RAF v RN - Falklands

[tartare]

At the suggestion of a forum member, am reading Jerry Pook's book RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands.
As a naïve civilian - staggered by the enmity at the time between the senior service and the crabs, and the navy's lack of co-ordination/knowledge of GR3 capabilities and SOPs in a ground attack role.
I assume that given there is no longer a Fleet Air Arm, it's a different world - i.e. Navy carriers and RAF F-35s operate as one totally integrated team?
Am sure there's still banter...

[Bob Viking]

There’s a nice fella, with a beard, that might be able to help you out. Now what’s his name again? Fishy? Sharpy?

BV

[Timelord]

I never quite understood it but RN Officers seemed to be trained from a very early age to hate the RAF. The feeling was not reciprocated as far as I remember.

[tartare]

There’s a nice fella, with a beard, that might be able to help you out. Now what’s his name again? Fishy? Sharpy?

BV

Oh God. I've read his book too.
Am staying well away...

[Gordon Brown]

I never quite understood it but RN Officers seemed to be trained from a very early age to hate the RAF. The feeling was not reciprocated as far as I remember.

In my experience, the RN officers were always more 'on message' than we were. Whether that meant they were better informed, or more indoctrinated than us, was never clear to me, but it was unusual to hear them criticise the RN in a public forum. Maybe we were just a bunch of whingers.

[Ninthace]

In my career, I have been both an RN and an RAF officer. The main difference between the two in my experience was the RN did not care about your family whereas the RAF did - in those days. For example the RN had no equivalent to Families Flt and and if an RN arrival interview included your family circumstances, it was just social chit chat rather than a genuine enquiry.

[Asturias56]

Historically that makes sense

the Navy used to send ships on long deployments and often switched bases - almost all of their strength was at sea and many missions were well over six months or even years.

The RAF had a very very large tail, almost all of which was deployed around the same base for long periods. Very few missions lasted over 10 hours.

When you married a sailor (civil or military) you knew what you were getting into and loving care attention never came into it.

[The Helpful Stacker]

...given there is no longer a Fleet Air Arm...

Ooo, the WAFU aren't going to like that, banter or not.

​​​​​​They're still hanging in there.

https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-fighting-arms/fleet-air-arm

[Mogwi]

The relationship between RN and RAF at squadron level was excellent during Corporate. We worked (and slept!) very much as a team and even flew as part of the same attack package on occasions. Where problems occurred, they were caused by the loss of RN expertise in tasking and co-ordinating ground attack missions. This was in turn a result of the wilderness years between F4/Bucc ops and the advent of the SHAR.

To the RN, aircraft are merely another weapon in the ready-use locker, whereas in the RAF they are their raison d’être - a not-so-subtle difference! This was exacerbated by personalities and it was rumoured that the Captain of Hermes was fighting three wars; the first against the RAF, the second against HMS Invincible and the third against the Argentines. We spent a lot of time attempting to ameliorate this, with varying degrees of success.

Where the RN won was in their belief in independent action. The RN pilot had much more flexibility in peacetime, which meant that flying at 50’ was the norm and did not require a special course in Scotland to achieve! Hence our ability to fly comfortably below 20’ on our very first attack mission against a heavily defended airfield and not lose a single aircraft from the team of 12.

As mentioned in Jerry’s book, the GR3s very offered the brown end of the stick and put in harm’s way to protect the SHARs. This was because it was (rightly) assessed that air defence would be critical to the success of the endeavour and the only aircraft that could do that were the 21 SHARs.

Having served in both light and dark blue uniforms, I can honestly say that the only discrimination I suffered was at the hands of the RAF - when I was still light blue but serving with the RN. I was actually told by my desk officer that my glowing Annual Report from the RN after the Falklands would not be considered when I was assessed for promotion, as it was not from a RAF unit. My riposte was short and to the point, which did not enhance my prospects!

Swing the lamp!

[meleagertoo]

In my (albeit brief) acquaintance with the RN and RAF the gaping divide seemed to be between the RN's pragmatic and 'operational' approach to events compared to the RAF's obsession with bureaucracy and procedure. When things go awry on a ship anyone and everyone needs to take such action as is necessary on the spot often without waiting for instructions and this has translated into a can-do and will-do attitude that the RAF never seemed to have. Mogwi's illustration re low flying is a perfect example. A RN colleague of mine went on to instruct at Shawbury at the joint helo training school and one day was tasked to collect a VIP from another station. He did his planning and was stopped by the duty Ops Officer who told him he wasn't authorised to go as the weather was too bad - it was a blue sky day. The Ops goon pointed out there was fog visible to the North. But I'm going South he explained...No, standing orders say fog in the vicinity, no flying...and my pal was an instructor - teaching IF! You couldn't make it up!
The difference is exemplified by the old tale of the crab and RN officer who pass each other in the Gent's. Seeing the RN officer shake off the drips, zip up and leave the crab later approaches him in the bar and rather haughtily anounces that at Cranwell they were taught, for hygiene's sake, to wash their hands after a pee. The Naval officer retorted that at Dartmouth they were just advised not to pee on their fingers...
I shan't go into the Junglies sleeping under their cabs in the desert in Iraq while the Chinook pilots wouldn't deploy anywhere without air-con portacabins and showers positioned in advance, or the GR3 guys whingeing about being embarked away from home for a week or two and claiming sub standard accommodation allowances which gained them little respect, as one would imagine.
Later in both civvy helo and airline ops the ex RAF were always the stiff, inflexible operators always calling Ops for instructions/approval while the RN and Army guys were almost always much more easygoing and creative too when it came to workarounds and problems.
There's definately a substantial cultural difference.

