Parliamentary Questions concerning Hercules Safety
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C130K
Nick Paton Walsh from Channel 4 News here. Working on the delayed out of service date for the C130K. Hoping to talk to former, or even serving pilots... Or even just interested parties. I can be rung n 07824 32 72 42 at any time.
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It's had its out of service date shoved back to 2012 from 2010.
Cos the A400M will not make it until March 2012.
Wanted someone real - who knows these machines - to talk to me about it
Cos the A400M will not make it until March 2012.
Wanted someone real - who knows these machines - to talk to me about it
MoD in ‘secret justice’ over deaths
From today's Sunday Times:
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been accused of operating “secret justice” after issuing a court gagging order to conceal how Whitehall cost-cutting might have caused the deaths of 10 servicemen in Iraq.
The MoD has demanded that key parts of the inquest next week into the crash of an RAF Hercules in Iraq in 2005 be held in secret on grounds of “national security”.
Nine British servicemen and one Australian airman died in the tragedy. It was the largest single loss of life of British forces in Iraq.
Their lawyers said they might challenge the gagging order in the coroner’s court this week because its real purpose appeared to protect the government from political embarrassment.
The secret MoD papers are understood to cover its decision not to spend an extra £50,000 buying a fire suppressant foam system for each Hercules plane in Iraq.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been accused of operating “secret justice” after issuing a court gagging order to conceal how Whitehall cost-cutting might have caused the deaths of 10 servicemen in Iraq.
The MoD has demanded that key parts of the inquest next week into the crash of an RAF Hercules in Iraq in 2005 be held in secret on grounds of “national security”.
Nine British servicemen and one Australian airman died in the tragedy. It was the largest single loss of life of British forces in Iraq.
Their lawyers said they might challenge the gagging order in the coroner’s court this week because its real purpose appeared to protect the government from political embarrassment.
The secret MoD papers are understood to cover its decision not to spend an extra £50,000 buying a fire suppressant foam system for each Hercules plane in Iraq.
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I think this is one story we can disregard Beags. The way evidence is going to be heard means that some kind of guarantee is received from interested parties.
I have to say that I have been impressed by the willingness of the MoD to open up the evidence. The BoI report has undergone a new redaction process which has taken an awful lot of time and has resulted in much more info being made available to the families.
Credit where it is due, a lot of time and effort has been put in to make this as open as possible.
I have to say that I have been impressed by the willingness of the MoD to open up the evidence. The BoI report has undergone a new redaction process which has taken an awful lot of time and has resulted in much more info being made available to the families.
Credit where it is due, a lot of time and effort has been put in to make this as open as possible.
Last edited by nigegilb; 23rd Mar 2008 at 19:07.
Once again the facts are emerging via the Coroner. Latest story is at:
BBC NEWS | UK | Hercules risk 'was widely known'
Well done everyone who will not rest until we know for sure why this accident occurred and must not be allowed to recur, something the RAF Flight Safety system notably failed to do on its own!
BBC NEWS | UK | Hercules risk 'was widely known'
Well done everyone who will not rest until we know for sure why this accident occurred and must not be allowed to recur, something the RAF Flight Safety system notably failed to do on its own!
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Latest from the last day of hearing evidence at the Hercules Inquest. A day in which there was huge reluctance to discuss the results of a trial which underlined the lack of protection for Slick MK3 Crews in Afghanistan and huge reluctance to discuss the MoDs over-arching Duty of Care when using "military risk" as an excuse to ignore "fitness for purpose."
Coroner will announce his verdict on Wednesday next, I hope there are a few senior officers out there examining their consciences after evidence disclosing their abject failure to deal with the grave weakness to ground fire in Hercules wing tanks. A problem known and understood in 2002. A high recommend to fit foam in a report released THREE times in 2002, 2003.
For the record and with reference to the culture of ignoring risk, the OEU parked up on the pan in front of Lyneham Ops and promptly phoned 2 Gp to say that it was NOT safe to send the slick to Afg. Their pleas fell on deaf ears and the weaknesses highlighted in the "secret trial" were ignored.
In an Inquest lasting 6 weeks the MoD and RAF have failed to explain why the TAT report, backed by a subject matter expert from DSTL was not handed to the procurement office for immediate staffing.
The MoD and RAF have failed to explain why they did not inform the crews on the front line as to the susceptibilty of Hercules wing fuel tanks to explode when penetrated by a single round.
An utter disgrace.
Lyneham inquest: Safety snub was a 'military risk'
By Gazette Reporter (PA)
RAF commanders' decisions to ignore safety recommendations for frontline aircraft were explained away as "military risk", it was claimed today.
An inquest at Trowbridge town hall into the deaths of ten servicemen when a Hercules C130k from RAF Lyneham was shot down in Iraq heard that three years before the tragedy "a culture of ignoring vulnerability" existed at decision-making level.
John Cooper, barrister for the families of two of the dead men, said this was why a recommendation in 2002 for a crucial safety modification on Hercules was not acted on by Air Command's HQ 2 Group, whose responsibilities include ensuring protection for frontline aircraft.
