Future Carrier (Including Costs)
First off, you have to understand that the Amazonas class sold to Brazil originated as Coastguard vessels for Trinidad and Tobago. For a variety of reasons, they pulled out of the contract, leaving BVT (as was) with three ships on their hands they wanted to get rid of. Hence they were sold at a bit of a knockdown price.
Second off - the RCB2 built for the RN were done so as part of the infamous ToBA, which was supposed to guarantee BVT (by now BAE) a workstream in return for closing some of their capacity. The need to have something to build came as a bit of a short-notice event, when it became clear that the T26 design and associated build cost was causing a huge game of chicken between BAE and HMG, which was likely to result in the steel trades on the Clyde being paid to stand around looking idle (normal jogging). That meant they needed something that did not need lots of design doing, so they hit upon the wizard wheeze of going for the Amazonas and badging it as RCB2.
Trouble was, the T&T coastguard and the Brazilian navy don't operate to the same safety standards as the RN, at which point the DMR and the Naval Authority hove into view demanding changes to the design to ensure compliance with stability standards, fire safety, explosive safety, escape and evacuation etc. Which required design changes. All of which cost time and money and incurred cost while the steel trades waited.
That's why there was the cost differential - less to do with UK "procurement" per se, than what at the time was the industrial strategy and the regulatory environment.
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Your River class example is also a little awry - and the cost increase there attributable to a number of things unrelated to UK "procurement".
First off, you have to understand that the Amazonas class sold to Brazil originated as Coastguard vessels for Trinidad and Tobago. For a variety of reasons, they pulled out of the contract, leaving BVT (as was) with three ships on their hands they wanted to get rid of. Hence they were sold at a bit of a knockdown price.
Second off - the RCB2 built for the RN were done so as part of the infamous ToBA, which was supposed to guarantee BVT (by now BAE) a workstream in return for closing some of their capacity. The need to have something to build came as a bit of a short-notice event, when it became clear that the T26 design and associated build cost was causing a huge game of chicken between BAE and HMG, which was likely to result in the steel trades on the Clyde being paid to stand around looking idle (normal jogging). That meant they needed something that did not need lots of design doing, so they hit upon the wizard wheeze of going for the Amazonas and badging it as RCB2.
Trouble was, the T&T coastguard and the Brazilian navy don't operate to the same safety standards as the RN, at which point the DMR and the Naval Authority hove into view demanding changes to the design to ensure compliance with stability standards, fire safety, explosive safety, escape and evacuation etc. Which required design changes. All of which cost time and money and incurred cost while the steel trades waited.
That's why there was the cost differential - less to do with UK "procurement" per se, than what at the time was the industrial strategy and the regulatory environment.
First off, you have to understand that the Amazonas class sold to Brazil originated as Coastguard vessels for Trinidad and Tobago. For a variety of reasons, they pulled out of the contract, leaving BVT (as was) with three ships on their hands they wanted to get rid of. Hence they were sold at a bit of a knockdown price.
Second off - the RCB2 built for the RN were done so as part of the infamous ToBA, which was supposed to guarantee BVT (by now BAE) a workstream in return for closing some of their capacity. The need to have something to build came as a bit of a short-notice event, when it became clear that the T26 design and associated build cost was causing a huge game of chicken between BAE and HMG, which was likely to result in the steel trades on the Clyde being paid to stand around looking idle (normal jogging). That meant they needed something that did not need lots of design doing, so they hit upon the wizard wheeze of going for the Amazonas and badging it as RCB2.
Trouble was, the T&T coastguard and the Brazilian navy don't operate to the same safety standards as the RN, at which point the DMR and the Naval Authority hove into view demanding changes to the design to ensure compliance with stability standards, fire safety, explosive safety, escape and evacuation etc. Which required design changes. All of which cost time and money and incurred cost while the steel trades waited.
That's why there was the cost differential - less to do with UK "procurement" per se, than what at the time was the industrial strategy and the regulatory environment.
Agree that the Industrial Strategy wasn't brilliantly handled - the builders could see then coming a long way off. (see Harland & Wolff right now) - but they were a lot more expensive than planned even so. And of course they then decided that a Merlin helicopter would be nice for the follow-on vessels. Constant pressure to increase size and complexity. I'm sure these Arsenal ships would turn out the same.
