cockpit safety
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cockpit safety
Thought you may be interested in reading the following about our own security in the air. This guy talks a lot of sense but how many airlines will take his suggestions concerning cockpit security on board and actually do something about it? None I guess but maybe pax may feel more confident about flying if an airline actually had the balls to do something about it. I know I'd rather fly with a company that was seen to put safety above meal choice and new fancy seats..... see what you think
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[ 24 September 2001: Message edited by: Red Minx ]
[ 26 September 2001: Message edited by: Red Minx ]
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[ 24 September 2001: Message edited by: Red Minx ]
[ 26 September 2001: Message edited by: Red Minx ]
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hyperlink problem so here it is......
Airlines must fortify the cockpit
By Elliott Hester. Elliott Hester is a flight attendant and syndicated columnist. He works for a major U.S. carrier
Published September 20th 2001
I the days following the simultaneous hijackings of our four U.S. airliners, much has been done to beef up airport security. Curbside baggage check-in has been discontinued. Uniformed police monitor security checkpoints. Small knives and box cutters are now confiscated from passengers. These measures will no doubt help to make air travel safer. But throughout this overnight transformation, experts fail to focus attention on the most critical aspect of airplane security.
The cockpit door is the final barrier between hijacker and an unsuspecting pilot. It is a feeble defense, built for ease of crew entry and as an emergency escape, not as a fortification against determined intruders. One heave of a shoulder, one kick of a purposeful foot and almost anyone, armed or otherwise, can break through the door and wreak havoc in a dozen different ways.
On Aug.11, 2000, Jonathon Burton broke through the cockpi door of a Southwest Airlines jet en route to Salt Lake City from Vegas. Burton stuck his head and torso through the hole he had created and yelled at the startled pilots: "I can fly this airplane!" Frightened passengers snatched him away and tried to restrain him, but the 19 year old Burton began a bloody fight. A band of male passengers ultimately beat him to death.
Five months earlier, on March 27, a German man broke into the flightdeck during a Germania charter flight from Berlin to the Canary Islands. The man, believed by authorities to have been under the influence of alcohol, forced his way into the cockpit while the plane was over Spanishairspace. He then proceeded to punch, kick and choke the 59-year-old pilot. At some point, the attacker managed to grab the controls. The aircraft veered from it's flight path and lost altitude briefly, but the co-pilot managed to stabilize it. The plane landed safely after the assailant was restrained by a group of male passengers.
And on JUly 23, 1999, as Nippon Airways on its way to Sapporo, Yuji Nishizawa, 28, got up from his seat, pulled an 8-inch knife on a flight attendant and forced her to unlock the cockpit door. He ordered the co-pilot out of the cockpit and demanded that the pilot fly to a U.S. military base west of Tokyo. When the pilot refused, Nishizawa stabbed him in the neck and took control of the aircraft.
As the captain lay dying, the Boeing 747, packed with 503 passengers and a crew of 14, plunged to within 984 feet of the ground. Moments before disaster struck, the deposed co-pilot and an off duty pilot stormed the cockpit, subdued the assailant and resumed control of the aircraft, which managed to land safely in Tokyo.
Since July 1997, there have been at least 16 reported instances in which a lone passenger attempted to break through the cockpit door. Of these, 10 attempts were successful. In almost every instance, the perpetraitor was either angry, deranged or intoxicated.
If these people (all of whom acted without training) can breach a cockpit door, imagine how easy it is for a group of motivated hijackers-even if they aren't carrying weapons.
Five airlines, Alaska, American, Delta, Northwest and TWA have already announced that they were seeking ways to fortify bifold cockpit doors-standard on the MD-83 aircraft - like the one Bradley was able to break through. But when the media attention faded, so did talk of cockpit fortification. "The one thing you can't do is put a bank vault door on the cockpit", said Alaska Airlines spokesman Jack Evans.
After the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, a bank vault door deserves serious consideration.
There's only one sure way to prevent an airplane hijacking: Make access to the cockpit impossible. On-board securityofficers can be overpowered. Cockpit keys can be easily snatched from flight attendants. But if the cockpit door is virtually impenetrable, if pilots are instructed to remain inside no matter what chaos breaks out in the cabin, hijackings may become an ugly memory.
The cost will be staggering. But airlines, forever diligent about their bottom line, always seem to find money when they think it will generate more.
