Warship Tour of duty, 7pm BBC2 covers the F35 accident

[NutLoose]

Title says it all. It’s the F-35 jet launch disaster episode.
so I take it is the one over the side in the ogging.

Sky channel 102

[Diff Tail Shim]

Title says it all. It’s the F-35 jet launch disaster episode.
so I take it is the one over the side in the ogging.

Sky channel 102
Yes it is. The pilot is still flying with 617, the intake blank was so far up the intake to be missed by everyone. I know that as one of the pilots at my line station is good mates with him. Proceedure and bad design major factors.

[Stratnumberone]

Given that my £5,000 car won’t start unless the clutch is depressed, it amazes me that a cutting-edge technology £xxx million jet can get as far as trying to take off with an engine blank installed. Staggering.

[alfred_the_great]

Read the BoI.

engine blanks were simply the last in a huge and quite concerning error chain.

[NutLoose]

I take it the shotgun used to scare the birds were firing some of these and not just standard cartridges.

https://www.wildlifecontrolsupplies.com/animal/NWS15MMBB.html

I am surprised in this day and age they do not have something built into the ramp similar to something like this

https://portek.co.uk/portfolio/scatterbird-mk4-bird-scaring-gas-gun/

rather have three men and a shotgun having to walk down the front and let rip with a shotgun.

[DaveReidUK]

Navy Lookout's long and highly critical take on the event and the investigation findings: The F-35 accident report – a reality check for UK Carrier Strike | Navy Lookout (https://www.navylookout.com/the-f-35-accident-report-a-reality-check-for-uk-carrier-strike/)

[dctyke]

Every jet that I’ve worked on with twin intakes had the two blanks connected and a warning flag. Basics that seem to have been forgotten in this new air force.

[Diff Tail Shim]

Every jet that I’ve worked on with twin intakes had the two blanks connected and a warning flag. Basics that seem to have been forgotten in this new air force.
When? Never so on Jags or Tornados? 50 years ago.

[nomorehelosforme]

Navy Lookout's long and highly critical take on the event and the investigation findings: The F-35 accident report – a reality check for UK Carrier Strike | Navy Lookout (https://www.navylookout.com/the-f-35-accident-report-a-reality-check-for-uk-carrier-strike/)


I don't think there is a positive sentence in that entire report!

[SpazSinbad]

I don't think there is a positive sentence in that entire report!
You'll have fun with SHARKEY take on event & report then. “With the RAF in charge we are Sunk!” 26 Sep 2023 https://hermajestystopgun.com/with-the-raf-in-charge-we-are-sunk/
"...A Royal Navy Board of Inquiry led by an experienced Fleet Air Arm fixed wing carrier pilot and supported by a Naval Air Engineer and a Surgeon Commander would undoubtedly have addressed all these important issues [five listed earlier] and produced a more concise and relevant Report...."

[Fortissimo]

You'll have fun with SHARKEY take on event & report then. “With the RAF in charge we are Sunk!” 26 Sep 2023 https://hermajestystopgun.com/with-the-raf-in-charge-we-are-sunk/
"...A Royal Navy Board of Inquiry led by an experienced Fleet Air Arm fixed wing carrier pilot and supported by a Naval Air Engineer and a Surgeon Commander would undoubtedly have addressed all these important issues [five listed earlier] and produced a more concise and relevant Report...."

AL1. Delete "would undoubtedly", insert "might".

And what does Sharkey think demanded an experienced Fleet Air Arm fixed wing carrier pilot? The accident was nothing to do with pilot handling, all the error chains being organisational or human factor-related. As for a Surgeon Commander, only if he or she had some serious HF knowledge that would be unusual for the medical profession; it is why the AAIB has an HF Inspector and not a doctor on the team.

[idle bystander]

And what does Sharkey think demanded an experienced Fleet Air Arm fixed wing carrier pilot? The accident was nothing to do with pilot handling, all the error chains being organisational or human factor-related. As for a Surgeon Commander, only if he or she had some serious HF knowledge that would be unusual for the medical profession; it is why the AAIB has an HF Inspector and not a doctor on the team.
But it is a bloody awful report, written by someone with almost no understanding of, and seemingly little interest in, the norms of carrier operations. Sharkey's point is that had the BOI been conducted by people with the appropriate experience it would have properly addressed the issues that are really behind this entirely unnecessary accident. These issues all flow from the catastrophic decision in 2000 when the Joint Force Harrier was formed and the Navy permanently gave up (was robbed of) direct control of its fixed-wing aviation, effectively reversing the Inskip Award of 1939 which returned naval aviation to where it belonged.
I guess it is career suicide for any light blue officer to suggest that naval aviation is anything more than aviation from a floating airfield, but this accident drives that point home.