[Evalu8ter]

"In my (albeit brief) acquaintance with the RN and RAF the gaping divide seemed to be between the RN's pragmatic and 'operational' approach to events compared to the RAF's obsession with bureaucracy and procedure". Hmm, I picked up my Frag Sheet from Lower Air Ops on Ark in Feb 2003, for one of our first sorties over Northern Kuwait (which meant flying through the highly alert SAM defences, both afloat and onshore…) and I noted that some of the CSAR/SPINS information seemed a bit 'Off' for CAOC generated procedures (they were very RN colloquial…). When I challenged the staff they admitted that they were used to 'making it up' as they were normally part of a self-licking lollipop of a Naval Task Group, and this 'Littoral Stuff' where they needed to operate under an ACC was all a bit 'different'. All the time we were 'working up' off Cyprus and even in Oman, this really didn't matter, but the fact they hadn't mentally clicked over to the 'real deal' was a little concerning, to say the least. A short 'rebrief' later, the appropriate CAOC issued details were retrieved and provided, and the Ops Team provided a stellar service, 24/7, henceforth. On this occasion, I was pleased to be the 'bureaucracy and procedure' obsessed RAF aircrew….

Oh, and 'I shan't go into the Junglies sleeping under their cabs in the desert in Iraq while the Chinook pilots wouldn't deploy anywhere without air-con portacabins' is total and utter b*llocks. I checked into the 'Boeing Hilton' for several nights in the desert in 2003, and slept in nothing else but a non-air conditioned tent until the end of the war (complete with being flooded out of one at Al Amarah during a thunderstorm). In fact, the only reason we had to sleep in the cabs and/or crap tents prior to the start of the campaign was that the RN PR machine needed the Junglies to be involved on the first night and their asthmatic Sea Kings lacked the ability to move 6 troops the 30-odd miles from the ship to the objective and back because the ship drivers (understandably) wanted to keep their ships outside SSM range. It was the RN hierarchy that pushed us into the desert, and under SCUD attack (including a few hours in CBRN kit), rather than apply the pragmatic military solution of using the additional Chinooks at AAS and disembarking the Sea Kings….who, likely, would have joined the battle at first light with the rest of the SHF after the USMC insert was abruptly terminated after the tragic loss of the CH-46.


Sorry, didn't mean to enter a rant…Spent a lot of time with the RN over the years and always enjoyed my time on Ops with the Junglies (and even WAFUs…), several of whom became good friends.

[minigundiplomat]

In my (albeit brief) acquaintance with the RN and RAF the gaping divide seemed to be between the RN's pragmatic and 'operational' approach to events compared to the RAF's obsession with bureaucracy and procedure. When things go awry on a ship anyone and everyone needs to take such action as is necessary on the spot often without waiting for instructions and this has translated into a can-do and will-do attitude that the RAF never seemed to have. Mogwi's illustration re low flying is a perfect example. A RN colleague of mine went on to instruct at Shawbury at the joint helo training school and one day was tasked to collect a VIP from another station. He did his planning and was stopped by the duty Ops Officer who told him he wasn't authorised to go as the weather was too bad - it was a blue sky day. The Ops goon pointed out there was fog visible to the North. But I'm going South he explained...No, standing orders say fog in the vicinity, no flying...and my pal was an instructor - teaching IF! You couldn't make it up!
The difference is exemplified by the old tale of the crab and RN officer who pass each other in the Gent's. Seeing the RN officer shake off the drips, zip up and leave the crab later approaches him in the bar and rather haughtily anounces that at Cranwell they were taught, for hygiene's sake, to wash their hands after a pee. The Naval officer retorted that at Dartmouth they were just advised not to pee on their fingers...
I shan't go into the Junglies sleeping under their cabs in the desert in Iraq while the Chinook pilots wouldn't deploy anywhere without air-con portacabins and showers positioned in advance, or the GR3 guys whingeing about being embarked away from home for a week or two and claiming sub standard accommodation allowances which gained them little respect, as one would imagine.
Later in both civvy helo and airline ops the ex RAF were always the stiff, inflexible operators always calling Ops for instructions/approval while the RN and Army guys were almost always much more easygoing and creative too when it came to workarounds and problems.
There's definately a substantial cultural difference.

You are Sharky Ward and I claim my £5.

The Chinook guys who left HMS Ocean in 2002 and ended up at Bagram were in tents with no Air Con, eating boil in the bag and ****ting in an oil can (the Junglies had sailed home at that point), likewise those based at Basra in 2003, who spent the summer heatwave in an office block with no windows or aircon, just like the Junglies. I'm not sure which Chinook crews insisted on air con in Iraq, given the invasion was in Winter you may have dreamt that one.

Otherwise, a well reasoned post of stereotypical tropes and latent inferiority. Bravo!

[reds & greens]

I found in my latter years of Service, that the RAF sought specific authority to undertake tasks, whereas the RN undertook them unless they were specifically not authorised to.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

I wonder if the 5 Bde BASO could be persuaded to chip in here - he once mentioned to me that RAF/AAC crews stuck to the tasks allocated and would RTB on completion for refuel, re-arm and rebrief. RN crews, however, would go on the first task they'd been allocated then stick around with that unit doing any other tasks they requested, rather than being useful to the Brigade as a whole. Obvs 2nd-hand and generalisations, but it was a source of frustration when assets were so limited.

Meleagertoo's dits of the First Gulf Unpleasantness are greatly at variance with my recollection of our time at Al Jouf - the politicking involved in trying to give the RN SKs an SF role were beyond a joke, they were a serious distraction.