Hercules XV179 went down during a low-level daylight flight between Baghdad and Balad on January 30 2005 when small arms fire hit one of its wing-located fuel tanks, causing the ullage, highly-flammable fuel vapour/air mix created as fuel is used, to explode and blow off the right wing.
Had blocks of ullage-preventing ESF (explosion-suppressant foam) been fitted inside the wing tanks, the 10 men on board may well be alive today, the inquest at Trowbridge town hall in Wiltshire has been told.
Air Commodore Peter Ollis was in post in 2002 when 2 Group received a military research document which stated Hercules' wing tanks were the most vulnerable part of the craft and recommended fitting ESF to combat this threat.
Mr Cooper put it to Mr Ollis, appearing as a witness today: "There was a culture of ignoring vulnerabilities and treating it as a military risk.
And this culture existed almost precisely at the time of the TAT in January 2002."
Mr Ollis replied: "No there was not. One of the most important areas we consider is the protection of the crews."
Mr Cooper asked: "If 2 Group chose not to follow a recommendation then they could call it military risk couldn't they? 'We are putting this aircraft into theatre on a military risk basis'?"
"Yes", came the reply.
Mr Cooper added: "The inquest has heard that recommendation upon recommendation from 1980 stated that there was a fuel tank vulnerability and that ESF would have mitigate against that.
"It was self-evident for years and years and years, so why wasn't anything done about it?"
Mr Ollis said: "In this case, it was decided that this was not a priority."
He said he did not recall seeing the 2002 TAT report but did remember having a conversation in 2002 about ESF. He said he did not know whether the recommendation to fit Hercules with foam was passed on to the DEC (Director of Equipment Capability) or the IPT (Integrated Project Team for Hercules) in 2002.
Mr Cooper concluded: "Here is a screaming plea for help, which was ignored."
Mr Ollis shook his head.
America Hercules have had ESF since the 1960s.
The victims based at RAF Lyneham were: RAF 47 Squadron's Flt Lt David Stead, the pilot, 35; Flt Lt Andrew Smith, 25, the co-pilot; Master Engineer Gary Nicholson, 42; Flt Sgt Mark Gibson, 34, Australian airman Flt Lt Paul Pardoel, 35 a navigator; and from Lyneham's Engineering Wing, Chief Technician Richard Brown, 40, an avionics specialist; Sergeant Robert O'Connor, 38, an engineering technician; and Corporal David Williams, 37, a survival equipment fitter, a passenger. Acting L/Cpl Steven Jones, 25, of Fareham, Hampshire, a Royal Signals soldier, was also part of the crew.
Sqn Ldr Patrick Marshall, 39, from Strike Command Headquarters, RAF High Wycombe, was another passenger on the Hercules.
Coroner will announce his verdict on Wednesday next, I hope there are a few senior officers out there examining their consciences after evidence disclosing their abject failure to deal with the grave weakness to ground fire in Hercules wing tanks. A problem known and understood in 2002. A high recommend to fit foam in a report released THREE times in 2002, 2003.
For the record and with reference to the culture of ignoring risk, the OEU parked up on the pan in front of Lyneham Ops and promptly phoned 2 Gp to say that it was NOT safe to send the slick to Afg. Their pleas fell on deaf ears and the weaknesses highlighted in the "secret trial" were ignored.
In an Inquest lasting 6 weeks the MoD and RAF have failed to explain why the TAT report, backed by a subject matter expert from DSTL was not handed to the procurement office for immediate staffing.
The MoD and RAF have failed to explain why they did not inform the crews on the front line as to the susceptibilty of Hercules wing fuel tanks to explode when penetrated by a single round.
An utter disgrace.
Lyneham inquest: Safety snub was a 'military risk'
By Gazette Reporter (PA)
RAF commanders' decisions to ignore safety recommendations for frontline aircraft were explained away as "military risk", it was claimed today.
An inquest at Trowbridge town hall into the deaths of ten servicemen when a Hercules C130k from RAF Lyneham was shot down in Iraq heard that three years before the tragedy "a culture of ignoring vulnerability" existed at decision-making level.
John Cooper, barrister for the families of two of the dead men, said this was why a recommendation in 2002 for a crucial safety modification on Hercules was not acted on by Air Command's HQ 2 Group, whose responsibilities include ensuring protection for frontline aircraft.
Hercules XV179 went down during a low-level daylight flight between Baghdad and Balad on January 30 2005 when small arms fire hit one of its wing-located fuel tanks, causing the ullage, highly-flammable fuel vapour/air mix created as fuel is used, to explode and blow off the right wing.
Had blocks of ullage-preventing ESF (explosion-suppressant foam) been fitted inside the wing tanks, the 10 men on board may well be alive today, the inquest at Trowbridge town hall in Wiltshire has been told.
Air Commodore Peter Ollis was in post in 2002 when 2 Group received a military research document which stated Hercules' wing tanks were the most vulnerable part of the craft and recommended fitting ESF to combat this threat.
Mr Cooper put it to Mr Ollis, appearing as a witness today: "There was a culture of ignoring vulnerabilities and treating it as a military risk.
And this culture existed almost precisely at the time of the TAT in January 2002."
Mr Ollis replied: "No there was not. One of the most important areas we consider is the protection of the crews."
