Latest Boeing News

[Mike Flynn]

Claims that Boeing (https://www.theguardian.com/business/boeing) knew of safety flaws in the manufacture of one of its largest passenger jet aircraft, but covered them up to speed production, are under investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), according to a reports.

The information came from a whistleblower inside the beleaguered US aircraft maker, and relates to the structural integrity of the 787 Dreamliner jet, a report published by the New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/us/politics/boeing-787-dreamliner-whistle-blower.html) alleges.

The engineer, identified as Sam Salehpour, told the newspaper that sections of the fuselage of the Dreamliner were improperly fastened together and could eventually break apart mid-flight.

Salehpour said he had worked for the company for more than a decade, including on the jets in question, and claimed Boeing (https://www.theguardian.com/business/boeing) employed “shortcuts” in the manufacturing process intended to reduce production bottlenecks – but which ultimately compromised safety.


WASHINGTON, April 9 (Reuters) - The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is investigating a Boeing whistleblower's claims that the company dismissed safety and quality concerns in the production of the planemaker's 787 and 777 jets, an agency spokesperson said on Tuesday.In a statement, Boeing said it was fully confident in the 787 Dreamliner, adding that the claims "are inaccurate and do not represent the comprehensive work Boeing has done to ensure the quality and long-term safety of the aircraft."
Boeing shares were down nearly 2% at $178.19 on Tuesday afternoon after the FAA confirmed the investigation, which was first reported by the New York Times.

Boeing engineer Sam Salehpour said he identified engineering problems that affected the structural integrity of the jets and claimed Boeing employed shortcuts to reduce bottlenecks during the 787 assembly process, his attorneys said in a release.In a statement,
Reuters was not able to independently verify the whistleblower's claims.

Source https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/apr/09/boeing-whistleblower-faa-investigation-report and https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/faa-probing-boeing-whistleblowers-quality-claims-787-777-jets-2024-04-09/

[DIBO]

More of the same: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/u...le-blower.html (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/us/politics/boeing-787-dreamliner-whistle-blower.html)

[MechEngr]

Could people heading to the press about problems include specific detail about what the shortcut was and what they believe the effect of it to be?

No doubts about some shortcut and no tolerance for them, but knowing the potential problem gives a bit more information for risk management. Is this "may allow a leak to develop at 10,000 landings" or "these should be grounded immediately?"

[WillowRun 6-3]

Complete "Agree" with MechEngr as to importance of knowing the particulars insofar as any engineering, manufacturing and production, and potentially certification, issues are concerned.

For the present, this SLF/attorney comments that the individual raising these concerns has engaged the services of a truly heavy-hitter attorney. Based only on press reports and absolutely no personal knowledge whatsoever, consider that Attorney Debra Katz, founding partner of Katz Banks Kumin in Washington, has already evidently driven extensive media and press coverage, and arranged for a spotlight appearance before Ccongress.

From the New York Times article: "Mr. Salehpour’s concerns are set to receive an airing on Capitol Hill. Senator Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut and the chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee’s investigations subcommittee, is planning to hold a hearing with Mr. Salehpour on April 17. Mr. Blumenthal said he wanted the public to hear from the engineer firsthand.

'Repeated, shocking allegations about Boeing’s manufacturing failings point to an appalling absence of safety culture and practices — where profit is prioritized over everything else,' Mr. Blumenthal said in a statement." (internal quotation as in NYT article).

And, according to the law firm's website, Attorney Katz was "[r]ecognized by the Washington Post as 'the feared attorney of the #MeToo movement (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/09/24/meet-christine-blasey-fords-lawyer-debra-katz-nerves-of-steel-and-proud-to-be-among-the-top-10-plantiffs-attorneys-to-fear-most/?utm_term=.56f18e1570ce),' [and she] has been successfully litigating employment discrimination, civil rights, and whistleblower protection cases for nearly 40 years." (internal quotation as in original)

In my law firm years I had exactly one matter defending claims brought by a D.C. whistleblower legal specialist; there was pretty extensive use of press releases (it was circa 2006) and it was, in a word, a wild ride. (Health care field, not aviation, client). Based on all this, and discounting some for "politics", Boeing appears highly likely to be gettin' into some chop over this, I'll bet.

[proper form of law firm name corrected, WR 6-3]

[BoeingDriver99]

And of course to balance the blood sucking lawyers viewpoint above… the 737 Max has smashed to pieces 346 people.

346 people are dead and unrecognisable due to Boeing mismanagement and failings. And that’s only until the next disaster.

[OldnGrounded]

Based on all this, and discounting some for "politics", Boeing appears highly likely to be gettin' into some chop over this, I'll bet.

Yes, I'd make the same bet. Katz's firm didn't take this case without being very confident that it has legs. Almost certainly, Salehpour doesn't have nearly deep enough pockets to pay for the level of representation that this will require, which means that Katz & Co. have probably agreed to fund it. And that means that they expect recovery under whistleblower statutes is likely.

[WillowRun 6-3]

And of course to balance the blood sucking lawyers viewpoint above… the 737 Max has smashed to pieces 346 people.

346 people are dead and unrecognisable due to Boeing mismanagement and failings. And that’s only until the next disaster.

Excuse me, but that slam on lawyers doesn't apply to yours truly. My interest in threads on this site isn't to be found in any form of pecuniary gain. You might take note, for example, of the extensive (totally voluntary and - happily - unpaid in any way) work I did on-thread, attempting to derail the unfair scapegoating prosecution of Forkner. I am NOT taking any credit for his being found not-guilty.... but it was the outcome for which I advocated in a good number of posts.

No apologist for Boeing here, and if you can point to even one single solitary post within the past 10 years on this forum where I have expressed a viewpoint intended to line my own or anyone else's pockets, do tell.

[Big Pistons Forever]

WR 6-3

I value your lawyerly perspective as it brings additional context to important issues. I hope you continue to contribute to this forum.

[PPRuNeUser0221]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO, MH370) or external factors (SAM hit over the Ukraine). Zero deaths due to Boeing defects. In terms of years in the sky, the safest plane (if we take into account no Boeing faults in the 3 death-related accidents)

Better have deep pockets for the slander lawsuits against you that will be forthcoming by Boeing - I am strictly referring to the 777 which I have intimate knowledge in.

Enjoy your 15' of fame pal
.

[ATC Watcher]

@ WR 6-3
" The dogs bark but the caravan pass by " ( Arab and French proverb) Do not pay too much attention , your input and legal remarks on this forum are highly appreciated as it gives another side perspective and brings knowledge most of us do not have. .

[ATC Watcher]

On the CNN web there is a quote from the whistleblower
“I literally saw people jumping on the pieces of the airplane to get them to align,” Salehpour said. “By jumping up and down, you’re deforming parts so that the holes align temporarily … and that’s not how you build an airplane.”
If true and can be sustained by a video or by more witnesses , then this will become another nightmare for the Boeing PR team .
But it it is all made up to attract attention and cannot be sustained , then we enter another game .

[sudden twang]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO,

.
Ok I’ll bite on this one.
iirc this incident involved the APFDS in a mode that would not provide speed protection. I’ve seen posters adorned to walls warning of the A/T speed trap. The use of the word TRAP is telling. I believe there is /was a mod to change the logic.
To simply say pilot error is somewhat simplistic imho.

[waito]

On the CNN web there is a quote from the whistleblower

If true and can be sustained by a video or by more witnesses , then this will become another nightmare for the Boeing PR team .
But it it is all made up to attract attention and cannot be sustained , then we enter another game .
Video is probably too much to ask. Other witnesses, yes. To confirm the whistleblowers credibility. But it sounds very specific - and terrible.

Another way: if he remembers the day it happened, maybe the airframe(s) can be identified and that particular part inspected for evidence?

[Lomon]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO, MH370) or external factors (SAM hit over the Ukraine). Zero deaths due to Boeing defects. In terms of years in the sky, the safest plane (if we take into account no Boeing faults in the 3 death-related accidents)

Better have deep pockets for the slander lawsuits against you that will be forthcoming by Boeing - I am strictly referring to the 777 which I have intimate knowledge in.

Enjoy your 15' of fame pal
.

Until the wreckage of MH370 is found, and the CVR and FDR analysed, you have no way of knowing what the cause of its disappearance was. The flight could have been down to pilot error, it could just as easily have been a sudden decompression which incapacitated the crew and the autopilot just kept on flying until it fell out of the sky.

[BizJetJock]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO, MH370) or external factors (SAM hit over the Ukraine). Zero deaths due to Boeing defects. In terms of years in the sky, the safest plane (if we take into account no Boeing faults in the 3 death-related accidents)

Better have deep pockets for the slander lawsuits against you that will be forthcoming by Boeing - I am strictly referring to the 777 which I have intimate knowledge in.

Enjoy your 15' of fame pal
.
A total red herring since he is talking about the 787, not the 777

[procede]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO, MH370) or external factors (SAM hit over the Ukraine). Zero deaths due to Boeing defects. In terms of years in the sky, the safest plane (if we take into account no Boeing faults in the 3 death-related accidents)

On that train of thought, the A340 wins hands down, with no fatalities whatsoever in 33 years. And the A380 for example has not even had a single accident, with the exception of QF32.

[Andy_S]

And the 787 itself has had zero hull losses and zero fatal accidents / incidents in 15 years of service.

[Less Hair]

Not fatal but it had those battery fires early on.

[OldnGrounded]

No apologist for Boeing here, and if you can point to even one single solitary post within the past 10 years on this forum where I have expressed a viewpoint intended to line my own or anyone else's pockets, do tell.

I've read your posts for most of that decade and have never seen the slightest indication that you've done any such thing. You're a valuable contributor to these conversations.

[BFSGrad]

A total red herring since he is talking about the 787, not the 777
Multiple news sources are reporting that the whistleblower is alleging problems with both the 787 and 777.

I thought the problem of 787 fuselage section mating tolerances was known and already addressed.

[sjmf]

Do you also have intimate knowledge of the assembly conditions the whistle blower alleges? The performance of the existing fleet (whilst impressive) does not speak to the conditions that new planes are being manufactured under, you could have a very safe existing fleet and terribly manufactured new airframes.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Many pertinent factual items are reported in the Reuters article linked above. Considering the intense attention focused on Boeing and its manufacturing problems in particular, this SLF/attorney offers some things to keep in mind, based on a very early assessment of what is known or reported publicly.

1. The whistleblower (Mr Salehpour) filed some type of complaint or report with FAA, according to every published item. I found this odd, because we recently saw much discussion of the whistleblower claims being litigated by the now-deceased John Barnett - claims that were filed with the U.S. Department of Labor under the AIR21 Whistleblower Protection Program. FAA does have a Hotline for reporting safety concerns. Perhaps FAA has a complaint resolution (or adjudication) process parallel or similar to the DOL - if it does, it isn't promiment on the agency website.

Not saying FAA isn't going to investigate and also not saying anything against Mr Salehpour's claims or anything else. Maybe going to FAA first, and then having DOL as a later option, is seen as creating pressure for a settlement - it plainly has created publicity.

2. The press reports mention both 787 and 777. On the former, after the shims issue and "skin-flatness specifications" issues which were subjects of intense attention previously, presumably FAA has a thorough background on the manufacturing process problems and at least much of what to look for.

3. The whistleblower and legal counsel have provided documents to the FAA and a letter dated January19 to FAA chief Whitaker, according to Reuters. If and when these are placed on the public record at the hearing before a Senate Subcommittee, things are quite likely to get very interesting. My guess is that the early January door plug incident could have motivated an actual filing to FAA, as pressure on Boeing had just spiked rather higher. (Boeing reportedly has offered to provide documents, testimony and technical briefings to Senate staff - perhaps showing some insight after delays and omissions in disclosing information about the door plug handling in the shop.)

4. Last and not at all least, there very likely is more to Mr Salehpour's "retaliation story" than the one-word claim of "threats"' combined with "exclusion from meetings" - as to which press reports do not add any detail about either claim. I've seen retaliation claims predicated on perceived exclusion or shunning but then management comes forward and shows pretty extensively that the aggrieved party did not have an assigned or routine role in a group or unit meeting, rather the person wanted to join and participate, but it wasn't part of their job in fact. If the reason the person was not allowed to join or participate was retaliatory - i.e., we don't need no stinking safety concerns - that's one thing. But arbitrary exclusions from some among a large volume of groups and meetings within a large manufacturing facility? I'm shocked.

[Unnumbered] Participation on this forum . . . I try to take it seriously. Thanks very much for all encouragement.

[warbirdfinder]

And of course to balance the blood sucking lawyers viewpoint above… the 737 Max has smashed to pieces 346 people.

346 people are dead and unrecognisable due to Boeing mismanagement and failings. And that’s only until the next disaster.

There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.

The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.

Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.

[artee]

There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.

The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.

Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.
Here we go again. It was the plane/it was the pilots, ad infinitum.

[PEI_3721]

Hear we go again; not necessarily so.

Consider the mindset, the thinking, which should precede activity.

The thinking required in evaluation, design, testing, production, and the assumptions made about human performance.

The responsibilities which the higher levels of management should have held which were systematically past down through the organisation, apparently without considering the local capabilities and effects; effects which would rebound back up to the highest level of management.

Instead of looking at outcome, consider the process of safety management and the responsibilities which should be inherent.

[SLF3]

There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.

The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.

Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.

So the FAA grounded the Max to protect the public from incompetent third world pilots? And the American pilots who tried to manage MCAS failure in the sim after the accident were carefully chosen to be representative of third world pilots?

[Ollie Onion]

Problem for Boeing is that now when the next 787 or 777 crashes it is going to lead to a massive reputational damage due to this whistleblower.

[OldnGrounded]

Problem for Boeing is that now when the next 787 or 777 crashes it is going to lead to a massive reputational damage due to this whistleblower.

True. Perhaps, to limit such damage in the future, Boeing should try harder to produce fewer whistleblowers.

[mustafagander]

I must say that if the Ethiopian crew failed to follow laid down procedures in which they were trained and operated the aircraft outside the flight envelope they deserve harsh criticism.
It's not Boeing's fault if crews refuse to operate the aircraft within the flight envelope and fail to apply procedures within their training to mitigate a problem.

[Ben_S]

I must say that if the Ethiopian crew failed to follow laid down procedures in which they were trained and operated the aircraft outside the flight envelope they deserve harsh criticism.
It's not Boeing's fault if crews refuse to operate the aircraft within the flight envelope and fail to apply procedures within their training to mitigate a problem.

Indeed. But then they shouldn't have been flying an aircraft that should never have been certified. Paint it on the crew as much as people want, the reality is, the aircraft should never have been allowed to take off.

[Equivocal]

But then they shouldn't have been flying an aircraft that should never have been certified. Are you correct to say it should never have been certified? Maybe the problem at certification was that not all of the functionality was declared and properly managed. If you accept that, perhaps you should be questioning whether Boeing should have Design Approval (or whatever it's called in the US).

[hec7or]

The comments on here post accident highlighted the fact that a great many "informed" individuals were unable to differentiate between main trim and manual trim and therein lies the problem. The main trim will not work if the cutout switches are positioned to off. If you think you are using manual trim when flicking the trim switch after the cutout switch has been selected then you will be somewhat disappointed.
In manual flight, main trim is the usual option not manual trim.

[warbirdfinder]

If one does not know the difference between main trim (the pickles switches) with the trim switches in normal and manual trim, when the trim switches are off, the handle on the trim wheel is extended and moving the trim wheel manually by muscle force, then that person should not be in the cockpit.

[phantomsphorever]

Hard to believe that there are still people out there, that claim that the whole MCAS debacle is down to badly trained 3rd world pilots.
Even more unbelievable that the FAA and other bodies of airworthiness around the world would ground a whole fleet for nearly 2 years for no reason.

I guess many years from now the US history books will say that Boeing fell due to inkompetent behaviour of pilots from other nations and that all of that was instigated by the European countries that wanted to push Airbus ahead - despite being the inferior solution.

;););)

[Bergerie1]

I think most pilots who have flown the 707 would have known how to cope. But this doesn't absolve the gradual erosion of pilot training and the defects in Boeing's design of the Max.

[Flatiron220]

When it comes to the 2 crashes, I think the emphasis needs to be on the design because:
Regardless of the quality of pilot training and procedures, MCAS went against the basic principles of redundancy and ‘failing safe’ and this potential threat could have been minimised with minimal effort. That is the real black mark for Boeing IMO, that and trying to conceal as much information about MCAS as they thought they could get away with.

[tdracer]

Problem for Boeing is that now when the next 787 or 777 crashes it is going to lead to a massive reputational damage due to this whistleblower.
It depends on the nature of the crash. For example, I doubt many people find the A350 crash that happened a few months ago reflects badly on Airbus.

[MechEngr]

Hard to believe that there are still people out there, that claim that the whole MCAS debacle is down to badly trained 3rd world pilots.
Even more unbelievable that the FAA and other bodies of airworthiness around the world would ground a whole fleet for nearly 2 years for no reason.

I guess many years from now the US history books will say that Boeing fell due to inkompetent behaviour of pilots from other nations and that all of that was instigated by the European countries that wanted to push Airbus ahead - despite being the inferior solution.

;););)

They failed to follow any portion of the stall warning procedure prior to completing all the triggers for MCAS. How badly trained must pilots be to be considered a part of the problem? The airline had tripled in size in a decade. This isn't a 3rd world problem - it appears to be a corporate greed problem of not spending sufficient time building a safety culture in order to build the size of the airline as rapidly as possible, but with the added twist that the CAA, the airline, and the training, was all done by the government. They chose to sell tickets rather than exhaustively train their pilots.

The 2 years was trying to figure out what to do about pilots performing the opposite to every required step.

[Loose rivets]

During the long threads about the accidents, I suggested that MCAS was a device - in the form of software - that operated when commanded. Such functions are incredibly common and often not presented to the users, and so it doesn't surprise me that much that it wasn't part of the technical course. I'm not judging, I'm just not surprised. It would be interesting to know what else we don't know about that inputs into that 47' 1" of flying surface.

I also mentioned that I'd found one airline with it covered in the Pilot's Handbook. By covered, I mean about three lines in a page segmented by lines into three or four paragraphs. Sorry, I can only remember it was a south American country.

Further, I suggested that the Ethiopian captain may have been adversely affected by news of what cause the previous crash. A vague image of systems in his mind, with the end result burning into his brain.

I'm still bewildered by the world's indifference, or even admiration, for the continuation of the first flight. 'They got it right.' Really? Making a flight with a very sick aircraft, and then minimalistic write up? Is it just me?

[Bergerie1]

When the Boeing 707 was introduced every pilot was trained and made very well aware of the possibility of a trim runaway. The procedure for dealing with this was trained on the simulator and even in the aircraft itself during training flights. On some 707 variants there was also a tendency in some configurations for a slight pitch up at high angles of attack (incidence) when approaching the stall. This was of concern to D.P. Davies who required the fitting of a stick nudger on UK registered 707 aircraft.

I quote below from a Leeham News article which you can access in this link:-
https://leehamnews.com/2019/11/01/a-basic-mcas-system-was-installed-in-the-boeing-707-in-the-1960s/

It seems to me that this basic knowledge and associated training became "diluted" over time in some countries and airlines. Had the proper emphasis and training been applied by all operators perhaps the 737Max accidents could have been avoided.

See also this link to listen to DPD talking about certificating the 707 and other early jet types:-
https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/602953-d-p-davies-interviews-certificating-aircraft.html

QUOTE
Additional Certification Requirements to the 707 by the UK CAAPrior to the introduction of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) each country, should it elect to, was responsible for approving each model and variant destined to be operated by their own domiciled carriers. As a result of its own aircraft manufacturing industry the United Kingdom (UK) was in reality the only other country in the world that could effectively complete an independent airworthiness review of an aircraft. Each foreign aircraft that was to be registered with the UK authorities underwent a review of its design and, equally important, was also subject to rigorous flight tests.

In his book Handling the Big Jets (first published in 1967) D. P. Davies, formally head of the flight test department of the UK Air Registration Board (ARB), now the CAA, describes at length the different stalling characteristics exhibited by aircraft with different wing and tail configurations. He personally test-flew every new jet aircraft model that was destined to fly with UK operators, such as BOAC and BEA. Davies also describes the various control systems that were incorporated on both British and American aircraft that reduced the possibility of a line pilot entering a stall. Details of flying characteristics and the use of automated control systems at high angles of attack are also included.

Davies is best known for mandating the fin of the Boeing 707 be lengthened by approximately 36 inches in order to achieve published Vmcg speeds (minimum control speed on the ground). Boeing ultimately accepted Davies recommendation and, we understand, halted production of the 707 for 10-11 months, whilst a new fin was designed and installed. All existing 707s were then retrospectively modified. A ventral fin was also installed on some variants to prevent ‘fully stalled take-offs’ which the Comet was also susceptible to.

Whilst test flying the 707-400 series at Renton, Davies noted that with the first stage of flap selected, the aircraft had a tendency to pitch up just prior to entering the stall. This was determined to be caused by the inboard leading edge devices, peculiar only to the 707-3/400 series which, when extended, effectively retained lift to higher angles of attack, and moved the Center of Pressure forwards, causing the nose to pitch up. Davies was not comfortable with this pitch up tendency and insisted that all UK certified 707 series aircraft were modified with the installation of a ‘stick nudger’ system.

In his book Davies stated that “The stick nudger introduces a small force into the elevator circuit which imposes positive stick free stability and removed the otherwise self-stalling tendency”. He goes onto to say that “as its input is so small all the runaway cases are completely innocuous.”

The ‘stick nudger’ should not be confused with a ‘stick pusher’, which is an entirely different system with a different objective. The stick pusher is typically installed on aircraft with T tail configurations which are susceptible to “super deep” stalls, such as the Bae 146 and Bac 1-11. All those Boeing 727s on the UK register were also modified with a stick pusher.
END QUOTE

[Tu.114]

Gentlemen, are You sure that this is not a red herring?

The issue with MCAS, as far as I can see it, is the following:

Slice 1:
It uses the most powerful control surface on the aircraft to force the nose down. On the accident aircraft (plural!), it was triggered not by multiple AOA vanes that all agreed about an approaching high AOA condition. The system was fired due to one single input from a quietly failed sensor without any checks, redundancy, whatever in place to keep it from happening. This was by design, not by a further system error. And unlike what has been written about the B707-400 above, it certainly introduced more than a tiny nose-down nudge.