I sure, however, that his QHI oppo - an IF instructor too (wow...) - would have handled his destination being fogged-in with aplomb, what with the amazing IFR reserves of the mighty Gazelle.

Not your best effort, Sharky..

[Bob Viking]

I love how some think an individual’s personal viewpoint from a very narrow standpoint can be assumed to mean anything whatsoever. Applying this view to an entire organisation is myopic to say the least.

For what it’s worth I think the RAF is better than the RN. Because I said so.

BV

I have no knowledge of the RAF vs RN in the Falklands other than what I have read about so I cannot offer any useful contributions.

[MPN11]

RAF ... accustomed to working on a fixed base with all facilities,
RN ... accustomed to working on a lonely bouncing base surrounded by water.
Army ... accustomed to working from tents in mud/sand in the middle of nowhere.

I can see how various mindsets can evolve.

[Ninthace]

In my experience, the mindset required to "fight" a ship (float, move, fight) is very similar to the mindset required to keep an RAF base operational and a long way from the Army way of thinking, from the blank looks I got when trying to do the same thing on an Army base, who bizarrely seemed to have no idea of Ground Defence as it was known then. Is it still Survive to Operate these days?

[[email protected]]

In my experience, the RN didn't believe they needed weather limits (or any others for that matter) because they felt so superior to the RAF and told everyone could always get the job done.

That explains the myriad of dits detailing close calls, almost mid-airs, just getting in by the skin of their teeth and, btw, quite a few actual accidents.

I was at a training ground near Peterborough one day in fog, with all the training tasking cancelled and then a Navy Wessex appeared over the fence having hover taxied for miles to get there - FOR A TRAINING EXERCISE.

Nuff said about attitude.

[Wetstart Dryrun]

Whenever a batch of naval students pitched up for an OCU course, they were generally a refreshing change.

Less refreshing was that they would do half a dog watch (navel terminology), and then go and drive a boat in accordance with general list career paths, necessitating training replacements.

Not too sure about gleeful cries of man overboard for stepping on the grass.

But thanks for runs ashore and mooses milk

[Mogwi]

In the autumn of ‘82, I was ashore in Stanley with a det of 2 x SHARs (living in the Upland Goose not the green tents!) to help No 1(F) with the air defence rôle by flying mixed pairs. Fatty Ives invited us to bounce a four-ship GR3 SAP that they had planned around the islands, which we were very happy to do.

At the briefing, it was stated that the GR3s would be NB 250’ (it’s a peace-time low flying area now - oh no it’s not!) and we were invited to stay above 500’ AGL. I pointed out that this height would negate any training value for us and I that was able to authorise the SHARs down to 50’ AGL, as that would be our modus operandi. There was a great harrumph and I was invited to booger orf in fine pitch. As it transpired, we already had their route and timings and “happened across” them numerous times on the way round anyway.

I think the boys enjoyed it but we weren’t invited to the debrief!

Mog

[pulse1]

My ex Marine friends tell me that, if they had a man down in Borneo, they always tried to get a Navy helicopter for a medivac as they were more likely to cope with whatever clearing was available. The instructor who taught me to fly was RAF and based at Boscombe Down. One of the many aircraft he flew was a Beaver. At that time there was a flight of Army Beavers at Old Sarum and these guys used to go out looking for difficult fields to land in. My RAF instructor was not even allowed to land his Beaver at Compton Abbas, or anywhere there wasn't regulation fire and rescue facilities.

[MPN11]

Is it still Survive to Operate these days?My STO office [5 of us] in RAF War Plans and Policy was shut down in 1992. Some of our work was transferred to HQ STC. I have no idea whether anything emerged from there.

[langleybaston]

My STO office [5 of us] in RAF War Plans and Policy was shut down in 1992. Some of our work was transferred to HQ STC. I have no idea whether anything emerged from there.

Slightly later I was asked to lead the revision of the Met. Office War Book. Then suddenly it didn't need revision. I doubt if it exists now.

These piping times of peace do seem rather edgy, do they not?.

[SASless]

A Navy Wessex showed up out of the murk while the RAF sat perched like Sea Gulls on Dolphins.:D

I suppose it will take the Navy to explain the concept to Air Force.


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/800x600/beach_parking_a57eb2cb5cf82b468328b708930c6f531a160d73.jpg

[sippy]

Whilst on RAF IOT at Cranwell in 1981- 5 of us were told on Thursday we would be travelling to Dartmouth on Sat to compete in Tri college cross country- We arrived and the RAF SRego who was with us told us the RAF had always come last in this race and the same would happen this time but we were to try hard!
The RN team were all Marine officers who had returned from Artic Warfare to train for the event several weeks earlier- one chap asked me how long we had been training - we only heard on Thursday was the reply - he asked if we had any men with us- we were perplexed till he mentioned that they would never run with enlisted men in the team because if one fell they would have to stop. The Sandhurst team showed up and each one was an Ethiopian officer cadet -yep, we came last by a long way. That night we went into the Dartmouth cadets mess- they appeared to do an 18 month IOT - all in a large barrack block with dawn sailing on the Dart- we were invited ashore for drinks- I returned to Cranwell defeated in the race but with a better appreciation of the different cultures of the services and the relative ease of our 18 week IOT compared to the RN course!

[tarantonight]

I have worked with a number of former RM/Army Commando types.

All would prefer an RN Pilot to retrieve them if the weather went belly up.

Enough said surely.

TN.

