Batik Canberra
The 35 ILS in both Jeppesen and ASA chart for Canberra is not easy to read.
Seems to be lots of little traps for tired eyes at o dark 30 after a long sector.
The usual chart full off clutter, doesn’t help situational awareness.
Why a holding pattern at Mombi and not at Menzie?
Many years ago the Moorabbin NDB and this one in particular was raised at RAPAC, in relation to the complexity of the chart, and perhaps simplifying the approach plates.
Or perhaps the crew were overwhelmed with all the NOTAM’s for obstructions at YSCB?
Seems to be lots of little traps for tired eyes at o dark 30 after a long sector.
The usual chart full off clutter, doesn’t help situational awareness.
Why a holding pattern at Mombi and not at Menzie?
Many years ago the Moorabbin NDB and this one in particular was raised at RAPAC, in relation to the complexity of the chart, and perhaps simplifying the approach plates.
Or perhaps the crew were overwhelmed with all the NOTAM’s for obstructions at YSCB?
As for the hold at MOMBI instead of MENZI, I assume it’s due to the terrain to the south when you’re outbound. The minimum holding altitude at MENZI would likely be too high to allow interception of the glideslope for the ILS, but that’s just a guess.
Minimum altitude step approaching MOMBI on the ILS 35 is 4600’. This is the altitude they seemed to have flown the pattern at. However the minimum holding altitude at MOMBI is 5600’, which is only written as a note on the DAP chart and without specify it’s a minimum altitude:
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They may have set 4600’ as a minimum approaching MOMBI, then flown the hold for whatever reason and missed the minimum altitude of 5600’? Fatigue, lack of familiarity, lack of ATC, poorly designed chart all may have contributed.
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They may have set 4600’ as a minimum approaching MOMBI, then flown the hold for whatever reason and missed the minimum altitude of 5600’? Fatigue, lack of familiarity, lack of ATC, poorly designed chart all may have contributed.
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Minimum altitude step approaching MOMBI on the ILS 35 is 4600’. This is the altitude they seemed to have flown the pattern at. However the minimum holding altitude at MOMBI is 5600’, which is only written as a note on the DAP chart and without specify it’s a minimum altitude...
That said, international operators would not normally use Airservices charts. It would be interesting to know what type of chart they were using and how the holding information was presented.
Last edited by BuzzBox; 23rd Jun 2024 at 01:03.
That hold in that position has always been a strange and in reality a stupid place for it. I remember years ago this was part of the command check to line in the sim for a regional, you had to be really careful about what altitude and speed you chose to hold at or you would be facing another go at it later. I heard of more than one potential captain coming unstuck there. It really is a trap if you are at high workload and don't read the chart thoroughly.
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How many airlines from overseas can legally operate into Canberra , say 100 flights from operators from India to Japan where to do same flight under same conditions with crews also not familiar with local procedures , how many would you estimate to get it correct. Missing that hold height is a worry .
I would have thought they would be using Jepps.
I feel like the notes could have a statement about descending when inbound once established on the glide path to make things clearer. That said, I also feel like a good route briefing produced by the company would highlight the terrain risk and give guidance. Seems like lots of factors, time of day, familiarity, complexity, and potentially Flt ops guidance. I would also be interested in the number of flight and duty hours in last few months/ days. Lots to look at.
I feel like the notes could have a statement about descending when inbound once established on the glide path to make things clearer. That said, I also feel like a good route briefing produced by the company would highlight the terrain risk and give guidance. Seems like lots of factors, time of day, familiarity, complexity, and potentially Flt ops guidance. I would also be interested in the number of flight and duty hours in last few months/ days. Lots to look at.
The Jeppesen plate is less clear than the Air Services one, at least ASA use the word HLDG in the text. It’s a bit unusual to have a higher holding altitude than the crossing altitude on the approach, obviously due to turning back towards high terrain in the hold. I wouldn’t be surprised to see a chart revision soon which makes things clearer.
Planning an approach into an unfamiliar airport isn’t best done at 0 dark o’clock at the end of a long flight when pushed for time. A thorough review of the route guide and charts can be done earlier on when everyone is awake and there is plenty of time to resolve any queries and formulate a plan. The approach briefing prior to TOD should be a simple recap of what’s already be gone through and understood.
Planning an approach into an unfamiliar airport isn’t best done at 0 dark o’clock at the end of a long flight when pushed for time. A thorough review of the route guide and charts can be done earlier on when everyone is awake and there is plenty of time to resolve any queries and formulate a plan. The approach briefing prior to TOD should be a simple recap of what’s already be gone through and understood.
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Going off their "request descent" and "request approach clearance" I reckon they were under the impression they couldn't commence the ILS without clearance (ie had no idea they were in class G).
And so they missed the capture, and requested a hold.
It didn't even sound like the hold was at any particular waypoint, they just held and clearly descended during it (perhaps outbound?) so they could re-capture the glideslope on the inbound.
Unless i missed it, there was no alert provided to them for going below MSA? (again, they were OCTA so not sure if that's a requirement by ATC)
And so they missed the capture, and requested a hold.
It didn't even sound like the hold was at any particular waypoint, they just held and clearly descended during it (perhaps outbound?) so they could re-capture the glideslope on the inbound.
Unless i missed it, there was no alert provided to them for going below MSA? (again, they were OCTA so not sure if that's a requirement by ATC)
I didn’t hear anything, however whilst separation, sequencing etc isn’t required, I’d be interested to hear if any safety alerts appear on the centre, approach, tower’s screens?
