Cdr N D 'Sharkey' Ward DSC, AFC RIP

[Treble one]

Sad news of the death of Cdr Ward is breaking this evening. RIP Sir.

https://www.facebook.com/share/p/Vwq5sAbqoqA7Xob9/

[BEagle]

RIP 'Sharkey'. No-one can doubt your bravery in the South Atlantic and your unswerving loyalty to the Fleet Air Arm.

A naval fighter pilot who had flown the Sea Vixen, Phantom and his beloved Sea Harrier, he had very positive views about the value of naval aviation and lived long enough to see the resurrection of naval fixed wing aviation with the F-35 embarked on the QE carriers.

A true character who will be greatly missed.

[Lookleft]

I only knew of him and have read his book but it would seem that the UK has lost one of the best fighter pilots of the post war generation.

[Mogwi]

Sad to hear that Sharkey has crossed the bar. We didn’t always see eye-to-eye but he always had my respect as both aviator and leader. There is no doubt that his leadership of 801 during the 1982 unpleasantness, contributed considerably to the final outcome.

Sleep well old comrade.

Mog

[Navaleye]

I hope the Navy and the FAA do the right thing by him and give him a suitable memorial. Rename the Falklands hall at the FAA musuem after him?

[Bob Viking]

Maybe they could rename the Yeovilton Wardroom after him. 😉

BV

[SpazSinbad]

JPG sent to me via e-mail source not known however headline is here: Fleet Air Arm Officers Association on X: "RIP Sharkey Sea Harrier and Falklands Conflict legend. https://t.co/Xi4NSY9TvW" / X (https://x.com/faaoa/status/1792121522762465640) & JPG otherwise: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GN7lByhWQAAIrJL?format=jpg

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/956x1464/sharkey_rip_aefa17a2d1b7bf5a52452c8b23af0c60f57bbad4.jpg

[Davef68]

JPG sent to me via e-mail source not known however headline is here: Fleet Air Arm Officers Association on X: "RIP Sharkey Sea Harrier and Falklands Conflict legend. https://t.co/Xi4NSY9TvW" / X (https://x.com/faaoa/status/1792121522762465640) & JPG otherwise: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GN7lByhWQAAIrJL?format=jpg

Text is taken from a post on Facebook by his son Ashton, which shared some pics of him with family members as well. I won't share it, but it's a public post of anyone wants to look for it.

[Bill Macgillivray]

Sad news indeed - I was "Sharkey,s" flt.cdr. and sometime QFI at Linton in the 60's and I could not have wished for a better student/course leader! One of the best in every way. Blue skies and calm seas!
Bill

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Controversial as some of his more recent comments were, no doubt due to not being fully aware of the advances in V/STOL technology and the advantages of low observerability and 5Gen, he was a major player in getting the Sea Harrier into service (CVS/Sea King/Sea Harrier was an important contribution to NATO) and led 801 NAS during NATO activities and the Falklands War.

Although he was frequently accused of 'crab bashing' he did acknowledge the role the RAF Harrier OCU played in teaching V/STOL flying to the RN and the role of RAF Phantoms and other types in NATO maritime scenarios. He also described how surface warships work in conjunction with aircraft from the carrier. Never did he try to claim that we only need carriers.

He had experienced personal tragedy in recent years with the death of his son.

RIP.

[DogTailRed2]

Do any of his military aircraft still survive?

[Davef68]

Do any of his military aircraft still survive?

In terms of the aircraft he flew when he achieved his 'kills', only ZA175 survives at the Norfolk and Suffolk Air Museum at Flixton. XZ451 was written off in 1989

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Legendary [Sea] Harrier pilot and champion of naval aviation Sharkey Ward dies (https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2024/may/21/20240521-sharkey-ward-obituary) - Royal Navy

Inspiring. Dynamic. Outstanding. Determined. Brave. Passionate. Combative.

All could be ascribed to arguably the Navy’s most famous aviator of the post-war era, Commander Nigel ‘Sharkey’ Ward who has died aged 80.

His name is inseparable both with the Sea Harrier and the battle for the skies of the Falklands 42 years ago, when the men he led – a latter-day ‘few’ – became the scourge of Argentine aviators.

Ward was the senior Harrier pilot deployed to the South Atlantic where the jet carved its name in aviation history in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds.

Convinced of the abilities of both his machine and the men who flew and maintained them, he fought two battles: one against naysayers in Whitehall and senior military figures, the other against Argentine aviators.