[tucumseh]

I don't think it really matters who or what wrote the report. In short order an interim report should have been issued to DG DSA:

'Once again an accident has been caused by the total breakdown of all eight Defence Lines of Development. Our recommendation is to do what you're meant to be doing'.

But that would need an SI president who was retiring that same day...!

[dead_pan]

This was first aired on the BBC programme back in the Spring. Lots of embarrassed faces around. Can't recall if the carrier's commander left his post before or immediately after - cause or effect?

The pilot had one helluva shaving rash, a consequence of the det cord in the canopy.

[dead_pan]

I
I am surprised in this day and age they do not have something built into the ramp similar to something like this

https://portek.co.uk/portfolio/scatterbird-mk4-bird-scaring-gas-gun/



Kind of like CIWS but without the lead?


rather have three men and a shotgun having to walk down the front and let rip with a shotgun.

Sounds like a bit of a wheeze to me. Some people are such fun-sponges ;)

[Davef68]

This was first aired on the BBC programme back in the Spring. Lots of embarrassed faces around. Can't recall if the carrier's commander left his post before or immediately after - cause or effect?.

Before - handover was in the Far East. But you can't blame him for the systemic failures that caused the crash.

[Ken Scott]

Every jet that I’ve worked on with twin intakes had the two blanks connected and a warning flag.

Not blanks but on the C130 the nose wheel pin was connected by bungees to the pitot covers, so that in theory you couldn’t miss the pin as the latter had big ‘remove before flight’ flags. For some unknown reason (to me anyway) the ground crew would often remove the covers, roll up the bungees and lodge them above the pin, hidden in the nose bay. A thorough walkround would discover the pin but it wasn’t unheard of that an aircraft would get airborne and find the nosewheel wouldn’t retract…

[Davef68]

Navy Lookout's long and highly critical take on the event and the investigation findings: The F-35 accident report – a reality check for UK Carrier Strike | Navy Lookout (https://www.navylookout.com/the-f-35-accident-report-a-reality-check-for-uk-carrier-strike/)


It still tickles me that in spite of this, the BoI report had an unredacted photo down the intake, but redacted captions on pictures of the ski ramp and deck lift!(Although someone suggested that the photo may be of a mock-up rather than a real F-35)

In this instance, the Government Special Access Programme Security Officer (GSSO) responsible for maintaining the secrecy of some aspects of the F-35, ordered them to be fitted for the visit to Oman and the transit of the Suez Canal, although gave no instruction when they should be removed. The intake ducting is designed to shield the fan at the front of the F-35’s engine from radar in order to help maintain the aircraft’s stealth. This feature is covered when it might be viewed close up by those without security clearance.

[stevef]

Even 30 + years ago I had to certify in the (civilian HS748) Tech Log that all pitot/static covers, gear pins and engine blanks had been removed before flight. What's the RAF/RN/AAC paperwork process to prevent oversights these days?

[dead_pan]

Before - handover was in the Far East. But you can't blame him for the systemic failures that caused the crash.

My point was did standards slip after he left?

[Mogwi]

Hermes Badgers certainly used live 12-bore ammo to disperse the local sheathbills on the ramp during Corporate. The Old Man nearly had epilepsy when he found out; quotes of Ancient Marriner, albatross and associated dread outcomes. Not that he was superstitious!

Mog

[dctyke]

When? Never so on Jags or Tornados? 50 years ago.

You are correct of course and my bad. Solid intake blanks would be almost impossible to lose because of their size and way they fit. I was thinking the inflatable type that sit inside the intake held in by air pressure. The f35 look to be of this type. I have only ever seen this type fixed together by a tape under the fuselage with a flag dead centre.

[MightyGem]

Even 30 + years ago I had to certify in the (civilian HS748) Tech Log that all pitot/static covers, gear pins and engine blanks had been removed before flight. What's the RAF/RN/AAC paperwork process to prevent oversights these days?
I doubt that it's changed, but in my time in the AAC it was the crew's responsibility to remove the blanks when they walked out to the aircraft.