Slice 2:
This protection system (for that is what it is, I consider it similar to the Airbus alpha protection in normal law in essence) has not been told about to the flight crews. It is said that this was due to cost cutting in training and intended to keep the Max under the same type rating as the previous models.

Slicee 3:
Self-certification, minimum authority supervision, ...

These are all cheese slices that had their holes lined up even before any crew set foot into the aircraft. Please take care not to bark up wrong trees.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Tu.114
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[Bergerie1]

TU.144 and WR6-3,

What I wrote is not a red herring and certainly does not absolve Boeing and the FAA from blame. All I was doing was pointing out that previous generations of pilots and airline training departments were well aware of, and used to dealing with, 1960s certificated aircraft and their deficiences. If you listen to what DPD had to say in the RAeS podcasts, the FAA was 'rather too lenient' in the application of its certification requirements for the 707, hence the changes DPD required for the rudder and the addition of a stick nudger.

Again, I think the FAA has had a rather too cosy arrangement with Boeing which, over the years, allowed Boeing to use grandfather rights for the 737. That, in itself, allowed later variants of the 737 to be built to less stringent requirements than would have been the case had it been a totally new type. But, so long as the training departments continued to apply training standards consistent with those earler requirements, safety was not significantly affected.

Come the Max, Boeing decided to correct for the longitudinal stability problems using the MCAS which operated on the whole stabilsier rather than a stick nudger operating on the elevators alone. Furthermore, allowing such a powerful control to be activated through inputs derived from a sole-source AoA sensor rather than having this duplicated or even triplicated, meant that there was now a gaping hole in the Swiss cheese. Thus, in no way, am I absolving Boeing and the FAA.

My comments regarding pilot proficiency concern the fact that, over time, flight operations departments may (probably?) have become less stringent regarding the awareness of, and training for, a runaway stabilser when compared with the way this was treated in the early days of the 707. I speak as an antique aviator and so am not aware of how much emphasis was placed on the runaway stabiliser drill on the 737Max.

And, WR6-3, I fully endorse your three likes above :-
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[Tu.114]

No disagreement here in principle.

However, the core of the issue may then be summed up by stating that the 737 Max is an 1960s aircraft at heart coming with 1960s style issues and, consequently, an 1960s safety record. All thanks to the grandfathering rights and obviously some reluctance to spend money on a whole new modern design instead of squeezing what can be squeezed out of an available model...

[tdracer]

However, the core of the issue may then be summed up by stating that the 737 Max is an 1960s aircraft at heart coming with 1960s style issues and, consequently, an 1960s safety record. All thanks to the grandfathering rights and obviously some reluctance to spend money on a whole new modern design instead of squeezing what can be squeezed out of an available model...

Sorry, but "1960s safety record" is a demonstrably false statement.
Hull loss statistics for the 737NG series is nearly identical to the A320 series (stats as of 2022 - they may have changed a bit since).
Hull loss rate/million departures (fatal/total):
737NG: 0.08/0.18
A320 Series: 0.08/0.17
(knowing a little bit about statistics, the difference is not statistically significant)

In contrast, the true 1960's safety record 737-100/200: 0.87/1.78

There is plenty to criticize about the 737 MAX MCAS system and how it was certified, but to say the 737 is inherently unsafe because of its basic design heritage simply doesn't hold water.

[Big Pistons Forever]

I would suggest that both MCAS accidents would not have occurred if the airplane was certified to modern certification standards. So yes in this case grandfathering 1960 certification standards directly lead to both tragic accidents. The airplane is full of systems that are completely uncertifable under today’s certification standards.

[Loose rivets]

Tu

The system was fired due to one single input from a quietly failed sensor without any checks, redundancy, whatever in place to keep it from happening

Quietly failed? The vane was wildly out of alignment with the shaft it rotates. The result was chaos.

I too am an old guy with far too much time on my hands. I read every post, some many times, in that two intensive years.

The replacement of the nearly new sensor with a refurbished one from somewhere in Florida still leaves me stunned. It's exactly the kind of trap fault-finders fall in to. It's vital to assume the new part might also be faulty, though the aviation industry is unlikely to provides time for a test flight for such a small part. Again, I question what was in the minds of the first crew and technicians in those first two days? Remember, it followed a grievously under-played emergency from the day before. In fairness, no one knew about the part's 'chaotic' status, simply because it didn't fall into that catagory yet.

The 707 nosing up at the late stages of a stall sounds related to the reason for MCAS. However, despite routinely reading duff gen about the reason MCAS was introduced, I only know about the inability to certify the MAX while nacelle lift was making the late stages of pulling back much too light on the pole. This was nearing the stall, and in certain turns - the latter being vitally important to get right.

[tdracer]

I would suggest that both MCAS accidents would not have occurred if the airplane was certified to modern certification standards. So yes in this case grandfathering 1960 certification standards directly lead to both tragic accidents. The airplane is full of systems that are completely uncertifable under today’s certification standards.
Also demonstrably false. MCAS met current certification standards - but only because of some very bad assumptions regarding pilot reactions and training. MCAS failure was classified as "MAJOR" (classifications are MINOR, MAJOR, HAZARDOUS, and CATASTROPHIC). MAJOR failures are allowed to occur at ~10-5/hr (for example, 'routine' engine failures are considered MAJOR) - which basically means 'increased crew workload', and redundancy is not required. The regulations regarding such faults haven't materially changed in decades.
In 20-20 hindsight, MCAS should have been classified as at least HAZARDOUS (and probably CATASTROPHIC) - which means probability of occurrence of 10-7/hr (or 10-9 for catastrophic) and require redundancy.
The problem wasn't the cert rules, it was the interpretation of the seriousness of the fault (which, to some extent, was hidden from the FAA).

[GlobalNav]

Also demonstrably false. MCAS met current certification standards - but only because of some very bad assumptions regarding pilot reactions and training. MCAS failure was classified as "MAJOR" (classifications are MINOR, MAJOR, HAZARDOUS, and CATASTROPHIC). MAJOR failures are allowed to occur at ~10-5/hr (for example, 'routine' engine failures are considered MAJOR) - which basically means 'increased crew workload', and redundancy is not required. The regulations regarding such faults haven't materially changed in decades.
In 20-20 hindsight, MCAS should have been classified as at least HAZARDOUS (and probably CATASTROPHIC) - which means probability of occurrence of 10-7/hr (or 10-9 for catastrophic) and require redundancy.
The problem wasn't the cert rules, it was the interpretation of the seriousness of the fault (which, to some extent, was hidden from the FAA).

In my opinion it was noncompliance because the analysis did not apply to the actual design, which why the hazard classification was insufficient. Perhaps one can consider this unintended but it is a consequence of deliberate obfuscation and a rush to certification of the design for financial purposes. Inexcusable.

The ineffectiveness of FAA oversight due to the new processes surrounding ODA is a major contributing factor. ODA should be eliminated, particularly in Boeing’s case.

[Big Pistons Forever]

The ineffectiveness of FAA oversight due to the new processes surrounding ODA is a major contributing factor. ODA should be eliminated, particularly in Boeing’s case.

I don't think that is realistic or even desirable and I say that as as someone who used to work for an aviation regulator. The reality is that the expertise exists in industry not the FAA, especially in this era of rapid technological advancements. The problem was regulatory capture of the ODA by Boeing. That, that was happening should have been obvious to the FAA and they should have taken action.

[BoeingDriver99]

Cherry picking statistics is pretty poor form. Deciding to choose only the 737NG to compare it with the A320 series is frankly embarrassing. How about comparing the 737NG to the A318 alone? Zero hull losses for the A318. You would agree that is an unfair and unrealistic comparison?

The discussion is about the 1960s era 737 that is a dead horse that continues to be beaten by Boeing. So compare apples to apples. The Boeing 737 is demonstrably less safe than the Airbus A320. Boeing’s own statistics show it, you even acknowledge the rate of the 100/200 being so much worse than the NG. What about the 3/4/500? Again much worse than the A320 family. And look at the Max - 1.48! So how about we compare that to the A320 NEO for most modern variants?

A320 NEO 0.11/0.11 versus 737 Max 1.48/1.48. Your own data confirms it. Do better. :ugh:

https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/boeing/boeingdotcom/company/about_bca/pdf/statsum.pdf

[ATC Watcher]

I think it was Winston Churchill who once said :" never trust a statistic you have not manipulated yourself .." or something similar.
Simple example : are Germanwings and Sully's US Air counting as A320 hull losses accidents in that comparison?

[tdracer]

Cherry picking statistics is pretty poor form. Deciding to choose only the 737NG to compare it with the A320 series is frankly embarrassing. How about comparing the 737NG to the A318 alone? Zero hull losses for the A318. You would agree that is an unfair and unrealistic comparison?

The discussion is about the 1960s era 737 that is a dead horse that continues to be beaten by Boeing. So compare apples to apples. The Boeing 737 is demonstrably less safe than the Airbus A320. Boeing’s own statistics show it, you even acknowledge the rate of the 100/200 being so much worse than the NG. What about the 3/4/500? Again much worse than the A320 family. And look at the Max - 1.48! So how about we compare that to the A320 NEO for most modern variants?

A320 NEO 0.11/0.11 versus 737 Max 1.48/1.48. Your own data confirms it. Do better. :ugh:

https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/boeing/boeingdotcom/company/about_bca/pdf/statsum.pdf

Talk about cherry picking stats! There are substantial systems differences between the various 737 versions (-1/200, -3/4/500, -6/7/8/900NG, and MAX). The -1/200 really was a 1960s design, and it's hull loss stats are comparable to other models from that period. Newer versions of the 737 incorporated various safety systems that simply were not available or feasible with then existing technology of the early versions. Newer technology has made aircraft safer, and the various 737 models have incorporated newer technologies that were available at the time the various models were designed - making them safer. That's why aircraft in general are so much safer today than they were in the 1960s - it's new systems such as TCAS and GPWS, along with improved crew training and ATC improvements.
The basic issue is - are derivative aircraft certified under the Changed Product Rule (CPR) meaningfully less safe than all-up new designs of the same vintage. By that metric, there is absolutely nothing wrong with the 737NG.
Yes, mistakes were made with the MAX, and Boeing deserves criticisms for the way they designed and certified it. But those are not related to the grandfathered aspects of the cert that were allowed by CPR (nearly all of the grandfathered cert aspects of the 737 are related to structures, not systems).

[Semreh]

Also demonstrably false. MCAS met current certification standards - but only because of some very bad assumptions regarding pilot reactions and training. MCAS failure was classified as "MAJOR" (classifications are MINOR, MAJOR, HAZARDOUS, and CATASTROPHIC). MAJOR failures are allowed to occur at ~10-5/hr (for example, 'routine' engine failures are considered MAJOR) - which basically means 'increased crew workload', and redundancy is not required. The regulations regarding such faults haven't materially changed in decades.
In 20-20 hindsight, MCAS should have been classified as at least HAZARDOUS (and probably CATASTROPHIC) - which means probability of occurrence of 10-7/hr (or 10-9 for catastrophic) and require redundancy.
The problem wasn't the cert rules, it was the interpretation of the seriousness of the fault (which, to some extent, was hidden from the FAA).

For the benefit of others, Unicode includes code points for superscripted numerals and 'plus' and 'minus' signs.

10⁺⁻¹²³⁴⁵⁶⁷⁸⁹⁰

So the maximum failure rates can be rendered as:

MAJOR: ~10⁻⁵
HAZARDOUS: ~10⁻⁷
CATASTROPHIC: ~10⁻⁹

The relevant code points are
Superscripted 'plus' sign: U+207A
Superscript 'minus' sign: U+207B
Superscript Left Parenthesis: U+207D ⁽
Superscript Right Parenthesis: U+207E ⁾
Superscript Numeral One: U+00B9
Superscript Numeral Two: U+00B2
Superscript Numeral Three: U+00B3
Superscript Numeral Four: U+2074
Superscript Numeral Five: U+2075
Superscript Numeral Six: U+2076
Superscript Numeral Seven: U+2077
Superscript Numeral Eight: U+2078
Superscript Numeral Nine: U+2079
Superscript Numeral Zero: U+2070

Copying and pasting from this post should work.

[tdracer]

I think it was Winston Churchill who once said :" never trust a statistic you have not manipulated yourself .." or something similar.
Simple example : are Germanwings and Sully's US Air counting as A320 hull losses accidents in that comparison?
Sully, yes (although as a hull loss, not a fatal hull loss since no one died). "Bad Luck" accidents are included, as is blatant crew error.
Germanwings - probably not. The stats specifically exclude intentional acts such as war or terrorism and I suspect pilot suicide would qualify.

[BoeingDriver99]

So stick with the Max statistics alone then. Approximately twice as dangerous as the 100/200. And approximately 15 times as dangerous as the Neo. But I’m sure you’d make another argument that those statistics don’t apply.

Hey ho - I can see where you sit on the issue. Such a shame to see the destruction of such a successful brand.

[MechEngr]

The problem with statistics of small numbers of events is that probabilities based on them have huge problems determining the confidence interval.

It's better to focus on the sequence that led to the accident and identify any places where the same initiator might start onto a different path. Like, before MCAS was involved, why did the last crew do exactly all the opposite things in response to a simple stall warning? Nice day, plenty of visibility, engines running fine. Set pitch and power and go on with the day. Or just concentrate on the autopilot to the exclusion of lowering the thrust until Vmo is exceeded?

What fault in the training allowed the crew the understanding that only autopilot could possibly be the answer to a problem that demanded autopilot be given no authority?

No point on continuing worry over MCAS as that software has been altered to perform a different function, but this won't be the last stall warning a crew gets on an airplane.

[Asturias56]

I think we've thrashed the MAX issue to death elsewhere

[DaveReidUK]

I think we've thrashed the MAX issue to death elsewhere

Yes, here we go again ...

[PEI_3721]

"The problem with statistics of small numbers of events is that probabilities based on them have huge problems determining the confidence …"

Which is why the use of outcome - fatalities, as a measure of safety is of little value in a very safe industry.

Alternatively, risk based safety - reducing the level of risk of harm to an acceptable minimum, considers current activity. The process looks to the future based on what has happened, and what is happening now; neither measure absolute, but a useful a guide for judgement of an uncertain future.

The 737 Max recent history should not be overly projected forward because of the mitigations from modifications.
However, the continuing manufacturing issues involving several types, and the difficulties in providing a quick fix for culture, etc, suggest that there is an increased level of risk which may take time to reduce.
Furthermore, the regulator who should oversee these aspects has suffered similar problems.

Thus the current situation has to be judged relative to the excellent historical record of Boeing aircraft and the industry in general; better than most forms of transport.
Flying is 'safe', and flying in Boeing aircraft is sufficiently comparable with other aircraft not to be concerned relative to other transport activities.
The issue remains about who and how risk based judgements are made:- manufacturing governance, regulator oversight, and the context of presentation - media and personal, human bias.

http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2006/risk,%20freedom%20&%20responsibility.pdf
,,

[Big Pistons Forever]

The problem Boeing has is that any significant accident that has causal factors linked to design or manufacturing failures by Boeing will be an extinction level event for Boeing.

If the door plug had come off at FL360 instead of 16,000 feet the airplane and everybody in would likely have been lost, so only luck saved Boeing on that “quality escape”. There is no question in my mind if the airplane had been lost due to the door plug blow out the MAX would still be grounded and Boeing would be in its death throes.

The “Latest News from Boeing” seems to be missing an understanding and acknowledgement that they are now runway limited. They have used up all their room for maneuver and simply can’t afford another egregious Fu*k Up, therefore immediate steps need to be taken to address the systemic issues in design and production even if it results in a short to medium term hit to profitability and share price.

[GlobalNav]

I don't think that is realistic or even desirable and I say that as as someone who used to work for an aviation regulator. The reality is that the expertise exists in industry not the FAA, especially in this era of rapid technological advancements. The problem was regulatory capture of the ODA by Boeing. That, that was happening should have been obvious to the FAA and they should have taken action.

Eliminating ODA is not the same thing as eliminating delegation. Delegation with appropriate and independent FAA OVERSIGHT has a long successful history, ODA is too rife with the OEM fox watching the chicken coop, with locks to keep the regulator out and busy with paperwork. The FAA executives that allowed and even promoted ODA bear a great deal of blame. You can find them now, retired from FAA, and enjoying lucrative industry jobs.

[MechEngr]

Congress legislates the function of the FAA and oversees the funding of the FAA and has not been providing the funding required to keep the FAA attractive enough to hire enough people skilled enough to do the job they are expected to do.

FAA has always had a divided charter - to promote the aviation industry and to promote aviation safety. Clearly the FAA cannot do both and be effective at both.

I remain unconvinced that FAA would have noticed the potential that pilots would not trim an airplane because the stall warning was sounding at the same time. ODA or not, that problem was going to remain. FAA already accepted that a false stall warning could be sounded and stick shaker enabled when there was no stall.

Greater oversight by the FAA on the factory floor would very likely have called a halt to production out of Spirit a long time ago, avoiding the door departing due to out-of-sequence re-work, but that's a Congressional funding issue for not having enough FAA inspectors vs supporting Boeing and Boeing customers getting the planes sold and used to promote aviation.

Accepting so much discrepant material seems the bigger problem and it seems unreasonable that instead of Boeing inspectors in Wichita they had Spirit re-work teams in Renton.

[tdracer]

FAA has always had a divided charter - to promote the aviation industry and to promote aviation safety. Clearly the FAA cannot do both and be effective at both.


Actually the part about promoting aviation was removed from the FAA charter several years ago.
That being said, the FAA is still obligated to consider the 'cost effectiveness' of its various dictates. For example, if you look at proposed (and issued) Airworthiness Directives, it has a section where it estimates the costs of compliance with the intent of the AD.

I completely agree with Global about the delegation vs. ODA. The FAA has used delegation for many decades (DERs and DARs being just one example). The difference being that a DER reported directly to the FAA (I was a DER for nearly 20 years before Boeing went ODA). DERs were selected by the FAA, and I had an FAA advisor that I could contact whenever I had a question or concern. With ODA, everything had to go through the Boeing compliance office - which not only had little knowledge of the intricacies of Propulsion), I was specifically bared from unilaterally contacting the FAA without going through the Boeing compliance office.
It also dumped far more responsibility on the ARs - along with the potential for 'undo pressure' from management. Personally I never experienced undo pressure as an AR (although, interestingly, I did as a DER - my case actually went into the development of the rules regarding undo pressure when Boeing went ODA) - and even had a Supervisor tell an engine manufacture to stop pressuring me when I raised concerns about functionality of a new FADEC s/w that I was responsible for certifying.
I don't know how much of it was the concept of ODA being fundamentally flawed, and how much was just the horrid Boeing implementation, but many of us raised concerns that the Boeing ODA was flawed and bound to fail.

[Bergerie1]

tdracer, The delegated examining system worked well in Britain back in the 1980s when I was a flight training manager (I have no idea what it is like now). And I always emphasised to the instructors that when, they were conducting pilot tests, they were working on behalf of the CAA and, by extension, the safety of the travelling public.

Equally, when we did CofA air tests on aircraft, we were acting on behalf of the ARB and later the CAA.

Delegation works well so long as the integrity of the process is maintained.

[SLF3]

Seattle times has an interesting response from Boeing to the 787 whistleblower claims. Google ‘Seattle Times Boeing’. Two comments:

Boeing engineer says ‘at normal loads’: I thought the acceptance criteria was ‘good for the design load at end of life’? A much tougher acceptance criteria.

And we are asked to believe Boeing redesigned the assembly process and delayed deliveries, at significant cost, to address a non problem?

This gentlemen may have a point.

[slacktide]

Actually the part about promoting aviation was removed from the FAA charter several years ago.

It was actually several decades ago. Which is why trotting out the old "dual mandate" meme is so tiresome, and marks the person who posts it as ignorant of basic aviation regulation.

It was changed after the ValuJet crash. Remember ValueJet? The Critter? Way back before Y2K and all that? The dual mandate was removed with the passage of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996.

[MechEngr]

I am not ignorant of aviation, thanks very much. The political reason FAA exists is to reassure the flying public that aircraft and aviation are safe, not primarily to ensure that aircraft are safe. They removed it from the charter as it was a visible conflict of interest, not because they were changing their attitude about it.

More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public.

[W9SQD]

@ MechEngr "More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public."

Your Fox News view of the world is jaundiced.

[MechEngr]

I never watch the pro-Putin, Mudoch news. I'm also skeptical, not jaundiced.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I am not ignorant of aviation, thanks very much. The political reason FAA exists is to reassure the flying public that aircraft and aviation are safe, not primarily to ensure that aircraft are safe. They removed it from the charter as it was a visible conflict of interest, not because they were changing their attitude about it.

More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public.

Pretty sure the folks in the parts of the FAA that manage the operations of the NAS would bristle, even if only slightly, at the . . . jaundiced overall indictment of the agency. Beyond that, as the part of the federal interagency that operates the National Airspace System, I think your characterization of its reason for being is incomplete and to that extent at least incorrect.

On whether FAA's role and responsibilities for safety in any and all sectors of aviation in the United States is infected and corrupted by conflict of interest, I'd pay good hard-earned lowly cabdriver money to watch a moderated discussion between someone advocating the viewpoint you articulated about conflict of interest and, say, a recent or current Administrator. Maybe recent would be better, because unconstrained by political static and signals in D.C. (Part of your viewpoint refutes itself. FAA doesn't need or want to "promote" aviation, because the armies of lobbyists have that task list constantly "in work", as you contend.)

Insofar as commercial aviation has an excellent safety record in the United States, why would anyone think FAA needs to reassure the public of something that has become a cliche - flying on an airliner is safer than any other form of transportation. It's a cliche, and it's the truth, too, is it not?

As to GA, what solution would be recommended? No to product liability law reform, or, bring on the trial lawyer bar? Tight up licensing rules so fewer persons who shouldn't be operating an aircraft cannot do so?