Mr Cooper asked: "If 2 Group chose not to follow a recommendation then they could call it military risk couldn't they? 'We are putting this aircraft into theatre on a military risk basis'?"
"Yes", came the reply.
Mr Cooper added: "The inquest has heard that recommendation upon recommendation from 1980 stated that there was a fuel tank vulnerability and that ESF would have mitigate against that.
"It was self-evident for years and years and years, so why wasn't anything done about it?"
Mr Ollis said: "In this case, it was decided that this was not a priority."
He said he did not recall seeing the 2002 TAT report but did remember having a conversation in 2002 about ESF. He said he did not know whether the recommendation to fit Hercules with foam was passed on to the DEC (Director of Equipment Capability) or the IPT (Integrated Project Team for Hercules) in 2002.
Mr Cooper concluded: "Here is a screaming plea for help, which was ignored."
Mr Ollis shook his head.
America Hercules have had ESF since the 1960s.
The victims based at RAF Lyneham were: RAF 47 Squadron's Flt Lt David Stead, the pilot, 35; Flt Lt Andrew Smith, 25, the co-pilot; Master Engineer Gary Nicholson, 42; Flt Sgt Mark Gibson, 34, Australian airman Flt Lt Paul Pardoel, 35 a navigator; and from Lyneham's Engineering Wing, Chief Technician Richard Brown, 40, an avionics specialist; Sergeant Robert O'Connor, 38, an engineering technician; and Corporal David Williams, 37, a survival equipment fitter, a passenger. Acting L/Cpl Steven Jones, 25, of Fareham, Hampshire, a Royal Signals soldier, was also part of the crew.
Sqn Ldr Patrick Marshall, 39, from Strike Command Headquarters, RAF High Wycombe, was another passenger on the Hercules.
Last edited by nigegilb; 16th Oct 2008 at 21:41.
He said he did not know whether the recommendation to fit Hercules with foam was passed on to the DEC (Director of Equipment Capability) or the IPT (Integrated Project Team for Hercules) in 2002.
I could be deeply cynical about much of what has been reported from the inquest, but this one takes the biscuit. While no doubt MoD has changed the terminology at regular intervals, the fact is that what TAT did was notify a Operational Constraint. (And in doing so, the “system” was seen to be working up to a certain level). While files, e-mails etc are routinely destroyed (not archived) after a few years these days, Constraints remain in the Constraints Document until cleared; and even then they should remain in case it crops up again. The CD is, to all intents and purposes, the DEC’s Risk Register and Hazard Log rolled into one. Different name, similar purpose. It contains a list of problems to be solved, or worked round, and the agreed mitigation. This one (vulnerability to defined threats listed in Def Stan 00-970) isn’t cleared as ESF embodiment isn’t complete. Therefore, there should be an audit trail, even if it is just the CD noting the originator, date and classification (Critical, Major, Minor, Safety, Limitation).
The above is how you, at front line (or anywhere in the Forces), influence what is procured. DEC is duty bound to address Constraints, even if the outcome is “Sorry guys, we tried but the BCs knocked us back”. There is an audit trail of decision making. Sorry if I’m teaching you to suck eggs, but this is really basic stuff in safety, airworthiness and fitness for purpose land. One would expect almost any MoD “witness” (DEC, IPT, 2 Gp) to know this system backwards. Of course, what I describe may no longer be carried out, in which case that is a major breach of the Safety Management System and complete abrogation of Duty of Care.
Edit: Sorry, should have added that the above gives lie to any claim by the IPT that they only get involved in airworthiness, not fitness for purpose. They are a core member of the Constraints Working Group (or whatever it’s called) because they have to report progress on those constraints which are in the process of being cleared (e.g. ESF procurement and embodiment, which they manage).
Nigel, Chappie et al; hat off. Supreme effort.
Last edited by tucumseh; 17th Oct 2008 at 06:50.
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All I can say is that Ollis was a most appropriate witness to call at this Inquest. Shame he couldn't recall seeing the TAT report; The DEC would have fitted foam if he had seen the report. And recommending foam was not within the remit of the IPTL, according to his evidence. Ollis described how the TAT report would have gone down the chain of command after hitting the Group Captain's desk.
I am surprised nobody repeated the claim made by Sec State John Reid, that 47 Sqn pilots were to blame for not arranging for fual tank protection.
RAF 'ignored' Hercules safety plea
Fitting a safety device that might have saved the men was not treated as a high priority and the danger this placed the plane in was treated as a "military risk", the inquest was told.
The 10 men were killed in January 2005 when fire from insurgents in Iraq pierced the fuel tanks of a Hercules C130 that was being used by special forces, causing a deadly fire.
For years the RAF had been warned that the Hercules was vulnerable to attack from small arms fire, the inquest heard. In 2002 a body called the UK tactical analysis team, which meets to discuss air tactics, recommended that all C130s be fitted with foam designed to prevent their fuel tanks from exploding when hit.
John Cooper, a barrister representing families of two of the men who were killed, claimed there had been "recommendation after recommendation" since 1980 that foam should be fitted. He called the 2002 advice a "screaming plea for help which was ignored".