[Compass Call]

I have worked for two Air Forces and in both it was standard practice when preparing a fighter for flight to lay out the aircraft blanks/locks for the pilot to see when he arrived at the dispersal.
After he had checked that all were accounted for they would then be stowed as appropriate while the pilot did his external pre-flight checks.
It was the responsibility of the pilot and airman in charge of the see-off crew to ensure all were accounted for.
I have never heard of an intake blank being left in during an engine start.
In a twin intake aircraft the blanks should be joined by a length of tape/cord. That way you cannot forget one.
It would seem that standards have dropped very badly and somebody in authority needs his a**e severly kicking.

CC

[DuncanDoenitz]

There are many variables on this subject, perhaps the least of which is aircraft type or civil/military. Consider conspicuity of the blank/flag combo, consequence of premature removal, remoteness of the aircraft from its tech-log/Form700, and authorisation of personnel to certify removal. Every cover, blank and lock is there for a reason, and its removal introduces a potential risk. For instance, the tech log requires certification for removal of all devices before acceptance by flight-crew; a particular concept of operation now requires the aircraft to be parked on a dispersal or flight-line several hundred metres from the flight office, and the aircraft is therefore parked for at least several minutes without prop-strops or gust-locks. There isn't a one-size-fits-all regime.

What is important is that for each organisation, fleet and type of operation, the responsibilites of every member of the ground/flight team are well thought out (day/night, fair-weather and foul), promulgated in procedures, and adhered to by everyone, every time.

[just another jocky]

I doubt that it's changed, but in my time in the AAC it was the crew's responsibility to remove the blanks when they walked out to the aircraft.

Surely aircraft dependant? I wouldn't expect the crew of, say, an E3D to be responsible for removing all blanks, covers pins etc, they'd be there all day. And the pies would go cold! :E

Perhaps it starts at the design stage? The F35 intake blanks look like they are pushed into the intake. If one is removed without the other, could certain wind conditions suck the other to the back where it cannot be seen. Would it be better to have a cover that sat over the intake lip so nothing of the cover ever actually penetrated the intake. They could then easily be connected. Just a thought.

[gopher01]

During my time on Albert, from 1967 to 1994 with some gaps, pitot head covers were removed and draped over the external power cable or if no cable, draped over the crewdoor between the support arm and the door so the door could not be closed. Both locations were obvious and needed a further action before departure, removal of grpund power or trying to close the crew door.
Where, as in geographically, they placed the pitot blanks on the nose lock happened I don't know as I have never heard of such a stupid procedure almost designed to cause problems!
Attempted takeoffs with the nose lock in did take place but not in any great number, normally followed by a quick circuit, appearance of growbag from Albert, grovel in the nose wheel bay, swift take off and disappear followed ultimately by a few slabs for the boys from the eng.

[Ken Scott]

Attempted takeoffs with the nose lock in did take place but not in any great number, normally followed by a quick circuit, appearance of growbag from Albert, grovel in the nose wheel bay, swift take off and disappear followed ultimately by a few slabs for the boys from the eng.

Unless the TOW was greater than MLW in which case many times round the hold or a slow cruise to the nearest sea to dump fuel ensued… my point was only that attaching blanks/ covers by bungees was not in itself foolproof! However in the F35 case where the blank could be placed far down an intake a bungee or very long flag might have proved useful?

Most intakes in my experience had blanks that were oversized and could not be pushed inside beyond the opening, what is it about the F35 one that requires placement so far down the intake as to render it not visible?

[lefty loose]

The MOD report concludes the sole cause of the incident was a LH (port) intake blank located inside the aircraft intake becoming pinned against the engine inlet guide vanes thus restricting airflow during the critical take off phase.

The F35 intake blanks in use at the time of this incident were the latest version, a plug type fitting whereby they were physically manipulated into position and held in place by friction; the only security was by the use of a single quick release pip pin secured to a lanyard which could be physically attached into the aircraft skin.

The LH (port) intake blank recovered from the sea immediately after the ditching of BK18 was recovered intact with the pip pin/lanyard inside the stowage pocket

This occurrence was not the first time of happening (for F35 Operators) and had been formally recorded on many previous occurrences; the report stated that other similar incidents had also taken place but had not been officially reported. The F35 community had been advised of previous (intake blank) incidents and thus were aware of the potential for ongoing incidents to become an accident

Such was the level of concern about other potential shortcomings that the report makes no fewer than 46 recommendations for things that should be changed going forward.