Just in case, totally just contingency - anyone who regards you as ignorant is a complete fool.

[waito]

AP on today Senate hearings https://apnews.com/article/boeing-whistleblowers-safety-senate-hearings-f8354ddddc6372e3337cd74b9ea264e3

One of the witnesses, MIT aeronautics lecturer - - - - - - -, lost his sister when a Boeing 737 Max 8 crashed in Ethiopia in 2019. - - - - commented on the disconnect between Boeing management’s words about safety and what workers observe on the factory floor.

“They hear, ‘Safety is our number one priority,’” he said. “What they see is that’s only true as long as your production milestones are met, and at that point it’s ‘Push it out the door as fast as you can.’” In talking to Boeing workers, - - - - - - said he heard “there was a very real fear of payback and retribution if you held your ground.”

​​​​​​​A second Senate hearing Wednesday will feature a Boeing engineer who claims that sections of the skin on 787 Dreamliner jets are not properly fastened and could eventually break apart.​​​​​​​

​​​​​​​Also scheduled to testify before a Senate investigations subcommittee Wednesday is - - - - - - - , a former manager on the Boeing 737 program. Two other aviation technical experts are on the witness list as well.

And about Boeing statements rejecting some allegations

[WillowRun 6-3]

AP on today Senate hearings https://apnews.com/article/boeing-wh...7cd74b9ea264e3 (https://apnews.com/article/boeing-whistleblowers-safety-senate-hearings-f8354ddddc6372e3337cd74b9ea264e3)

AP article very helpfully includes link to [correction: letter to Boeing CEO from Chair and Ranking Member of Permanent Investigations Subcomm.] - which cites letter to FAA Admin. from Mr. Salehpour's attorney.

(FWIW, any attorney can slap a brief or pleading together but correspondence to official addressees and subject matter of high importance - something of a lost art in most offices, though fortunately for Mr Salehpour, not in his law firm representation.)

[waito]

AP on today Senate hearings https://apnews.com/article/boeing-wh...7cd74b9ea264e3 (https://apnews.com/article/boeing-whistleblowers-safety-senate-hearings-f8354ddddc6372e3337cd74b9ea264e3)

AP article very helpfully includes link to [correction: letter to Boeing CEO from Chair and Ranking Member of Permanent Investigations Subcomm.] - which cites letter to FAA Admin. from Mr. Salehpour's attorney.

(FWIW, any attorney can slap a brief or pleading together but correspondence to official addressees and subject matter of high importance - something of a lost art in most offices, though fortunately for Mr Salehpour, not in his law firm representation.)

Any news from the actual hearing?

[waito]

I seem to have missed Sully's interview on MSNBC from end of March

Capt. ‘Sully’ on Boeing’s aviation safety: ‘They have lost their way’

[BFSGrad]

Any news from the actual hearing?
Today’s hearing available from multiple news sources. This ABC News video seems to be complete. Recommend viewing at 2X speed if you don’t want to waste 100 minutes of your life.

Senate Hearing 4/17/24 - ABC News

[waito]

Today’s hearing available from multiple news sources. This ABC News video seems to be complete. Recommend viewing at 2X speed if you don’t want to waste 100 minutes of your life.


I'm not fully convinced of Sam S. worries regarding 787 fuselage tolerances. I speculate:
He probably was applying metal knowledge and did assume that composite fuselage stress works the same
They initially took it serious but too many experts contradicted him. Even two company engineers (not known what leadership level) came forward to defend it as safe in public.
I think too many people were tired of Sam S. stubborn sticking to the issue although proven wrong.

They then transferred him to the more conventional 777 - wait a minute - is the 777x still conventional, apart from the skin?

For the benefit for him I hope I'm wrong, but this needs to be looked at with open mind, what's the truth.

[tdracer]

They then transferred him to the more conventional 777 - wait a minute - is the 777x still conventional, apart from the skin?
The 777X wing is composite, as are several other major structural elements (this going back to the original 777) such as the cabin floor and some of the tail. The fuselage itself is still aluminum but has been redesigned to be 'slimer' structurally so making the inside of the cabin wider (something like six inches IIRC).

For the benefit for him I hope I'm wrong, but this needs to be looked at with open mind, what's the truth.
For the sake of Boeing (and millions of the traveling public) I hope you're right.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I'm not fully convinced of Sam S. worries regarding 787 fuselage tolerances. I speculate:
He probably was applying metal knowledge and did assume that composite fuselage stress works the same
They initially took it serious but too many experts contradicted him. Even two company engineers (not known what leadership level) came forward to defend it as safe in public.
I think too many people were tired of Sam S. stubborn sticking to the issue although proven wrong.

They then transferred him to the more conventional 777 - wait a minute - is the 777x still conventional, apart from the skin?

For the benefit for him I hope I'm wrong, but this needs to be looked at with open mind, what's the truth.

On the same day, the Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing on a somewhat more structured (no pun intended) subject. It heard three witnesses, each with qualifications most people would say make them "experts", on the subject of the final report of the FAA's Organization Designation Authorization Expert Review Panel. As anyone following the Boeing saga will know, the Panel was mandated by the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act - the legislation which served as the vehicle for Congressional urges to "do something" after the MAX accidents as well as vehicle for arguably meaningful reforms.

Witnesses: Dr. Javier de Luis (lecturer at MIT Dep't of Aeronautics and Astronautics);
Dr. Tracy Dillinger (Manager for Safety Culture and Human Factors, NASA); and
Dr. Najmedin Meshkati (Professor, USC School of Engineering, Aviation Safety and Security Program).
link for Chair Sen. Maria Cantwell (D. Wash.) opening statement:
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2024/4/cantwell-opening-remarks-at-hearing-with-faa-s-independent-expert-panel-on-boeing-s-safety-culture

It almost never fails to amaze me how a hearing before a legislative committe can be mistaken for, or viewed as, the equivalent of full fact discovery in civil litigation in federal district court. I mean, to cut this short without stomping on parts of it to make it fit together, there is no equivalent of obligation to produce all relevant information, and nothing equivalent to cross-examination (partisan rotation of questioning, no, that's not cross).

I won't prejudge the individual whistleblowers' stories on the merits of what they've said and are saying. I will, however, say that their respective recitations depend on their having first painted a picture in which they not only are doing the right thing in the specific situation, and doing it in reasonable ways, but every action taken by company management in response is malevolently directed against them. Sometimes that picture turns out to be true, correct and valid. But it is far from the default setting, and cannot be taken as the default merely by reciting "whistleblower". Perhaps too much paper chasing of billable hours has turned this SLF/attorney cynical (or even, jaundiced).

Whatever the actual facts pertaining to each individual's situation turn out to be, do their stories really add content of significance to what already is known about Boeing's drift away from engineering first and down to bean-counter depths? Is it really new, does it add information not already assimilated into the overall set of facts? I guess we'll find out. The Subcommittee chaired by Senator Blumenthal is for Permanent Investigations, part of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. If this were a dispute between two labor organizations over which one has jurisdiction of the work (the subject matter), I think Senate Commerce and its Aviation Subcomm would win, hands and gavels down. But then, over at Senate Commerce, Senator Cantwell and Senator Cruz were in charge of a hearing (see above) with less p.r. drama, just the Expert Texpert Choking Smokers Panel stuff. (name the Beatles song, 50 points)

[artee]

On the same day, the Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing on a somewhat more structured (no pun intended) subject. It heard three witnesses, each with qualifications most people would say make them "experts", on the subject of the final report of the FAA's Organization Designation Authorization Expert Review Panel. As anyone following the Boeing saga will know, the Panel was mandated by the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act - the legislation which served as the vehicle for Congressional urges to "do something" after the MAX accidents as well as vehicle for arguably meaningful reforms.

Witnesses: Dr. Javier de Luis (lecturer at MIT Dep't of Aeronautics and Astronautics);
Dr. Tracy Dillinger (Manager for Safety Culture and Human Factors, NASA); and
Dr. Najmedin Meshkati (Professor, USC School of Engineering, Aviation Safety and Security Program).
link for Chair Sen. Maria Cantwell (D. Wash.) opening statement:
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2024/4/cantwell-opening-remarks-at-hearing-with-faa-s-independent-expert-panel-on-boeing-s-safety-culture

It almost never fails to amaze me how a hearing before a legislative committe can be mistaken for, or viewed as, the equivalent of full fact discovery in civil litigation in federal district court. I mean, to cut this short without stomping on parts of it to make it fit together, there is no equivalent of obligation to produce all relevant information, and nothing equivalent to cross-examination (partisan rotation of questioning, no, that's not cross).

I won't prejudge the individual whistleblowers' stories on the merits of what they've said and are saying. I will, however, say that their respective recitations depend on their having first painted a picture in which they not only are doing the right thing in the specific situation, and doing it in reasonable ways, but every action taken by company management in response is malevolently directed against them. Sometimes that picture turns out to be true, correct and valid. But it is far from the default setting, and cannot be taken as the default merely by reciting "whistleblower". Perhaps too much paper chasing of billable hours has turned this SLF/attorney cynical (or even, jaundiced).



Whatever the actual facts pertaining to each individual's situation turn out to be, do their stories really add content of significance to what already is known about Boeing's drift away from engineering first and down to bean-counter depths? Is it really new, does it add information not already assimilated into the overall set of facts? I guess we'll find out. The Subcommittee chaired by Senator Blumenthal is for Permanent Investigations, part of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. If this were a dispute between two labor organizations over which one has jurisdiction of the work (the subject matter), I think Senate Commerce and its Aviation Subcomm would win, hands and gavels down. But then, over at Senate Commerce, Senator Cantwell and Senator Cruz were in charge of a hearing (see above) with less p.r. drama, just the Expert Texpert Choking Smokers Panel stuff. (name the Beatles song, 50 points)
I always appreciate the time you take to follow this stuff, and translate it into something closely related to English for us plebs to understand. :ok:

[waito]

The 777X wing is composite, as are several other major structural elements (this going back to the original 777) such as the cabin floor and some of the tail. The fuselage itself is still aluminum but has been redesigned to be 'slimer' structurally so making the inside of the cabin wider (something like six inches IIRC).

Cabin floor, I remembered but wasn't sure.
So what was Sam S pointing to on the 777? Only on the -x or also on the classic? (I mean 777 classic must have been the pinnacle of safety and reliability in the Boeing fleet, so I'd be surprised)
​​​


For the sake of Boeing (and millions of the traveling public) I hope you're right.
Fair enough.

[waito]

It almost never fails to amaze me how a hearing before a legislative committe can be mistaken for, or viewed as, the equivalent of full fact discovery in civil litigation in federal district court.

Thank you artee for the translatesummary 😉

I noticed as well, the public hearing is more of a confirmation of impressions, and to put pressure to act in a certain way. But if it results in an investigation with taking a look at all facts, that's ok.

[Chronic Snoozer]

But then, over at Senate Commerce, Senator Cantwell and Senator Cruz were in charge of a hearing (see above) with less p.r. drama, just the Expert Texpert Choking Smokers Panel stuff. (name the Beatles song, 50 points) I Am The Walrus.

[waito]

I'm not fully convinced of Sam S. worries regarding 787 fuselage tolerances.

Found another opinion in an NYT articleMr. Salehpour said the shortcuts that he believed Boeing was taking resulted in excessive force being applied to narrow unwanted gaps in the assembly connecting pieces of the Dreamliner’s fuselage. He said that force led to deformation in the composite material, which he said could increase the effects of fatigue and lead to premature failure of the composite.

John Cox, a former airline pilot who runs a safety consulting firm, said that while composites were more tolerant of excess force than metals, it was harder to see that composites had been stressed to the point that they would fail. “They just snap,” he said.

“The catastrophic in-flight breakup, yes, that’s a theoretical possibility,” Mr. Cox said. “That’s why you’d want to have the testing done to preclude that.”

Boeing’s tests are an appropriate step, Mr. Cox said, because “if the degradation goes far enough, that could potentially lead to a catastrophic failure.”

FAA Investigates Claims by Boeing Whistle-Blower About Flaws in 787 Dreamliner - The New York Times (nytimes.com) (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/us/politics/boeing-787-dreamliner-whistle-blower.html)

[kontrolor]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZsUHIGGW7M

Boeing managment, from high to low, should be kicked out and put on trial.

[WillowRun 6-3]

[ no attempted Beatles humor this time ]

The Senate Commerce Committee hearing with three members of the Expert Panel included some very interesting and pertient information. It also includes some uninspired and simplistic (perhaps also essentially pointless) questioning by certain Members of the Committee - but the statements and answers to questions by the three witnesses struck this SLF/attorney as worth the time it took up. The truly expert witnesses are identified with their affiliations in a previous post. Here's the link from C-SPAN:
https://www.c-span.org/video/?534976-1/aviation-safety-specialists-testify-boeing-safety-culture

The Expert Panel report recommended certain actions be required of Boeing in (iirc) six months. FAA Administrator Whitaker chopped that timing down to 90 days, from the date of the final report (February 26). So despite some tedium and less-than-enlightening Senatorial questions, the content of this hearing provides context - imo important context - for the forthcoming 90-day deliverable(s) to FAA. Plus, Senate Commerce leaders have made it clear that the legislation enacted in the aftermath of the MAX accidents will not be the end of the legislative process - further reform or restructuring is under review (even if the incomplete FAA 5-year reauthorization clogs the lawmaking pipeline for now).

Particularly forceful were the comments by Illinois Senator Tammy Duckworth, who chairs the Subcommittee on Aviation Safety, Operations and Innovation. On the odd chance that there may be a few forum folks not enthralled by C-SPAN production values, Sen. Duckworth's turn with the witnesses is relatively early in the 2-hour program.

[Bbtengineer]

There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.

The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.

Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.

This has already been argued to death.

MCAS had far too much authority and not nearly enough input validation.

The fact that the third pilot in the jump seat on the prior Lion Air flight could help successfully manage what the two person crew on the accident flight could not doesn’t invalidate any of that.

BA fixed it.

They didn’t fix it because it didn’t need fixing.

They didn’t have to adjust the design of the airframe when they reduced MCAS authority and that should tell us all we need to know.

If only the control system needed changing, then only the control system was broken to begin with.

I will leave you with Sully Sullenberger’s testimony on MCAS.

"was fatally flawed and should never have been approved."

[HighWind]

If only the control system needed changing, then only the control system was broken to begin with.

Just because it can be fixed in software, does not mean that a software fix to an aerodynamic issue is the right solution to begin with.
When 100+ Maxes has been produced, then fixing the control system becomes the only feasible solution.

MCAS had far too much authority and not nearly enough input validation.

Correct. Before I criticize all the B737’s from the classic (Speed trim), I will mention that the B737 safety statistics is on par with A320. So despite flaws in the architecture, it’s pretty darn safe.
When you give a computer the control of the trim, then you are heading into fly by wire territory. In a FBW system you need more than input validation, you also need to validate the computation (COM/MON), and the function of the actuators (Stuck/runaway).
A well designed FBW system does the fault isolation, and eliminates the need for (some) memory items (And the risk of pilots performing them incorrectly). A badly designed FBW system kills people.

[waito]

The Senate Commerce Committee hearing with three members of the Expert Panel included some very interesting and pertient information.

Thank you for the link. I need to find time watching this.
We as public can't get better insight than this one for the time being.

​​

[waito]

Boeing is one drastic example for the power shift from engineering to accounting (or read: shareholder interests)

I see it in my company. Customer satisfaction is important. That is a given. NO NEED to talk about it. Product quality? We are the best anyway, no doubt about it. NO NEED to talk about.

Meanwhile, 60% of the agenda, discussions, infos are covering cost saving, accounting party tricks, cost distribution, cash flow strategy, stock buyback policy, re-sourcing to cheaper suppliers, lean management, reduce workforce,..., and the ever revolutionary ideas on boosting efficiency.

20% is adjusting self admin rules to align with accounting changes, and 20% of communication covers the product.

Too often a relevant product info only tickles down, as in "four weeks from now we will change the product characteristics, please prepare." Appears as almost accidental. And one week before the change is due.

Usually this is forwarded with a cascade of lean "FYI" comments from management, signalling "dunno if it is important, nothing I can add, you make up your mind."
​​​​​
That's from top to bottom in management. If we outline that product work is degraded, we see shoulders shrugged.

No, I'm not in accounting or administration department.

That's how "safety is our top concern" will be forgotten in the daily business!
​​

[Less Hair]

To me the issue seems to be that certain modern management approaches fail to see the value of many if not most "soft" factors: Customer satisfaction, trust, long term loyalty, employee satisfaction and motivation and such. If it can't be seen in SAP it gets ignored. You can measure and online monitor the time it takes to install every bolt and nut and how much torque got applied but the other soft elements are forgotten.
Plus Boeing had a heavy focus on legal terms and settings with "watertight" contracts, however when supplies still did not arrive on spec and time they were surprised and had to change their leaned down organisation and change processes in a hurry.
The third issue I see is that they reduced their staff, loosing experienced specialist know how in the process while sitting idle in terms of launching new programs for too long. This is why the next program will have to be expensive. New people need to learn their trade from scratch. Look at Airbus for comparison and how they fine tune the A320 over many years: Sharklets, engines, cabin, ACF door arrangements, tanks and center wing box, new flap settings. Step by step they are keeping their teams busy.

[PAXboy]

Less Hair Sums up the process that I saw begin in the mid 1980s, it emerged from the USA and spread to many English speaking countries - possible others too. I was working for an American company at the time, based in the UK with regular visits to HQ and saw what was coming down the track to us. In the UK, the big changes started with the recession of 90/92, after that the money men took over and the focus was away from the product and certainly from the staff.

One of the aspects of outsourcing that, I think, was not understood was this: The promise of outsourcing was that they would deal with all the problems and give you what you wanted. Some staff were transferred to the outsourced company and so their loyalty changed to all of their customers - not to you alone. Other staff, particularly seniors of course, often took the money and walked. More experience left the company. They thought they needed less managing of outsourcing. However, what I saw from the mid 90s onwards was that outsourcing needed to be MANAGED TIGHTLY. Because they now had many customers, it did not matter how important you were. You had screwed them down on price and so they had less to give you.

Boeing has simply hit the usual point of a mature company that was a fat cat and ripe for the picking. Airbus were the new kids on the block that were ignored but, as above, they steadily made their own road. Not least, they started with multiple productions sites and built it up. Boeing tried to do that with the 787 - which was ALSO a complicated new machine. To add to their problems, they were moving their production away - to save money and get subsidies. So they did (at least) three new things at once. That was not going to work out well.

The major problem for Boeing now is that, as this way of financial thinking has been around for 35+ years. This means that EVERYONE now in the system thinks that way. You cannot turn that around fast. It took some 20 years to get fully absorbed and will take at least 10 years to work through the system. That is, if Boeing make the right decisions now.

We have all heard the 'customer safety is our top priority' and variations from every sector of commerce. None of us believe that anymore. Just this week, I had to ring the bereavement department in a UK District Council. Automated phone answer and three levels of 'Press X' before I got to the department. They confirmed that I had to go through that sequence every time. Fantastic. When I worked in local government, we prided ourselves on answering the main phone number fast and dealing with the enormous range of enquiries with experienced and helpful humans.

There are other examples I (and all of us) can quote. When Coke-Cola decided to keep up with the kids and developed New Coke, they were fortunate that it was not at FL380 and they could bin the whole lot.

[pax britanica]

MBA s and management 'Consultants' are at the heart of this fatal corruption in the corporate world. Of course not every aspect of an MBA course nor every consultancy is flawed but overall they imbue the wrong culture and wrong values in technology and safety critical companies.
Some years ago before they were fully established I ended up being booked on Easyjet for the first time, Knowling little about them i checked outt heir corporate page on the internet , CEo CFO VP sales VP marketing etc etc . And of course the usual 'Safety is our first priority.' slogan So, for a laugh i rang them and said I was new to them and could they assure me that I would as safe as flying on BA say.. Oh yes of course, safety is our first priority . Ok sounds good but i have another question, , whats that? -well if safety is your first priority how come no one on the board has that in their title or responsibilit list. End of...

Another example occurred just yesterday, i had to meet someone off a train from London to a major West country station. 2 hours late due to track problems, break downs, lack of drivers usual stuff. When i get to the station there are 8 ticket inspectors (revenue protection personnel) barring the only exit . Quite an intimidating gang actually . No reason why they shouldnt do a random check at that station but was it really wise to demand to see all over again peoples tickets when they were 2 hours late and the company is always whining about staff shortages.
Money before customers every time and it wont change until we get a Tenerife 2 because modern managers do not regard their customers as people , they are just revenue and staff are not valued they are just costs.

[Big Pistons Forever]

The problem is on both sides. The same MBA led behavioural incentives developed in tandem in the regulators. Senior staff with a deep understanding of the issues were replaced by compliant managers that allowed the corporate capture that ensured effective oversight would be neutered.

Demoralized middle level staff then started leaving and were replaced by new hires without the knowledge and experience to know what was important and what wasn’t and brought a tick box mentality to every task.

The sad fact is that the MAX fiasco was probably inevitable, and if it wasn’t the MCAS, some other cheese hole would have lined up.

[Less Hair]

To be fair MBAs and consultants are very important as well. And legal people as well. Many great engineering marvels never made a profit or never saw the market at all. Just look at soviet airliners. But within a certain balance a strong engineering weight is important. And a long term strategy with big investments permitted beyond fearing for the next quarterly figures. It would be perfect to motivate the top people not only by bonuses for having pleased the stock market but maybe more for technical innovation, safety, employee and customer satisfaction, number of new orders coming in etc.

[Twitterati]

I hope Airbus are watching closely when it comes to refreshing the 320!

[PAXboy]

Less Hair you are correct - it is the balance between good work and money that has been lost. Further, in the last 30/35 years, there has been a real return to the stock market as casino. The idea that you invest in a company for the long term is an unknown idea. Remarkable developments in computing and telecommunications means that companies can make money in the tinest slivers of fractions - but, when they all land up, they make a pile. They also remove money from companies that need it. I often see reports that a particular stock is down 'because they did not provide the results that Wall Street expected'. They may have made a good profit and be trading well - but let's dump them to get a fraction more elsewhere.