The inquest in Trowbridge, Wiltshire, has been told that the warning from the tactical analysis team was sent to a number of RAF bodies including the service's Strike Command, now Air Command, and HQ 2 Group, which is responsible for making sure the RAF's aircraft are fit for purpose.
Peter Ollis, a retired air commodore, who was based at 2 Group at the time, told yesterday's hearing that he remembered the debate surrounding the foam. He said: "It was considered, but was not deemed to be a priority and thus was not progressed."
Ollis also told the inquest that at the time 2 Group was busy making sure that the UK's radar defences were up to scratch in the wake of the September 11 attacks. "It was very busy," he said. He told the inquest he had not actually seen the 2002 recommendation.
"I have no recollection of seeing it before." But he added: "I do recall the subject being mentioned."
Ollis said he would have expected group captains - a rank lower than that which he held - to have discussed the recommendation with Hercules experts, but not necessarily passed it up to him. He said he would have remembered more clearly if the question of foam had been a "hot topic", adding: "There were a number. That wasn't one of them."
Richard Stead, father of the plane's pilot, Flt Lt David Stead, asked Ollis: "What is the point of gathering expertise and doing nothing with it?"
Ollis replied: "The decision was that ESF [the foam system] was not a priority at the time." Shaking, Stead said: "It might be not a priority to you, but look around this courtroom..."
The inquest is expected to end next week.
I am surprised nobody repeated the claim made by Sec State John Reid, that 47 Sqn pilots were to blame for not arranging for fual tank protection.
RAF 'ignored' Hercules safety plea
- Steven Morris
- The Guardian,
- Friday October 17 2008
- Article history
Fitting a safety device that might have saved the men was not treated as a high priority and the danger this placed the plane in was treated as a "military risk", the inquest was told.
The 10 men were killed in January 2005 when fire from insurgents in Iraq pierced the fuel tanks of a Hercules C130 that was being used by special forces, causing a deadly fire.
For years the RAF had been warned that the Hercules was vulnerable to attack from small arms fire, the inquest heard. In 2002 a body called the UK tactical analysis team, which meets to discuss air tactics, recommended that all C130s be fitted with foam designed to prevent their fuel tanks from exploding when hit.
John Cooper, a barrister representing families of two of the men who were killed, claimed there had been "recommendation after recommendation" since 1980 that foam should be fitted. He called the 2002 advice a "screaming plea for help which was ignored".
The inquest in Trowbridge, Wiltshire, has been told that the warning from the tactical analysis team was sent to a number of RAF bodies including the service's Strike Command, now Air Command, and HQ 2 Group, which is responsible for making sure the RAF's aircraft are fit for purpose.
Peter Ollis, a retired air commodore, who was based at 2 Group at the time, told yesterday's hearing that he remembered the debate surrounding the foam. He said: "It was considered, but was not deemed to be a priority and thus was not progressed."
Ollis also told the inquest that at the time 2 Group was busy making sure that the UK's radar defences were up to scratch in the wake of the September 11 attacks. "It was very busy," he said. He told the inquest he had not actually seen the 2002 recommendation.
"I have no recollection of seeing it before." But he added: "I do recall the subject being mentioned."
Ollis said he would have expected group captains - a rank lower than that which he held - to have discussed the recommendation with Hercules experts, but not necessarily passed it up to him. He said he would have remembered more clearly if the question of foam had been a "hot topic", adding: "There were a number. That wasn't one of them."
Richard Stead, father of the plane's pilot, Flt Lt David Stead, asked Ollis: "What is the point of gathering expertise and doing nothing with it?"
Ollis replied: "The decision was that ESF [the foam system] was not a priority at the time." Shaking, Stead said: "It might be not a priority to you, but look around this courtroom..."
The inquest is expected to end next week.
Ollis said he would have expected group captains - a rank lower than that which he held - to have discussed the recommendation with Hercules experts, but not necessarily passed it up to him. He said he would have remembered more clearly if the question of foam had been a "hot topic", adding: "There were a number. That wasn't one of them."
I'm very surprised that he, in particular, wouldn't have known what his subordinates were doing......
Having served under him when he was a Sqn Cdr and Stn Cdr, his style was always to know about absolutely everything going on amongst his subordinates. So if he didn't know the strength of feeling about this issue, he would have to have been astonishingly poorly briefed by those dealing with the topic. Was there any "Hmm, my 1 star wouldn't want to hear this" going on at the time?
And he reads PPRuNe...
So:- "Hello -and how is Stevenage Borough Council these days? I liked the old photos in your presentation!"
Last edited by BEagle; 17th Oct 2008 at 09:04.
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The mere fact that 2Gp took the decision not to proceed with the fitting of foam, a critical operational constraint, without consulting either the DEC or IPTL, is a display of unbelievable arrogance and stupidity.
The fact that this constraint and the refusal to act on the recommendation was not recorded for audit and scrutiny, a complete breakdown of the safety management system.
One family member had to leave the Court whilst the witness was giving evidence yesterday, she felt physically sick.
Western Daily Press;
Air Commodore admits ESF was not a priority on Hercules plane Friday, October 17, 2008, 08:00
Be the first to comment
The father of the pilot of a Hercules plane shot down in Iraq grilled an RAF chief yesterday over why safety equipment that might have saved his son was not deemed 'a priority'.