On the long journey to the Falklands he impressed upon the media that in the hands of his pilots, the Sea Harrier had a distinct edge over its foe – countering a narrative that, outnumbered ten to one by their opponent, three out of four jump jet pilots would not return home.

His confidence was well placed. On its first day in combat, Ward’s squadron – which lived up to the motto it ‘borrowed’ from Marshal Petain at Verdun: On les aura, We’ll get ‘em – downed two Argentine Mirages and a Canberra.

Despite being widely hailed in the media and compared with legendary fighter pilots from the two World Wars, Sharkey Ward was not an ‘ace’ – the definition requires five air-to-air ‘kills’ – but he certainly possessed their traits.

The air war had been raging three weeks when Ward downed his first enemy, a Pucara twin-prop ground-attack aircraft, destroyed the ‘old-fashioned way’: by cannon.

That same day, May 21, while again providing cover for amphibious forces landing at San Carlos Bay, Ward (one) and his wingman Steve Thomas (two) downed three Argentine Daggers with Sidewinder missiles in an engagement lasting barely 60 seconds.

The squadron commander’s final victory of the conflict was a Hercules transporter brought down by a combination of Sidewinder and cannon on June 1.

He flew more than 60 sorties during Operation Corporate, by day and night, often in bad weather – winter had set in by the time the conflict ended.

Thanks to the skill of pilots and the unique abilities of the Sea Harrier, the jets downed 20 Argentine aircraft without loss in dogfights (two Harriers were lost to flak, four to accidents) earning them the nickname ‘La Muerta Negra’, the Black Death.

Ward clashed with task force commander Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward and his staff whose orders, in the Harrier pilot’s eyes, “were totally nonsensical”.

Sharkey Ward ignored them – the right thing to do, in hindsight, as Admiral Woodward conceded. Had he not “we might have lost the war”.

Instead, the Sea Harrier commander was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for both his leadership (“inspiring and dynamic”) and his deeds in Falklands skies as “an outstanding, successful Sea Harrier pilot” in the words of his citation.

The son of an RAF officer, Nigel Ward joined the Royal Navy in 1962 and spent the first four years of his career as a warfare officer, before undertaking fast jet pilot training.

Upon completion in 1969, he first flew Sea Vixen fighters, then the legendary F4 Phantom, rising to senior pilot of 892 Naval Air Squadron.

When his time on Phantoms ended, he was assigned to the MOD as a staff officer responsible for developing the naval variant of Britain’s famous ‘jump jet’.

It began a near decade-long association with the aircraft – earning a second nickname: Mr Sea Harrier - first as he helped to develop it as a naval fighter, then commanding the unit charged with introducing it into service and, once it was, eventually was named commanding officer of 801 Naval Air Squadron.

After the Falklands, Ward remained in the Service as an adviser on aerial warfare at the MOD before leaving the Royal Navy in 1985.

In civvy street he tried his hand at maritime security, tourism, wrote a best-selling memoir, Sea Harrier Over the Falklands, before eventually settling in Grenada from where he continued to argue the case for naval air power with vigour.

Today’s head of the Fleet Air Arm, Rear Admiral Anthony Rimington, said Commander Ward had left his mark on the history of naval aviation.

“As well as being an outstanding fighter pilot, Commander Nigel ‘Sharkey’ Ward was the strongest of advocates of carrier-based power *– and took the opportunity to practise what he preached to demonstrative effect, both during his service in the Falklands war and afterwards,” he added.

[Widger]

A man who divided opinion and spawned many a debate here on Pprune.

RIP Sir and thank you for your Service

Obituary (https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2024/may/21/20240521-sharkey-ward-obituary)

[Asturias56]

A man who divided opinion and spawned many a debate here on Pprune.

RIP Sir and thank you for your Service

Obituary (https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2024/may/21/20240521-sharkey-ward-obituary)
That's very fair I don't think anyone on here ever questioned his flying ability or, his bravery or the importance of what he achieved in the Falklands War.

His later contributions seemed designed to stir everyone up and were met with a lot less admiration.

[SLXOwft]

The mention above of his son Ashton reminded me of a post he made on National Suicide Prevention Day last year, saying how a Ashton had been a tower of strength as he (Sharkey) never got over losing Kris in such a tragic way. I trust they are flying in those blue skies together.

[India Four Two]

How did he get his nickname?

[Lordflasheart]

Why Sharkey ?