On another point, PPRuNers may be amused to read the advice for Boeing from Mr O'Leary, as detailed in Fortune magazine:

Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary shared some words of wisdom on how the aircraft manufacturer should navigate the future of its management.

“The best CEOs and owners are the accountants, the people who do the boring, repetitive, day-to-day delivery, and that’s what you need,” CEO Michael O’Leary told Bloomberg on Wednesday. “They already design great aircraft—you’ve got to make them, but you’ve got to make them on-time and within budget, and that needs accountants.”

He added that so-called accountants have clarity on the vision of a company, while personnel like engineers can lose sight of an overall mission in favor of tweaking what’s not broken.

“It’s like, never put a pilot in charge of an airline,” he said. “They want to buy new shiny toys.”

Right there is the problem of balance. You need the Finance, the Engineering, the Pilots and more to collaborate. He may have made FR successful by being a sole voice - but his business is very different to Boeing. I suggest that his reiteration of the past 35 years of mgmt behaviour adds to the problems.

Fortune Magazine (https://fortune.com/2024/04/24/ryanair-ceo-michael-oleary-boeing-dave-calhoun-faa-earnings-management-advice/?utm_source=search&utm_medium=suggested_search&utm_campaign=search_link_clicks)

[Asturias56]

I've always thought it interesting that the much disliked Michael O'Leary at Ryanair has always kept a focus on safety and and engineering - very early in their growth he approved locating spare engines around the network when, as a real bean-counter you'd have thought he'd have cut spares and centralised.

[ATC Watcher]

We can dislike MOL for his treatment of his staff ( and his Pax ) but on the Training and Safety front they are well above the average and certainly above some mainstream carriers ..including the one of my home country :(

[Bergerie1]

ATC Watcher, I agree. GNSS has its vulnerabilities. We need to keep sufficient alternative methods of navigation alive and active.

[WillowRun 6-3]

An important piece of reporting is published in the edition of Aviation Week dated April 22-May 5. Headlined, "Credibility Crisis", the article reports in some depth about the case Boeing has made publicly as to the safety of the 787 with particular reference to, and emphasis on, the allegations and/or concerns articulated by the whistleblower who testified recently before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

Before a summary of key aspects of the AW&ST reporting, a couple of sidebars should be stated. First, and this is based on mere SLF/attorney background - though some of background is in employment law and labor relations - the move by Boeing to South Carolina seems to be a major factor in what has gone wrong in that aseembly plant and its operations. Not only flight away from union representation of the labor force, not only moving out of the historic airplane-building culture of Seattle, but those factors seem pretty evident in the demise of the safety culture - as was testified to in the other Senate Committee hearing (Senate Commerce, with the three membeers of the Expert Panel).

Second, the AW&ST article notes that the whistleblower's attorney's letter to the FAA included various documents. The letter "cited internal Boeing documents - including a white paper from engineers with similar critiques - to support his claims" and the magazine requested copies of such documents but the law firm "did not provide them." One could speculate about various reasons why not, but it would be just speculation. That said, it is quite tempting to say that the law firm representing the whistleblower should make those documents public.

The article's main point is to report on the analysis and evidence Boeing has compiled showing that the assembly of 787 airplanes has not produced any unsafe conditions, in any meaningful context. There was a media briefing given by a "vice-president and chief engineer for mechanical and structural engineering".

As the article reports, extensive examination of in-service airplanes did not reveal any degradation or weakening of the fuselage sections where "joins" are made. Inspections were done at heavy maintenance intervals and extensively of the in-service fleet. (Referring to the article, 980 airframes were built before the gaps/shims problem was discovered and acknowledged; eight have undergone heavy maintaenace checks at the 12-year interval and 671 have been inspected at the six-year interval.) No evidence was found to support the claims made by the whistleblower with regard to long-term degradation of the integrity of the structure.

Significant evidence also was derived from the fatigue test article.

I'm obvioulsy (real obviously, sorry to have to say) not an engineer, so I may not be doing a worthy job of summarizing the article. I do say, as a sometime-vocal critic of Boeing, anyone who cares about the "latest Boeing news" - whether to contribute to restoring the once-preeminent engineering powerhouse or to helping it slide into oblivion - owes it to a decent sense of intellectual honesty to read the article.

Though Boeing has significant heavy lifting to do to restore a meaninful safety culture (don't take my word for it, take it from the Section 103 Expert Panel), that imperative does not equate to this specific whistleblower's substantive claim about airframe structures being correct. I'll be happy to stand corrected (or, in equivalent terms, to return to my seat and fasten my . . . ) if it is shown the article does not actually establish that his claims (about the structure, not about the lack of safety culture) are incorrect. And if they are in fact incorrect, well . .. it would be pedantic to divert into points about the employment law principles and process. But that said, perhaps it isn't so curious after all why his attorneys did not file a retaliation claim with the Department of Labor (which, as all know, other whistleblowers did file).

[waito]

Thank you WillowRun 6-3 for this great summary. I assume we can't access that article online, so you took the burden to list the key facts?

​​​​​​Recently I read the signs and also "wasn't fully convinced" of the issues with the aft fuselage structure. This is another sign.

While these 6 and 12 years checks (C and D checks I assume) could suffer from missing practical experience with carbon fiber composites assessment, at least with the combination Boeing and the fuselage proportions and connection method...

​​​​​​... the fatique test should tell a lot about the level of degradation for this very circumstances. Depending on the test methods and test circumstances of course. Engineer Sam S, the whistleblower, complained that he never received those details after he requested them. Maybe that's why he sticks to his assessment. Like when the tests in reality had been the initial program structure tests with perfect tolerances, which did not consider out of tolerance gaps and "brutal methods" to make it fit. These would be a rather doubtful assessment in this case.

But I have now even more the feeling that experts could focus on the other issues first without missing much.

Just my humble opinion, with room for improvement.

[tdracer]

An important piece of reporting is published in the edition of Aviation Week dated April 22-May 5. Headlined, "Credibility Crisis", the article reports in some depth about the case Boeing has made publicly as to the safety of the 787 with particular reference to, and emphasis on, the allegations and/or concerns articulated by the whistleblower who testified recently before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

Before a summary of key aspects of the AW&ST reporting, a couple of sidebars should be stated. First, and this is based on mere SLF/attorney background - though some of background is in employment law and labor relations - the move by Boeing to South Carolina seems to be a major factor in what has gone wrong in that aseembly plant and its operations. Not only flight away from union representation of the labor force, not only moving out of the historic airplane-building culture of Seattle, but those factors seem pretty evident in the demise of the safety culture - as was testified to in the other Senate Committee hearing (Senate Commerce, with the three membeers of the Expert Panel).

I'm not sure I put much stock in the 'lack of union workforce' drumbeat (especially since much of that drumbeating seems to be originating with the IAM Union).
Two factors to keep in mind - prior to 2020 (i.e. Covid), roughly half of the 787's were assembled in Everett by the IAM. Despite claims by the union to the contrary, there is scant evidence that the Everett built 787s were of better quality than those made in South Carolina.
Second, all the 737 and 767-2C/KC-46 are assembled in the Puget Sound area by IAM union labor. It's not like those have been without issues....

[WillowRun 6-3]

I'm not sure I put much stock in the 'lack of union workforce' drumbeat (especially since much of that drumbeating seems to be originating with the IAM Union).
Two factors to keep in mind - prior to 2020 (i.e. Covid), roughly half of the 787's were assembled in Everett by the IAM. Despite claims by the union to the contrary, there is scant evidence that the Everett built 787s were of better quality than those made in South Carolina.
Second, all the 737 and 767-2C/KC-46 are assembled in the Puget Sound area by IAM union labor. It's not like those have been without issues....

I'll (always) defer to better-informed posters.

It may be a case of the S.C. plant being the source of two prominent whistleblowers and (given Steelworkers roots in this SLF/atty) maybe IAM claims have sounded especially strong. Also, in prior threads, iirc going back even before Lion Air, the move to S.C. was attributed to non-union workforce goals by various posters. (and possibly were given too much credence).

I scanned the AW&ST article again now, twice, and there is no discussion of S.C. airframes as compared to airframes assembled in Everett. I think the reporting is not based on one plant being more of a problem than the other.

waito: thanks for acknowledging the post.
And I'm pretty sure the article is published as subscription-paywall. There's also a Check 6 podcast but don't know how available it is.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Was the fatigue testing done on a fuselage with the specific fault ? That is one with the excessive gaps present?

The fatigue characteristics of riveted aluminum structures are very well understood, however all composite structures are quite new. I would be interested in hearing from a structures expert on how well these types of structures resistance to degradation can be evaluated.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I apologize in advance to the AW&ST interests for quoting from behind the paywall, but it's an important issue. I'll let the well-informed interpret this section on the fatigue testing. (The person quoted is the vp and chief engineer etc as noted previously.)

In-service reviews of the oldest and most used airframes underpin results from tests done early in the program to validate the 787’s design—tests that unknowingly trialed production flaws discovered years later.
“The most impactful data is the data that we got from our full-scale fatigue test,” Chisholm said. “The build condition [was] the same as what we saw in the later build.”
Put another way, the same nonconformances that crept into the first 980 aircraft were present in the fatigue test article. While the revelation does not reflect well on Boeing’s original quality assurance process, it bolsters the argument that its design—including material selection and tolerances—is robust.
“In over 165,000 cycles, there were zero fatigue issues in the composite structure,” Chisholm said.
The tests, which began in September 2010 on ZY998, the third 787 airframe built, ran through 2015 and simulated entire flights, from taxi through ascent, cruise, descent and back to taxi (AW&ST Dec. 21, 2015-Jan. 3, 2016, p. 51). Targeted at creating a dataset for the airframe’s durability, the
tests subjected the structure to loads that simulated more than 3.6 times the design life of 44,000 flight cycles.
Testing was conducted in a steel rig weighing more than 1 million lb. at the Boeing manufacturing plant in Everett, Washington. The rig included more than 100 mechanical connections to push, pull and twist the 182-ft.-long fuselage, wing forward leading edge and vertical stabilizer. The 787 structure incorporated over 3,000 sensors that evaluated more than 40 million discrete load conditions as the airframe was subjected to shear forces, bending moments and torsion loads typically experienced during five flight conditions ranging from benign to extremely turbulent.
Although some parts failed over the course of testing, they were all metallic. Components and parts that cracked or failed prematurely included a metal bearing pad in the main landing-gear support structure and tie-rod end lug and support fittings. There were no catastrophic failures during the test, Boeing adds.
The fatigue-test airframe incorporated additional sen￾sors along the side-of-body wingbox joint, which was reinforced after earlier static tests revealed weakness in the area. The redesign, which pushed back first flight of the 787 to December 2009, was validated in static tests the previous month and later incorporated into ZY998. Compared with fatigue tests on earlier metallic airframes, the 787 test unit included more sensors on various stiffener terminations and more extensive periodic inspections than required by the baseline maintenance program.
Average 787 utilization is about 600 cycles per year, Boe￾ing said. The busiest aircraft operate 900-1,400 cycles annually, Aviation Week Network Fleet Discovery data show. The highest-time 787, an All Nippon Airways 787-8, has flown 16,500 cycles in its 11-year service life.
The 44,000-cycle life expectancy is reflected in the extent of the 787 tests compared with previous fatigue tests on conventional aluminum-built airframes, such as the 777, which completed the then-record number of 120,000 simulated cycles in 1997. This represented the equivalent of 60 years in operation or twice the 777’s design service objective (DSO) of 60,000 flights. The DSOs of the 787 and 777 have both been significantly extended beyond previous generations, such as the 757 and 767, which underwent fatigue tests simulating 100,000 flights, or twice a 20-year DSO of 50,000 flights.
_______________________________________________________

[Commander Taco]

Have a listen to the Aviation Week “Check 6” podcast of April 19. It provides an excellent explanation of what the whistleblower’s allegations are all about, as well as the challenges of composite construction.

[waito]

The podcast is available to anybody, along with transcript. Good insight.

WR63:excellent.

Disclaimer: I'm Electric Engineer with no experience in the matter I discuss here. It's just a superficial opinion from someone with technical backgrounds.

IMO almost all is addressed by Boeing. Especially the fatigue test over 5 years and simulating 3x the maximum life cycles, was done with an also imperfect fuselage with exceeding the tolerances.

Also IMO, the remaining issue is the suspected overforcing of the composites for measurement of gaps in production. Causing possible microcracks, and causing possible gaps out of tolerance when finally assembled with lower force. This was not simulated in the fatigue test as far as I know.

There's no perfect experience with all that on the free market that we can hope to get a verdict easily.

I assume the fuselage issues form a lower risk than most people expect. It's not an urgent issue. The question is, can they detect individual cracks in time on the ["overbent" and "overgapping"] fuselages in time? Does it help to buy back an older airframe with this known condition and perform an accelerated fatigue test?

[ATC Watcher]

First disclaimer :I am not an composite specialist not engineer, but I fly composite gliders since 50 years, and I even own one now. I do not do the heavy maintenance on it but the regular 25h/50h and annual ones. Unlike in aluminium Cracks in standard composite ( e.g. fibreglass) are easily detectable and easily repairable. On the other hand Carbon composites does not pre-crack, it normally shatters in one go. no warning. , hence a strict G- limits and a non-extensible shelf life.
I read somewhere that , unlike many other parts, the 787 fuselage is made of : " carbon laminate composite" , . so my guess is the force (i.e. how many Gs " were used to force the parts in place) was probably under its limits otherwise it would have shattered. Immediately.
But waiting for specialists to comment..

[MechEngr]

The way fatigue cracks propagate through metal is very different from the way damage accumulates in composites. In particular, fatigue cracks in metal form and progress at very small stress loads - 10% or less of the maximum yield load**. The cracks start at some tiny mismatch in grain structures and, because the crack is into metal crystals, the size of the front edge of the crack is as little as a single atom in size, causing a huge stress concentration.

I think composites tend to fail from separation of the fibers from the matrix (usually epoxy for carbon fiber.) The usual final failure is by rupture of the fibers from the matrix which is usually rather explosive as the fibers can store a lot of energy from the combination of strength and elasticity, but the composite can accumulate damage with even the smallest loads, a characteristic shared with aluminum.

For much more about composite fatigue failure than is suitable to type here see Principal Features of Fatigue and Residual Strength of Composite Materials Subjected to Constant Amplitude (CA) Loading (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6720546/), section 2.5. The Hierarchy of Damage. It's an NIH report and mostly technical, but the 2.5 section gives a good overview.

**I have seen metal parts that failed in use where more than 90% of the original material had succumbed to the fatigue crack and only 10% or less remained to be twisted loose; a load that was very small compared to the strength capacity of the undamaged part.

[waito]

Maybe you are talented and knowing people - is it worth to open a separate special thread on this composite fuselage - shimming issue to take a detailed look? I could jump start by collecting relevant infos, but I need to stay out of technical conclusions.

[Hot 'n' High]

Is the latest whistleblower proven at least partially incorrect?

WR 6-3, always interesting to see your views and excellent assessments! :ok: I guess my only thought on this is that we really have 2 questions here:-

(1) Has the use of these practice on the joints caused a safety issue with the affected airframes? Maybe not - an engineering decision required there but it seems Boeing (and others) think not.

The other arguably more important question is:-

(2) Was this technique an approved, formally safety assessed method of build documented by Boeing? Well, I think the answer is "no". This being the case, how many other non-documented, non-approved practices are taking place across all the company assembly lines? This latter point links nicely with the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 where it increasing looks like poor/undocumented work (for possibly a number of reasons) took place leading to the loss of the door plug in flight.

So, Boeing may be able to "prove" (1) is not an issue ....... but, in many ways, (2) is the far more serious question. Answering that one will be exceedingly difficult for Boeing to prove. And I'm sure other manufacturers will be using this as an opportunity to look critically at their own production lines. This last point is a very positive spin-off from Boeing's woes.

Anyway, just a thought........ :ok:

[KCode]

While the technical issue appears to have had a thorough and satisfactory engineering assessment, the cultural aspects remain unanswered. Per Hudson, Reason et al, trust must be in place before effective communication takes place. Had the whistleblower trusted that his concerns would be addressed through company channels, it is unlikely to have been escalated to a Congressional Hearing. The 103 report indicates that there is Management/worker diconnect on safety culture, SMS and safety initiatives.

[oceancrosser]

I was in AMS yesterday. On the stand beside us was a KLM 787-10, which is probably less than 3 years old. As I was doing the walkaround of my airplane, I noticed the sun reflecting off the blue color on the upper fuselage. And the fuelage surface looked pretty uneven all over. More so than with any aluminum airplane. Also the fuselage join where the AFT (Section 47) meets the MID (section 46) was really well noticeable. Something I have not noticed on other airplanes. Seems to my pilot eye, the Boeing method of making composite fuselages does not lend itself to making super even and smooth surfaces.
I have no idea whether I would see the same on an A350…

[SRMman]

Was the fatigue testing done on a fuselage with the specific fault ? That is one with the excessive gaps present?

The fatigue characteristics of riveted aluminum structures are very well understood, however all composite structures are quite new. I would be interested in hearing from a structures expert on how well these types of structures resistance to degradation can be evaluated.

In my time I have worked in and around metallic and composite aircraft structures, and also have some knowledge of fatigue testing for certification. I’d be very surprised if the fatigue specimen, whether it be a component or complete fuselage/wing assembly, was not built exactly to drawing. I agree that a composite structure behaves very differently to metallic, but nevertheless the fatigue test is the baseline at entry into service for the aircraft Maintenance/Inspection Program. Whilst the Program is initially conservative to account for unknowns and some build variability, the assumption is that production structure is built to drawing.

Deliberate deviation from drawing during manufacture, fitting, assembly, which obviously would include use of excessive force, missing/incorrect size shims, takes the component or structure into unknown territory and not covered by the pre-certification testing.

[Commander Taco]

Deliberate deviation from drawing during manufacture, fitting, assembly, which obviously would include use of excessive force, missing/incorrect size shims, takes the component or structure into unknown territory and not covered by the pre-certification testing.
That forms the basis of the whistleblower’s allegations. As a post-production engineer with responsibility to ensure that the finished product meets both the pre-production build and the pre-production certified standard, he alleges that the aircraft do not meet those requirements.

[WillowRun 6-3]

That forms the basis of the whistleblowers allegations. As a post-production engineer with responsibility to ensure that the finished product meets both the pre-production build and the pre-production certified standard, he alleges that the aircraft do not meet those requirements.

Given the allegations, is it possible to determine whether they are consistent with, or not consistent with, the analysis and evidence reported by Aviation Week in the article and the podcast? The reporting is based on inputs provided by Boeing; if their source is a reason to doubt those inputs are complete or even accurate, then it still is "information" as reported by the magazine. Though a less certain determination, are the allegations consistent with this information or not?

FAA presumably will reply to the letter filed by Mr Salehpour's attorneys. But until then . . .

Also given the content of various posts following the one in which I summarized the AW&ST article, the refusal to release the documents that were filed with FAA together with the attorney's letter now seems even more difficult to understand. The predicate for the hearing before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations - where the whistleblower testified - was that (paraphrasing) the American people have a right and/or need to know if these airplanes are safe. On what basis are the American people being told to ponder this question with only part of the relevant information? Is it because once FAA completes its review, the entire filing will be made public?

[MechEngr]

This would ordinarily be handled by going to the FAA first, but it will probably go there next. I know from aircraft radar development projects I was on, there was no way to afford to test every extreme tolerance excursion, but everything had a factor of safety; the main structure was capable of resisting 30 Gs and then some for margin.

The question bridges between if it met the certified configuration and if the deviations were run through engineering to confirm the result would meet the original requirement. Either should be acceptable.

[waito]

This would ordinarily be handled by going to the FAA first, but it will probably go there next.
I understood, from the sources WillowRun and Commander Taco mentioned, that this was already done meanwhile, and deviation approved. But I'm not sure what exactly I read.
EDIT: I found it. Not sure if I interpret it right. See in there:

I'll open I opened a tech deep dive thread (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/658885-tech-deep-dive-boeing-787-fuselage-shimming-issues.html) and jump start with a key facts collection from these articles and that expert podcast.

[SRMman]

This would ordinarily be handled by going to the FAA first, but it will probably go there next. I know from aircraft radar development projects I was on, there was no way to afford to test every extreme tolerance excursion, but everything had a factor of safety; the main structure was capable of resisting 30 Gs and then some for margin..

As I recall, the aircraft I was involved with, or at least the wings, in the static test had to meet a limit load of 2.5 G (without deformation); that was supposed to be the maximum load ever likely to be experienced by any aircraft in the life of the fleet. On top of that a factor of safety of 1.5, equivalent to a total load (Ultimate Load) of 3.75 G was applied to the test specimen (once!), which it had to sustain for a short period; permanent deformation was permitted as I recall. There are youtube videos of such structures undergoing these loads, ending with spectacular results!

[MechEngr]

Moved myself from other thread:

The " Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act" falls into the weird zone. It doesn't prevent errors, it simply adds another stick to beat people with. Mostly, if an unexpected thing happens, then it can be claimed it happened because the organization failed to follow the generalized, non-specific, requirements. And then there are requirements that likely won't help.

For example:

(d) Safety Reporting Program.—The regulations issued under subsection (a) shall require a safety management system to include a confidential employee reporting system through which employees can report hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, and incidents. A reporting system under this subsection shall include provisions for non-punitive reporting of such items by employees in a manner consistent with other confidential employee reporting systems administered by the Administrator. Such regulations shall also require a certificate holder described in subsection (a) to submit a summary of reports received under this subsection to the Administrator at least twice per year.

The complaint at hand was that the "hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, and incidents" and the claim is the reporting was ignored. The anonymity would not make the reporting more effective - whatever defects are being reported would remain if anonymously reported - and the reporter would then still have the dilemma of whether or not to stay in a position they are unable to affect vs. being moved to some other position where they can also not affect the outcome, just as when they are identified.

Make the system: A system of anonymous reporting to the FAA for which the FAA has to extract answers and report to Congress within 30 days of receipt.

