SCP and it was shown that fuel at this time would be in a constant flow through those systems and was most likely where the fuel to sustain the fire came from. It was also agreed by experts present and by members of the BoI panel, that the vented fuel would have ignited as the flames would be in contact with that area, that the feed system to 1 tank from 7 tank would likely to have been breached and with fuel feeding to 1 tank, if that had over pressurised and blown off it would now be venting at a constant rate, so also able to fuel the fire.
I doubt I've explained that too well at the moment, forgive the fact as I have a mad 3 year old wanting my attention.
The misalignment of pipes was listed by Eaton Aerospace as highest fuel leak cause with failed coupling or seal at the bottom. Pipes are aligned by hand and as was stated by a witness it can be difficult to do so when reaching high above the head and into an area with a great deal of pipes and cables. It was not specified which pipes had been found misaligned, it was found that two pipes on one plane were misalinged after 230 when all Nimrods were checked.
The actual definition GP CPT Hickman gave for the Nimrod now is not ALARP at present but they are working towards that standard by the end of year and it is tolerably safe.
Cool Mod
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buoy15
Is taking a well earned ban after making his disgraceful remarks. I cannot imagine a worse case of contempt for the families than his - should he attempt another such post he will be gone - permanently.
I regret that we didn't pick it up sooner.
Is taking a well earned ban after making his disgraceful remarks. I cannot imagine a worse case of contempt for the families than his - should he attempt another such post he will be gone - permanently.
I regret that we didn't pick it up sooner.
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Air Marshal Sir Barry Thornton, Chief of Materiel (Air), said:
"I can assure you that the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Air Force place the highest priority on airworthiness and the safety of our personnel in the air and those we support in operations in the ground. We would not ask our personnel to fly in aircraft we did not believe were safe."
What about the last 30 odd years prior to XV230 crash Bob Answorth is on record as saying it was not airworthy during this time ?? So they did ask personnel to fly in aircraft which were not safe !!!!!!!!!
Safe to fly and airworthy are not the same thing !!!!!!
Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, Chief of the Air Staff, had reaffirmed that the Nimrod was airworthy “and that we are dealing with all the issues raised by this incident”.
Didn't he say in the Panorama Programme in June 2007 that"AAR was as safe as it needed to be".
In December 2007 we had a Nimrod declare a Mayday following AAR with fuel pouring into the Bomb Bay.
Put your trust in these people if you like but the evidence speaks for itself.
"I can assure you that the Ministry of Defence and the Royal Air Force place the highest priority on airworthiness and the safety of our personnel in the air and those we support in operations in the ground. We would not ask our personnel to fly in aircraft we did not believe were safe."
What about the last 30 odd years prior to XV230 crash Bob Answorth is on record as saying it was not airworthy during this time ?? So they did ask personnel to fly in aircraft which were not safe !!!!!!!!!
Safe to fly and airworthy are not the same thing !!!!!!
Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy, Chief of the Air Staff, had reaffirmed that the Nimrod was airworthy “and that we are dealing with all the issues raised by this incident”.
Didn't he say in the Panorama Programme in June 2007 that"AAR was as safe as it needed to be".
In December 2007 we had a Nimrod declare a Mayday following AAR with fuel pouring into the Bomb Bay.
Put your trust in these people if you like but the evidence speaks for itself.