USCG aborted rescue possible microburst [Archive]

2nd May 2023, 14:47

Probably unlikely to overpower a Jhawk, my feeling is there was another issue - certainly the visibility didn't help and it would have been difficult to tell sea from sky. Possible disorientation and late recognition of the descent.

The second video shows the high level of turbulence encountered before the move left and I wonder if the wind was coming across the starboard side of the vessel (it appears to be a cruise liner so will be very slab-sided) and downdraughting on the port side to add to the turbulence.

Much like sitting below the demarcation line when the wind is blowing across a ridge.

I have experienced such downdraughts in far less dramatic conditions than in the video.

All in all an interesting and character-building experience for the crew - perhaps a little brown trouser moment too.

Well done for keeping it out of the oggin:ok:

lelebebbel

2nd May 2023, 16:07

The second video shows the high level of turbulence encountered before the move left and I wonder if the wind was coming across the starboard side of the vessel (it appears to be a cruise liner so will be very slab-sided) and downdraughting on the port side to add to the turbulence.

Much like sitting below the demarcation line when the wind is blowing across a ridge.

I have experienced such downdraughts in far less dramatic conditions than in the video.

All in all an interesting and character-building experience for the crew - perhaps a little brown trouser moment too.

Well done for keeping it out of the oggin:ok:

There is an official statement from the USCG on their instagram account @uscg_rs that confirms this theory

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1080x1227/screenshot_20230502_090624_instagram_32e23910fcc3dff0b4f4265 626c5f02aa69b1843.jpg

albatross

2nd May 2023, 18:18

Reminds me of the movie Forest Gump.
Well done Coast Guard!
https://youtu.be/WyEmNlYL6qE

[email protected]

2nd May 2023, 18:51

Yup, a great job in sh*tty conditions:ok:

ShyTorque

2nd May 2023, 21:47

I’ve experienced what can only have been a microburst event in Central America.

A very sobering thing and although it happened some forty years ago in my early career it remains a disturbing memory. The aircraft kept descending very rapidly despite full power and flaring to min power speed. We lost about 1,000 feet and came out of extremely heavy rain only a couple of hundred feet above the jungle tree tops. As soon as we came out of the rain the aircraft began climbing like a dingbat,

I came close to making headlines with that one, especially bearing in mind that a very senior army officer was one of the passengers. We turned back to the departure point (a jungle camp) and stayed the night!

albatross

2nd May 2023, 21:57

Yup, a great job in sh*tty conditions:ok:

Many moons ago: At the FSI sim at Bell they took us, as a training exercise at the end of the day, through the Delta 191 accident Wind-Shear /Downburst crash WX in a 212.

We were 2 Captains flying as a crew and I was the Pilot Flying.
As things when rapidly pear-shaped going down the ILS into the shear/downburst. ( I would have liked to see the sim actions from outside…we were bouncing around pretty good ). I asked the PNF to take control of the collective and maintain 100% Q as I tried to maintain best climb wings level, straight ahead at 58 knots.
We managed to fly straight ahead out of it.
The instructor said he had never seen a crew divide control like that. He thought it was good CRM which he would share with others. Apparently a lot of crews did not manage to fly out of it. He asked where I had learned that.
I told him I got the idea from DC-3 crews I had flown with who did that on takeoff. ( Later on I watched a WW2 USAAF training film on the B-26 Marauder and they used the same technique so I guess it was far from a new idea.)
What made me think to do it at that time I have no idea.
My concern was as we bounced around was I would over-torque a bit and get into Torque limiting. Some of the 212s I had flown had torque limiting set way too low. 102-103%.

We later told a Check Pilot about it he maintained that the PF was to manipulate Cyclic, Pedals and Collective at all times and he would fail the rides of any crew who did that.
I guess he thought the PNF’s function was to be an interested spectator and contribute nothing more to events than fervent prayer and childish screams.

JimEli

3rd May 2023, 00:41

Incredible winds, ship appears to be listing to port, causing extreme turbulence off the superstructure. Downwind abort. Lucky the engines didn't roll back from salt water injestion.

megan

3rd May 2023, 01:21

We later told a Check Pilot about it he maintained that the PF was to manipulate Cyclic, Pedals and Collective at all times and he would fail the rides of any crew who did that.
I guess he thought the PNF’s function was to be an interested spectator and contribute nothing more to events than fervent prayer and childish screamsThose in power can have some odd ideas, was riding shotgun while a lad was gaining the requisite ICUS time to progress to a command in a two crew operation, a problem developed and in good CRM manner the issue was discussed and an option decided, chief pilot wouldn't let the lad log ICUS as he didn't make all the decisions ie we were not to discuss our options. :ugh:

Sea Plane Driver

3rd May 2023, 01:40

I told him I got the idea from DC-3 crews I had flown with who did that on takeoff.