Why not? Because Congress doesn't want the burden of reviewing the FAA work and certainly won't allocate funds to create, manage, or man this effort. On top of that, it would put Congress in the chain of accountability. Being anonymous, one could set up a campaign of hundreds of false complaints every month, week, or day in order to bring the company, the FAA, and Congressional oversight to their knees. If such harassment reporting can be traced, then it's not truly anonymous.
Moved from the other thread:

(e) Code Of Ethics.—The regulations issued under subsection (a) shall require a safety management system to include establishment of a code of ethics applicable to all employees of a certificate holder, including officers, which clarifies that safety is the organization’s highest priority.

A longtime favorite. If a person is unethical then a Code of Ethics won't change that. Pressed too hard as a priority and it moves to being background noise that even ethical people won't pay any attention to. They can remain ethical, but the campaign is an irritation, as if they cannot be trusted.
---
For a law firm representing a whistle blower the main weapon I would expect them to use is the offer to sign an NDA in exchange for a large settlement. Unless the client wants otherwise, I would expect that of any damages litigation. The lack of publication isn't surprising.

2)

If the plaintiff wants to release the information, Wikileaks is available as are Google Docs.

In response to "strawman" then what happens to an item on a plane that is near delivery and they wait 6 months to deal with the complaint? How long was the door unsecured from the factory?

[BlankBox]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-taps-debt-market-raise-10-billion-sources-2024-04-29/

Boeing taps debt market to raise $10 billion, sources say

April 29 (Reuters) - Boeing (BA.N), opens new tab on Monday tapped debt markets to raise $10 billion, after the U.S. planemaker burned $3.93 billion in free cash during the first quarter as production of its best-selling jet declined, sources familiar with the matter said.
Boeing shares rose 3.4% after the successful sale. Ratings agencies last week slashed the outlook on Boeing's credit to just above "junk" status. On Monday, both assigned ratings nearing junk to Boeing's new senior unsecured notes, with S&P assigning a BBB- rating and Moody's a Baa3 rating.


​​​​​​​Maybe all that burned buyback cash would come in handy now?

[Lonewolf_50]

Boeing has finalised an agreement with GKN Aerospace to integrate its St. Louis site under Boeing's wing. The agreement helps secure the future of key aircraft programmes and ensures workforce job continuity. The deal, completed in partnership with GKN Aerospace and its parent company, Melrose Industries, guarantees the continuation of essential parts manufacturing for the F/A-18 and F-15 programmes.
Boeing immediately assumes control of GKN's St. Louis site, integrating its operations into its own. Moreover, the transition ensures job security for approximately 550 employees previously employed by GKN, who will now become part of Boeing's workforce. The US, which is still in the process of acquiring the F-35 Lightning II multirole fighter aircraft, has also considered procuring the F-15X multirole fighter aircraft in small volumes to supplement its fleet of F-35 aircraft and maintain fleet diversity, according to GlobalData's "The Global Military Fixed Wing Aircraft Market 2023-2033 (https://www.globaldata.com/store/report/military-fixed-wing-aircraft-market-analysis/)" report.

Steve Parker, senior vice president and chief operating officer of Boeing Defense, Space & Security, emphasised the broader impact of the agreement, stating, "This agreement allows us to not only deliver for our customers but also gives the highly skilled GKN workforce the opportunity to bring their immense talents to bear in support of the warfighter and the St. Louis defence and aerospace industry. This is a win-win-win for those employees, Boeing, and the broader Saint Louis community." For what it's worth. I'd need to look but I suspect a bit of MD connection in there somewhere.

[MechEngr]

GKN had bought the site from Boeing in 2001, so this is just a return to the previous ownership status.

[MK 4A Tank]

Second Boeing whistleblower dies in less than two months (msn.com) (https://www.msn.com/en-nz/news/national/second-boeing-whistleblower-dies-in-less-than-two-months/ar-AA1o0rED?ocid=msedgntp&pc=LCTS&cvid=389ae4c536854e8eab3c99fd25543636&ei=18)

[MechEngr]

MRSA was the initiator for causing his death.

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus Bacteria. See https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/mrsa/symptoms-causes/syc-20375336 for details.

Not a doctor but it looks to me like it's one of those infections where the early symptoms can be taken as a "no big deal," like many other infections can be, and progress to "near to death" far more quickly than the infected person expects.

For transmission they list, among others, skin to skin contact as happens for wrestlers, so it's not a disease limited to the already unhealthy, but it can certainly take advantage.

[BFSGrad]

The various press accounts seem ambiguous about when/where Dean acquired MRSA. One account says after he entered the hospital and another says he tested positive for Flu B and MRSA upon being admitted. Any of the 3 maladies noted (Flu B, pneumonia, MRSA) can cause death, even in a “healthy” 45-year-old. A likely scenario is that he became infected with Flu B, which developed into pneumonia and he then acquired MRSA in the hospital after being intubated.

The news reports of this death as “sudden” (he was in ICU for 2 weeks) along with bookending it with the Barnett death certainly adds fuel to the conspiracy theories. Then there’s Dean’s attorney stating that he doesn’t want to speculate about the circumstances of Dean’s death. I’ve not seen any reports of additional investigation of Dean’s death beyond the obvious and well-documented medical circumstances. I don’t know what else there would be to investigate.

[waito]

Saw this one. Not sure if the comment is from NTSB as well (likely not) and fair.

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1079x1359/screenshot_20240502_203759_instagram_a60beb8c2750dbd04b5d4c2 330857cd94501bd13.jpg


I had digged out FAA and EASA for EAD's of 737/32x as a sign of safety level. There was no such difference between both Families.

HOW can I shrink the image sizes? Wasn't there a forum functions to choose the sizing?? 😠

[WillowRun 6-3]

waito, what is the source for the (really quite awkward) graphic you posted? I can read what the graphic says the source took information from - but who is the source of the graphic? Who published it, s.v.p.?

[Petit-Lion]

The scale looks wrong. In fact the red curve is likely plotted as the sum of B+A, not B only, which makes this graph misleading.
And it has already been said that the B fleet is more ancient and about the same size than the A fleet, so more incidents expected, the market share of the year is irrelevant.
(No sympathy for B here, as I feel more for Bombardier)

[soarbum]

The scale looks wrong. In fact the red curve is likely plotted as the sum of B+A, not B only, which makes this graph misleading.

Well spotted!

[MechEngr]

More important than number and age is operators and cause, into which age may matter or not. Will a newly off the line plane have the same problems from maintainers that one that is a few years over the expected lifespan? The above chart is nothing more than useless to make any comparison that is important.

One bit that is noticeable is that there was a sharp increase in incidents for Boeing when Airbus incidents increased. I'd look to see if that latter part was due to a ramp up in Airbus sales, causing some Boeing planes to be transferred to secondary operators with less capable maintainers or more short-haul flights that ramp up minor damages or simply getting to the part of their life where problems accumulate and the best maintainers were put to concentrate on the new Airbus purchases.

Let me look at the chart to see if that conjecture is true - and there it is - nothing.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Lies, blasted lies, statistics - and publishing junk - garbage - nonsense.... but ah! calling it "data" or better yet, "evidence", well now, that's metaphysical truth. Even more so when it shows up in graphical form.

Rant ends.

[llagonne66]

Well, we do not know who has authored this chart and if the data is really coming from the NTSB.
I have downloaded the "AviationAccidentStatistics_2003-2022_20231228.xlsx" file available on the NTSB statistical reviews page (https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/Pages/research.aspx).
A very simple query on the Flight regulation column relating to "Part 121: Air carrier" operations shows that during this period incidents/accidents for A and B were:
- 88 for A
- 296 for B
Of course, these raw numbers do not tell us anything as they should be crossed with the number of A and B A/C flying under Part 121 operations in each year from 2003 to 2022.
I don't know where to find such data but I am pretty sure that some of you will be able to do so :ok:

[waito]

I did the new Samsung/Google reverse picture search.
The list of appearances doesn't look too trustworthy.

At the end tons of Russian and Iranian sites. Is the source somewhere from them kingdoms of honesty?

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/200x2000/screenshot_20240503_153435_google_7807a3493896595427096e0896 56233a4ea483c1.jpg

[Petit-Lion]

I think EADs relate more with design/fabrication issues than with operations/maintenance issues, hence the intent of this "chart"...

[andmiz]

This analysis of the above chart will prove helpful to many.

https://visualapproach.io/does-data-show-boeing-is-unsafe/

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1080x690/how_this_chart_became_this_chart_same_data_visual_approach_a nalytics_1_0fcd9d346e841d064f1b80395583f3ad97e54c35.jpg

[ATC Watcher]

Very nice explanation and demonstration as to why we should not always trust data that is difficult to verify , and sometime sit is not easy to do.
the last sentence of the demonstration is essential in understanding incidents data , we knew it but worth repeating over and over.
This highlights another danger of simply using the number of reports filed as an indication of aircraft safety: not all incidents are the same........... the elevated number of incident reports stems from a very strong safety culture, not one of reduced safety. In this case, more incident reports are an indication of increased safety.

[5star]

And ANOTHER fiickup by Boeing….:=

Since a few weeks, several crews report issues with the Boeing performance calculation suite -OPT- for the B777 family. Random crashes, erroneous data calculations….A serious issue, one would think…
However, according to sources in close contact with Seattle, Mr Boeing is still in ‘relax’ mode and will implement a fix for this serious issue in about…… 2 months….
2 MONTHS….really? What a sh1tshow this company has become!

[Smooth Airperator]

The performance of the computer that did the OPT on the 787 family deteriorated so fast, that my company had us stop using it on aircraft that were literally 3 months old. The hardware was never capable in the first place. But then, what do you expect from a company that couldn't even design a toilet seat that would stay up mid-way through pissing.

[ACMS]

Boeing don’t actually design or make the toilet seats mate but I get your point….

[waito]

Report of 787 falsification of inspection records in Charleston by workers
Article on Airbus vs. Boeing after AB Quarterly Results

Both on AP newssite

[PPRuNeUser0221]

787 Progress

LNs 1194, 1193, 1192, 1191 (ZE641/787-10 ZE514/787-10 ZC109/787-9 ZC025/787-9) are undergoing final assembly in 4 slots in gthe Charsletown factory - These are meant for (Singapore Airline, British Airways, Lufthansa and American Airlines) and they all carry the Trent-1000 except the American Airlines 787-9 that carries the GenX-1B

[PPRuNeUser0221]

787 Deliveries since October
Boeing WB Activity
Boeing 737 Activity

[CAEBr]

I see the manned Starliner flight has been postponed again - quoting a suspect oxygen relief valve just two hours before lift off. No indication of how it was found, last minute supplier recall or BITE failure or whatever, but another visible failure. Surely the basic oxygen system in spacecraft is well understood and not a high risk system these days ?

[Asturias56]

It's new - and small glitches have always been very common on any manned mission.

[CAEBr]

It's new - and small glitches have always been very common on any manned mission.
Yes, I get that but my point is that oxygen systems appear to be well understood and haven't been a big issue in the past, so is it that previous experience has been lost or is it that the level of risk analysis and acceptable risk is now so much lower than was the case in the Apollo days that getting previously acceptable systems to a currently acceptable risk level is becoming almost too difficult.

[MechEngr]

The valve is part of the rocket, not the capsule. In particular, part of the Atlas V upper stage - Centaur. It's not that new. There remain only 17 more Atlas V launches.

The overall launch vehicle is the responsibility of ULA which is two segments of Boeing plus two segments of Lockheed-Martin. Centaur propulsion appears to be largely the engineering responsibility of Aerojet Rocketdyne. The booster appears to have been designed with the partial goal of absorbing engines from Russia to keep Russian rocket scientists from going to high bidders elsewhere. This became a problem when Russia invaded Crimea.

This should be launch 100 for Atlas V design with 0 launch failures in the previous 99, and 2 anomolies in the upper stage failure to deliver to full altitude. The satellites were in slightly lower than desired orbits, but still usable from the first and the second simply used more Centaur fuel that was intended for de-orbit of the upper stage.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlas_V#Mission_success_record

[OldnGrounded]

Surely the basic oxygen system in spacecraft is well understood and not a high risk system these days ?

The problem seems to be with the Atlas V.

https://www.reuters.com/science/boeings-new-starliner-capsule-set-first-crewed-flight-space-station-2024-05-06/

Oops, sorry. Didn't see MechEngr's post.

[OldnGrounded]

Report of 787 falsification of inspection records in Charleston by workers
Article on Airbus vs. Boeing after AB Quarterly Results

Both on AP newssiteUS FAA opens probe into Boeing 787 inspections (https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/faa-opens-new-investigation-into-boeing-wsj-reports-2024-05-06/)

[CAEBr]

The valve is part of the rocket, not the capsule. In particular, part of the Atlas V upper stage - Centaur. It's not that new. There remain only 17 more Atlas V launches.

The .. .


Thanks for the clarification MechEngr

[WillowRun 6-3]

@ Claybird

The charts with the colour background and details about aircraft production and et cetera: where are these published, please, if it is a publicly available source? If it isn't available publicly, could you please give descriptive information about where these are found? They are quite interesting charts, .... or whatever would be the proper nomenclature.

[A0283]

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-68979354

[tdracer]

Given the crap that Spirit is allegedly shipping to Boeing, I have to wonder why Airbus is so steadfast in keeping Spirit as a supplier (including steps to make it harder for Boeing to re-acquiring Spirit...)

[Bksmithca]

Given the crap that Spirit is allegedly shipping to Boeing, I have to wonder why Airbus is so steadfast in keeping Spirit as a supplier (including steps to make it harder for Boeing to re-acquiring Spirit...)
Thinking out loud but is it possible that Airbus has a better QA program and more inspection so they aren't have the same issues as Boeing?

[MechEngr]

Given the crap that Spirit is allegedly shipping to Boeing, I have to wonder why Airbus is so steadfast in keeping Spirit as a supplier (including steps to make it harder for Boeing to re-acquiring Spirit...)

AFAIK the division of Spirit that makes Airbus parts is in Ireland.

From BBC

Spirit has a major operation in Northern Ireland, which manufactures the wings for the Airbus A220. It is one of Northern Ireland's largest and most important manufacturing businesses with more than 3,000 employees.

[tdracer]

AFAIK the division of Spirit that makes Airbus parts is in Ireland.

From BBC
I could be wrong, but my understanding is that is not the only Spirit division that makes Airbus parts - some are made in the US.

[MechEngr]

https://www.spiritaero.com/company/programs/

The most I see is

The Airbus A350 is a key program for Spirit. The central section panels are built in Kinston, North Carolina, then incorporated into the fuselage (Section 15) in Saint-Nazaire, France. Spirit also manufactures the A350 wing front spar and fixed leading edge.

They don't attribute a location for the wing front spar and fixed leading edge, but maybe Kinston as well?

[Asturias56]

"AFAIK the division of Spirit that makes Airbus parts is in Ireland."

yes - the old Shorts/Bombardier now Spirit operation in Belfast

Think it also does work for Airbus on the A.220 - it would make sense to sell the whole thing to Airbus TBH

[DaveReidUK]

AFAIK the division of Spirit that makes Airbus parts is in Ireland.

From BBC
Spirit has a major operation in Northern Ireland, which manufactures the wings for the Airbus A220. It is one of Northern Ireland's largest and most important manufacturing businesses with more than 3,000 employees.

That of course came about because the A220 was formerly the Bombardier CSeries, and Bombardier owned Shorts for many years following privatisation, before selling the operation to Spirit in 2020.

[CAEBr]

That of course came about because the A220 was formerly the Bombardier CSeries, and Bombardier owned Shorts for many years following privatisation, before selling the operation to Spirit in 2020.
Quite, and importantly the acquisition was not part of the process by which they obtained (or perhaps more correctly were formed from) the ex Boeing plants. Would be interesting to understand what if any NDAs are in place to protect Boeing and Airbus data.

[WHBM]

Quite, and importantly the acquisition was not part of the process by which they obtained (or perhaps more correctly were formed from) the ex Boeing plants. Would be interesting to understand what if any NDAs are in place to protect Boeing and Airbus data.
You really don't want to get too worked up over that. There are very many (possibly a majority) of major component builders who supply to both airframers. Starting, of course, with the engine manufacturers.

[WillowRun 6-3]

From one of several media sources (report of investigation also noted on CNBC tv broadcast Squwak Box today):

"The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has opened an investigation into Arlington, Virginia-based Boeing Co. for statements the company made regarding safety practices, following an incident where a panel blew off an Alaska Airlines 737 Max 9 16,000 feet above Oregon in January.

Reuters reported that the SEC investigation will look into whether Boeing or its executives made statements misleading investors, according to a report from Bloomberg News, based on three sources familiar with the development.

Boeing declined to comment on the matter when [media outlet] reached out to the company, while the SEC did not respond to requests for comment."

Editorial comment: one wonders whether, and if so how, this development - if reports are accurate - may affect pending decisions by Department of Justice with regard to the DPA, Deferred Prosecution Agreement, in the criminal case in federal district court in Texas. At least this SLF/attorney wonders.

[BlankBox]

The US Justice Department on Tuesday notified Boeing that it breached terms of its 2021 agreement in which the company avoided criminal charges for two fatal 737 Max crashes.

After a series of safety missteps earlier this year, including a door plug that blew off an Alaska Airlines flight shortly after takeoff, the Department of Justice said Boeing is now subject to criminal prosecution.


https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/14/business/boeing-justice-department-criminal-prosecution/index.html

[remi]

There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.

The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.

Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.
I realize this post is a month old but ...

You say this like the only thing going on in the Ethiopian cockpit was a captain and copilot having a leisurely conversation about runaway trim. In reality there was a Jumbotron of cautions and warnings going off due to bad air data and whatnot.

Analysis of crew performance was mixed in all the numerous accident reports, but in general I think there is a consensus that task saturation was a problem for the crew, the copilot of which was also very low in hours.

The AoA sensor single point of failure combined with abnormalities in takeoff tasks would have been difficult for any crew. Some crews might have saved Lion Air. Some or perhaps most would have saved the Ethiopian aircraft. This particular crew did not. The plain fact is, though, is that regardless of crew performance, the design was obviously defective in multiple ways.

[remi]

US FAA opens probe into Boeing 787 inspections (https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/faa-opens-new-investigation-into-boeing-wsj-reports-2024-05-06/)Asked for comment, Boeing provided an April 29 email from Scott Stocker, who leads the company's 787 program, to employees in South Carolina where the 787 is assembled.

In the email, Stocker said that an employee saw what appeared to be an irregularity in a required 787 conformance test.

Stocker said in the email that after receiving the report, "we quickly reviewed the matter and learned that several people had been violating Company policies by not performing a required test, but recording the work as having been completed."

Stocker said Boeing promptly informed the FAA "about what we learned and are taking swift and serious corrective action with multiple" employees.

He added, "our engineering team has assessed that this misconduct did not create an immediate safety of flight issue.".
If employees performed exceptionally well, management would happily take the credit, but of course this is "employee misconduct" not "management failure."

My perhaps naive view is that something involving "several people" in a regimented environment like aviation manufacture is definitively a management issue. Is it a failure to provide an independent check? Is it a failure to oversee a team? Is it *wink wink* *nudge nudge* encouraging a team to violate company and legally mandated procedures? Whatever it is, it's not a spontaneously arising cabal of assemblers who have decided all on their own to do something that doesn't pay them more yet is the worst kind of safety failure in aviation and has the direst possible consequences for career.

[WillowRun 6-3]

The post replied to is a month old, yes - but having a proper understanding of the multiple causes of the Ethiopian accident will take on greater importance (in the view of this SLF/attorney) in the context of Boeing now losing the protection of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement.

Some very eminent worthies in the world of civil aviation law, policy and regulation have been heavily critical of U.S. Department of Justice and FBI putting Boeing under the criminal investigation microscope, specifically regarding the Alaska 1282 door plug incident and, more broadly, in the aftermath of the two MAX crashes which resulted in the charges deferred by the DPA. And not to forget the prosecution of the unfortunately chatty (Jedi mind tricks and so on) Boeing pilot, Mark Forkner. If justice was miscarrying in the fact of his being charged and put on trial, at least his acquittal stopped it.

What this latest development leaves in front of those who hold responsibility for the civil aviation sector in the United States is the question of whether, despite the objections that bringing in the feds for criminal inquiries causes people to avoid coming forward, avoid reporting and disclosing what they know, are there not exceptional cases with respect to which accountability in a court of law is in fact proper recourse for serious wrongdoing? We say so often these days (regarding certain poor weather and money received for silence) "no person is above the law." Corporate persons, too?

Collapse of the DPA, if the news reports are accurate, is no cause for rejoicing, unless one wishes to witness Boeing driven toward oblivion (or whatever word fits the approach of corporate demise). Nevertheless, it would seem both logical, and accurate as a matter of law, that the families of the people killed in the two crashes will now have proper opportunities to be heard and to exercise their statutory rights as (technically defined) "crime victims" in a United States District Court.

It does verge on the pedantic to say this, but I will anyway. Legal counsel for the families of the people killed in the crashes are going to have an extraordinary, and very likely wholly unprecedented, experience preparing them for their day in court under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Perhaps Counsel will visit some of the law schools and other types of schools where courses relevant to aviation safety, and law and policy and regulation, are taught. It is easily imagined that the representation of these family members will yield impactful lessons, stories and insights about how important it is that everyone working in civil aviation take good care that the wrongdoing of the MAX saga never occur again.

[remi]

The post replied to is a month old, yes - but having a proper understanding of the multiple causes of the Ethiopian accident will take on greater importance (in the view of this SLF/attorney) in the context of Boeing now losing the protection of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement.

[...]

It does verge on the pedantic to say this, but I will anyway. Legal counsel for the families of the people killed in the crashes are going to have an extraordinary, and very likely wholly unprecedented, experience preparing them for their day in court under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Perhaps Counsel will visit some of the law schools and other types of schools where courses relevant to aviation safety, and law and policy and regulation, are taught. It is easily imagined that the representation of these family members will yield impactful lessons, stories and insights about how important it is that everyone working in civil aviation take good care that the wrongdoing of the MAX saga never occur again.
I for one would welcome the "death" of the McBoeing born 25 years ago if it would bring about the atavistic rebirth of an engineering and safety obsessed airliner manufacturer.