The panel further concluded;-

• The omission of an item of Red Gear could have occurred in any one of the aircraft.
• Experience from embarked operations was that FOD was often found in jet intakes.
• The use of the pip pin could have prevented the blank from migrating down the intake.
• There were six related aircraft intake blank issues that occurred on the night of 16 Nov 21 and morning of 17 Nov 21 (the day of the incident).

The report did not clarify;-

• The official policy of using the pip pin to secure intake blanks; however it did references the lanyard being too long and the possibility of causing scratch marks on the aircraft engine intake skin.
• If the ground crew had actually carried out an engine/intake inspection (by climbing into the common duct) immediately prior to the pilot getting into the aircraft; and had formally reported to the pilot as per 1.4.58.

it is my understanding that since this incident there have been multiple solutions investigated, from the most simple to cutting edge technology of which the following are on the short list;-

• Pussers chord tied between the LH and RH blank (chord on the outside)
• Pussers chord tied between the LH and RH blank (chord on the inside) requiring the engineer to climb in the RH (starboard) intake taking with him/her/them the LH (port) blank, fitting it from the inside, then on exit fitting remaining blank; incorporating common duct and engine compressor inspection each time.
• Fitment of a RFID (radio frequency identification) to each item of Red Gear and the introduction of bar readers to track them.
• Fitment of an Air Tag (other brands available) Bluetooth trackable, latest gives a bleep if lost
• Fitment of a GoPro (other brands available) into the common duct, can be linked to any appropriate device so we can all see where our money is going.

It would appear the odds on favourite is an old Fleet Air Arm method of accounting going back many years, now used by the Storeman Logistics Controller; Leading Seaperson Davey Jones; entitled The Hanrahan method.

This has turned out to be an expensive and very embarrassing incident for all concerned including the US Military, the only good thing is that everyone walked away with a story to tell.

[Asturias56]

I think, reading the report, there were a lot of other issues involved - lack of routine, lack of records, crew kept off the deck for "security" reasons etc etc.

yes the blank should have been noticed but the overall report suggested all was not well with the operation overall. :(

[sycamore]

Lefty loose,a `pusser`s chord ` is played on a Bosun`s whistle.....Pusser`s `cord` is a long piece of `string`......

[lefty loose]

sycamore

https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/effect_an_effect.png

[212man]

entitled The Hanrahan method.
I assume: “I counted them all out, and I counted them all in”? I guess that will be lost on many of more recent generations, given it was quoted 41 years ago.

[SpazSinbad]

Lefty loose,a `pusser`s chord ` is played on a Bosun`s whistle.....Pusser`s `cord` is a long piece of `string`......
Seein' as like weeze correctin' faux jackspeke :} The loosernut OP said this: "ogging'. Whilst SIR Jack says: [& ASLO aks: "How long is that piece of string?"]
"Ogging is term for a tactic developed for the online multiplayer game Netrek...."
https://www.encyclo.co.uk/meaning-of-Ogging
&
"OGGIN: nautical slang a word used by sailors for the sea"
https://www.thefreedictionary.com/oggin

[MightyGem]

Surely aircraft dependant? I wouldn't expect the crew of, say, an E3D to be responsible for removing all blanks, covers pins etc, they'd be there all day. And the pies would go cold! :E
I was just giving an Army Air Corps view. :)

[Compass Call]

lefty loose
I have a better idea to prevent re-occurrence of this incident:-
That the crew preparing the aircraft for flight do the job that they are trained to do!!

CC

[DaveReidUK]

That the crew preparing the aircraft for flight do the job that they are trained to do!!

We look forward to your solutions to all the upstream factors which contributed to that not happening.

[golder]

This is the episode, for those outside the UK. BBC has a country block.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GT7BML201Hw

[SpazSinbad]

[QUOTE=golder;11529581]This is the episode, for those outside the UK. BBC has a country block./QUOTE] Thanks for the link. Crash story starts at 40min 14 seconds to go for 9 minutes.

[Just This Once...]

I have a better idea to prevent re-occurrence of this incident:-
That the crew preparing the aircraft for flight do the job that they are trained to do!!


We will take your suggestion as an implied statement that this 'crew' should probably exist, be on-board, be trained and suitably equipped. Otherwise you are giving our clown-show too much credit.

It's not like we did this 'just give-it-a-go, what-could-go-wrong cruise' in front of a 'skeleton' detachment of US Marines that still outnumbered the UK by over a 100, or deployed NMC capable jets in the hope they could be fixed at sea. That could have been really embarrassing...