Agree that the Industrial Strategy wasn't brilliantly handled - the builders could see then coming a long way off. (see Harland & Wolff right now) - but they were a lot more expensive than planned even so. And of course they then decided that a Merlin helicopter would be nice for the follow-on vessels. Constant pressure to increase size and complexity. I'm sure these Arsenal ships would turn out the same.
15% heavier, 12% longer, Cost was £ 116 - £ 140 mm each - average £ 127 mm more or less
River 1's cost £150 mm in total lease and purchase costs I think for 3 vessels so £ ~ £50mm apiece. the Brazilian versions of the type 1 cost £ 44 mm each
At least 29 changes were made in the changing the design from the Amazonas - the helicopter required a flying control position, a new landing grid and mods to refuelling and in flight refueling provision.
What is really weird was that they were supposed to be used to "iron-out" snags in the delivery of the T26's. but "Glasgow" has been building for over 7 years.
River 1's cost £150 mm in total lease and purchase costs I think for 3 vessels so £ ~ £50mm apiece. the Brazilian versions of the type 1 cost £ 44 mm each
At least 29 changes were made in the changing the design from the Amazonas - the helicopter required a flying control position, a new landing grid and mods to refuelling and in flight refueling provision.
What is really weird was that they were supposed to be used to "iron-out" snags in the delivery of the T26's. but "Glasgow" has been building for over 7 years.
Last edited by Asturias56; 26th Jun 2024 at 08:10.
15% heavier, 12% longer, Cost was £ 116 - £ 140 mm each - average £ 127 mm more or less
River 1's cost £150 mm in total lease and purchase costs I think for 3 vessels so £ ~ £50mm apiece. the Brazilian versions of the type 1 cost £ 44 mm each
At least 29 changes were made in the changing the design from the Amazonas - the helicopter required a flying control position, a new landing grid and mods to refuelling and in flight refueling provision.
What is really weird was that they were supposed to be used to "iron-out" snags in the delivery of the T26's. but "Glasgow" has been building for over 7 years.
River 1's cost £150 mm in total lease and purchase costs I think for 3 vessels so £ ~ £50mm apiece. the Brazilian versions of the type 1 cost £ 44 mm each
At least 29 changes were made in the changing the design from the Amazonas - the helicopter required a flying control position, a new landing grid and mods to refuelling and in flight refueling provision.
What is really weird was that they were supposed to be used to "iron-out" snags in the delivery of the T26's. but "Glasgow" has been building for over 7 years.
As for ironing out snags in T26 delivery, no-one credible would have believed that. The RCB2 and T26 are incomparable in complexity and systems among other things.
the bit about the T26's came from Conrad Waters - the Editor of World Naval Review. The idea seems to have been to perfect the systems for moving and assembling different bits in one place. Of course it's probably just some flim-flam to explain why it was given to Scotland. Hasn't worked out too well.
According to James Cartlidge in January the averaged costs per vessel were very similar
Being of a certain age, the RN I joined had several classes/sub-classes based on and including the original Type 12 hull (Torquay was still in commission), 12M (Rothesays), and 12I (Leanders) - Batch 1, Batch 2, and Broadbeam - all of which had been further subdivided. My point being having a common hull doesn't mean they are the same vessel with the same role. The Batch Ones were primarily purchased to replace the Island class FPVs with a more capable vessel, and theoretically the Castle Class (an orphan class originally supposed to replace the Islands but defence cuts led to only 2 being built); that replacement ended up being the the one-off HMS Clyde, which like the Castles had a flight deck. As N_A_B said the Port of Spain/Amazonas Class was a budget version to fill a coast guard role. The Batch Twos, irrespective of the industry politics, enabled the RN to perform a policing, support of civil power role both more economically and without having to use increasingly scarce escorts off their main tasking. Another advantage which fits the forward deployment role is 66% longer endurance than the Batch Ones.
N_A_B my understanding is that Amazonas and River Batch 2 have the same length (90.5 m) and nominal displacement (2000 tons) - happy to be corrected.
The report stems from a pro-Global Britain think tank, like all think tanks it states its research is rigorous, independent and policy-driven. Its funders include many who would benefit from a bigger better armed RN. The fact is until the next strategic review and a dose of the fiscal realities which both the currently major parties are ignoring, it's all a digital fantasty fleet wish list.