I much prefer the treatment of fatal transportation accidents in common law countries to that in civil law countries. Treating accidents as de facto crime scenes and routinely seeking prosecution of pilots, captains, engineers, controllers, etc., is at best not helpful to fact finding and safety improvements, and most likely corrosive. Humans are always involved in fatal accidents, but safety requires expecting failure, and overt malfeasance aside, a human failing at a critical task is literally doing what is expected of humans.

As anyone with any common sense regarding human behavior can deduce from the fact that even extreme punishment appears to have relatively little effect on crime, criminal liability for unintentional or negligent failure isn't going to make employees straighten up and fly right. It may make them want to, but being humans, they will fail anyway.

But ... Willfully, carefully, and deliberately engineering systems over a period of years in a manner that is clearly opposed to both best practices and common sense is not a pilot making mistakes in a situation where failing to perform the right action in 15 seconds will destroy a plane full of passengers.

I don't think this is a case of "putting the ATC in jail," but more a case of mundane corporate crime for financial or personal gain. You could think of it as a fraud upon safety.

[shore leave]

Asked for comment, Boeing provided an April 29 email from Scott Stocker, who leads the company's 787 program, to employees in South Carolina where the 787 is assembled.

In the email, Stocker said that an employee saw what appeared to be an irregularity in a required 787 conformance test.

Stocker said in the email that after receiving the report, "we quickly reviewed the matter and learned that several people had been violating Company policies by not performing a required test, but recording the work as having been completed."

Stocker said Boeing promptly informed the FAA "about what we learned and are taking swift and serious corrective action with multiple" employees.

He added, "our engineering team has assessed that this misconduct did not create an immediate safety of flight issue.".
If employees performed exceptionally well, management would happily take the credit, but of course this is "employee misconduct" not "management failure."

My perhaps naive view is that something involving "several people" in a regimented environment like aviation manufacture is definitively a management issue. Is it a failure to provide an independent check? Is it a failure to oversee a team? Is it *wink wink* *nudge nudge* encouraging a team to violate company and legally mandated procedures? Whatever it is, it's not a spontaneously arising cabal of assemblers who have decided all on their own to do something that doesn't pay them more yet is the worst kind of safety failure in aviation and has the direst possible consequences for career.

Even though the details of the article are vague it references a conformance check. If the parts/assembly being tested were subject to a conformity test which forms part of type certification process this has to be witnessed/verified by manufacturer in this case Boeing supplier quality and FAA/ODA.

[Lascaille]

@ Claybird

The charts with the colour background and details about aircraft production and et cetera: where are these published, please, if it is a publicly available source? If it isn't available publicly, could you please give descriptive information about where these are found? They are quite interesting charts, .... or whatever would be the proper nomenclature.

This is a good question as some of those charts, at least, look like commercial-in-confidence information at the least...

Does the expression white-anted still carry meaning around these parts?

[BugBear]

It does verge on the pedantic to say this, but I will anyway. Legal counsel for the families of the people killed in the crashes are going to have an extraordinary, and very likely wholly unprecedented, experience preparing them for their day in court under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. Perhaps Counsel will visit some of the law schools and other types of schools where courses relevant to aviation safety, and law and policy and regulation, are taught. It is easily imagined that the representation of these family members will yield impactful lessons, stories and insights about how important it is that everyone working in civil aviation take good care that the wrongdoing of the MAX saga never occur again.
"Duty of care..." Dereliction of duty, willful and fraudulent

[DaveReidUK]

This is a good question as some of those charts, at least, look like commercial-in-confidence information at the least...

They're snapshots on Google Docs, not sure whether they're one-off or are regularly posted.

This link may or may not work: Google Docs (https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xPZP2NmigprVBd5dklYcFOGraAn4C8Z4W0z2TPD-eD0/edit?pli=1#gid=1546128388)

[Lascaille]

They're snapshots on Google Docs, not sure whether they're one-off or are regularly posted.

This link may or may not work: Google Docs (https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1xPZP2NmigprVBd5dklYcFOGraAn4C8Z4W0z2TPD-eD0/edit?pli=1#gid=1546128388)

I haven't clicked your link - that is the location of the documents but not the source of the documents. In the sense that the map is not the territory, so to speak.

I was wondering if whomever posted them there was technically permitted to do so. If not - that goes back to what I suggested before about Boeing possibly being white-anted.

[Fly-by-Wife]

The Flights spreadsheet tabs would appear to be based on publicly available information - Flightaware reports.

[DaveReidUK]

The Flights spreadsheet tabs would appear to be based on publicly available information - Flightaware reports.

I'd be surprised if that's the case - several of the columns have data that's not readily available from FR24.

It's more likely that the information is from Boeing - the 787 listing certainly is.

[Fly-by-Wife]

Dave,
Have you looked at the rightmost column on the FLIGHTS tabs (the first 2 tabs in the spreadsheet)? You will see the Flightaware report links for those. I specifically only mentioned the FLIGHTS tabs, as you are correct that the other tabs do not have any reference to information that is obviously publicly available.

[DaveReidUK]

Dave,
Have you looked at the rightmost column on the FLIGHTS tabs (the first 2 tabs in the spreadsheet)? You will see the Flightaware report links for those. I specifically only mentioned the FLIGHTS tabs, as you are correct that the other tabs do not have any reference to information that is obviously publicly available.

Ah, yes, I see what you mean, thanks.

Worth noting, though, that the link won't necessarily bring up the page for the flight in question where that BOEnnn flight number has been subsequently reused.

[GlobalNav]

Boeing shareholders loyal to their CEO approve $33 million compensation for Mr Calhoun. The way things are going, he better cash that check quickly.

[OldnGrounded]

Boeing shareholders loyal to their CEO approve $33 million compensation for Mr Calhoun. The way things are going, he better cash that check quickly.

The $33M approval is for 2023 compensation and almost all of it is stock awards. Valuation is, of course, fluid and Boeing shares have dropped precipitously in value — by what? 25%? — since the door plug departure. I doubt that Calhoun could even seriously consider selling most of that stock anytime soon, given the uproar that would certainly immediately ensue and the consequences for shareholder value.

He can't cash that check. Nor should he be able to.

[BFSGrad]

An extensive law enforcement investigation has determined the cause of Boeing whistleblower John Barnett’s death was suicide, according to documents released Friday by the Charleston Police Department.

Boeing whistleblower John Barnett died by suicide, police investigation concludes (https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/boeing-whistleblower-john-barnett-died-by-suicide-police-investigation-concludes/ar-BB1mAN7q)

[Mike Flynn]

This from the Uk Guardian newspaper today.

Boeing’s largest factory is in “panic mode”, according to workers and union officials, with managers accused of hounding staff to keep quiet over quality concerns.

The US plane maker has been grappling with a safety crisis sparked by a cabin panel blowout (https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/06/alaska-airlines-grounds-boeing-737-max-9-planes-after-mid-air-window-blowout) during a flight in January, and intense scrutiny of its production line as regulators launched a string of investigations.



Its site at Everett, Washington – hailed as the world’s biggest manufacturing building – is at the heart of Boeing’s operation, responsible for building planes like the 747 and 767, and fixing the 787 Dreamliner.

One mechanic at the complex, who has worked for Boeing for more than three decades, has claimed it is “full of” faulty 787 jets that need fixing.



Many of these jets are flown from Boeing’s site in South Carolina, where the company shifted final assembly of the 787 in 2021 in what was characterized (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-makes-it-official-washington-state-will-lose-787-production/) as a cost-cutting measure.

“There is no way in God’s green earth I would want to be a pilot in South Carolina flying those from South Carolina to here,” the mechanic, who requested anonymity for fear of retaliation, told the Guardian. “Because when they get in here, we’re stripping them apart.”

Managers at Everett “will hound mechanics” to keep quiet about quality-assurance concerns and potential repairs, the mechanic alleged, emphasizing speed and efficiency over safety. He added: “Boeing has to look in the mirror and say: ‘We’re wrong.’”

[BonnieLass]

I am curious about one aspect of the Boeing issues of recent years

Are there any records of whistleblowers speaking out against the aircraft and how they are manufactured, safety issues etc prior to the MAX crashes?

It takes a lot of courage to be a whistleblower, you tend to lose your job and the company concerned will do its upmost to question and utterly destroy your sanity, sincerity and uphold its reputation by any means necessary.

When the MAX crashes happened it seemed, from an outsider to the industry's point of view, that a very nasty can of worms started to spill and not just about the MAX but also the KC135, 777, 787 et al.

Were the powers at be at Boeing surpressing and hoping to keep surpressed any whistleblowing prior to MAX failures?

With the best will in the world I cannot believe that prior to the MAX crashes, everything in the Boeing garden was rosy, there has to have been people on the assembly lines and other sectors within Boeing who had doubts, concerns and so forth about quality control, systems etc, did they just keep it to themselves, were they stopped from speaking out?

When at work you are usually actively encouraged to speak out if something is wrong, does Boeing have that much power over its employees that they were too scared to have spoken out prior to the MAX crashes?

[DaveReidUK]

When at work you are usually actively encouraged to speak out if something is wrong, does Boeing have that much power over its employees that they were too scared to have spoken out prior to the MAX crashes?

I think you've answered your own question:

It takes a lot of courage to be a whistleblower, you tend to lose your job and the company concerned will do its upmost to question and utterly destroy your sanity, sincerity and uphold its reputation by any means necessary.

[RobinS49]

I am curious about one aspect of the Boeing issues of recent years

Are there any records of whistleblowers speaking out against the aircraft and how they are manufactured, safety issues etc prior to the MAX crashes?

It takes a lot of courage to be a whistleblower, you tend to lose your job and the company concerned will do its upmost to question and utterly destroy your sanity, sincerity and uphold its reputation by any means necessary.

When the MAX crashes happened it seemed, from an outsider to the industry's point of view, that a very nasty can of worms started to spill and not just about the MAX but also the KC135, 777, 787 et al.

Were the powers at be at Boeing surpressing and hoping to keep surpressed any whistleblowing prior to MAX failures?

With the best will in the world I cannot believe that prior to the MAX crashes, everything in the Boeing garden was rosy, there has to have been people on the assembly lines and other sectors within Boeing who had doubts, concerns and so forth about quality control, systems etc, did they just keep it to themselves, were they stopped from speaking out?

When at work you are usually actively encouraged to speak out if something is wrong, does Boeing have that much power over its employees that they were too scared to have spoken out prior to the MAX crashes?

Companies dont go bad overnight so the impact of the McD management takeover took time. Clearing out experienced managers and engineers together with outsourcing, would have reduced the chance of whistleblowing together with a clear message from the top on changed priorities. Cut costs, maximise returns to shareholders. There were early warning signs with the 787 problems but it took the Max crashes for the full can of worms to be exposed. It will take years and top to bottom changes to get Boeing back to full health.

it can be done but those on Wall Street who have at least in part driven the change should take some responsibility and share the pain. Those obscene management pay schemes are little more than bribes to pay out to shareholders regardless of the consequences for the business, let alone customers and staff. They need employ real managers who understand customers, products and people and get rid of the financial engineers.

[BonnieLass]

Companies dont go bad overnight so the impact of the McD management takeover took time. Clearing out experienced managers and engineers together with outsourcing, would have reduced the chance of whistleblowing together with a clear message from the top on changed priorities. Cut costs, maximise returns to shareholders. There were early warning signs with the 787 problems but it took the Max crashes for the full can of worms to be exposed. It will take years and top to bottom changes to get Boeing back to full health.

it can be done but those on Wall Street who have at least in part driven the change should take some responsibility and share the pain. Those obscene management pay schemes are little more than bribes to pay out to shareholders regardless of the consequences for the business, let alone customers and staff. They need employ real managers who understand customers, products and people and get rid of the financial engineers.

The "McD" which I assume is McDonnell-Douglas, the current issues surrounding the MAX and 787 are slightly reminiscent to the infamous rear cargo door and the even more infamous hydraulic systems on the DC10. IIRC there were whistleblowers regarding both issues on the DC10, but ignored or at least brushed aside til both issues cost lives (Turkish 891 and United 232)

"Lessons will be learnt" is generally the script that follows. But obviously lessons are not being learnt and the DC10, although eventually successful and relatively popular, pretty much destroyed McDonnell-Douglas reputation in the same way, it seems, the MAX and 787 are doing for Boeing.

There certainly is far too much emphasis on money and nowhere near enough emphasis on basic safety and quality. As much as people would hate to see the demise of Boeing, they along with every company like them who place money before safety, only have themselves to blame.

[RobinS49]

Have not forgotten the Turkish airlines crash as I knew people on the flight. There had been a big rugby game in Paris and people were coming home from it.
Which makes me think - when did MD become flakey? The history of Douglas is pretty honourable, and late 60s/early 70s pre-dates shareholder value and the malign influence of Wall Street.

[WillowRun 6-3]

The UK Guardian article is typical of the media approach to the crises at Boeing - it repackages information already in the public domain in a way that tends to exaggerate or sensationalize. In particular, the inspection of "joins" in the 787 aircraft still on Boeing premises has been discussed with FAA and was the subject of an extensive safety analysis and public discussion by a relevantly responsible Boeing engineering executive several weeks ago.

Perhaps the mechanic quoted in the article knows something more. Based on the information already in the public domain, that appears doubtful, and very likely it is very doubtful.

That being said, there is little quarreling, if any, over the short-sighted and ultimately vastly counter-productive "cost" saving motive for the move to South Carolina.

About generalizations on whistleblowers, sometimes their claims about impropriety or other ways of referring to "wrongdoing" are correct, and sometimes their claims are not correct. Having represented both individuals in the status of whistleblower as well as defended companies against such claims (as the attorney part of "SLF/attorney"), the reality is that just by slapping the label "whistleblower" on an individual does not guarantee their claims of impropriety or wrongdoing are valid - likewise just because the company resists the claims does not mean the claims are invalid.

Not least, trying to take a longer view, what would help Boeing in its current crisis is a Board seat for union representation of employees. Was it not the case, a good number of years ago, that the legendary labor leader William "Wimpy" Winpisinger was highly effective for the membership, difficult for the Company to exert any pressure upon (if any even could be exerted at all), and still tremendously good for the Company's success in the marketplace and in the aviation and space sectors overall? (One biolgrapher described Wimpy as "aggressive, radical, blunt, flamboyant and outspoken" (the order of those attributes might be incorrect) - couldn't Boeing at least in the minds of those who would like to see the ship righted, benefit from someone like that?)

[Lonewolf_50]

I'll say it more concisely, Willow.
It's typical Gruniad Sensationalist Rubbish.
(Regardless of such criticism as Boeing deserves over the MCAS screw up).

[EEngr]

The engineer, identified as Sam Salehpour

Poor Sam. To whom do we send condolences?:rolleyes:

[remi]

The UK Guardian article is typical of the media approach to the crises at Boeing - it repackages information already in the public domain in a way that tends to exaggerate or sensationalize. In particular, the inspection of "joins" in the 787 aircraft still on Boeing premises has been discussed with FAA and was the subject of an extensive safety analysis and public discussion by a relevantly responsible Boeing engineering executive several weeks ago.
The Guardian does a lot of very good reporting, but they have pet peeves (the environment in particular) where they publish biased and marginally defensible reporting.

Boeing might have made it into "pet peeve." But the underlying facts are probably true anyway, even if presented with a veneer of sensationalism.

[Mike Flynn]

The Boeing name was once gold plated but sadly now attracts headline stories like this.
CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. — The first crewed launch of Boeing's Starliner spacecraft has been delayed until no earlier than June 5 after an automatic abort cut short an attempted flight Saturday afternoon just minutes before liftoff.

Boeing's Starliner spacecraft (https://www.space.com/19367-boeing-cst-100.html) and its Atlas V rocket were less than 4 minutes away from launching two NASA astronauts to the International Space Station (https://www.space.com/16748-international-space-station.html)(ISS) today, June 1, from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station (https://www.space.com/33926-cape-canaveral.html) in Florida at 12:25 p.m. EDT (1625 GMT) when the abort occurred. A ground launch sequencer (GLS) computer triggered the automatic abort 3 minutes and 50 seconds before liftoff, but the exact cause is still unclear.

"It's disappointing," NASA commercial crew program manager Steve Stich said in a press conference after the launch scrub. "Everybody's a little disappointed but you kind of roll your sleeves up and get right back to work." The delay means Starliner's astronaut crew, NASA's Butch Wilmore and Sunita Williams, must wait nearly another week to fly.

[Bksmithca]

The Boeing name was once gold plated but sadly now attracts headline stories like this.
Just the case of the media piling on. As I understand it Boeing's only involvement is with the capsule itself yet the problem was with the Atlas V rocket. But according to the media its Boeing's fault.

[Big Pistons Forever]

I thought Boeing was the prime contractor for the Starliner, so that makes it Boeing’s fault just like the door plug fiasco is on Boeing.

[Lascaille]

The point is noticing that the media have started to include the name 'Boeing' alongside negative news whenever the slightest opportunity to do so presents itself.

[BonnieLass]

From the layman's side, yes the media have pounced on Boeing and continue to chew on Boeing for everything including any remote connection to the company cos Boeing have actually invited it by their arrogance over MAX.

When the first MAX went down, the attitude of the upper management at Boeing was dismissive and somewhat shifting on the "blame game". When the second MAX went down, they still had an almost untouchable arrogance. It appeared to the public that Boeing were riding on the coat tails of their own history of building fine aircraft and their desire to beat Airbus at any cost. You only had to look at the comments sections of the various media to see that, although most public didn't know the details of MAX, the mud was sticking to it and thus the company like superglue.

The MAX exposed a huge disconnect tween the upper management of Boeing and reality. It took too long for them to admit that they may have got things wrong. Then the whistleblowers started talking and that exposed even greater disconnect tween the upper management and the shopfloor and then everything just snowballed and progressively got worse.

The media is a double edged sword.....when you are doing well, it will sing your praises from the rooftops......do something wrong and not mea culpa immediately and people die, then the media will crucify you.

So as much as the media are still chewing on Boeing and causing discomfort to the company, they have largely invited and asked for it by virtue of their reactions and attitudes to MAX and the subsequent quality control issues on other aircraft that were exposed by whistleblowers. The authorities can punish Boeing for their failings but the media can and will rub salt into those wounds and make sure they never forget that they answer to the public, they depend on the public to succeed in their business and that the attitude that the bank balance is not more important than public safety.

[Lascaille]

I'm not intending to excuse the MAX design decisions, which are pretty shocking and unforgiveable in my opinion.

[BFSGrad]

I thought Boeing was the prime contractor for the Starliner, so that makes it Boeing’s fault just like the door plug fiasco is on Boeing.

The Starliner is a Boeing product, but neither of the last two scrubs were due to faults in the Starliner. However, the Atlas V booster is a United Launch Alliance (ULA) product, which is a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed-Martin. The recent scrub was due to a faulty ULA ground computer and the scrub prior to that was due to a valve problem in the Atlas V upper stage, so Boeing has shared responsibility for the scrubs. That being said, how many news articles have mentioned Lockheed-Martin?

[Random ATCO]

Do you think the US Justice Department will sue Boing this summer?

Lately at the ACC, a Boeing traffic had a hidraulic failure, and another Boeing lost the autopilot and the RVSM.. just in the last few days. There are constant incidents with these planes. This is not normal.

[hobbit1983]

Do you think the US Justice Department will sue Boing this summer?

Lately at the ACC, a Boeing traffic had a hidraulic failure, and another Boeing lost the autopilot and the RVSM.. just in the last few days. There are constant incidents with these planes. This is not normal.

Errr..there are so many Boeings flying, this probably is stastically normal? Autopilot issues and hydraulics aren't exclusively Boeing issues.

Unless those issues are caused by QA issues on newly delivered Boeings, it's not noteworthy.

[tdracer]

The Starliner is a Boeing product, but neither of the last two scrubs were due to faults in the Starliner. However, the Atlas V booster is a United Launch Alliance (ULA) product, which is a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed-Martin. The recent scrub was due to a faulty ULA ground computer and the scrub prior to that was due to a valve problem in the Atlas V upper stage, so Boeing has shared responsibility for the scrubs. That being said, how many news articles have mentioned Lockheed-Martin?
While ULA is a joint venture between Boeing and LockMart, the Atlas V launch vehicle is a LockMart product (Boeing produces the Delta IV)(at least they did, it's been a long time since I can recall a Delta IV launch).
So while Boeing is 'connected' by the ULA venture, problems with the Atlas fall directly on Lockheed-Martin.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Do you think the US Justice Department will sue Bo[e]ing this summer?

You're referring to the result of DOJ's review of the status and potential resolution or conclusion of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). At the risk of some oversimplification the DPA is an agreement by which DOJ defers an actual prosecution against Boeing on criminal charges based on conduct to which Boeing admitted in the DPA; the deferral is conditioned on Boeing not breaking the law during the time period covered by the DPA.

The Alaska door plug incident blew the DPA subject matter area wide open again, occurring as it did so close to the end-date of the DPA time period. There were quite pointed objections from some observers about DOJ (FBI) treating the door plug incident as a criminal matter and investigating it as such. It was clear, at that point, that the DOJ's view had become that whether Boeing had fulfilled the DPA's conditions was, at best and giving the Company a substantial benefit of the doubt, an open question.

There also is the complication that the federal appellate court ruled that the two 737 MAX crash victims' families had been incorrectly denied the opportunity, in federal district court in which the DPA had been entered as a matter of record, to exercise their rights under the federal Crime Victim' Rights Act. To venture further case status comments would lead this SLF/attorney into finer points of federal criminal procedure, a terra incognita. But I can say that the fact the crash victims' families will have their literal "day in court" is part of the context for what DOJ will do with the DPA now.

DOJ isn't contemplating "suing" Boeing; this isn't a civil matter. My own view is that, first of all, the DOJ will press Boeing to agree to (for lack of more precise terminology) a DPA-2.0, with another time period dovetailing to where the first DPA ended, and - this would be the more difficult part - a new set of conditions. Some months ago I posted the perhaps scatter-brained idea of putting Boeing into federal regulatory receivership, a term I just made up. But look, Boeing has shown itself to be bankrupt, or nearly so, in many metrics (or qualitative assessments) of quality assurance as well as corporate strategy. Receivership for financial bankruptcy is pretty familiar territory. Isn't part of the legacy of the 737 MAX MCAS disasters the idea that safety in civil aviation design, and honesty and integrity in the certification process, are attributes that don't - or at least should not - have price tags or cost accounting rules?