I flew DC-3s, both seats. Not sure what the crews did that saved the day in a -3?

SASless

3rd May 2023, 01:47

Albatross,

I flew that Sim Scenario as the victim and as the Instructor......lots of times.

It is an attention getter.

Once paired with an up and coming young Spark with him at the controls and watched some serious learning be accomplished.

My opining that he would be experiencing some real turbulence and interesting weather conditions I was informed he knew about such from his time on the North Sea.

During the ILS he correctly identified a sink rate that he appeared unable to correct.....was advised to pull maximum power and reduce his IAS to Vbroc (as you described)

He did...and reported the sink rate was still excessive.....and demonstrated he felt he had done everything he could do.....when I reached down and pulled the Collective up until we bled Nr to 90% or so thus gaining control of the sink rate.

We broke out of cloud to see the airport and probably. were harvesting ears of corn (virtually).

My comment about Redlines being for normal operations and there being nothing normal about crashing....seemed to bother him somewhat but he did admit to the wisdom if not caring for the delivery.

The operator we flew for at the time incorporated as part of a continued takeoff after an engine failure the procedure of bleeding off the Nr and my view was if it was fine and dandy to do it VMC during OEI procedures then doing it IMC and crashing it was ok to do it with both engines running.

As to the CRM thing of having the Non-Handling Pilot handle the Collective.....could be a blessing and a curse.

How would you structure the CRM technique, procedure, control, and determination of who moves the collective and in what manner and to what extent would take some serious thought and structure.

Bottom line question....some of these aircraft are flown Single Pilot IFR....Bell 412's for instance.....are we saying a Single Pilot is not capable of controlling the aircraft that such a CRM Technique would be required if there was a second Pilot?

I might not be a hard headed as that Checkf Pilot that took complete refusal but I would ask that the justification be well sourced and it be proven such a procedure be needed and structured for the maximum safety and minimum risk of complications that could pose additional risks.

[email protected]

3rd May 2023, 05:21

Getting the NHP to operate the collective is simple as long as you tell him what to do.

In the above example the instruction was clear - maintain 100%.

You could use 'Maintain Nr in the green arc or at ***%' or 'Set ***% for landing' or any number of specific commands - most of which we used for double manual approaches on the Sea King.

PlasticCabDriver

3rd May 2023, 05:28

Those in power can have some odd ideas, was riding shotgun while a lad was gaining the requisite ICUS time to progress to a command in a two crew operation, a problem developed and in good CRM manner the issue was discussed and an option decided, chief pilot wouldn't let the lad log ICUS as he didn't make all the decisions ie we were not to discuss our options. :ugh:

My favourite PICUS moment: landed offshore and I land a bit off centre, so the Co gives me banter about the landing. “well there goes your PICUS for this flight” says I. “no, no, no” he says, “I’m taking the p*ss out of your landing, therefore acting exactly like a Captain”. Fair point, he had me on that one!

Cornish Jack

3rd May 2023, 09:58

Warren Vanderburgh in one of the "Children of the magenta" series, examined the Delta Tristar microburst at Atlanta and illustrated the event with the FDR readouts against the video. He makes the case for using every last ounce of available energy (to hell with limits).

steve_oc

3rd May 2023, 10:31

Used the "split controls" procedure every now and then on the Wessex 3 (ASW) and I've also used it occasionally in a North Sea sim ride. It's a good means of reducing the workload of the PF when things are going a bit pear-shaped, as long as you brief the other pilot on exactly what to do. On the downwash issue, I was landing on my destroyer in our Wessex while she was replenishing from a tanker on the upwind side. As I moved over the deck we arrived in the downwash from the aft superstructure and landed with pretty much full up collective, much to our surprise and fortunately in the centre of the deck.

albatross

3rd May 2023, 11:44

I flew DC-3s, both seats. Not sure what the crews did that saved the day in a -3?

I was not referring to the wind shear weather scenario when speaking of the DC-3 but to the technique of the PNF handling the throttles during normal operations on take off.
As to pulling to droop that works in a single engine scenario on the 212 when the good engine goes to N1 topping..we used that in the 205 a lot or a 212 with the -3 not -3B engines also at high density altitudes when you can have both engines at topping but torque below 100%. However in a 212 with both hamsters running torque limiting and RPM droop is not your friend ( not that we ran around pulling more than 100% torque ) …you can watch as RPM, N1 and TOT drop but torque is indicating high. perhaps 104+. you have to lower collective to get the indicated torque back below limiting. As one pilot described the system in simplistic terms “its like you are rolling off the throttles while pulling collective”. More than one accident has had the torque limiter as a contributing factor. ( one case was a high time 205 driver very recently converted to the 212. The difference between N1 topping and “torque limiting” had not been properly covered during his checkout. )
Getting the torque limiter correctly set up was and is important. There was a time when correct setup was often not done and there was considerable debate as to correct procedures..the manual was worded in such a way as to be ambiguous to some.

albatross

3rd May 2023, 13:01

Albatross,

I flew that Sim Scenario as the victim and as the Instructor......lots of times.