On a slightly different point, as I said in February regarding a proposed T32 design:
- The contract for the three Batch 1 vessels had a value of £378 million = £126 million per vessel (not sure how this works as Lease 1 £50million, Lease 2 £52, exercising of buy clause £39) - Launched 2002-2003
- The contract for the five Batch 2 vessels had a value of £635 million = £127 million per vessel - Launched 2016-2019
Being of a certain age, the RN I joined had several classes/sub-classes based on and including the original Type 12 hull (Torquay was still in commission), 12M (Rothesays), and 12I (Leanders) - Batch 1, Batch 2, and Broadbeam - all of which had been further subdivided. My point being having a common hull doesn't mean they are the same vessel with the same role. The Batch Ones were primarily purchased to replace the Island class FPVs with a more capable vessel, and theoretically the Castle Class (an orphan class originally supposed to replace the Islands but defence cuts led to only 2 being built); that replacement ended up being the the one-off HMS Clyde, which like the Castles had a flight deck. As N_A_B said the Port of Spain/Amazonas Class was a budget version to fill a coast guard role. The Batch Twos, irrespective of the industry politics, enabled the RN to perform a policing, support of civil power role both more economically and without having to use increasingly scarce escorts off their main tasking. Another advantage which fits the forward deployment role is 66% longer endurance than the Batch Ones.
N_A_B my understanding is that Amazonas and River Batch 2 have the same length (90.5 m) and nominal displacement (2000 tons) - happy to be corrected.
The report stems from a pro-Global Britain think tank, like all think tanks it states its research is rigorous, independent and policy-driven. Its funders include many who would benefit from a bigger better armed RN. The fact is until the next strategic review and a dose of the fiscal realities which both the currently major parties are ignoring, it's all a digital fantasty fleet wish list.
On a slightly different point, as I said in February regarding a proposed T32 design:
A crew of 50 (presumably 'core crew' i.e. supplemented by specialists for the 'autonomous systems' or a crewed aerial vehicle) is all fine and dandy but when spread across Cruising or Defence watchbills how will it be sustained? There is research that suggests a three watch system is the most sustainable for crew effectiveness and, physical and mental health.
the bit about the T26's came from Conrad Waters - the Editor of World Naval Review. The idea seems to have been to perfect the systems for moving and assembling different bits in one place. Of course it's probably just some flim-flam to explain why it was given to Scotland. Hasn't worked out too well.
There was no flim-flam whatsoever in awarding the contract to the Clyde. As per previous posts it was an explicit provision of the ToBA, which in turn was enabled by the closure of the Portsmouth shipbuilding facility (a BAES decision).
I was comparing the River Batch 1's s with the Batch 2's - I made a specific reference to "follow-on vessels"
Type Offshore patrol vessel Displacement Length Beam Draught Batch 1: 3.8 m (12 ft 6 in)[1]
Type Offshore patrol vessel Displacement Length Beam Draught Batch 1: 3.8 m (12 ft 6 in)[1]
- Bush, Steve (2014). British Warships and Auxiliaries. Maritime Books. pp. 23–24. ISBN 978-1904459552.
- Offshore Patrol Vessels". BAE Systems. Retrieved 2 August 2016.
- Royal Navy. Retrieved 2 August 2016.
- "Construction begins on new Royal Navy warships". BAE Systems (Press release). Retrieved 2 August 2016.
- Ministry of Defence (10 October 2014). "First steel cut on new patrol ships". gov.uk (Press release). Retrieved 2 August 2016.
Why? You're talking about two different classes separated by well over a decade?
Comparing RCB1 to Amazonas is daft given the history.
You appeared to be comparing RCB2 to Amazonas, which would be more sensible given their origin and relative proximity, but cost differences explained by the factors I outlined earlier.
I'm afraid your logic is impenetrable.....
Comparing RCB1 to Amazonas is daft given the history.
You appeared to be comparing RCB2 to Amazonas, which would be more sensible given their origin and relative proximity, but cost differences explained by the factors I outlined earlier.
I'm afraid your logic is impenetrable.....
The point was that the newer ones are bigger and more expensive and that's a common trend. Any "Arsenal Ships" will start out as being (relatively) simple and low cost but its unlikely that they'll finish up that way.
Anyway what's a decade in UK procurement - especially for warships?
Perhaps we can wander back to carriers.... wherever they are
Anyway what's a decade in UK procurement - especially for warships?
Perhaps we can wander back to carriers.... wherever they are
IMO the trend is more to be forced into initially buying something cheap and inadequately equipped by the bean counters of the House of Darkness until they can be convinced to release more money to make a cost effective version. I hark back half a century to the Type 42 which budgetary constraints forced to be too small, under armed, and lacking resistance to action damage. I still remember my father ranting on about the PVC cabling vs the fire resistant multiple independent wiring runs of the ships of the previous generation that shared their names.