On the final day of evidence at the inquest into the deaths of all 10 on board the plane, Richard Stead, the father of flight XV179 pilot David Stead, asked Air Commodore Peter Ollis why the RAF had undertaken a major piece of research and a study into what Hercules planes needed in war zones, only to ignore the findings.
The report had recommended the planes be fitted with explosion suppressant foam, or ESF, which would help stop fuel tanks exploding if hit by gunfire from the ground.
But ESF was not fitted, and a Hercules from RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire exploded after being hit over Iraq in January 2005.
Amid dramatic scenes, the Air Commodore robustly defended the decision not to fit ESF, but was left speechless at the end of an exchange with Mr Stead.
"What is the point of gathering expertise and doing nothing with it?" asked the grieving father.
Mr Ollis replied: "The decision was that ESF was not a priority at the time."
Shaking with emotion as he looked around the court at the crew's grieving family members, Mr Stead said: "It might not be a priority to you, but look around this courtroom…"
Earlier, the barrister for two of the XV179 families, questioned Mr Ollis about why RAF Hercules didn't have the potentially life-saving ESF, when American and Australian planes did.
A tactical report, named the TAT, undertaken three years before the tragedy, recommended ESF be fitted after finding that the most vulnerable part of a Hercules plane was the fuel tanks, but with a cost of more than half a million pounds per plane, the recommendation was dropped.
"There was a culture of ignoring vulnerabilities. And this culture existed almost precisely at the time of the TAT in January 2002," the barrister said.
"No there was not," replied Mr Ollis. "One of the most important areas we consider is the protection of the crews."
Mr Ollis agreed that the decision to send Hercules planes into combat zones without ESF could be described as a 'military risk'.
Edited to add, the safety of J crews was so important that a modern anti-missile system earmarked for the fleet was actually cancelled.........to pay for enhancements to the MK3.
The fact that this constraint and the refusal to act on the recommendation was not recorded for audit and scrutiny, a complete breakdown of the safety management system.
One family member had to leave the Court whilst the witness was giving evidence yesterday, she felt physically sick.
Western Daily Press;
Air Commodore admits ESF was not a priority on Hercules plane Friday, October 17, 2008, 08:00
Be the first to comment
The father of the pilot of a Hercules plane shot down in Iraq grilled an RAF chief yesterday over why safety equipment that might have saved his son was not deemed 'a priority'.
On the final day of evidence at the inquest into the deaths of all 10 on board the plane, Richard Stead, the father of flight XV179 pilot David Stead, asked Air Commodore Peter Ollis why the RAF had undertaken a major piece of research and a study into what Hercules planes needed in war zones, only to ignore the findings.
The report had recommended the planes be fitted with explosion suppressant foam, or ESF, which would help stop fuel tanks exploding if hit by gunfire from the ground.
But ESF was not fitted, and a Hercules from RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire exploded after being hit over Iraq in January 2005.
Amid dramatic scenes, the Air Commodore robustly defended the decision not to fit ESF, but was left speechless at the end of an exchange with Mr Stead.
"What is the point of gathering expertise and doing nothing with it?" asked the grieving father.
Mr Ollis replied: "The decision was that ESF was not a priority at the time."
Shaking with emotion as he looked around the court at the crew's grieving family members, Mr Stead said: "It might not be a priority to you, but look around this courtroom…"
Earlier, the barrister for two of the XV179 families, questioned Mr Ollis about why RAF Hercules didn't have the potentially life-saving ESF, when American and Australian planes did.
A tactical report, named the TAT, undertaken three years before the tragedy, recommended ESF be fitted after finding that the most vulnerable part of a Hercules plane was the fuel tanks, but with a cost of more than half a million pounds per plane, the recommendation was dropped.
"There was a culture of ignoring vulnerabilities. And this culture existed almost precisely at the time of the TAT in January 2002," the barrister said.
"No there was not," replied Mr Ollis. "One of the most important areas we consider is the protection of the crews."
Mr Ollis agreed that the decision to send Hercules planes into combat zones without ESF could be described as a 'military risk'.
Edited to add, the safety of J crews was so important that a modern anti-missile system earmarked for the fleet was actually cancelled.........to pay for enhancements to the MK3.
Last edited by nigegilb; 17th Oct 2008 at 09:41.
How those senior officers compelled to give evidence at such an inquest must dread it. The complacent, incompetent and incestuous attitudes in the higher command are displayed for all to see. They have done their best to tear down the airworthiness protection that used to exist but, as tucumseh tells us, there are still residual procedural safeguards that would have to be deliberately circumvented to enable the budgetary savings that are the sole raison d'etre of the MOD these days. None of them could expect to be brought to book years after the dirty deeds were done, and by something as arcane as Her Majesty's Coroners Service. Thank God for that, for the families, for tucumseh, and above all for you Nigel. The incoming CAS needs to read himself into the state of UK Military Airworthiness right now. It needs very major surgery, Sir, and in a sterile environment a long long way from the Ministry of Defence. Time is of the very essence.
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'or tucumseh, and above all for you Nigel.
We're all getting a bit Daily Mail here aren't we?