[chevvron]

I flew with several test pilots at Farnborough from all 4 services; they were all excellent but the best ones were the Royal Marines and Army Air Corps in that order.

[tartare]

This was exacerbated by personalities and it was rumoured that the Captain of Hermes was fighting three wars; the first against the RAF, the second against HMS Invincible and the third against the Argentines. We spent a lot of time attempting to ameliorate this, with varying degrees of success.



Thanks Mog, was unaware of those personality dynamics, and will read the rest of the book with that perspective overlaid.
First reaction was it's crazy that egos and inter-personal conflicts still blow up amongst those who are leading the people who are fighting and dying - but then on reflection it's been that way throughout military history, and probably always will be!
I continue to find Falklands stories absolutely extraordinary - and am working on the screenplay.

[ancientaviator62]

Just read Paul Tremelling's book Harrier 'How To Be a Fighter Pilot' which has some comments relevant to the subject under discussion in a later era.

[tartare]

Damn good book that.
His description of 2 ship low-level close air-support in a narrow valley in Afghanistan (?) in marginal weather was hair raising...!

[[email protected]]

A Navy Wessex showed up out of the murk while the RAF sat perched like Sea Gulls on Dolphins.:D

I suppose it will take the Navy to explain the concept to Air Force.


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/800x600/beach_parking_a57eb2cb5cf82b468328b708930c6f531a160d73.jpg
Meanwhile the US Army is giving itself another medal for turning up to work on time...........

[sangiovese.]

Whilst on RAF IOT at Cranwell in 1981- 5 of us were told on Thursday we would be travelling to Dartmouth on Sat to compete in Tri college cross country- We arrived and the RAF SRego who was with us told us the RAF had always come last in this race and the same would happen this time but we were to try hard!
The RN team were all Marine officers who had returned from Artic Warfare to train for the event several weeks earlier- one chap asked me how long we had been training - we only heard on Thursday was the reply - he asked if we had any men with us- we were perplexed till he mentioned that they would never run with enlisted men in the team because if one fell they would have to stop. The Sandhurst team showed up and each one was an Ethiopian officer cadet -yep, we came last by a long way. That night we went into the Dartmouth cadets mess- they appeared to do an 18 month IOT - all in a large barrack block with dawn sailing on the Dart- we were invited ashore for drinks- I returned to Cranwell defeated in the race but with a better appreciation of the different cultures of the services and the relative ease of our 18 week IOT compared to the RN course!

Reminds me of the Incirkik Ryder Cup…..strange how the RAF always won with its special golf team always on Det that week….

[cheekychimp]

I have worked with a number of former RM/Army Commando types.

All would prefer an RN Pilot to retrieve them if the weather went belly up.

Enough said surely.

TN.
I don't remember much whingeing from them when I was on a TACP, organising RAF MERT to extract them in some unbelievably dangerous situations. So probably not enough said.

[Mogwi]

Rather like the meeting of the heads with Maggie on 2nd April 82, where CAS said he couldn’t help, head pongo said he would require 30k troops to retake the islands and 1SL said “We will sail on Monday Ma’am”. (I paraphrase!) And we did. The only SHARs left behind were still on the production line at Dunsfold.

Mog

[[email protected]]

I don't remember much whingeing from them when I was on a TACP, organising RAF MERT to extract them in some unbelievably dangerous situations. So probably not enough said.

Yes, some of our SAR rearcrew were on the MERT dets and their tales of recovery under fire are hair-raising - maybe TN could just remind us what the RN helicopters were doing at the time?

[Yellow Sun]

Rather like the meeting of the heads with Maggie on 2nd April 82, where CAS said he couldn’t help, head pongo said he would require 30k troops to retake the islands and 1SL said “We will sail on Monday Ma’am”. (I paraphrase!) And we did. The only SHARs left behind were still on the production line at Dunsfold.

Mog

On 4th April 1982, 42 Sqn received the warning order. The following day 2 Nimrods departed for Ascension. On the 7th April they flew the first surveillance sorties south of Ascension. Just remind us how far your war canoe had got by that time Mog?😜

YS

[huge72]

If we return to the time of the thread, I believe a lot of the problem stemmed from the fact that prior to the war John Knott was about to cut the Navy. So when the war broke out the Navy saw it as a way to prove they were the force that was needed. An example is, what to 72 Sqn became known as Op Headless Chicken. 5 Bde was due to sail along with the Puma Force, until someone at Northwood said Pumas can't operate off ships. Oh so where is there another Wessex Squadron they said. Send 72 they said. So in typical War Film fashion we were all at a Squadron Dining In when the Sqn Cdr was given the message, you're off to war. Over the Easter weekend we all packed and flew from NI back to Benson passing the Pumas going to take over in NI. Engineers worked like beavers to modify our Cabs for the cold weather and we raided stores for war kit having handed it all in when we went to NI. Sqn Cdr went to Northwood for final briefing before embarking, to be told by Admiral Fieldhouse, "You can **** off back to Ireland, I don't want anymore Crabs in my War". We returned to NI, Pumas returned to Odiham, our wife's had had a party and drank all the Booze and the Navy reformed 847 with Wessex that had been in storage and with aircrew that had been in Desk Jobs. So from the very top it was seen as a Navy war and they didn't need any help from anyone and certainly not a fully operational RAF squadron!