A criminal matter against Boeing now, even if it could be formally charged and prosecuted, would not be something for the DOJ to brag about, given the rather serious challenges Boeing now confronts. So a respectable best-guess prediction is that DOJ will leverage the threat of such a prosecution in order to force Boeing to agree to another DPA term of, say, three (3) years and some additionally imposing conditions for staying out of legal trouble. . . this time.

[Random ATCO]

You're referring to the result of DOJ's review of the status and potential resolution or conclusion of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). At the risk of some oversimplification the DPA is an agreement by which DOJ defers an actual prosecution against Boeing on criminal charges based on conduct to which Boeing admitted in the DPA; the deferral is conditioned on Boeing not breaking the law during the time period covered by the DPA.

The Alaska door plug incident blew the DPA subject matter area wide open again, occurring as it did so close to the end-date of the DPA time period. There were quite pointed objections from some observers about DOJ (FBI) treating the door plug incident as a criminal matter and investigating it as such. It was clear, at that point, that the DOJ's view had become that whether Boeing had fulfilled the DPA's conditions was, at best and giving the Company a substantial benefit of the doubt, an open question.

There also is the complication that the federal appellate court ruled that the two 737 MAX crash victims' families had been incorrectly denied the opportunity, in federal district court in which the DPA had been entered as a matter of record, to exercise their rights under the federal Crime Victim' Rights Act. To venture further case status comments would lead this SLF/attorney into finer points of federal criminal procedure, a terra incognita. But I can say that the fact the crash victims' families will have their literal "day in court" is part of the context for what DOJ will do with the DPA now.

DOJ isn't contemplating "suing" Boeing; this isn't a civil matter. My own view is that, first of all, the DOJ will press Boeing to agree to (for lack of more precise terminology) a DPA-2.0, with another time period dovetailing to where the first DPA ended, and - this would be the more difficult part - a new set of conditions. Some months ago I posted the perhaps scatter-brained idea of putting Boeing into federal regulatory receivership, a term I just made up. But look, Boeing has shown itself to be bankrupt, or nearly so, in many metrics (or qualitative assessments) of quality assurance as well as corporate strategy. Receivership for financial bankruptcy is pretty familiar territory. Isn't part of the legacy of the 737 MAX MCAS disasters the idea that safety in civil aviation design, and honesty and integrity in the certification process, are attributes that don't - or at least should not - have price tags or cost accounting rules?

A criminal matter against Boeing now, even if it could be formally charged and prosecuted, would not be something for the DOJ to brag about, given the rather serious challenges Boeing now confronts. So a respectable best-guess prediction is that DOJ will leverage the threat of such a prosecution in order to force Boeing to agree to another DPA term of, say, three (3) years and some additionally imposing conditions for staying out of legal trouble. . . this time.

In my opinion, the DOJ should bring criminal charges against Boeing based on the company breaking the DPA; there are constant incidents with Boeing planes and, as an ATCO, IMHO this is not normal. There are incidents like the ones I mentioned above (hidraulic failure, autopilot lost, RVSM capacity lost) that could happen with any other aircraft as well, but not so often. And this is happening.

There are obvious signs of negligence in the way Boeing has manufactured its aircrafts: bolts that come loose and doors that blow away. If the DOJ proves everyone at the company knew this and management decided to look away instead of fixing it, then there is a good base for prosecuting Boeing executives.

If the DOJ prosecutes Boeing, that would add weight to the civil lawsuits related to the 737 MAX crashes.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Graves-Larsen Joint Statement on FAA Briefing of Boeing Plan [press release] June 04, 2024

Washington, D.C. - Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO) and Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA) released the following joint statement after today’s briefing for Committee members by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator Michael Whitaker on Boeing’s plan to improve manufacturing processes and aircraft conformity:

“We want to thank Administrator Whitaker for briefing our members and for his assurances that the FAA will hold Boeing accountable for following its proposed safety plan. We believe, and the Administrator agrees, that safety is the highest priority when it comes to America’s gold standard-setting aviation system.

“Both the FAA and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee will continue to play critical oversight roles as this process moves forward. Our committee’s oversight of the FAA’s efforts and aviation manufacturers, large and small, will continue to be deliberate and fact-based. We will also continue to oversee the implementation of recent laws passed by Congress, including the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 and the Aircraft Certification Reform and Accountability Act, to ensure the FAA has the tools it needs and utilizes them to help keep our system safe.”

[MechEngr]

No one interested in the case Boeing lost to an electric plane startup that Boeing invested in?

Anyway - who in the FAA needs to be charged for failure to perform due-diligence on the creation and issuance of the Emergency AD? The FAA vouched that the included instructions were suitable for every pilot and that was clearly not the case.

Small wonder the FAA wants to focus away from themselves.

[BonnieLass]

Something I find astonishing about the FAA in regard to the MAX.

Have they ever explained why they waited so long to ground it after the two fatal crashes, especially when considering 50+ other authorities had already grounded it. Again as a layperson it truly smacked of someone has someone in their back pocket and some palms are being heavily greased. I am unsure if it has ever happened before that the "home" authority had dragged its heels in grounding an aircraft like they did on MAX.

From the outside looking in, it made the FAA look spineless and untrustworthy, and that delay in grounding fed the fear in the flying public against flying in anything with the Boeing name, let alone the MAX.

The media pounced on the ineffectiveness of the FAA in their "ooops everyone else has grounded it, I spose we better ground it too" attitude, that is very simplistic wording, I know, but that was the impression given to many of the public who didn't understand the implications or issues with MAX. The public see bits of aircraft scattered all over the ground and they generally do not have the insight on the why or how, they look to the company who built it and the authority who allowed it to fly to do something, and neither Boeing or the FAA seemed to be doing anything...least not til after the second crash and other authorities and airlines around the world acted and grounded it. It was a very complacent and blase attitude from Boeing and FAA.

Worst of all, there were questions being asked by the public in the context of "had these two planes crashed in the US, would Boeing and the FAA been so slow in acting and so dismissive?"

[ATC Watcher]

As far as I remember it was not the FAA that finally grounded the Max on their own initiative, it was the US President that forced it . That part of the story , who pressured who and when would be interesting to read one day.

[BonnieLass]

As far as I remember it was not the FAA that finally grounded the Max on their own initiative, it was the US President that forced it . That part of the story , who pressured who and when would be interesting to read one day.

Agreed.

Oh to have been a fly on that wall.....

[Lascaille]

As far as I remember it was not the FAA that finally grounded the Max on their own initiative, it was the US President that forced it . That part of the story , who pressured who and when would be interesting to read one day.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/canada-grounds-boeing-737-max-8-leaving-us-as-last-major-user-of-plane/2019/03/13/25ac2414-459d-11e9-90f0-0ccfeec87a61_story.html

(Just to back it up more than an 'I remember' because it intrigued me)

[BonnieLass]

Having the President force the FAA to ground an aircraft surely diminishes the public trust and confidence in both the FAA and Boeing.

Much gets said about trusting government departments and manufacturers, worldwide. How does a company as large as Boeing and one of the world leaders in aviation matters rebuild their reputations after being essentially shown up by the President and told in no uncertain terms to pull their fingers out and do what should have happened without any prompting?

It makes the rumours and chitchat about "greasing palms" very understandable. The FAA and Boeing were/still are way too close. The FAA should be impartial and unbiased and not show favouritism yet here they were doing exactly that with Boeing and potentially endangering the public and aircrews whilst the rest of the world reacted quickly by grounding the MAX.

Someone has got to have been greasing palms....they had to be cos how else can the FAA have been so blind and so deaf to what Boeing were doing, it beggars belief.

The worst part is that the inaction cost lives and that is completely and utterly unforgiveable. The FAA need prosecuting and suing, let alone Boeing, they were both fully complicit in what happened.

[WillowRun 6-3]

The risk of prosecution and conviction for bribery is a pretty significant risk. Other than "it has to be the case" is there even one piece of evidence showing either a payor, or a recipient, of illegal payments? Compare the simple assertion of greased palms with, for example, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act bribery cases.... there's nothing to be compared.

Of course there is another explanation, stated succinctly in a phrase that has a long history and which has been widely recognized as an occurrence which actually. . . takes place: regulatory capture. It's a kind of careerist mindset, of arrogating a level of ownership of an industry's progress and well-being to one's self. If you want to correlate that well-known tendency by regulators and the regulated with "greased palms", well, it would be odd semantics.

As for the grounding, don't give the then-President so much credit. Despite owning and operating a 757 aircraft, aviation wasn't and isn't among his main interests. Recall that after Amb. Thomas Carter left the ICAO role, the then-President did not nominate a successor Permanent Representative for Senate confirmation and Ambassador rank. Somewhat similarly the current administration has failed to nominate a successor (for Senate confirmation) to Sullenberger, who resigned in July 2022. This is not to defend the FAA's glacial pace in the 737 MAX crisis. But despite large personalities, neither administration was or is reminiscent of LBJ (the notorious arm-twister as Senate Majority Leader, even before the White House).

[megan]

Worst of all, there were questions being asked by the public in the context of "had these two planes crashed in the US, would Boeing and the FAA been so slow in acting and so dismissive?"The line of lawyers would have stretched from Washington to Seattle and back again, they (lawyers) wrecked GA, they have experience..

[Asturias56]

"they (lawyers) wrecked GA, they have experience.."

Not just GA - look at health claims!

Of course it's not JUST the lawyers - it's every individual who decides that "someone must pay" - and that included a lot of people in GA as well as the general public. No win no fee sounds great in theory but it does have consequences

[BugBear]

". No win no fee sounds great in theory but it does have consequences...

​​​​...Loser pays... Sounds even better

[WHBM]

The risk of prosecution and conviction for bribery is a pretty significant risk. Other than "it has to be the case" is there even one piece of evidence showing either a payor, or a recipient, of illegal payments? Compare the simple assertion of greased palms with, for example, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act bribery cases.... there's nothing to be compared.
That's a USA-centric interpretation of inappropriate payments. Other nations look at Washington practices, and in particular "campaign contributions".

[WillowRun 6-3]

That's a USA-centric interpretation of inappropriate payments. Other nations look at Washington practices, and in particular "campaign contributions".

True, the meaning associated with the phrase "greased palms" is that the payments are illegal and not merely unseemly or examples of money or wealth's unwarranted influence in government decisions - at least it was the interpretation of the phrase I understood.

Of course, now in the U.S. we are confronted by the recent development that financial inducements for cooperation on the part of certain characters in the entertainment industry, whose talents may be seen as far closer to the world's oldest profession than to the theater, can be legally categorized as a type of "campaign contribution".

[Big Pistons Forever]

WR 6-3

I was reading an article that speculated that there may grounds for a shareholder class action suit against Boeing on the grounds that actions taken by management corruptly enriched C suite execs (outsized bonuses ?) which resulted in loss of share holder value. Seems a stretch to me but then I am just a dumb airplane driver, not a lawyer. Since money talks do you see any likely legal moves by major investors aimed at Boeing ?

[WillowRun 6-3]

WR 6-3

I was reading an article that speculated that there may grounds for a shareholder class action suit against Boeing on the grounds that actions taken by management corruptly enriched C suite execs (outsized bonuses ?) which resulted in loss of share holder value. Seems a stretch to me but then I am just a dumb airplane driver, not a lawyer. Since money talks do you see any likely legal moves by major investors aimed at Boeing ?

To start, the claim that executives, and presumably managerial staff as well, made decisions driven by giving highest priority to their bonuses and grants of stock or options may have significant validity. But has it not been the case that decline in shareholder value (as may have occurred) has resulted from the impact of the poor decisions or poor execution, rather than the diversion of corporate funds - in effect - to improperly increase bonuses and other compensation elements? The decline in shareholder value has had plenty of impetus; the litany of problems, perhaps more accurately a litany of crises, is heavy weather indeed. The improper bonus and other comp, in the aggregate, would obviously amount to significant money in some absolute sense but while the shareholder value isn't an amount for which I have seen quantification, I think it would necessarily be a larger order of magnitude. So there's not a good cause-and-effect link.

Shareholder derivative litigation is not a practice area on my resume, so the above could turn out to be a .... bad day at the office. A quick search-engine-search (I dislike giving any of them product placement) turned up this D&O legal newsletter describing a settlement of a class action shareholder derivative suit based on Boeing's poor decisions especially the MAX accidents. In the article are links to court or court-related documents about the settlement terms. (I haven't run down details to make sure there were no later developments which made material changes in the result, however.) I'm including the link because, as far as this SLF/attorney is concerned, no question by an aviator about a legal matter derived directly from aviation affairs and occurrences is a dumb question.
https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/11/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/boeing-air-crash-derivative-lawsuit-settles-for-237-5-million/

However. .... The crises at Boeing have become profound, or is that an exaggeration? With the caveat about this not being my area of legal practice, I'm inclined to think that the outcome of the pending Department of Justice decision about the Deferred Prosecution Agreement could provoke another round of shareholder litigation. Among other reasons, the ditch along the side of the Engineering Powerhouse Highway into which Boeing has driven - whether one believes it is still in the ditch or has got its wheels mostly back on the road - was not an unavoidable, inevitable result. As more bad news - if there is more, and the pending DPA decision seems to hold no prospect for good news - emerges, institutional shareholders could well see the corporate turnaround taking years if it can be turned around at all. And wanting some recourse more quickly.

[PAXboy]

This was reported in the UK paper The Independent (https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/boeing-planes-whistleblowers-exclusive-b2557582.html) on Thursday 6th June. Reporting from LA.
Latest Boeing whistleblower predicts ‘other things hiding in the bushes’ at beleaguered aircraft manufacturer

Exclusive: The former quality investigator tells The Independent that the company is ‘infested with ‘yes-men and bean-counters’ and should be ‘torn down and rebuilt’ in order for progress to made
Roy Irvin, who worked as a quality investigator for Boeing for six years, said the aircraft manufacturer was “infested with ‘yes men’ and bean-counters”, and that the company would “tear down and rebuild” to make significant progress.

Mr Irvin is one of a handful of employees, both past and present, who have spoken out in recent months about their experiences and concerns of bad workplace practices at Boeing. Two men have died since going public.

The manufacturer has been under fire for months after a series of high-profile safety incidents, including a door plug blowing out of a plane at 16,000 feet in January. The possibility of similar catastrophes occurring in the future should not be ruled out, Mr Irvin said.

“I hope there’s no more but I feel there may be other things hiding in the bushes,” he told The Independent. “The door blowout really hit home for me because I predicted this.”

[Jonty]

More bad news? (https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-investigates-quality-problem-undelivered-787s-sources-say-2024-06-13/)

[Random ATCO]

Something I find astonishing about the FAA in regard to the MAX.

Have they ever explained why they waited so long to ground it after the two fatal crashes, especially when considering 50+ other authorities had already grounded it. Again as a layperson it truly smacked of someone has someone in their back pocket and some palms are being heavily greased. I am unsure if it has ever happened before that the "home" authority had dragged its heels in grounding an aircraft like they did on MAX.

From the outside looking in, it made the FAA look spineless and untrustworthy, and that delay in grounding fed the fear in the flying public against flying in anything with the Boeing name, let alone the MAX.

The media pounced on the ineffectiveness of the FAA in their "ooops everyone else has grounded it, I spose we better ground it too" attitude, that is very simplistic wording, I know, but that was the impression given to many of the public who didn't understand the implications or issues with MAX. The public see bits of aircraft scattered all over the ground and they generally do not have the insight on the why or how, they look to the company who built it and the authority who allowed it to fly to do something, and neither Boeing or the FAA seemed to be doing anything...least not til after the second crash and other authorities and airlines around the world acted and grounded it. It was a very complacent and blase attitude from Boeing and FAA.

Worst of all, there were questions being asked by the public in the context of "had these two planes crashed in the US, would Boeing and the FAA been so slow in acting and so dismissive?"

Agree. The FAA dragged its feet... it's like the ECB of aviation :E

[MechEngr]

Had there been two Max crashes in the US it would not have been from MCAS, so unlikely to be slow and dismissive. US airlines require far more hours to get to the front than the First Officers in both accident planes had.

Other countries grounded after Ethiopia claimed the FAA Emergency AD instructions were followed to the letter, and the FAA knew that could not be true. Other countries believed the Ethiopian narrative.

AFAIK, no one grounded the MAX after the Lion Air report detailed what went right on one day that went wrong on the next and that was within a few weeks. On that score everyone was slow in acting as they all looked at the Emergency AD and that report and decided it was safe. Grounding only happened after the second, misreported, crash.

[WillowRun 6-3]

"....and decided it was safe." But, was it really?

After many exchanges in which you have highlighted (or explained) the failures of the Ethiopian participants in the MAX saga, the "misreporting" factor is one that can be taken at face value, for the sake of..... whatever label applies to back-and-forth on threads (especially when one side is just SLF/attorney).

So is your view that the 737 MAX was fine as it was, that nothing needed to be changed, nothing from the omissions in the manuals, to the single point of failure (the airspeed inputs), to the very fast reaction time required.... I mean, if big changes indeed were needed, what scale or calibration of "safe" was being applied to reach those decisions (that "it was safe")? Or is it the case that the decisions finding "it was safe" were erroneous after all - but the intense and unrelenting attacks on Boeing were way out of proportion, given the true analysis of cause(s) of the Ethiopian crash? And the intense and unrelenting pronouncements and prophecies of both failure and doom of Boeing that those attacks brought forth?

Even mustering up as much cynicism as I can stand, the modifcations resulting from the grounding in order to regain flight status weren't unnecessary, weren't just for appearances..... were they?

[MechEngr]

My view is that the MAX with the original MCAS was found to be challenge to fly and it was up to the airlines and the CAAs to decide if their pilots could handle the challenge. At no point was either plane in such a condition that they were beyond their control until the pilots had let forces accumulate to 100 pounds of trim over a period of several minutes. It simply exceeded some unexplored factor about transitioning to manual flying with what, in the first case, was seen as a nuisance and not a life-threatening behavior. In the second, the Captain turned over control to thumb through the FCOM and the FO seemed to think that allowing trim force to increase was OK as long as he could stop it for a little bit. I have no explanation for the third.

The original changes proposed after Lion Air were not complicated. Seeing pilots fail to follow the long term procedures and do the opposite of what was required, not to mention failing to follow the new procedures and do the opposite of what was called for meant having to find a solution to pilots acting adversely to the process.

One side trip I came across is that the airport from which ET-302 departed had some incident a few years before where it was determined that there was a habitat that hosted a huge bird population nearby and recommended that the birds be encouraged to be elsewhere. Many airports hire falconers for this task. The ET-302 report made no mention of this and suggested the AoA vane departed for no reason at all, just got tired and left (or some such, don't quote me) and that the vane heater failure was likely the cause and not from the wiring being torn out if the vane hit a bird.

In any case, the CAAs and airlines looked at that report and they decided it was safe and should have taken whatever measures they felt were required to see their pilots could handle that particular challenge. I have found no link to information immediately after that report and before Ethiopian crash that called for the 737 MAX to be grounded on the basis that pilots would certainly do what the ET-302 crew did, particularly after being warned with such detail as the Lion Air report included.

The FAA was confident in their assessment of US airline operations and of their Emergency AD/ FCOM update, and, as far as the procedure change, they were correct. While I have heard of breathless terror about the situation in a simulator, failing to release a video from briefing to attempt suggests that what they said doesn't match the message they implied.

I remain convinced that the correct solution is to alter each SMYD system to not pass along faulty AoA readings as valid data; this would prevent the initially startling (apparently, or so it's been called) false stall warning, from which all ET-302 crew misbehavior stemmed; the flight computer was already programmed to shift to the alternate SMYD in case the primary one failed, so MCAS would never have gotten incorrect AoA readings and never been involved at all. The FAA likely has requirements in place that make sure that fixing the fundamental problem is so lengthy a process that it can't ever be used. The FAA had also approved the company that mis-calibrated the AoA sensor that doomed Lion Air, so making the AoA sensors individually self-validating should also be required. With those in place the original MCAS software would be 100% as it was originally written and ET-302 would be a bird strike on avweb.

[WideScreen]

Had there been two Max crashes in the US it would not have been from MCAS, so unlikely to be slow and dismissive. US airlines require far more hours to get to the front than the First Officers in both accident planes had.

Other countries grounded after Ethiopia claimed the FAA Emergency AD instructions were followed to the letter, and the FAA knew that could not be true. Other countries believed the Ethiopian narrative.

AFAIK, no one grounded the MAX after the Lion Air report detailed what went right on one day that went wrong on the next and that was within a few weeks. On that score everyone was slow in acting as they all looked at the Emergency AD and that report and decided it was safe. Grounding only happened after the second, misreported, crash.
Certainly, and Trump did not loose the 2020 election, there is a huge amount of proof of 2020 election fraud [NOT].

Come on man, wake up to nowadays reality.

[DaveReidUK]

It seems to be a variation on Godwin's Law (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin%27s_law), that every discussion about Boeing's future eventually regresses to dissecting the Max crashes.

[BugBear]

Max crashes ... Didn't the fuel/oil heat exchanger need redesign after BA038? Not Boeing's fault? Battery fires grounding the Dream fleet? Stainless steel plus Titanium fire box? Sole source AoA data? Alaska hole plug departure?

Pencil whipped skin inspections Aloha? Very rich target area. One issue clouds newer stuff ups? How technical shall we get

Abandoning monolithic CFRP in favor of mechanical fastening? Build a bigger oven? Dorsal lightning strikes disrupting CFRP continuity ?? How do we retorque buried bolts ??

Personally, I do not favor (pseudo) monocoque plastic airframes.

MCAS...I think the two crashes were flown by pilots who believed they were controlling the Pitch with elevators, not just trimming the tailplane with.them

​​​​

[Falcon666]

https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-out-of-service-for-20-days-after-dutch-roll-2024-6?utm_source=copy-link&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=topbar

Another problem.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Another QA quality escape.....