Something happened at Proserpine the other month, seems like a report never popped up, but we heard a RPT departing did something wrong upwind, centre jumped on and seemed to provide separation and a wtf are you doing, I assume they had a discussion before departing and they didn’t follow instructions, someone was watching closely however.
I guess it depends how closely some controllers are watching.
Something happened at Proserpine the other month, seems like a report never popped up, but we heard a RPT departing did something wrong upwind, centre jumped on and seemed to provide separation and a wtf are you doing, I assume they had a discussion before departing and they didn’t follow instructions, someone was watching closely however.
I guess it depends how closely some controllers are watching.
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I didn’t hear anything, however whilst separation, sequencing etc isn’t required, I’d be interested to hear if any safety alerts appear on the centre, approach, tower’s screens?
Something happened at Proserpine the other month, seems like a report never popped up, but we heard a RPT departing did something wrong upwind, centre jumped on and seemed to provide separation and a wtf are you doing, I assume they had a discussion before departing and they didn’t follow instructions, someone was watching closely however.
I guess it depends how closely some controllers are watching.
Something happened at Proserpine the other month, seems like a report never popped up, but we heard a RPT departing did something wrong upwind, centre jumped on and seemed to provide separation and a wtf are you doing, I assume they had a discussion before departing and they didn’t follow instructions, someone was watching closely however.
I guess it depends how closely some controllers are watching.
I’d assume Canberra is the same, unless the centre controller gets the altitude alerts based off the radar lowest safes the cb app guys use
Listened to an American like accent fly over IAF and not turn , descending into high terrain the tower controller started instructing a turn, then climbing turn ! English not controllers first language he run out of ways to say your going to die soon . Our line up clearance cancelled I watched on TCAS expecting him to disappear . Things went quiet and I wanted to scream at him on the radio but worried if I stepped on senior controller . Must have got pull up or woke up and put it into a climb with turn .
Just because YSCB is in the nation's capital doesn't mean it needs 24/7 ops. Movements should be/are what determine ATC requirements. What are Canberra's movements between 2300 and 0600? Should controllers sit in the TWR and APP for 2 or 3 movements in 7 hours? Aussie's flying into YSCB CTAF know what they are doing. Batik or any other operator need to know what they are doing by conducting their own risk management to keep their pax safe. And they haven't done that. Two guys arrive in a 737 and do not know how to get in there - that is not the fault of CTAF procedures. They were not educated on the arrival at this time, and people here are blaming CTAF procedures/lack of ATC.
Why should we, the taxpayer, pay for ATC services that are not required due lack of late night ops at YSCB? Yes, Aussies are on the flight, I get that. But CASA and the airline itself mnust ensure the safety of a new operator before clearing them in. Clearly this crew did not even read Jepps or the ERSA to realise the field is uncontrolled and therefore they need to determine a plan to land safely. Yes, ATC services would have negated all this, but we shouldn't have to pay because unqualified operators are dropping the ball.
Why should we, the taxpayer, pay for ATC services that are not required due lack of late night ops at YSCB? Yes, Aussies are on the flight, I get that. But CASA and the airline itself mnust ensure the safety of a new operator before clearing them in. Clearly this crew did not even read Jepps or the ERSA to realise the field is uncontrolled and therefore they need to determine a plan to land safely. Yes, ATC services would have negated all this, but we shouldn't have to pay because unqualified operators are dropping the ball.
Yes, ATC services would have negated all this, but we shouldn't have to pay because unqualified operators are dropping the ball.
Then why does Avalon have a tower? Why is Ballina getting a tower? It is very much about passenger safety and little to do with unqualified operators. Given what happened in 2004 do you consider Qantas to be an unqualified operator because it was a very similar incident. Tower not open, misreading a Jepp chart and a fatigued crew losing SA about the terrain around Canberra.
The methods of control and procedures for all the cost will not protect anymore from rogue aircraft or operators than having a CTAF. After all a number of internationals managed to descend to unsafe lows into Melbourne, in full Radar, while in CTA, or rather exiting out of it. If light aircraft had been in the lane at the time it wpuld have been close or an RA, the answer, make the offending steps lower, so it doesn't happen again.
Why should we, the taxpayer, pay for ATC services that are not required due lack of late night ops at YSCB?
but we shouldn't have to pay because unqualified operators are dropping the ball.
Another line of thinking is that one 737 into the hill south of Canberra would pay for a lifetime of late night controllers.
After all a number of internationals managed to descend to unsafe lows into Melbourne, in full Radar, while in CTA,
Overseas Airlines operating services into our cities is good for the economy and therefore good for the tax payer. Is the cost of 24/7 ATC in Canberra worth it to encourage new services while keeping existing services safe?
No, if it was the mix of traffic then Airservices would not be bothering. It has to do with the number of passenger movements. That is the reason Ballina got a RFFS and the reason it is getting a tower. The incidents at Melbourne were mostly to do with cocked up approaches which is the pilots domain not ATC. This incident in Canberra and the QF one were primarily because ATC wasn't available. The Batik crew, and not without reasonable expectation, considered that they were operating in CTA all the way. The problem for the Batik crew was that they thought that they were operating into an environment at least equivalent from where they departed from. If you want a good example of how CTAF procedures can catch a crew out when they are expecting an ATC service look at MCY. The simple fact is that airspace management in this country is no longer fit for purpose.
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Was ATC involved in preventing further descent or in rebuilding SA for the crews involved? I can think of two cases where they were off the top of my head.
That is the reason Ballina got a RFFS and the reason it is getting a tower.
I still think though that internationals to a CTAF is a bad idea, no matter how much briefing there are still a lot of issues to contend with and this incident highlights just a few.
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