[langleybaston]

On 4th April 1982, 42 Sqn received the warning order. The following day 2 Nimrods departed for Ascension. On the 7th April they flew the first surveillance sorties south of Ascension. Just remind us how far your war canoe had got by that time Mog?😜

YS

I can confirm the RAF "We have no plan" scenario from an oblique source.
C Met O HQSTC rang me [I was P Met O 1 Group Bawtry]. "The bastards have invaded the Falklands!"
Me: "What are my orders sir [or some such humble stance]?"
C Met O: "Nobody appears to have a plan. Just stay near the phone".

[Yellow Sun]

I can confirm the RAF "We have no plan" scenario from an oblique source.
C Met O HQSTC rang me [I was P Met O 1 Group Bawtry]. "The bastards have invaded the Falklands!"
Me: "What are my orders sir [or some such humble stance]?"
C Met O: "Nobody appears to have a plan. Just stay near the phone".

With the best will in the world LB, but 42 Sqn deployed to Ascension, not on the spur of the moment, but to an operating base with which they were acquainted and visited on a regular basis. There may have been no contingency to retake the Falklands but there were plans in place to operate in the South Atlantic and it was some of these that were activated. I doubt that the C Met O would have been aware of any relevant contingency plans, other than in the broadest terms.

YS

[langleybaston]

With the best will in the world LB, but 42 Sqn deployed to Ascension, not on the spur of the moment, but to an operating base with which they were acquainted and visited on a regular basis. There may have been no contingency to retake the Falklands but there were plans in place to operate in the South Atlantic and it was some of these that were activated. I doubt that the C Met O would have been aware of any relevant contingency plans, other that in the broadest terms.

YS

Point taken. At that time Met was not operating a southern hemisphere numerical forecast model. I was an ex-programmer and also ex-Central Forecast Office southern hemisphere analyst, but latterly got near the sharper end, where my spiritual home had always been.

Certainly Met support for S hemisphere was pretty crude [upper winds were very much based on what previous aircraft had reported].
In a commendably short space of time the numerical model was extended to S hemisphere once the balloon went up. If there were contingency plans to extend south, they did not get much priority before the invasion..

The other area where C Met O should have been in the loop is the involvement of the Mobile Met Office: forecasters holding VR commissions, because he was their head honcho at one star level. I had a fair few MMU staff on my books [eleven stations] and there was precious little excitement in the early days.

But it was a long time ago and I do not trust my memory so I have to claim E & O. E!

[Mogwi]

On 4th April 1982, 42 Sqn received the warning order. The following day 2 Nimrods departed for Ascension. On the 7th April they flew the first surveillance sorties south of Ascension. Just remind us how far your war canoe had got by that time Mog?😜

YS

Quite right! I am afraid that I was focussed on air defence and of course, the surveillance tasking was certainly of great value to the task force.

Mog

[SASless]

As an outsider and participant in some other situations involving adversarial engagements with various military and non-military forces to include some foreign militaries.....the one thing that binds us all together is the fact that plans and planning are effective up to the first contact with the enemy at which point pretty much all the existing plans become fit for lining the bottoms of bird cages.

It would appear the RAF and RN....followed by the Army seemed to be caught a bit flat footed upon the occupation of the Falklands by Argentine forces.

What is most admirable is the way the UK Military stood up forces and achieved a very daunting challenge so far away from friendly bases and ports.

While the back and forth goes on here.....please don't forget or minimize what was achieved by all of the UK Military forces during the Falklands Situation.

That there was confusion and conflicting orders coming down from above comes with the turf when the Starting Bell gets rung by the Opposition be it on the small unit level or at the Seat of Government level.

[alfred_the_great]

Yes, some of our SAR rearcrew were on the MERT dets and their tales of recovery under fire are hair-raising - maybe TN could just remind us what the RN helicopters were doing at the time?

Persistent ISTAR in HERRICK, SH in HERRICK, flying interesting stuff in HERRICK, persistent ISR in other warm places, embarked aviation in defence of CASD, MCT, CT, embarked aviation around the world.

why, did I miss something?

[ex-fast-jets]

Thank you SASless for finally bringing an element of sense to this sometimes ridiculous thread........

"please don't forget or minimize what was achieved by all of the UK Military forces during the Falklands Situation"

I have remained deep and silent since this thread appeared and I do not wish to enter - again - a debate that has been going on for years - it would take too much time and be of little interest to many.

But just to answer the question which started this thread by tartare - yes, there were problems between the RN and RAF - but not at working level. On HERMES, the problem started at the top and was largely kept there, although the autocratic nature of RN command at sea made balance very difficult. But the sailors and airmen worked seamlessly together to keep the Harriers flying, and the different shades of uniform colour at and below Lt Cdr/Sqn Ldr were transparent, irrelevant and caused absolutely no problems - we all worked together to achieve the common aim.

I agree with Mog's assessment of the "three wars" on HERMES which is a nice way of putting it - there are other aspects of Mog's comments with which I disagree, but I am not prepared to get into a pi55ing contest. If you are reading Jerry Pook's book tartare, look at the pictures in it. The one taken by Mark Hare - sadly now no longer with us - on about the 15th page of the piccies - shows that the Crabs did know how to fly low. Mark at that stage was a first tourist, and the height he was flying at when he took that picture was representative of the heights we were all flying at. It was not a contest to see who could fly the lowest.

Back to the SASless comment - let me add the RFA folk and the crews of the STUFT who did some remarkable things, and who almost certainly have not received just recognition for what they did.

And finally, to chip in with who has the best helicopter crews - the RAF, the Army, the RN and the RM all have some quite excellent crews - but I doubt that anyone would question the efforts of the crews of BN in 82, or the quite amazing things that Chinook crews - and many others - have done since in Afghanistan and other places.