Standard Royal Navy nickname for any one named Ward -
Apparently after Captain Jack Ward, 1553 to 1622 - English Barbary Coast Pirate.
(I had to look it up.)

He was right then, and right later on too. Just look around at the reality.
(I didn't need to look that up)

LFH.

[cynicalint]

My condolences to Sarah, his daughter-in-law, Kris' wife, who treated me with such professionalism at Wansbeck Hospital last year for INR and swellings on my neck.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

That's very fair I don't think anyone on here ever questioned his flying ability or, his bravery or the importance of what he achieved in the Falklands War.

His later contributions seemed designed to stir everyone up and were met with a lot less admiration.


As ever, when reading or hearing someone's comments, you need to try and think about what do they know but do not say, as they assume you know it, and what do they not know but you assume that they do.

I think that part of problem is that people are quick to jump to conclusions without looking at the bigger picture. For example, in Sea Harrier In The Falklands he mentions the way that 800 NAS were not totally adept at using radar and that the Flag (Woodward) and his staff misunderstood how to employ a fighter as a task group weapon, and he is slated for this. Yet similar comments have been made by many others. In particular I recall a PWO/AAWO type commenting in a Falklands related book that the loss of HMS Sheffield was a stark reminder that the RN was not as good as it should have been. With the run down of carrier aviation in the 1970s there would have been few opportunities to exercise these capabilities, and as I recall some of Sea Harriers were fitted with radar on the way South.

As for anti RAF comments, he not only praises the Harrier OCU and 1 Sqn, he mentions that in the NATO role RAF Phantoms would have been up threat of the CVS centred RN task group - which he notes in his description of defence in depth. He does ask questions about the Black Buck missions, and he fell into the common trap of blaming RAF map redrawing for the loss of the big carriers. Ironically he himself makes the argument that the staff officers missed - air defence of a task group or convoy in the North Atlantic or Norwegian Sea several hundred miles from a friendly airbase.

To put fighter cover over the fleet at just a few hundred miles would take up all the tanker resources of the RAF and most of the fighters.

Without going into what that means exactly in too much depth, a few simple speed/time/distance calculations prove the value of having your fighters near to the area or assets to be protected - see post #7376 (https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/221116-future-carrier-including-costs-369.html#post11603401).

Quoting his Sea Harrier Over The Falklands once more, and the final paragraph of Appendix II (A Layman's Guide to Fighter Combat):

Perhaps there is one disadvantage to the present generation of V/STOL jets and this invokes the first question, 'What more could one ask for?' The Harrier family of jets are versatile and capable - but they need the best pilots to fly them. That is why the cream of RAF pilot capability gets channelled into the Harrier world. One might therefore ask for a V/STOL jet (with the Sea Harrier's unique combat performance) that can be flown successfully by 'an average pilot' rather than just the best pilots.

I think that it was unfortunate that he did not get to visit the F-35B test team to learn about the value of 5Gen and low observability (as suggested here (https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/517553-sharky-watch-live-10.html#post7972459) by WhiteOvies) or to see the F-35B Lightning at sea - where he might be impressed by how smoothly and accurately it lands on deck, how it can both launch and recover in heavy seas with high wind speeds, and how efficient the STOVL deck is.

[Asturias56]

WEBF - you just have to trawl through many many comments on here about Ward's later contributions to the defence debate to see how he was seen - and I'm afraid it tarnished his outstanding fighting record.

Dryden's words come to mind:-

A daring pilot in extremity;
Pleas'd with the danger, when the waves went high
He sought the storms; but for a calm unfit,
Would steer too nigh the sands, to boast his wit.
Great wits are sure to madness near alli'd;
And thin partitions do their bounds divide:
Else, why should he, with wealth and honour blest,
Refuse his age the needful hours of rest?

[meleagertoo]

Can't see that as poor tast at all; far from it, it is a relevant and rather poignant thought very elegantly put by Dryden. It is entirely in keeping with an accurate and honest rather than syrupy, sugar-coated tribute to the rather un-syrupy and not at all sugar-coated Cdr Ward.
Tributes need to be honest and realistic, surely?

[SASless]

I was raised to speak well of the dead as it shall be my turn one day.

I was also raised to honor those who put their life on the line in defense of country and especially honor those who did so with great gallantry and effect.

"Sharkey" as a Royal Navy Harrier Pilot earned our respect for his service in the Royal Navy and especially during the Falklands combat.

He was a stalwart and quite vocal advocate about Naval Aviation and earned the right to speak on the issues surrounding the Naval Service and its needs and shortcomings as he understood them.