It is an attention getter.

As to the CRM thing of having the Non-Handling Pilot handle the Collective.....could be a blessing and a curse.

How would you structure the CRM technique, procedure, control, and determination of who moves the collective and in what manner and to what extent would take some serious thought and structure.

Bottom line question....some of these aircraft are flown Single Pilot IFR....Bell 412's for instance.....are we saying a Single Pilot is not capable of controlling the aircraft that such a CRM Technique would be required if there was a second Pilot?

I might not be a hard headed as that Checkf Pilot that took complete refusal but I would ask that the justification be well sourced and it be proven such a procedure be needed and structured for the maximum safety and minimum risk of complications that could pose additional risks.

SASless
Please understand I was and am not advocating that the PNF handle the collective in normal ops.
I too have flown 212/412 single pilot.
In this specific case I was getting rapidly “task saturated” and saw the PNF maintaining 100% Q as a way to let me better concentrate my limited skills on maintaining Vbroc, heading ect. I was still monitoring Q in my scan. The PNF kept it nailed and it helped in this particular case. The PNF was a resource to make things easier and I used him. He understood what I was attempting to do and happily complied…there was no time to brief it. It was a spur of the moment call.

212man

3rd May 2023, 13:21

However in a 212 with both hamsters running torque limiting and RPM droop is not your friend

Exactly! Basically Power = Torque X Nr, so if Torque stays fixed and you are drooping Nr, the FCU is reducing fuel flow and hence reducing power.

SASless

3rd May 2023, 13:27

Removing Torque Limiting also removed Torque Damping which easily led to torque surges caused by Pilot induced oscillations in the torque settings caused by Collective movement.

We had that inflicted upon us by that Operator as far too many of the young ones coming from the North Sea flying aircraft with bags of power came to the tropics and high temps to an aircraft that was weight limited rather than having excess power.

Handling techniques took a while to adapt.....but ultimately after enough serious over torques commonsense had the aircraft returned to the state the design engineers had decided upon.

I believe in CRM and have advocated for it long before it became as popular as it has. become.....as Crew Coordination, teamwork, and related concepts were part of flying a large crew served helicopter with a crew of Five or Six during normal Ops and more during other operations.

With the advent of radio communication even pilots flying solo can use CRM techniques during times of high stress or mechanical problems.

I am not faulting you for what you did.....am just saying such innovative measures needs to be well coordinated and no confusion be allowed to cause any new and extra problems.

What is unusual about the DFW scenario is the ugly is late in the approach and very near the ground leaving just a very short timeframe to counter the severe effects of the micro-burst but it is well within the abilities of the 212/412 modeling of the Simulator and one would hope the actual aircraft as well.

When we had free time for a Sim with no customers or maintenance preventing use of the Sim.... I used to set up the DFW Model or the Air Methods Blue Field WV model and fly those approaches several times solo in order to stay proficient.

Both of those were excellent tests of aircrew but each with very different underlying reasons.

One thing stands out from such training is there is usually more than one right answer and the discussion should be along the lines of what is the better way rather than what is the wrong way.

Wrong ways quickly identify themselves and can be discounted with a minimum of discussion.

Refusing to discuss something is sure the wrong answer in and of itself.

212man

3rd May 2023, 15:25

We had that inflicted upon us by that Operator as far too many of the young ones coming from the North Sea flying aircraft with bags of power came to the tropics and high temps to an aircraft that was weight limited rather than having excess power.
I think you will find that the torque TCU mod you refer to came about after a fatal North Sea accident, where the standard 104% Tq limiting MAY have contributed to the inability to avoid a water impact (See Para 2.2 pg 18 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422efd3ed915d1371000297/10-1982_G-BIJF.pdf).

albatross

3rd May 2023, 17:31

I think you will find that the torque TCU mod you refer to came about after a fatal North Sea accident, where the standard 104% Tq limiting MAY have contributed to the inability to avoid a water impact (See Para 2.2 pg 18 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5422efd3ed915d1371000297/10-1982_G-BIJF.pdf).