In order to create "More room in coach" for example, American Airlines recently spent millions to remove the last two rows of seats on it's aircraft. Currently, the airline is spending millions more to replace undersized overhead bins with larger ones. These "selling points" are designed to increase profit in the long run.
But an impenetrable cockpit has never been a selling point. At least until now.
If airline CEOs have trouble finding money, they need to look no further thatn their own inflated paychecks. In the 3-year period from 1998 to 2000, for example, the two top ranked officials at US airways earned a combined total of more than $65 million in salaries, bonuses and other compensation.
Cockpit doors must be fortified. The money is there. Anyone claiming otherwise is a liar or a fool.
Airlines must fortify the cockpit
By Elliott Hester. Elliott Hester is a flight attendant and syndicated columnist. He works for a major U.S. carrier
Published September 20th 2001
I the days following the simultaneous hijackings of our four U.S. airliners, much has been done to beef up airport security. Curbside baggage check-in has been discontinued. Uniformed police monitor security checkpoints. Small knives and box cutters are now confiscated from passengers. These measures will no doubt help to make air travel safer. But throughout this overnight transformation, experts fail to focus attention on the most critical aspect of airplane security.
The cockpit door is the final barrier between hijacker and an unsuspecting pilot. It is a feeble defense, built for ease of crew entry and as an emergency escape, not as a fortification against determined intruders. One heave of a shoulder, one kick of a purposeful foot and almost anyone, armed or otherwise, can break through the door and wreak havoc in a dozen different ways.
On Aug.11, 2000, Jonathon Burton broke through the cockpi door of a Southwest Airlines jet en route to Salt Lake City from Vegas. Burton stuck his head and torso through the hole he had created and yelled at the startled pilots: "I can fly this airplane!" Frightened passengers snatched him away and tried to restrain him, but the 19 year old Burton began a bloody fight. A band of male passengers ultimately beat him to death.
Five months earlier, on March 27, a German man broke into the flightdeck during a Germania charter flight from Berlin to the Canary Islands. The man, believed by authorities to have been under the influence of alcohol, forced his way into the cockpit while the plane was over Spanishairspace. He then proceeded to punch, kick and choke the 59-year-old pilot. At some point, the attacker managed to grab the controls. The aircraft veered from it's flight path and lost altitude briefly, but the co-pilot managed to stabilize it. The plane landed safely after the assailant was restrained by a group of male passengers.
And on JUly 23, 1999, as Nippon Airways on its way to Sapporo, Yuji Nishizawa, 28, got up from his seat, pulled an 8-inch knife on a flight attendant and forced her to unlock the cockpit door. He ordered the co-pilot out of the cockpit and demanded that the pilot fly to a U.S. military base west of Tokyo. When the pilot refused, Nishizawa stabbed him in the neck and took control of the aircraft.
As the captain lay dying, the Boeing 747, packed with 503 passengers and a crew of 14, plunged to within 984 feet of the ground. Moments before disaster struck, the deposed co-pilot and an off duty pilot stormed the cockpit, subdued the assailant and resumed control of the aircraft, which managed to land safely in Tokyo.
Since July 1997, there have been at least 16 reported instances in which a lone passenger attempted to break through the cockpit door. Of these, 10 attempts were successful. In almost every instance, the perpetraitor was either angry, deranged or intoxicated.
If these people (all of whom acted without training) can breach a cockpit door, imagine how easy it is for a group of motivated hijackers-even if they aren't carrying weapons.
Five airlines, Alaska, American, Delta, Northwest and TWA have already announced that they were seeking ways to fortify bifold cockpit doors-standard on the MD-83 aircraft - like the one Bradley was able to break through. But when the media attention faded, so did talk of cockpit fortification. "The one thing you can't do is put a bank vault door on the cockpit", said Alaska Airlines spokesman Jack Evans.
After the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, a bank vault door deserves serious consideration.
There's only one sure way to prevent an airplane hijacking: Make access to the cockpit impossible. On-board securityofficers can be overpowered. Cockpit keys can be easily snatched from flight attendants. But if the cockpit door is virtually impenetrable, if pilots are instructed to remain inside no matter what chaos breaks out in the cabin, hijackings may become an ugly memory.
The cost will be staggering. But airlines, forever diligent about their bottom line, always seem to find money when they think it will generate more.