Sharkey was a Fighter Pilot with all that embraces and was decorated for gallantry during combat aerial operations.

I did not know Sharkey but I have known many Military Aviators that walked in the same kind of boots as did he.

We should all accept we have lost a Man that we would want to serve with when facing an aggressive capable enemy in combat.

You may not have agreed with him but you should respect him.....I do unreservedly.

I believe that when we take the measure of a Man we must take a full measure and not just pick the parts we wish.

Hand Salute, Commander Ward! Fair Winds and Following Seas!

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Asturias56

Not being one for poetry I have no idea what that is meant to say. However I will say from my own life experience, and observations of others, that most of the problems I have encountered in life have been due to me assuming that other have known what I considered basic facts, or from other assuming that I knew things that they considered basic facts. Perhaps this aspect of the human condition is why we need forgiveness?

Quoting Sea Harrier Over The Falklands:

There were essentially three elements of naval warfare which had to be controlled and directed from the Ops Room: Above the Surface (Air), On the Surface, and Under the Surface (Anti submarine). These were very much interbred and interdependent, thanks to the variety of modem weapons available to the fleet and the sophistication of the modern threat. It was therefore no easy task to collect and collate the information from all the ship's sensor (including aircraft sensors and information from other platforms) and present them to the Command in an easily digestible fashion. All friendly units in each element had to be continuously plotted and information from the separate levels of defence recorded, so that in extremitis the Command could judge priority and take the appropriate action.

Defence in depth had become the war fighting philosophy of the day. Against the air threat, the outer layer of defence could be air to air and surface to air systems provided by a third party and deployed some point between the source of the threat and the fleet at sea. In the South Atlantic there was no such layer available and the Task Group had to rely on its organic defensive weapon platforms.

The outer layer of air and surface defence was the Sea Harrier on Combat Air Patrol. Whenever the threat assessment made air attack highly possible, or probable, then CAP aircraft would be stationed up threat to deter and/or engage the attackers. (Should a surface attack be predicted then the SHAR would be dispatched over the horizon to search for the enemy units.) Air defence radar pickets (warships fitted with suitable sensors and weapon systems) would also be stationed up threat, but inside the CAP stations, to provide information to the CAP and the Carrier Group itself. These pickets would be armed with a variety of surface to air weapons and represented a second line of defence. The next layer of defence was the the medium or long range surface to air ship borne missile system. Sea Dart fulfilled this role for the Group. Attackers or their air to surface missiles that managed to penetrate through the outer layers of defence would then face the next designer system - the Short Range or Point Defence Missile Systems such as Sea Wolf. And, as a last ditch defence (on the hard kill side), high rate of fire, radar directed guns such as Phalanx fitted bill. Soft kill options, such as jamming and chaff were also an important integral part of the air defence in depth scenario.

If one analyses the probabilities of engagement and kill of each of the layers of defence, and calculates the overall probabilities of engagement and kill of the cumulative system, it is easy to demonstrate mathematically and in practice that money spent on defence in depth is far better than spending the same amount on a single 'all singing, all dancing' weapon system. The latter can never be perfect or 100% efficient and if it has weaknesses, which it surely will, the threat will be certain to capitalise on these deficiencies and circumvent the system. The separate layers of defence in depth each act as a deterrent to an enemy, and each are capable of causing attrition to attacking forces.

It is the Commander Task Group's job to ensure that where possible he does not place his force in a position that denies that force the full benefit of its defence in depth systems, whether by geographical location or by misuse of a particular asset or layer.

The under surface threat had to be approached in the same manner as the air threat, using third party resources, long range sensors such as Towed Array Sonar, ASW frigates as a screen between the threat and the group, anti submarine helicopters on the screen and at other locations around the group, and last but not least sonars fitted to the ships in the main body. Each of the anti submarine platforms must be capable of not only locating the threat submarine but also of prosecuting it with appropriate weapons. And with the submarine threat being ever present and very difficult to detect, the various level of defence have to be working at 100 per cent efficiency for twenty four hours a day when in a threat zone.*

There were, of course, no third parties of any description providing defence for the Task Force in the South Atlantic; no Nimrods, no air defence fighter barriers, and no shore based Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft.#

*Technological developments since 1982 have changed things and increased the range at which submarines can be detected, with the advent of things such as low frequency active sonar. The longer range comes at the expense of resolution, which is where the helicopter with dipping sonar comes into its own.