One family member had to leave the Court whilst the witness was giving evidence yesterday, she felt physically sick.
The mere fact that 2Gp took the decision not to proceed with the fitting of foam, a critical operational constraint, without consulting either the DEC or IPTL, is a display of unbelievable arrogance and stupidity.
Here's another, containing equally contentious opinion:
XV179 at 150'; shot down. XV179 at 3000'; not engaged.
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Equiv, it wasn't 2Gp's decision to make. Their duty was to hand that report to DEC. DEC has responsibility for operational capability. DEC would have called a meeting with the 3 core stakeholders, DEC,IPT and the User. DEC gave evidence at the Inquest and made it absolutely clear that with the backing of DSTL and the high rec given to foam protection his only choice would have been, how do we pay for this, EP or UOR. DEC had never seen the report before coming to the Inquest and it had been issued with the same rec three times. He was very very disappointed and he broke down at the end of his evidence.
Furthermore, 2 Gp should have warned its own front line crews that a single bullet could easily bring down a Hercules aircraft. Armed with that knowledge there is no way XV179 would have been down at 150' in the day time, they would have been out of range of bullets.
I believe every word I wrote, stupidity and arrogance, because 2 Gp simply ignored the report.
I will try and find an account of John Reid's evidence yesterday, he is saying almost exactly the same as me. He is very angry about the failure of senior officers to look after their own men, he acknowledged yesterday that armed with the information contained within the TAT report (I have read the redacted version) the boys would not have been down and low in the day time.
This whole thing stinks, reflected in a day of very high emotions in Court yesterday. It is not often that Barristers and hardened reporters weep along with the families. I think it is fair to comment on the emotional side, so many people died unnecessarily.
I wasn't there for Ollis's evidence, I hear he was very robust.
Furthermore, 2 Gp should have warned its own front line crews that a single bullet could easily bring down a Hercules aircraft. Armed with that knowledge there is no way XV179 would have been down at 150' in the day time, they would have been out of range of bullets.
I believe every word I wrote, stupidity and arrogance, because 2 Gp simply ignored the report.
I will try and find an account of John Reid's evidence yesterday, he is saying almost exactly the same as me. He is very angry about the failure of senior officers to look after their own men, he acknowledged yesterday that armed with the information contained within the TAT report (I have read the redacted version) the boys would not have been down and low in the day time.
This whole thing stinks, reflected in a day of very high emotions in Court yesterday. It is not often that Barristers and hardened reporters weep along with the families. I think it is fair to comment on the emotional side, so many people died unnecessarily.
I wasn't there for Ollis's evidence, I hear he was very robust.
Last edited by nigegilb; 18th Oct 2008 at 08:02.
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Yesterday's Court account.
An RAF officer who led the investigation into a Hercules aircraft shot down in Iraq expressed anger today at senior commanders' failure to pass on vital information that could have saved 10 men's lives.
Wing Commander John Reid, president of the military Board of Inquiry (BoI) into the crash, blamed the tragedy on "a failure of intelligence".
He criticised the failure to tell crews of a known vulnerability affecting the plane in question - detailed explicitly in a military research document three years beforehand.
In evidence at the men's inquest in Trowbridge, Wiltshire, Mr Reid apologised to the dead men's families, many of whom wept openly, for this lack of knowledge on the topic.
Hercules XV179 went down during a low-level daylight flight between Baghdad and Balad on January 30 2005 when a medium-calibre anti-aircraft round hit one of its wing-located fuel tanks, causing the ullage, highly-flammable fuel vapour/air mix created as fuel is used, to explode and blow off the right wing.
The inquest heard previously how two US helicopter crews were shot at by the enemy between Baghdad and Balad shortly before the stricken C130k flew through the air space at low level.
Due to a communication failure, an incident report never made it through to intelligence officers until it was too late.
This, according to Mr Reid, was of greater significance than the Hercules craft's well-publicised lack of ESF (explosion-suppressant foam), which stops fuel tanks in the wing exploding if hit by enemy fire. US Hercules have had ESF since the 1960s.
"Of greater significance with XV179 is the failure of intelligence," he said.
"This was a known ambush site and tragically XV179 flew into the same ambush."
A 2002 Tactical Analysis Team (TAT) report sent to senior RAF figures said Hercules wing tanks were the most vulnerable part of the planes, liable to explode if hit by small arms fire, and that ESF would offer protection.
No action was taken. And the message about the wing tanks' vulnerability was not passed on to crews either.
Mr Reid said ESF would probably have saved the crew's lives but, regardless of whether it had been fitted, a still greater failure was that crews were not even told of the crafts' vulnerability - that a Hercules could potentially be felled by a singly enemy round. Had they been told, they could have changed their tactics accordingly.
"I'm not so disappointed that the aircraft did not have ESF," Mr Reid told the inquest.
"I'm more cross that the vulnerability was not known. Had the vulnerability been known then the crew would not have flown that profile (low level; about 150ft). Had the aircraft been hit at a higher level, it could have given the crew more time to sort something out."
Mr Reid said to the families they must think it "weird" that even after the publication of his 2005 BoI report, he still had limited knowledge of ESF - despite evidence of British military knowledge on this subject dating back to 1980.