What i recall was that some folks were setting up the system so that you were encountering limiting well before 104 whereas the test called for verification after setup that no torque limiting was occurring before 104. I remember testing one and discovering that was limiting at 99-100.
I was told that one company was setting it up to limit at 108-110 but can’t say if that was true or not.
A Bell pilot told me that 2 working engines would provide well over 140% and the Transmission and mast could fail around the 120% mark. Hence the reason for the limiting system. What would have be happening in the C box I know not.
I do recall watching a 212 at a fire camp make a fast, steep downwind approach and hearing the RPM rapidly bleed off at the bottom as he tried to stop it. That noise got everyone’s attention. Our comments as we saw the approach was “What the hell is that guy doing??!!” We could do nothing but watch helplessly as the drama unfolded. Fortunately not one of our aircraft. End of a long day on fires and I think he was just tired and lost the picture as we had been flying full out dawn to dusk for about 2 weeks and living in less than comfortable conditions.

212man

3rd May 2023, 22:14

I was told that one company was setting it up to limit at 108-110 but can’t say if that was true or not.
the mod SAS was referring to took away the torque sharing and raised the limiting to 112%, with two sets of dolls eye recorders at 108% and 112%. Governing instability was a serious issue. I was in an operation that had 5 aircraft with 3 TCU configurations - Bell standard, Bell HP (TB-145) and ‘operator’ Led to an interesting argument with engineering one morning when they tried to get me to do a torque limiting check on an operator modded machine (would have been an MGB change!)

SASless

3rd May 2023, 22:39

In an interesting place where the Operator was not present.....their Engineer over Beer in a Sand Dune top sandbagged Bar....bragged he would set whatever power limits the Pilot desired on his Bell 212.

Upon him offering to work his magic on the one I was using I opined that as it was not on an American Registry there would be some problems in gaining a sign off of his work but thank you for offering.....and off to another part of the Bar.

That was the same Operator that had similar engineering standards in a very remote place on the same Continent where the Engineer used a set of Vise Grip pliers and a hacksaw to shorten the threaded part of some Main Rotor Push Pull Tubes Clevises on a Bell 206.

Their enticement to keep you from leaving was upon your first anniversary the Company would give you a US Navy Leather Flying Jacket.

I was many months shy of getting one of them after seeing the maintenance standard.....and bought the jacket on my own....as it seemed a better bargain.

As I sit here....I can see a Clock that came from the last 212 I flew....when it went to the scrap heap as being beyond economical repair.....with something like 41,000 Hours on it or some such silly number.

[email protected]

5th May 2023, 12:59

We seem to have drifted a long way off the topic of praising the USCG crew for keeping the aircraft salt water free in some crappy conditions.

Perhaps we need more SAR pilots on here:)

Snowbound 612

5th May 2023, 13:26

In the early 80's our squadron lost a helo at AUTEC. In a dip at night with no weather warning from range. One minute in a steady hover, next swimming. All suvived.

albatross

5th May 2023, 14:36

Very true Crab….I plead guilty to unbridled thread drift.
It would be very interesting to find out what kind of power they had to pull to save the day.
The CVR would be interesting to. There are probably some lessons to be learned. I think there would be some “ Expletives Deleted “ and other non-PC remarks!
Well done to them for a recovery from a very bad situation.

We seem to have drifted a long way off the topic of praising the USCG crew for keeping the aircraft salt water free in some crappy conditions.

Perhaps we need more SAR pilots on here:)

212man

5th May 2023, 18:02

We seem to have drifted a long way off the topic of praising the USCG crew for keeping the aircraft salt water free in some crappy conditions.

Perhaps we need more SAR pilots on here:)
At least it is a USCG aircraft - unlike the Belgium NH90 video post on LinkedIn that is being showered with comments from ardent (US) patriots!

megan

6th May 2023, 02:42

praising the USCG crew for keeping the aircraft salt water freeFollowing their little jaunt I very much doubt the aircraft was salt water free, some of the salt water may even have been generated in the cabin, but I know what you mean. Reminded of the crew who had a double engine failure over the beach as a result of salt encrustation on the compressors following such a rescue. Huge thumbs up to the Coast Guard, anyone engaged in SAR work gets my admiration for how they hang it all out at times.

Torquetalk

6th May 2023, 04:49

It would be very interesting to find out what kind of power they had to pull to save the day.

I‘ll open the bidding at at least 100% AEO. A poorly considered cross and flat approach to the lee side of a vessel needed that to check the descent. And that was low profile with a mere 30kt wind.

Once they moved away from the vessel, they probably went straight into a large downwind vortex. If the wx conditions were unpredictable, they were unlucky, then somewhat lucky.