In order to create "More room in coach" for example, American Airlines recently spent millions to remove the last two rows of seats on it's aircraft. Currently, the airline is spending millions more to replace undersized overhead bins with larger ones. These "selling points" are designed to increase profit in the long run.
But an impenetrable cockpit has never been a selling point. At least until now.
If airline CEOs have trouble finding money, they need to look no further thatn their own inflated paychecks. In the 3-year period from 1998 to 2000, for example, the two top ranked officials at US airways earned a combined total of more than $65 million in salaries, bonuses and other compensation.
Cockpit doors must be fortified. The money is there. Anyone claiming otherwise is a liar or a fool.
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I agree 100%.. I also think that camera's should be installed in the cabin and galleys, and monitored by the tech crew. If a problem arises, the pilots may then release a gas, and put everyone to sleep and then land the thing. I doubt a passenger would get through security, especially now, with a gas mask in their carryon, so that should take care of the hijackers.
Pilots crew meals can be stored somewhere in the Flight Deck, and communication with cabin crew only by interphone. Sure it wont encourage CRM/Socialbility, but it will help to keep us all safe.
Pilots crew meals can be stored somewhere in the Flight Deck, and communication with cabin crew only by interphone. Sure it wont encourage CRM/Socialbility, but it will help to keep us all safe.
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Ditch, i totally agree with the Surveillance cameras in the galley and cabin, as well as the gas.
I think its one of the safest and quickest ways, by putting everyone to sleep, except the tech crew!! as for the cameras, they should be hooked up to the Black box, so everything is recorded... or even beemed back down to earth via satelite so the authorities can immediately identify the hijackers and take appropriate actions...
any other suggestions??
I think this is a very important topic...
I think its one of the safest and quickest ways, by putting everyone to sleep, except the tech crew!! as for the cameras, they should be hooked up to the Black box, so everything is recorded... or even beemed back down to earth via satelite so the authorities can immediately identify the hijackers and take appropriate actions...
any other suggestions??
I think this is a very important topic...
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I agree with the door issue and I really don`t think the costs will be "staggering".
The gas, although, is something different. How do you achieve the proper dosage for a widely diverse population in the back, under circumstances differing from zero pressurization to maximum differential pressure. The latter achieving a total "renewal" of cabin air every 4 minutes.
The gas, although, is something different. How do you achieve the proper dosage for a widely diverse population in the back, under circumstances differing from zero pressurization to maximum differential pressure. The latter achieving a total "renewal" of cabin air every 4 minutes.
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I will try for some shameless market research here, apologies in advance.
I run a small martial arts school in London and quite often bring guest instructors over from Russia, all of them with counter-terrorism back ground. These former special forces guys used to train Russian pilots and some aircrew that fly VIPs, and their view is:
From a purely physical point of view, cockpit is relatively easy to defend by someone with minimum of training and a little resolve (the psychological aspect of someone garrotting your passengers and aircrew to influence the pilot I'd prefer to ignore for now; also PLEASE do not take this as criticism of the pilots of the 4 planes that crashed in US!)
I would like to get some opinions from airline professionals- do you agree with the above statement?
Another question- I know the current training the cabin crew and the pilots get regarding highjack situations encourages the policy of appeasement of highjackers, agreeing to their demands and getting the plain to the ground. But in light of recent events in US, and with the increasing incidents of air rage, is there any interest from the flying professionals in getting some self-defense and basic body-guard or bouncer style training- you know, defending yourself and others in tight spaces, disarming, restraining and controlling attackers?
Many thanks for your time, and apologies for digressing from the "secure cockpit door" topic.
David.
I run a small martial arts school in London and quite often bring guest instructors over from Russia, all of them with counter-terrorism back ground. These former special forces guys used to train Russian pilots and some aircrew that fly VIPs, and their view is:
From a purely physical point of view, cockpit is relatively easy to defend by someone with minimum of training and a little resolve (the psychological aspect of someone garrotting your passengers and aircrew to influence the pilot I'd prefer to ignore for now; also PLEASE do not take this as criticism of the pilots of the 4 planes that crashed in US!)
I would like to get some opinions from airline professionals- do you agree with the above statement?