I return to "deep and silent"

[langleybaston]

Persistent ISTAR in HERRICK, SH in HERRICK, flying interesting stuff in HERRICK, persistent ISR in other warm places, embarked aviation in defence of CASD, MCT, CT, embarked aviation around the world.

why, did I miss something?
the decodes for abbreviations perhaps?

[downsizer]

the decodes for abbreviations perhaps?

Google perhaps?

[SLXOwft]

If we return to the time of the thread, I believe a lot of the problem stemmed from the fact that prior to the war John Knott was about to cut the Navy. So when the war broke out the Navy saw it as a way to prove they were the force that was needed.

I think it is a combination of that (although 2nd Lt Nott 2GR Rtd had already changed his mind on the LPDs but Four One Commando had already been disbanded in '81) - the RAF were net winners under CMD 8288: retention of 4 F-4 AD squadrons alongside Tornado ADV and 3 extra Nimrod MR2 conversions - and the fact that that generation of senior captains and admirals had lived through the destruction of the Carrier and (warm) Blue Water navies by Maj Healey RE Rtd apparently under the belief the RAF could do the same job more cheaply and equally effectively. Although a career submariner Fieldhouse, had been first lieutenant of Hermes when the 1st Wilson government was trying to sell her to Australia in the mid 60s and Lyn Middleton was CO 809 NAS (Hermes Buccaneer squadron) at the same time. There appears to have been a climate of fear that this was the last chance to save the Navy having any role outside North Atlantic ASW and the SSBNs'; any substantial avoidable involvement of the other services had to be forestalled.

Timelord, the belief that the RAF had used deceit and underhand tactics in the 60s was communicated to me as an OUT by BRNC staff in the early 80s, I trust later generations were more enlightened.

Just to be clear, I think I understand why the were like they were, but that doesn't excuse discourtesy to the members of other services.

(AT the risk of restarting another hamsterwheel) Sharkey is the one I don't understand, though I suspect some thing he has said/written are just for effect. He had served with men in light blue when on 892, in his Falklands book he had complementary things to say about Wittering, Ian Mortimer, and Bertie Penfold, and nothing negative about the members of 1F he mentions. He is unpleasant about the RAF as an institution and members he met fleetingly or not at all. In someways I think he was redirecting frustration with the RN higher ups. He had however seen the end of the RN's Advanced, Operational and CO/SPLOT/QWI training squadrons and the apparent end of fleet carriers. His clearly has a very narrow field of view and is only concerned with preservation of fixed wing RN flying and does not care who he offends and how flaky some of the 'evidence' he quotes is and how ridiculous he appears. It is a shame he wasn't content with the recognition he deserved for his role in introducing SHAR and as CO 801.

I would think most WAFUs were more worried the Fishheads would have no qualms selling us out if it was in their interests than being threatened by the light blue.

[[email protected]]

why, did I miss something? Yes, perhaps the bits where they were recovering injured troops under fire............Flying racetrack patterns in a bagger isn't quite the same.:E

[Expatrick]

Rather like the meeting of the heads with Maggie on 2nd April 82, where CAS said he couldn’t help, head pongo said he would require 30k troops to retake the islands and 1SL said “We will sail on Monday Ma’am”. (I paraphrase!) And we did. The only SHARs left behind were still on the production line at Dunsfold.

Mog

Given that it was a Friday, good job the meeting was in the morning, otherwise unlikely the Navy would have been represented! 😀

[MENELAUS]

Given that it was a Friday, good job the meeting was in the morning, otherwise unlikely the Navy would not have been represented! 😀

Foxtrot Oscar

[MENELAUS]

I think it is a combination of that (although 2nd Lt Nott 2GR Rtd had already changed his mind on the LPDs but Four One Commando had already been disbanded in '81) - the RAF were net winners under CMD 8288: retention of 4 F-4 AD squadrons alongside Tornado ADV and 3 extra Nimrod MR2 conversions - and the fact that that generation of senior captains and admirals had lived through the destruction of the Carrier and (warm) Blue Water navies by Maj Healey RE Rtd apparently under the belief the RAF could do the same job more cheaply and equally effectively. Although a career submariner Fieldhouse, had been first lieutenant of Hermes when the 1st Wilson government was trying to sell her to Australia in the mid 60s and Lyn Middleton was CO 809 NAS (Hermes Buccaneer squadron) at the same time. There appears to have been a climate of fear that this was the last chance to save the Navy having any role outside North Atlantic ASW and the SSBNs'; any substantial avoidable involvement of the other services had to be forestalled.

Timelord, the belief that the RAF had used deceit and underhand tactics in the 60s was communicated to me as an OUT by BRNC staff in the early 80s, I trust later generations were more enlightened.

Just to be clear, I think I understand why the were like they were, but that doesn't excuse discourtesy to the members of other services.

(AT the risk of restarting another hamsterwheel) Sharkey is the one I don't understand, though I suspect some thing he has said/written are just for effect. He had served with men in light blue when on 892, in his Falklands book he had complementary things to say about Wittering, Ian Mortimer, and Bertie Penfold, and nothing negative about the members of 1F he mentions. He is unpleasant about the RAF as an institution and members he met fleetingly or not at all. In someways I think he was redirecting frustration with the RN higher ups. He had however seen the end of the RN's Advanced, Operational and CO/SPLOT/QWI training squadrons and the apparent end of fleet carriers. His clearly has a very narrow field of view and is only concerned with preservation of fixed wing RN flying and does not care who he offends and how flaky some of the 'evidence' he quotes is and how ridiculous he appears. It is a shame he wasn't content with the recognition he deserved for his role in introducing SHAR and as CO 801.