"I apologise - I cannot explain it," he said.
Wiltshire coroner David Masters has repeatedly expressed frustration at the RAF and MoD's lack of record-keeping. The crucial 2002 TAT report was only unearthed while the inquest was adjourned for six months over the summer.
ESF only began being fitted in UK Hercules after the BoI in 2005 firstly found the wing tank vulnerability of its own accord and recommended ESF as a solution. The coroner thanked Mr Reid for his investigation, adding that he was "the catalyst for the introduction of ESF" in British Hercules.
On a separate issue, John Cooper, barrister for two of the families, read an answer given by Quinton Davis, Under-secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on Tuesday this week regarding UK Hercules having ESF.
Mr Davis said 74% are fitted, adding: "All serving C130s that are routinely deployed on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are now fitted with ESF."
Mr Cooper said: "I want to ask you about the word 'routinely'."
Mr Reid replied: "It is not a very good use of words. That's not accurate." Clarifying, he added: "No aircraft are now sent without ESF."
Mr Cooper said: "If members of the Government representing the MoD are inadvertently misleading the public that is of concern. Ministers still do not get it."
An RAF officer who led the investigation into a Hercules aircraft shot down in Iraq expressed anger today at senior commanders' failure to pass on vital information that could have saved 10 men's lives.
Wing Commander John Reid, president of the military Board of Inquiry (BoI) into the crash, blamed the tragedy on "a failure of intelligence".
He criticised the failure to tell crews of a known vulnerability affecting the plane in question - detailed explicitly in a military research document three years beforehand.
In evidence at the men's inquest in Trowbridge, Wiltshire, Mr Reid apologised to the dead men's families, many of whom wept openly, for this lack of knowledge on the topic.
Hercules XV179 went down during a low-level daylight flight between Baghdad and Balad on January 30 2005 when a medium-calibre anti-aircraft round hit one of its wing-located fuel tanks, causing the ullage, highly-flammable fuel vapour/air mix created as fuel is used, to explode and blow off the right wing.
The inquest heard previously how two US helicopter crews were shot at by the enemy between Baghdad and Balad shortly before the stricken C130k flew through the air space at low level.
Due to a communication failure, an incident report never made it through to intelligence officers until it was too late.
This, according to Mr Reid, was of greater significance than the Hercules craft's well-publicised lack of ESF (explosion-suppressant foam), which stops fuel tanks in the wing exploding if hit by enemy fire. US Hercules have had ESF since the 1960s.
"Of greater significance with XV179 is the failure of intelligence," he said.
"This was a known ambush site and tragically XV179 flew into the same ambush."
A 2002 Tactical Analysis Team (TAT) report sent to senior RAF figures said Hercules wing tanks were the most vulnerable part of the planes, liable to explode if hit by small arms fire, and that ESF would offer protection.
No action was taken. And the message about the wing tanks' vulnerability was not passed on to crews either.
Mr Reid said ESF would probably have saved the crew's lives but, regardless of whether it had been fitted, a still greater failure was that crews were not even told of the crafts' vulnerability - that a Hercules could potentially be felled by a singly enemy round. Had they been told, they could have changed their tactics accordingly.
"I'm not so disappointed that the aircraft did not have ESF," Mr Reid told the inquest.
"I'm more cross that the vulnerability was not known. Had the vulnerability been known then the crew would not have flown that profile (low level; about 150ft). Had the aircraft been hit at a higher level, it could have given the crew more time to sort something out."
Mr Reid said to the families they must think it "weird" that even after the publication of his 2005 BoI report, he still had limited knowledge of ESF - despite evidence of British military knowledge on this subject dating back to 1980.
"I apologise - I cannot explain it," he said.
Wiltshire coroner David Masters has repeatedly expressed frustration at the RAF and MoD's lack of record-keeping. The crucial 2002 TAT report was only unearthed while the inquest was adjourned for six months over the summer.
ESF only began being fitted in UK Hercules after the BoI in 2005 firstly found the wing tank vulnerability of its own accord and recommended ESF as a solution. The coroner thanked Mr Reid for his investigation, adding that he was "the catalyst for the introduction of ESF" in British Hercules.
On a separate issue, John Cooper, barrister for two of the families, read an answer given by Quinton Davis, Under-secretary of State for Defence, in the House of Commons on Tuesday this week regarding UK Hercules having ESF.
Mr Davis said 74% are fitted, adding: "All serving C130s that are routinely deployed on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are now fitted with ESF."
Mr Cooper said: "I want to ask you about the word 'routinely'."
Mr Reid replied: "It is not a very good use of words. That's not accurate." Clarifying, he added: "No aircraft are now sent without ESF."
Mr Cooper said: "If members of the Government representing the MoD are inadvertently misleading the public that is of concern. Ministers still do not get it."
Mr Reid said ESF would probably have saved the crew's lives but, regardless of whether it had been fitted, a still greater failure was that crews were not even told of the crafts' vulnerability - that a Hercules could potentially be felled by a singly enemy round. Had they been told, they could have changed their tactics accordingly.
"I'm not so disappointed that the aircraft did not have ESF," Mr Reid told the inquest.