Counterfeit Titanium Found In Boeing And Airbus JetsBy
Amelia Walsh (https://www.avweb.com/author/amelia-walsh/)
-
Published:June 14, 2024
1 (https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/counterfeit-titanium-found-in-boeing-and-airbus-jets/#comments)
https://s30121.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Spirit-AeroSystems_B737-Production-Line-2_2010_Spirit-AeroSystems_Full-use-5fa478b55056a36_5fa47a59-5056-a36a-0709e8a8742339cc-696x278.jpg.webp (https://s30121.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Spirit-AeroSystems_B737-Production-Line-2_2010_Spirit-AeroSystems_Full-use-5fa478b55056a36_5fa47a59-5056-a36a-0709e8a8742339cc.jpg.webp)The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Spirit AeroSystems, a supplier of fuselages for Boeing and wings for Airbus, are investigating counterfeit titanium found in recently manufactured jets.

According to The New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/14/us/politics/boeing-airbus-titanium-faa.html), who first reported the news, falsified documents were used to verify the material’s authenticity—prompting concerns about the structural integrity of the airliners. The investigation comes as small holes were found in the material due to corrosion.

The use of fake titanium affects certain Boeing 737 Max and 787 Dreamliner airliners, as well as Airbus A220 jets, according to sources who spoke anonymously to the New York Times. It is unclear how many of the aircraft are in service and which airlines own them.

In a statement, Spirit AeroSystems said, “This is about titanium that has entered the supply system via documents that have been counterfeited. When this was identified, all suspect parts were quarantined and removed from Spirit production.” The company added, “More than 1,000 tests have been completed to confirm the mechanical and metallurgical properties of the affected material to ensure continued airworthiness.”

Both Boeing and Airbus reported their testing of the affected materials has not revealed any issues and airworthiness of their aircraft fleets remain uncompromised.

[ATC Watcher]

@ MechEngr : Had there been two Max crashes in the US it would not have been from MCAS, so unlikely to be slow and dismissive. US airlines require far more hours to get to the front than the First Officers in both accident planes had.

Are you insinuating that Boeing only make airplanes and procedure for US Pilots ? Then they should not sell it to other countries. As to your remark about FOs difference in experience between teh US and other countries , , from memory in both Lion and Ethiopian cases the PF was the Captain no ? and in the Lion air case the FO had over 5000 h , 4000 of them on 737.

Meanwhile as reported by Reuters : ​​​​​​​...Boeing is investigating a new quality problem with its 787 Dreamliner after discovering that hundreds of fasteners have been incorrectly installed on the fuselages of some undelivered jets, The sources said the affected fasteners had been torqued from the wrong side, using the head instead of the associated nut.
I find this difficult to believe, especially now, when surely Boeing management know they are under a microscope. Is the training and workers quality so bad and so deep rooted that it can't be fixed ?

[GlobalNav]

@ MechEngr :
Are you insinuating that Boeing only make airplanes and procedure for US Pilots ? Then they should not sell it to other countries. As to your remark about FOs difference in experience between teh US and other countries , , from memory in both Lion and Ethiopian cases the PF was the Captain no ? and in the Lion air case the FO had over 5000 h , 4000 of them on 737.

Meanwhile as reported by Reuters :
I find this difficult to believe, especially now, when surely Boeing management know they are under a microscope. Is the training and workers quality so bad and so deep rooted that it can't be fixed ?

It could be fixed, but not without replacing much of the supervisory people, and dictating drastically different business objectives (I.e., $$$ incentives). So it’s not likely.

[MechEngr]

It seems to be a variation on Godwin's Law (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Godwin%27s_law), that every discussion about Boeing's future eventually regresses to dissecting the Max crashes.
Sorry about that. The crashes are the only reason that there is a discussion about Boeing's future and it's tough to avoid the origin story.

[BugBear]

Would not have wanted to be seated against the aft bulkhead when the PCU tried to destroy itself...
Low frequency abrupt dis-orientaion of the tail feathers accompanied by a very loud thump thump thump.
Who built the tail, Spirit? Is this the result of the PCU being mounted with missing bolts?
If the PCU is loose in its mount, does the yaw damper logic react to its position relative to the spar? That would lead to a very interesting ride. If the training is feet on floor, is there time to suss pulling yaw damper breaker, then 'wait' for the roll to self damp?

For MechEgr: Are we to be grateful this occurred in the US ??
Rudder hardover deja vu...?

[WillowRun 6-3]

"My view is that the MAX with the original MCAS was found to be challenge to fly and it was up to the airlines and the CAAs to decide if their pilots could handle the challenge."

MechEngr, is it your view that the 737 MAX as originally configured, and with the manuals and training program(s) for the variant (including but not limited to "differences" training) as originally written, met all pertinent FAA certification standards fully?

The point could be eluding this SLF/attorney but your argument appears to mean that as long as the safe operation of a given transport category aircraft type and variant can be figured out *despite* certification misstatements, omissions, and other failures of compliance, certification failures are not significant in context of the corporate health and vitality of an aerospace enterprise as large as Boeing. Granted, the certification mischief (at least as I understand it) was revealed after the two crashes. But I think many a knowledgeable engineer and pilot in various threads, with relevant experience, have severely criticized Boeing's fast-and-loose certification gamesmanship (to describe it charitably).

If there was not full compliance with certification requirements, then you appear to be contending that such an outcome is acceptable, because the challenge of flying the aircraft could be met, either safely, or safely enough.
If the answer is, there was full compliance.... well, readers are being asked to believe the saga of the 737 MAX after the two crashes (after, singly and collectively) was a fake-out, for the groundlings and their favored dumb shows and media noise. That's a tough sell, Jedi mind tricks or no tricks at all.

[BoeingDriver99]

Notice recent Boeing/FAA fireworks to try and drag Airbus into this self-made mess.

Boeing can begin to start the decade it will take to reinvent themselves now; Airbus never had to start so are just waltzing away with superior aircraft. And COMAC are literally laughing at Boeing’s ability to throw the baton under their own wheels. Repeatedly. With the help of the FAA.

The future is A, C, B.

[hans brinker]

@ MechEngr :
Are you insinuating that Boeing only make airplanes and procedure for US Pilots ? Then they should not sell it to other countries. As to your remark about FOs difference in experience between teh US and other countries , , from memory in both Lion and Ethiopian cases the PF was the Captain no ? and in the Lion air case the FO had over 5000 h , 4000 of them on 737.

Meanwhile as reported by Reuters :
I find this difficult to believe, especially now, when surely Boeing management know they are under a microscope. Is the training and workers quality so bad and so deep rooted that it can't be fixed ?

In the Ethiopian crash the captain started of as PF. While he was flying the FO was unsuccessful for a while trying to remember the memory items for unreliable airspeed, and finding the procedure in the QRH. During that time MCAS several times trimmed nose down followed by the captain trimming several time nose up. How many times is not absolutely clear from the report, but I counted 24 instances of (shortened) —MCAS trimmed AND interrupted by the captain trimming ANU— and several other mentions of the captain trimming ANU.
Not switching off the electric trim after having to trim ANU 30+ times, for a combined 3+ minutes is very questionable.
The captain then handed over control to the FO, who after every MCAS input only trimmed ANU for a second or two, even though he was pulling on the control column with between 60 and a 100 pounds force. His instruments all indicated correctly, and although several warnings were going off both pilots were aware they had unreliable airspeed, so manually setting pitch power and manual trim inputs are required. Not even trying to trim off any off that load makes me wonder how many hours he had actually flying the airplane, and why he still was an FO at that age with all those hours.
AFAIK see, at no point was there an attempt made to reduce power, and even though both pilots airspeed weel above max flap speed, after the flaps were selected up, they were selected, first to 1, subsequently to 5, without any discussion about flap settings, and not based on any QRH procedure.

For Ethiopian, the captain was the pilot flying. Once the erroneous airspeed indications began, he 3 times tried to engage the AP, not the correct thing to do. While they were climbing out, both airspeed indicators indicated above VMO, airspeed calls were made and acknowledged by both crew members, but no attempt to reduce power was made. When manual trim wasn’t working, they elected to switch electric trim on but did not trim anu, even though they had an over 100 lbs pull on the control. It all happened fast, and they did ditch the trim off, but did nothing else before or after to handle the situation.



There is definitely people at Boeing that in my opinion deserve jail time for the way MCAS was implemented on the 737. MCAS started on a different Boeing with dual AOA input and comparator , QRH procedures and warnings. those were changed to single source, with no warnings and no mention in the manual explicitly to cut training cost. But there is absolutely no way you can overlook the problems with accident rates in some countries compared to others. It isn’t just pilot training, but maintenance as well. The crew that flew the Indonesian aircraft the day before had the same condition, barely avoided a crash, flew a whole leg manually trimming with the stick shaker going off, totally different instrument indications between left and right, several other warnings. and only wrote up that the electronic trim seemed have an issue. Do you honestly believe a well trained union pilot in the USA or Australia or anywhere in Western Europe would have done that?

[BugBear]

"...Do you honestly believe a well trained union pilot in the USA or Australia or anywhere in Western Europe would have done that?..."

No, I don't. That said, Boeing designed MCAS to protect Max from "third world pilots". In doing so, re departure stall protection, they (knowingly) killed several hundred folks.

​​​​​​Bugfinder

btw... Our pilots we're not pulling to Trim the airplane, they were pulling to control (maneuver) the aircraft. When elevators are TrimTabs, the game is up... Never maneuver with Trim. Does Boeing even know how to control an aircraft?

​​

[hans brinker]

"...Do you honestly believe a well trained union pilot in the USA or Australia or anywhere in Western Europe would have done that?..."

No, I don't. That said, Boeing designed MCAS to protect Max from "third world pilots". In doing so, re departure stall protection, they (knowingly) killed several hundred folks.

​​​​​​Bugfinder

​​


MCAS was designed for the US Airforce. Specifically for the KC-46 Pegasus, a 767 derivative. It was redesigned for the 737MAX because of aerodynamic differences from the 737NG, in a way specifically aimed at several US carriers that didn't want extra training for their pilots (single source AOA, no contractor warning). It was never for departure stall protection, it was initially put on to address high speed stability issues, but was later expanded to achieve a US regulatory requirement for back pressure increasing with increased angle of attack at lower speeds. Not even sure where you get the 3rd world pilots "quote" from.


And where did I say the pilots should have controlled the aircraft with trim??? I said they didn't trim while having to pull with all their force to control the aircraft for several minutes...

[Bergerie1]

BugBear, Hans Brinker is correct in his post above. MCAS was introduced to meet the certification issue caused by the unwanted aerodynamic effects of the nacelles on the larger engines.
https://skybrary.aero/articles/maneuvering-characteristics-augmentation-system-mcas

[BugBear]

BugBear, Hans Brinker is correct in his post above. MCAS was introduced to meet the certification issue caused by the unwanted aerodynamic effects of the nacelles on the larger engines.
https://skybrary.aero/articles/maneuvering-characteristics-augmentation-system-mcas
And to alleviate emphatic NU Pitch caused by more powerful engines, which were also moved forward of prior engine placement to clear the wing...
MCAS got Boeing a sistered on type Airworthiness Certificate for a fifty hear old design...saving tens of billions of dollars

Without a new type rating, and absent new pilot training, the stage is set.

Regards

[BugBear]

Hans...

"And where did I say the pilots should have controlled the aircraft with trim??? I said they didn't trim while having to pull with all their force to control the aircraft for several minutes..."

You didn't... Boeing controls the AC with Trim....in this case, mysteriously, and with fatal results. It is Boeng controlling with Stabiliser "Trim". Calling the HS a trimming device is an invitation to disaster,

qed

[hans brinker]

Hans...

"And where did I say the pilots should have controlled the aircraft with trim??? I said they didn't trim while having to pull with all their force to control the aircraft for several minutes..."

You didn't... Boeing controls the AC with Trim....in this case, mysteriously, and with fatal results. It is Boeng controlling with Stabiliser "Trim". Calling the HS a trimming device is an invitation to disaster,

qed


Ah, I misread what you meant.

But every air transport plane out there for the 7 decades has used the elevator for control, and the HS for trim. And every manufacturer has increased the amount of controlling the aircraft does for you behind the scenes. I fly the bus, and haven't trimmed myself in 12 years, outside of the SIM. I would definitely call what Airbus does controlling the aircraft with trim/HS.

The design of MCAS was a disaster. The fatal results were also because of the pilots.
3 minutes of having to trim ANU in the first 10 minutes of flight is not mysterious. It's a very clear indicator that switching of the trim would help.
Switching of the electric trim after the aircraft is out of trim, even though you were able to trim the force off before is also not good enough.

[BugBear]

"Switching off the electric trim after the aircraft is out of trim, even though you were able to trim the force off before is also not good enough."

Agreed. Reading QRH takes both eyes and both hands. Flying takes two eyes and two hands. Turning ninety degrees and finding the trim motor switches takes two eyes and two hands.

​Back to a third pilot?

Any trimmed condition that cannot be overcome by flight controls swiftly should be prohibited ....imo
Quote (https://www.pprune.org/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=11677222) Multi (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/658567-latest-boeing-news-13.html#)

[tdracer]

And to alleviate emphatic NU Pitch caused by more powerful engines, which were also moved forward of prior engine placement to clear the wing...
Not quite. MCAS was unrelated to the engine thrust induced patch-up from the engines (which, BTW, are similar thrust levels to those on the 737NG).
The issue was that - at very high angles of attack (i.e. near stall) - the additional lift generated by the larger, further forward engine nacelles on the MAX reduced the control forces needed to pull up. This is contrary to a FAR/CS that required increasing the pitch require increased control forces. Various aerodynamic fixes were tried, but didn't have the desired effect. MCAS, OTOH, by trimming the stab, created the desired increase in control forces.
After the grounding, it was proposed by the Canadian CAA that Boeing simply get rid of MCAS entirely, and obtain an exemption to the relevant FAR, then address the controllability effect with training. Personally, I rather liked this option, but reportedly the FAA and EASA were rather less thrilled by that option.

[BugBear]

Not quite. MCAS was unrelated to the engine thrust induced patch-up from the engines (which, BTW, are similar thrust levels to those on the 737NG).
The issue was that - at very high angles of attack (i.e. near stall) - the additional lift generated by the larger, further forward engine nacelles on the MAX reduced the control forces needed to pull up. This is contrary to a FAR/CS that required increasing the pitch require increased control forces. Various aerodynamic fixes were tried, but didn't have the desired effect. MCAS, OTOH, by trimming the stab, created the desired increase in control forces.
After the grounding, it was proposed by the Canadian CAA that Boeing simply get rid of MCAS entirely, and obtain an exemption to the relevant FAR, then address the controllability effect with training. Personally, I rather liked this option, but reportedly the FAA and EASA were rather less thrilled by that option.
That is frankly more damning than my imperfect analysis.

Waive certification rules? Like EASA waived airframe cues at Stall for Airbus?
{Pitch stability at stall, no nose down?)

[TachyonID]

Not quite. MCAS was unrelated to the engine thrust induced patch-up from the engines (which, BTW, are similar thrust levels to those on the 737NG).
The issue was that - at very high angles of attack (i.e. near stall) - the additional lift generated by the larger, further forward engine nacelles on the MAX reduced the control forces needed to pull up. This is contrary to a FAR/CS that required increasing the pitch require increased control forces. Various aerodynamic fixes were tried, but didn't have the desired effect. MCAS, OTOH, by trimming the stab, created the desired increase in control forces.
After the grounding, it was proposed by the Canadian CAA that Boeing simply get rid of MCAS entirely, and obtain an exemption to the relevant FAR, then address the controllability effect with training. Personally, I rather liked this option, but reportedly the FAA and EASA were rather less thrilled by that option.

Anybody that transitioned from NGs to MAX notices pretty quickly that (particularly in TOGA) the nose gets light in rotation-- and for the first time in any 737 driver's recollection it takes positive stick to keep the nose where it needs to be. This is very NOT like the NG and Classics. So, yes, it needs training to manage. MCAS (at least "fixed" MCAS) is insufficient now to tame the trait. The whispers are that tailstrikes are up as a result-- at least on go-around-- and not just at my company where they are still flying both types.

So, yeah, the genie is out of the bottle. Center of Lift moves forward in pitch and you better be ready to apply positive stick to manage it. Boeing knew that would happen 10 years ago. My sense is that everybody is training to that reality even if it's not what the book says. MCAS was an inadequate remedy.

[BonnieLass]

From dodgy PA announcements to hydraulic leaks, this has not been a the best of weeks for the 777

The dodgy PA announcement is weird to say the least.

https://simpleflying.com/united-airlines-boeing-777-oxygen-mask-announcement/

[CVividasku]

Not quite. MCAS was unrelated to the engine thrust induced patch-up from the engines (which, BTW, are similar thrust levels to those on the 737NG).
The issue was that - at very high angles of attack (i.e. near stall) - the additional lift generated by the larger, further forward engine nacelles on the MAX reduced the control forces needed to pull up. This is contrary to a FAR/CS that required increasing the pitch require increased control forces. Various aerodynamic fixes were tried, but didn't have the desired effect. MCAS, OTOH, by trimming the stab, created the desired increase in control forces.
After the grounding, it was proposed by the Canadian CAA that Boeing simply get rid of MCAS entirely, and obtain an exemption to the relevant FAR, then address the controllability effect with training. Personally, I rather liked this option, but reportedly the FAA and EASA were rather less thrilled by that option.
I'm pretty sure the pilots would be more than able to deal with this.
I even suspect it could, paradoxically, be easier.
If you feel your airplane suddenly going nose-up while at stall, you might feel a very strong desire to counter this rotation by pushing full forward. Which is exactly what you have to do.
Ah, I misread what you meant.

But every air transport plane out there for the 7 decades has used the elevator for control, and the HS for trim. And every manufacturer has increased the amount of controlling the aircraft does for you behind the scenes. I fly the bus, and haven't trimmed myself in 12 years, outside of the SIM. I would definitely call what Airbus does controlling the aircraft with trim/HS.

The design of MCAS was a disaster. The fatal results were also because of the pilots.
3 minutes of having to trim ANU in the first 10 minutes of flight is not mysterious. It's a very clear indicator that switching of the trim would help.
Switching of the electric trim after the aircraft is out of trim, even though you were able to trim the force off before is also not good enough.
I haven't read everything but it seems that what he means is that the trimming system should not be more powerful than the control system.
If the control system is easily overriden by the trim, then the trim becomes the real control system, and the main controls become the trim. The roles are reverted.

Having now flown both airbus and boeing, I really don't understand the concept of having a speed stability on an airliner with a flight control law. The entire point of the flight control law should be to make the pilot's job easier. Removing the trim does make it easier.

Then, the defects added by airbus are easily corrected. An airplane should not be allowed, able to trim itself below maneuvering speed. With a THS position that gives an equilibrium speed below maneuvering speed. So in airbus talks it shouldn't go below VLS. It shouldn't go above max speed as well.
Then, there should be a very conspicuous trim indicator.
To finish with, the manufacturer should introduce an emergency "untrim" button, that would unsurprisingly be located next to the previous indicator, and which would reset the stabilizer position to a neutral position that allows flight at all masses, centers of gravity, and flaps/gear configurations.

This would have prevented AF447, it would have allowed XL airways 888 to survive, and maybe some others.

[Capn Bloggs]

I'm pretty sure the pilots would be more than able to deal with this.
I even suspect it could, paradoxically, be easier.
If you feel your airplane suddenly going nose-up while at stall, you might feel a very strong desire to counter this rotation by pushing full forward. Which is exactly what you have to do.
Yes, like the pilots of 447 did. :rolleyes: Stability is designed-into an aircraft for a reason.

From dodgy PA announcements to hydraulic leaks, this has not been a the best of weeks for the 777
Sensationalistic nonsense. SimpleFlying is nothing more an enthusiastic amateur website. This sort of stuff happens day in, day out and is only catastrophised by dribble like that article.

[Jonty]

This would have prevented AF447, it would have allowed XL airways 888 to survive, and maybe some others.

I don’t think either of those would have survived had they had the system you suggest.

AF447 was deep into the stall, which the pilots hadn’t recognised. And when they did recognise it, they were so far in the system gave them conflicting information when they tried to get out of it.

it’s the same with MCAS. If Boeing had been more forthcoming with information about it airlines could have trained for it and its failure modes. They weren’t and the airlines didn’t. The results are well known and Boeing deserves everything it gets in my opinion.

As for the THS, every pilot flying big jets should have it drilled in to them that’s it’s the most powerful control surface on the aircraft, and should be respected as such.

[ATC Watcher]

. Do you honestly believe a well trained union pilot in the USA or Australia or anywhere in Western Europe would have done that?
No I don't especially when you added the " well trained -union " bit. But not every 737 operator in the US , Australia or Europe fit that description.

@CVividasku
the trimming system should not be more powerful than the control system..
I thought so too. but modern airliners are not unique in this. the good old PA-18 has this feature too and it can bite you hard too .

A personal anecdote from years back. Towing gliders for years on Socata Rallyes and Robins DR400, Simples trims. you can dive rapidly and easily after release on both not having to touch the trim much .Our club bought a Super Cub to reduce the towing costs especially for aerobatics towing ( 4-5000Ft) it has a moving horizontal stab trim , ok, read the POH, nothing special mentionned.in there . I had previous recreational experience on standard PA18 with 100 HP .never had trim issues. On my first acrobatic high tow, after release want to dive down but a rather strong force is needed on the stick, so I trim ND to be able to reach a good rate of descend, keeping a bit of RPM to keep engine warm ,(standard towing procedure) speed and ROD increases, but still on the yellow arc at 2000 Ft time to start to level off and then the force on control is too hard ,I turn back the trim ANU ,but very high forces needed to turn the trim handle but it turns eventually however nothing happens, Had to flip the aircraft in a sharp 7--80 degrees turn to lift the nose up using the rudder to break the dive and save the day. Big discussion afterwards,
Learned that when too strong force is on the Horizontal stab , the cable supposed to move it just glides around the pulley of the trim handle in the cockpit. Basically once you pass a certain speed you can't trim back . Nothing in the POH , and not mentioned on the (basic) type rating training I received either. OK this was GA, not Airline ops.