I would think most WAFUs were more worried the Fishheads would have no qualms selling us out if it was in their interests than being threatened by the light blue.

What an absolute load of prize one bollocks

[Expatrick]

Foxtrot Oscar

Embarrassing isn't it!

[langleybaston]

Embarrassing isn't it!

Once upon a time there was the purple concept.

I am sure the informed taxpayer liked it.

I am sure the informed civilian adjunct liked it.

But greedy, small minded, jealous inbred airships and RN / Army equivalents have never bought in to the simple fact that they are paid large salaries to ensure defence of the realm.

Sad but true,

[Union Jack]

I think it is a combination of that (although 2nd Lt Nott 2GR Rtd had already changed his mind on the LPDs but Four One Commando had already been disbanded in '81) - the RAF were net winners under CMD 8288: retention of 4 F-4 AD squadrons alongside Tornado ADV and 3 extra Nimrod MR2 conversions - and the fact that that generation of senior captains and admirals had lived through the destruction of the Carrier and (warm) Blue Water navies by Maj Healey RE Rtd apparently under the belief the RAF could do the same job more cheaply and equally effectively. Although a career submariner Fieldhouse, had been first lieutenant of Hermes when the 1st Wilson government was trying to sell her to Australia in the mid 60s and Lyn Middleton was CO 809 NAS (Hermes Buccaneer squadron) at the same time. There appears to have been a climate of fear that this was the last chance to save the Navy having any role outside North Atlantic ASW and the SSBNs'; any substantial avoidable involvement of the other services had to be forestalled.

Timelord, the belief that the RAF had used deceit and underhand tactics in the 60s was communicated to me as an OUT by BRNC staff in the early 80s, I trust later generations were more enlightened.

Just to be clear, I think I understand why the were like they were, but that doesn't excuse discourtesy to the members of other services.

(AT the risk of restarting another hamsterwheel) Sharkey is the one I don't understand, though I suspect some thing he has said/written are just for effect. He had served with men in light blue when on 892, in his Falklands book he had complementary things to say about Wittering, Ian Mortimer, and Bertie Penfold, and nothing negative about the members of 1F he mentions. He is unpleasant about the RAF as an institution and members he met fleetingly or not at all. In someways I think he was redirecting frustration with the RN higher ups. He had however seen the end of the RN's Advanced, Operational and CO/SPLOT/QWI training squadrons and the apparent end of fleet carriers. His clearly has a very narrow field of view and is only concerned with preservation of fixed wing RN flying and does not care who he offends and how flaky some of the 'evidence' he quotes is and how ridiculous he appears. It is a shame he wasn't content with the recognition he deserved for his role in introducing SHAR and as CO 801.

I would think most WAFUs were more worried the Fishheads would have no qualms selling us out if it was in their interests than being threatened by the light blue.
No comment to make on the overall thrust of the post, but If I may (and with a nod to SLXOwft) I should like to put the brief reference to Admiral Fieldhouse and his preparedness to be CINCFLEET in a much clearer context.

Although certainly a "career submariner", Admiral Fieldhouse was also a very distinguished "career commander". before becoming CINCFLEET, having served as a Captain of the 3rd Frigate Squadron in HMS DIOMEDE, as a Commodore as COMSTANAVFORLANT (the forerunner of SNMG1), and as a Rear Admiral as Flag Officer Second Flotilla, before becoming Flag Officer Submarines and then Controller of the Navy. Rather than being First Lieutenant of HMS HERMES, he was actually the Executive Officer, or second in command, in the rank of Commander and, having been provisionally selected for promotion to Captain in 1967, additionally took temporary command of HERMES, including covering the withdrawal from Aden, between the departure of the then Captain Lewin (later Admiral of the Fleet - and CDS to Fieldhouse's CINCFLEET) and the arrival of Captain (later Rear Admiral Parker).

Add to the foregoing, Admiral Fieldhouse was both Deputy Director and then Director of Naval Warfare before becoming Flag Officer Second Flotilla, all of which I believe makes clear that he was indeed a very distinguished and well-rounded seagoing commander, whether above or below the waves. No wonder he subsequently became First Sea Lord, CDS, and he would almost certainly have become an outstanding Chairman of the NATO Military Committee if ill health had not unfortunately intervened

Jack

[tartare]

R/e Hermes Captain's three wars - without speaking ill of the dead - we are talking about RA Linley Middleton?
Really appreciate all the input to the original question gents.
There's something very British about this war - dreadful as it was - and not meant in a misty eyed way at all.
Enormous challenge, overwhelming odds (I read somewhere the Americans were pretty much convinced the taskforce would be defeated).
Improvisations at time bordering on Heath Robinson lash ups.
Under resourced, in some cases very outdated or unreliable equipment (GR3 radios and IFF!).
Terrible climate, brutal fighting.
Against such odds - you would have expected another story of glorious British failure.
Yet, Britain won.