#The Sea Harrier, and the CVS, was expected to operate in the GIUK Gap and Norwegian Sea, with Tomcats from USN carriers and two squadrons of RAF Phantoms (dedicated to maritime air defence) providing the bulk of the air defence, supported by AEW. The Nimrods sent South in 1982 were mostly used in ASuW roles.

That description of defence in depth puts his credibility far above many other frequently quoted defence 'experts' - such as those who insist that warships with anti air missiles make having fighters aboard the carrier unnecessary, or that the Navy only needs carriers. Similarly his brief mention of ASW puts him far above those who insist that you either can do without frigates or that you can easily do ASW without a carrier, or without frigates. He also has never said that the RAF is not needed - which some people seem think that he said.

meleagertoo

Yes of course - but with forgiveness and an awareness of the mismatch between what they think we know, and what we think they know. Too err is human - to forgive is divine.

SASless

Well said. If we cannot forgive others how can be expect to be forgiven ourselves?

Cdr Ward was involved in the development of the Sea Harrier - which had a place in the NATO war plans. He had been a NATO nuclear planner, so he was no doubt aware that not only did pushing naval forces forward into the Norwegian Sea and a renewed emphasis on maritime strategy and the Northern Flank not only provided the most effective defence against the Soviet Navy and in particular its submarines and bomber force, but took pressure off the NATO central front by posing a threat to the Soviet homeland.

[RetiredBA/BY]

Quite a coincidence but I met up with one of my airline colleagues, last Thursday, like myself a former RAF QFI but he had been one of Sharkey’s instructors at Linton. Seems Cdr Wards talents shone through even then.
Like my former RAF mate Al Curtis , lost in the suspected collision in the South Atlantic, may he rest in peace.

[megan]

Well said SAS :ok: Always viewed the bashing of Cdr. Ward on these pages as nothing but the usual inter service scrapping by mostly juveniles, unbecoming.

[dagenham]

I found myself on YouTube this weekend, listening to Sharkey talking about the falklands. Worth a listen and perhaps raising a glass - after all the measure of civility is having a serious debate and sharing a drink afterwards.

https://youtu.be/bjpgSEPk1TY?si=IAVPCOOwHLLiMMgf

[SpazSinbad]

Thanks for the heads up about the videos. The other three below:

Royal Navy Sea Harrier Falklands War - #2 of 4 'Sharkey' Ward.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKGonlPlLbc

Royal Navy Sea Harrier Falklands War - #3 of 4 'Sharkey' Ward.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPmOdswrpLQ

Royal Navy Sea Harrier Falklands War - #4 of 4 'Sharkey' Ward.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TnsJb3k1meo

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Also from the IWM Collections, here is a sound file from the April to June 1982 period:

Ward, Nigel David (Oral history) (https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80012552)

Audio diary recorded by commanding officer of 801 Naval Air Sqdn, Fleet Air Arm aboard HMS Invincible in South Atlantic during Falklands War, 4/1982-6/1982

REEL 1 Audio diary recorded by commanding officer of 801 Naval Air Sqdn, Fleet Arm aboard HMS Invincible in South Atlantic during Falklands War, 4/1982-6/1982: 5/4/1982: reaction to send off of Naval Task Force; start of combat training; morale; attitude to Lord Carrington's resignation; members of squadron; anticipated role of squadron; sings parody of song 'Don't Cry For Me Argentina' composed by 820 Naval Air Sqdn, Fleet Air Arm; reasons for recording audio diary; need for unit to get onto war footing; disappointment in rejection of John Nott's resignation; talking to journalists on board; adjusting to demands and pressures of war. 6/4/1982: poor flying conditions; outcome of conversation with Lieutenant Mike 'Soapy' Watson. 7/4/1982: day's activities; achievements of squadron; briefing duties; opinion of squadron's readiness. 9/4/1982: previous day's meeting on board HMS Hermes; air intercept role of squadron; missile firing practice; night flying.

REEL 2 Continues: opinion of Boscombe Down's testing of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier FRS.1; outcome of weapons testing. Saturday: reads part of progress report sent to Naval Task Force commander. Monday: review of weekend's activities; disarray amongst 800 Sqdn, Fleet Air Arm; importance of influencing Captain Lin Middleton. 18/4/1982: belief Argentineans might still back down; problems with fuel during landing during night flying; further air combat and air intercept training and discussions; obtaining allocation of Aim-9 Sidewinder Missile; dissimilarities between Fleet Air Arm squadrons; opinion of his unit. 19/4/1982: opinion of performances in combat training operations involving HMS Hermes and 800 Naval Air Sqdn.