Back to the carrier question, PoW was subject to some tug assisted movement earlier this week. I think we all know where QE is. Lord Torrington's concept of the fleet in being is still as relevant as in 1690. Now one seems to moan about military aircraft spending most of the time on the ground.
Anyway this was just an excuse to mention that CNS Esmeralda (the Chiliean Navy's four masted training barquentine) is scheduled to arrive in Pompey tomorrow evening. She is on a six month training voyage with 94 mids. onboard and a number of officers from other navies. She is calling at twelve ports in nine countries, most recently Brest.
Correction: she will anchor overnight at Spithead and enter port on Monday
Back to the carrier question, PoW was subject to some tug assisted movement earlier this week. I think we all know where QE is. Lord Torrington's concept of the fleet in being is still as relevant as in 1690. Now one seems to moan about military aircraft spending most of the time on the ground.
Anyway this was just an excuse to mention that CNS Esmeralda (the Chiliean Navy's four masted training barquentine) is scheduled to arrive in Pompey tomorrow evening. She is on a six month training voyage with 94 mids. onboard and a number of officers from other navies. She is calling at twelve ports in nine countries, most recently Brest.
Correction: she will anchor overnight at Spithead and enter port on Monday
King's Harbour Master Portsmouth
GUN SALUTE – CHILEAN NAVY WARSHIP 1 JULY 2024
LNTM No 81/24
1. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by the King's Harbour Master Portsmouth that a 19 Gun salute will be conducted by the CNS “Esmeralda”, to celebrate her arrival for a formal five-day visit to the City of Portsmouth on Monday 1 July 2024.
2. The vessel will commence the ceremonial salute as she transits north from Outer Spit Buoy (OSB) at approx. 0930 on her inbound passage toward the War Memorial, Southsea seafront, completing at approx. 0940.
3. To ensure safety during the firing, as allowed in the provisions of the Dockyard Port of Portsmouth Order 2005, KHM will impose a dynamic exclusion zone of 100 metres around the ship in all directions for all marine traffic during her transit from the OSB to the vicinity of the Southsea War Memorial. Mariners are to remain clear of this exclusion zone.
4. A sécurité broadcast will be made on VHF Channel 11 by KHM enacting the exclusion zone with a further broadcast to disestablish the exclusion zone immediately on completion of the event.
5. Cancel this Local Notice to Mariners 2 July 2024.
GUN SALUTE – CHILEAN NAVY WARSHIP 1 JULY 2024
LNTM No 81/24 1. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by the King's Harbour Master Portsmouth that a 19 Gun salute will be conducted by the CNS “Esmeralda”, to celebrate her arrival for a formal five-day visit to the City of Portsmouth on Monday 1 July 2024.
2. The vessel will commence the ceremonial salute as she transits north from Outer Spit Buoy (OSB) at approx. 0930 on her inbound passage toward the War Memorial, Southsea seafront, completing at approx. 0940.
3. To ensure safety during the firing, as allowed in the provisions of the Dockyard Port of Portsmouth Order 2005, KHM will impose a dynamic exclusion zone of 100 metres around the ship in all directions for all marine traffic during her transit from the OSB to the vicinity of the Southsea War Memorial. Mariners are to remain clear of this exclusion zone.
4. A sécurité broadcast will be made on VHF Channel 11 by KHM enacting the exclusion zone with a further broadcast to disestablish the exclusion zone immediately on completion of the event.
5. Cancel this Local Notice to Mariners 2 July 2024.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 28th Jun 2024 at 18:21.
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Type 26 construction now is on simultaneously in UK, Australia and Canada across 3 variants. Canada has announced them as the River-class destroyers (which is kinda fair, really) and named the first 3.
We welcome the announcement of the start of construction of test modules for the Canadian Surface Combatant, and eagerly await the arrival of HMCS Fraser, Saint-Laurent and Mackenzie.
Reading the details, holy cow 6-8 years for the first (2030's) and 2050 for the last.
Last edited by rattman; 29th Jun 2024 at 01:49.
Looks like the first 26 will have taken nearly 10 years if she's commissioned in early 2027 as currently forecast
Harland & Wolf shares suspended
UK Strategic Defence Review 2020 - get your bids in now ladies & gents
UK Strategic Defence Review 2020 - get your bids in now ladies & gents