"I'm more cross that the vulnerability was not known. Had the vulnerability been known then the crew would not have flown that profile (low level; about 150ft). Had the aircraft been hit at a higher level, it could have given the crew more time to sort something out."
"I'm not so disappointed that the aircraft did not have ESF," Mr Reid told the inquest.
"I'm more cross that the vulnerability was not known. Had the vulnerability been known then the crew would not have flown that profile (low level; about 150ft). Had the aircraft been hit at a higher level, it could have given the crew more time to sort something out."
While acknowledging different viewpoints and perspective, surely these issues (vulnerability analysis, ESF and intelligence) are inextricably linked?
The VA was carried out but apparently not disseminated beyond 2Gp. Failure to do so meant the people who could do something about it (e.g. procure and fit ESF, and manage the resultant constraint in the interim) apparently did not know. Had the vulnerability been known in-theatre, both it and the threat analysis would have informed tactical decisions.
And, going back to my mention of the Constraints Working (or Assessment) Groups the core membership, and hence distribution of minutes and Constraints Document (which includes the decision audit trail), should include senior pilots, observers (where applicable) and engineers from an appropriate air station. You cannot separate out ESF and vulnerability – they should be mentioned in the same paragraph in the CD.
This is a major systemic failure, not entirely unrelated to the dumbing down of the MoD and creation of stovepiped IPTs in 1999 (as opposed to non-stovepiped IPTs of 89-91). The IPTL’s evidence is a classic example of an IPT squeezing its boundaries of responsibility to save money and avoid obligations, while failing to ensure the resultant gap is closed. Until the late 90s, everyone I knew in the Air world knew exactly how the system I describe worked. When I became part of an IPT, I got nothing but blank looks. I still have the letter I wrote to IPTL asking “Who is now responsible for clearing Operational Constraints?”, prompted by the person whose job it was ignoring clear breaches of airworthiness regs forced by failure to manage uncleared constraints. Not because he was abrogating responsibility, but because he simply didn’t know it was his job and had not been trained. As I said, dumbing down.
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Tuc, I am still concerned that the MoD is not clear on areas of responsibility. There was a lot of backsliding going on in this Inquest. However, if the witnesses were accurately describing the current state of affairs then I would be very worried if I was the new CAS. I was staggered by the IPTL's responses, fitness for purpose (operational capability) was not something he needed to get actively involved in. He just arranged the contracts once modification approvals where in place. I just don't understand that mentality. Reactive instead of proactive? No thanks. FFP nothing to do with IPTL?
He stated that the hazard log was not the place to record the vulnerability to fuel tank explosion from specified threat effects, but did not add where it should have been recorded. No mention of CWGs constraints documents, processes.
Issues concerning Duty of Care, Military Risk and Operational Constraints were stifled in Court.
I disagree with Reid on foam, he appears to have missed the point that fuel tank vulnerability and foam protection was known about in the RAF back in 1982. He fails to touch on the fact that Hercules J was procured without foam in the mid 1990s in the light of a DERA document spelling out the iminent loss of an aircraft to fuel tank explosion. Of course the ITT document has been destroyed/lost.
All these are failures to procure and modify aircraft that are fit for purpose.
I hope the Coroner deals with the wider issues and malaise that we tried to highlight in Court. In particular the way they are inter-related.
He stated that the hazard log was not the place to record the vulnerability to fuel tank explosion from specified threat effects, but did not add where it should have been recorded. No mention of CWGs constraints documents, processes.
Issues concerning Duty of Care, Military Risk and Operational Constraints were stifled in Court.
I disagree with Reid on foam, he appears to have missed the point that fuel tank vulnerability and foam protection was known about in the RAF back in 1982. He fails to touch on the fact that Hercules J was procured without foam in the mid 1990s in the light of a DERA document spelling out the iminent loss of an aircraft to fuel tank explosion. Of course the ITT document has been destroyed/lost.
All these are failures to procure and modify aircraft that are fit for purpose.
I hope the Coroner deals with the wider issues and malaise that we tried to highlight in Court. In particular the way they are inter-related.
Last edited by nigegilb; 18th Oct 2008 at 09:37.
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there are no words that can be expressed to even begin to explain what it felt like to hear the words spoken by john reid. sadly, i couldn't keep my dignity enough to stay and had to leave, we all had been destroyed by the words and the admission and even the coroner came out during the adjournmnet to apologise for our distress.
now, we are at the end. at 1445 yesterday afternoon i closed my book and stopped note writing and await the verdict from the coroner.
i should be happy to hear the words that verified what we already knew but instead am left devastated.
as one family member put it, how could they have sent our boys into that situation, they had no chance.
there is nothing i can or am able to say as i am left too bereft, except thank you for all of your help and support, i know bob would have appreciated it.
now, till weds......
now, we are at the end. at 1445 yesterday afternoon i closed my book and stopped note writing and await the verdict from the coroner.
i should be happy to hear the words that verified what we already knew but instead am left devastated.
as one family member put it, how could they have sent our boys into that situation, they had no chance.
there is nothing i can or am able to say as i am left too bereft, except thank you for all of your help and support, i know bob would have appreciated it.
now, till weds......