[Mortmeister]

I have worked for two Air Forces and in both it was standard practice when preparing a fighter for flight to lay out the aircraft blanks/locks for the pilot to see when he arrived at the dispersal.
After he had checked that all were accounted for they would then be stowed as appropriate while the pilot did his external pre-flight checks.
It was the responsibility of the pilot and airman in charge of the see-off crew to ensure all were accounted for.
I have never heard of an intake blank being left in during an engine start.
In a twin intake aircraft the blanks should be joined by a length of tape/cord. That way you cannot forget one.
It would seem that standards have dropped very badly and somebody in authority needs his a**e severly kicking.

CC
Ever tried to lay out all of the blanks on a flight deck with 20 knots of wind blowing over a deck doing 25 knots?
It is mighty difficult!

[Mortmeister]

But it is a bloody awful report, written by someone with almost no understanding of, and seemingly little interest in, the norms of carrier operations. Sharkey's point is that had the BOI been conducted by people with the appropriate experience it would have properly addressed the issues that are really behind this entirely unnecessary accident. These issues all flow from the catastrophic decision in 2000 when the Joint Force Harrier was formed and the Navy permanently gave up (was robbed of) direct control of its fixed-wing aviation, effectively reversing the Inskip Award of 1939 which returned naval aviation to where it belonged.
I guess it is career suicide for any light blue officer to suggest that naval aviation is anything more than aviation from a floating airfield, but this accident drives that point home.

Why thank you, as someone from Joint Force Harrier that worked bloody hard at trying to make it work, your comments fill me with pride….
Were you there? Was ‘Sharkey - I won the war and hate all things RAF’ there?
I was an SNCO Flight Deck Supervisor on both Invincible (once with 16 Harriers + 3 Sea Kings) and Illustrious on multiple deployments, which I think qualifies me as being SQEP to talk about life on a busy deck. I worked with some truly excellent FDOs and CFDs and we always got everything back safe.

Yes there were certainly RAF aircrew elements who were vehemently against JFH, mostly because they lost control of their train set when at sea and tried everything to stop it working, but there were just as many RN officers trying everything in their power to screw us around. At Senior Rate level we made it work, if that meant a de-brief in the Mess then that was what we did.

This whole debacle on 617 could so easily have been avoided if LfE from JFH had been employed, but it wasn’t.
We lost plenty of inflatable intake blanks until we worked out that tying them to the lashings meant they never got a ‘float test’ or we removed them during the flying period (let’s face it, once you’ve done a FOD walk, how does FOD get on the deck)?
A Liney or Plane Captain would sign the F705 to certify they have been removed and secured in a Lacon in the catwalk.

As they had been successfully at sea for months, there can be only one reason this happened, complacency brought about by fatigue. They didn’t have enough ground crew to start with, as they lost some they were not replaced. Less bodies, fatigue add in some complacency and they went straight to the scene of the accident.

This was avoidable, but no-one either had the courage to speak up, or (as I suspect) they were ignored from above when they did.
As a ‘crabmariner’ I agree, flying from a CV is a whole different ball game and needs to be respected or it will bite you.

Really glad that the armourers did their bit (as always & despite being shafted by the NEM) and that HUX continues to fly the jet.

[NutLoose]

As much as you want to make things idiot proof you cannot 100% of the time, there is always ways of beating the system, silica gel bags in the Vulcan intakes instead of the jet pipe for one. In my 40 plus years of aircraft engineering I have seen several examples of WTF from two aircraft taking off with 10 foot of towing arm still attached to the nose leg and wondering why the gear wouldn’t retract, through to pitot covers left on or taxying and landing with tie down weights attached. I am afraid sh*t does happen.

The VC10 used to have hard plastic intake blanks that would be removed and dropped by the fwd freight door for stowing, a new mover was told to stow them, asked where he was told the opening on the stb side, of course the freight door had been closed so he walked down the side until he found an opening and shoved them in, as it took off and retracted the gear, 4 engine blanks appeared from the Stb main U/C doors and fluttered back down to earth.

I myself missed a missing beacon on a Jag A/F, not all Jags at the time had a lower anti col and I did a walkround looked underneath but couldn’t see a thing wrong, it had a bird strike cleaning off the beacon flush but not hitting anything else. So there was nothing visible to see unless you got directly under it and looked up which one guy did later fixing a snag..