Another question- I know the current training the cabin crew and the pilots get regarding highjack situations encourages the policy of appeasement of highjackers, agreeing to their demands and getting the plain to the ground. But in light of recent events in US, and with the increasing incidents of air rage, is there any interest from the flying professionals in getting some self-defense and basic body-guard or bouncer style training- you know, defending yourself and others in tight spaces, disarming, restraining and controlling attackers?
Many thanks for your time, and apologies for digressing from the "secure cockpit door" topic.
David.
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David - our airline already trains it's cabin crew to restrain a passenger and we carry handcuffs etc. This training takes place in a cabin moock up by a comppany owned by ex-policemen who are self defense experts.I can tell you it's quite scary taking part in the practical exercises but at least if we have to do it for real, we've had a 'go' before hand. The only thing is, before this tradgedy, the most we were looking at was an idiot who had had too much to drink!
I have a feeling that the policy regarding compliance with hijackers will now be changed radically.
I've been reading this week about the idea that pilots should carry guns with bullets which would explode causing great damage to human tissue but not to the plane istself. Still seems a bit worrying to me but what about pilots having stun guns? No danger of decompression and if we had the cockpit door sorted out, a stun gun hopefully would be a very final resort.
CCTV cameras would need to be conceiled or would be too easy to pull off/obscure.
Back to cockpit doors again, on my last flight whilst working on the upper deck of a 747-200 I boarded to find engineers fitting a new lock which can not be opened from the outside and without a key. A US pax was highly delighted to witness this and said he would be flying with us all the time in future as we were taking security so seriously. Imagine the confidence which may be generated if airlines were seen to be taking even more radical steps as suggested in this link! The only problem with the door was the flight deck got a bit pissed off having to get up and open it for me every 20 mins!!!!! There'd have to some sort of 'buzz - in' system ..... I know some lazy sods who just woulnn't be bothered getting up!
I have a feeling that the policy regarding compliance with hijackers will now be changed radically.
I've been reading this week about the idea that pilots should carry guns with bullets which would explode causing great damage to human tissue but not to the plane istself. Still seems a bit worrying to me but what about pilots having stun guns? No danger of decompression and if we had the cockpit door sorted out, a stun gun hopefully would be a very final resort.
CCTV cameras would need to be conceiled or would be too easy to pull off/obscure.
Back to cockpit doors again, on my last flight whilst working on the upper deck of a 747-200 I boarded to find engineers fitting a new lock which can not be opened from the outside and without a key. A US pax was highly delighted to witness this and said he would be flying with us all the time in future as we were taking security so seriously. Imagine the confidence which may be generated if airlines were seen to be taking even more radical steps as suggested in this link! The only problem with the door was the flight deck got a bit pissed off having to get up and open it for me every 20 mins!!!!! There'd have to some sort of 'buzz - in' system ..... I know some lazy sods who just woulnn't be bothered getting up!
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I agree totally that cabin crew,flight crew and pax saftey must now take precedence over innovation. Airlines are so concerned about beating the competion to fancier seats, better entertainment more stylish advertisement campaigns! After the events of september 11 they are now going to have to push saftey to the forefront of their attention! (thats if cabin crew have a job to go back to....but thats a whole new subject)
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Minx, interesting point about arming crew. The main problem is that safe and effective use of such weapons is an area of specialised skills that has a tremendous implication for training. The flight crews job must be to fly the plane not have gun or stun fights. If it is considered necessary to have such weapons on board then Sky marshalls, properly trained and unidentified,is the way to go.
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Aeropig - I did say a 'last resort'. I'm afraid I can't see airlines paying an extra wage for an air marshall when flight deck jobs are being lost left right and centre. Would it be a feasible idea to train pilots and f/e's losing their jobs to fill this role until, hopefully, the industry picks up and they can fulfill their flying positions again? I've talked to quite a few at my company and frankly, they'd be prepared to dish out tea and coffee if it meant retaining a position in the company and the prospect of being there when pax confidence returns and expansion begins again. 
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Hi Minx, sorry about the delay in replying but could'nt get into the forums. From experience you can train anyone to use a weapon the problem is that not everyone can use a weapon properly ie WHEN to use it. It is a question of apptitude in the same way as not everyone will make good aircrew.The problem then is who sets the selection criteria? and how will the training be done. So whilst i see the direction you are coming from I think that if it does happen it will be an independent service and not necesarily drawn from airline staff. Hope this answers your question even if it doesn't give much comfort