REEL 3 Continues: Airborne recording from cockpit during mock combat with 800 Naval Air Sqdn and comments. 20/4/1982: previous nights training exercise; question of 800 Naval Air Sqdn's lack of knowledge of weapons system; discussion with Captain Jeremy Black regarding media coverage; comments of air interception by 800 Naval Air Sqdn against Argentine Air Force reconnaissance aircraft; differing radar pick-ups between 800 and 801 Naval Air Sqdns; reaction to operational status of 800 Naval Air Sqdn; reaction to non-arrival of Aim-9 Sidewinder Missiles; equipping with automatic pistols. 23/4/1982: state of readiness; intercepting Argentinean reconnaissance aircraft; loss of helicopters removing Special Air Service from South Georgia; ditching of Westland Sea King helicopter and search for missing crewman; anxieties about role of HMS Hermes; Aim-9 Sidewinder Missile supply problems. 26/4/1982: attacks on Argentine Navy submarine ARA Santa Fe on South Georgia, 25/4/1982; reaction to recapture of South Georgia; receiving permission to shoot down Argentine Air Force reconnaissance aircraft; writing paper advising on role of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harriers; discussions with Lieutenant Commander Robin Kent on board HMS Hermes; questions aims of Task Force and role of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier squadrons.

REEL 4 Continues: 2/5/1982: air activities during 1/5/1982; Flight Lieutenant Paul Barton's first squadron kill; shooting down of Argentine Air Force English Electric Canberra by Lieutenant Al Curtis; air attacks on Port Stanley; further air activities; waiting for retaliation; daily routine, 2/5/1982. 9/5/1982: circumstances of strike on HMS Sheffield, 3/5/1982; death of Lieutenant Nick Taylor, 3/5/1982; opinion of allocation of aircraft from HMS Hermes; question of over-tasking of squadron, 4/5/1982; loss of squadron pilots in probable air to air collision, 6/5/1982; attacks on Darwin and Fox Bay; reaction to Royal Navy ship locking weapons onto his aircraft; question of staff's use of Hawker Siddeley Sea Harrier FRS1; question of 800 Naval Air Sqdn's performing aerobatics during combat air patrols.

REEL 5 Continues: attack and capture of Argentine Navy trawler ARA Narwal, 9/5/1982; accommodation of ARA Narwal's crew on board HMS Invincible. 11/5/1982: concerns over 800 Sqdn's use of radar and tasking; opinion of Staff Aviation Officer (SAO) Chris Hunneyball. 22/5/1982: strike on HMS Ardent; air combats and personal kills; squadron morale and kills. 25/5/1982: recap of previous days actions including Royal Navy losses; manning aircraft during attack on SS Atlantic Conveyor, 4/6/1982: levels of flying and fatigue; shooting down of Flight Lieutenant Ian Mortimer; loss of aircraft on frozen deck; chasing Argentine Air Force Lockheed C-130 Hercules.

REEL 6 Continues: shooting down of Argentine Air Force Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft. Cockpit recording, 5/5/1982: Avro Vulcan strike on Stanley Airfield; Sea Harrier visual searches; shooting down of Lieutenant Nick Taylor; loss of HMS Sheffield; ineffectiveness of helicopter torpedoes; question of being tasked away from duties; question of frequencies being changed for security; opinion of command; further aspects of Naval Task Force operations; atmospheric and noises from cockpit.

REEL 7 Continues: atmosphere and noises from cockpit.

[Flugplatz]

RIP top bloke!

[Mogwi]

Also from the IWM Collections, here is a sound file from the April to June 1982 period:

Ward, Nigel David (Oral history) (https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80012552)

REEL 7 Continues: atmosphere and noises from cockpit.


Only 7 reels? He got off lightly.

Mog

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Cdr Ward was in this 1986 BBC documentary, part of the Horizon series, that covers the technical issues relating to the fight against Argentine aircraft in the Falklands. Many of the lessons are still relevant - such as the need to engage at maximum range, the need for fighters, the need for Airborne Early Warning, defence in depth, and so on.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bLUSLbZb7o

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yDYx84DdJ-w

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZzMe7RXVfU&t=1s

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xZas4rLSGQg

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9O_vkRFQwRI

Cdr Ward also featured in this episode of the BBC documentary Decisive Weapons:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E9sFmhV7Jy4