[MENELAUS]

Lyn M didn’t suffer fools gladly.. be it light or dark blue, Crab Harrier pilot or ASW 2nd tourist. And continued to do so when he went on to become FONAC after leaving the ‘Happy H’. He did reserve a particular animus for Air Force officers whom he considered gash ill mannered shags… a gross generalisation of course. But a view which we’d all had drilled in to us to some extent as we progressed through the training system, which was conducted in the main at RAF establishments until we reached Culdrose, Portland or VL, or embarked. Was this view nonsense. ? Of course it was… I’ve served with enough RAF exchange officers to know that the enmity was misplaced. It was however, prevalent, and was probably a result of being in the minority at these establishments.
All that said, and by way of example, the bollocking that he handed out to a Sea King crew ( and CO and TOSK) that had ditched unnecessarily whilst conducting night FCS malfunctions at the dip ( a nonsense frankly as there was no real ASW threat and that’s what sims are for) was a thing to behold. As was the order to get back in to the aircraft ( that had stayed upright ) and recover it back to the carrier.
At the end of the day by its very nature it was always going to an RN/RM/ARMY campaign with some elements of Air Force involvement. Certain parts of the RAF involvement ( the effort involved in bombing Stanley from long range being a prime example) were ‘bigged up’ in my view to justify the time and effort. The runway continued to be used almost until the surrender by Arg Hercs. Whether it prevented them deploying other assets to the FI is another question and probably worthy of a whole new thread of its own.

[melmothtw]

Lyn M didn’t suffer fools gladly.. be it light or dark blue, Crab Harrier pilot or ASW 2nd tourist. And continued to do so when he went on to become FONAC after leaving the ‘Happy H’. He did reserve a particular animus for Air Force officers whom he considered gash ill mannered shags… a gross generalisation of course. But a view which we’d all had drilled in to us to some extent as we progressed through the training system, which was conducted in the main at RAF establishments until we reached Culdrose, Portland or VL, or embarked. Was this view nonsense. ? Of course it was… I’ve served with enough RAF exchange officers to know that the enmity was misplaced.
All that said, and by way of example, the bollocking that he handed out to a Sea King crew ( and CO and TOSK) that had ditched unnecessarily whilst conducting night FCS malfunctions at the dip ( a nonsense frankly as there was no real ASW threat) was a thing to behold. As was the order to get back in to the aircraft ( that had stayed upright ) and recover it back to the aircraft.
At the end of the day by its very nature it was always going to an RN/RM/ARMY campaign with some elements of Air Force involvement. Certain parts of the RAF involvement ( the effort involved in bombing Stanley from long range being a prime example) were ‘bigged up’ in my view to justify the time and effort. The runway continued to be used almost until the surrender by Arg Hercs. Whether it prevented them deploying other assets to the FI is another question and probably worthy of a whole new thread of its own.

Black Buck wasn't just about the runway at Stanley, but about tying down Argentinean fighters for homeland defence given that nowhere was out of range of UK airpower.

Very interesting thread, though!

[SLXOwft]

Menelaus, I probably shouldn't have got involved; I was in the processs of getting in when others were risking their lives and never had the command responsibilities of Lord Fieldhouse and Linley Middleton nor the privilege of meeting them. Though, I do remember the advice, 'you can be either friendly or tough with your subordinates but you MUST be consistent' - which from your account LM was. As a man who survived three crashes off Eagle in less than a year and flew the death trap that was the Scimitar and also has a reputation as an excellent desk officer, I can't help but admire him. However, I acknowledge that EFJ and his colleagues had an unpleasant experience while flying dangerous missions. As to Lord Fieldhouse, what I have heard about him suggests the country was very fortunate to have him in charge of Op Corporate. I do wonder if there was an element of the late Duke of Edinburgh's brand of naval officer sense of humour involved.

[DuncanDoenitz]

Black Buck wasn't just about the runway at Stanley, but about tying down Argentinean fighters for homeland defence given that nowhere was out of range of UK airpower.

Very interesting thread, though!
Exactly. In a similar vein to Op Chastise and the Doolittle Raid, some operations have an effect upon respective morale (civilian and military), present a statement of national resolve, and disrupt the enemy's strategic planning far beyond any materiel damage inflicted.

[langleybaston]

Menelaus, I probably shouldn't have got involved; I was in the processs of getting in when others were risking their lives and never had the command responsibilities of Lord Fieldhouse and Linley Middleton nor the privilege of meeting them. Though, I do remember the advice, 'you can be either friendly or tough with your subordinates but you MUST be consistent' - which from your account LM was. As a man who survived three crashes off Eagle in less than a year and flew the death trap that was the Scimitar and also has a reputation as an excellent desk officer, I can't help but admire him. However, I acknowledge that EFJ and his colleagues had an unpleasant experience while flying dangerous missions. As to Lord Fieldhouse, what I have heard about him suggests the country was very fortunate to have him in charge of Op Corporate. I do wonder if there was an element of the late Duke of Edinburgh's brand of naval officer sense of humour involved.

I have read nothing about LM to contradict my conclusion:
Thank God I never had him as a boss.

[MENELAUS]

He was an excellent administrator. And did a bloody good job with Hermes. Given that the thing was sinking most of the time and positioned quite so far to the East. Compared to N.
Frankly we were blessed with all our commanders, Moore/ LM and Woodward. They weren’t there to be charitable !

[Union Jack]

I have read nothing about LM to contradict my conclusion:
Thank God I never had him as a boss.
Unlikely of course in your role but, for your amusement on a lighter note, I understand that LM was underwhelmed when the then FOF2, inbound in a Lynx after a sea day, and flying past HERMES at anchor in Plymouth Sound, had the pilot hover in front of HERMES's very bulbous bow and pass the message "From FOF2 to HERMES: 'Would you like me to pick your nose?'":hmm:

Jack

[MENELAUS]

Unlikely of course in your role but, for your amusement on a lighter note, I understand that LM was underwhelmed when the then FOF2, inbound in a Lynx after a sea day, and flying past HERMES at anchor in Plymouth Sound, had the pilot hover in front of HERMES's very bulbous bow and pass the message "From FOF2 to HERMES: 'Would you like me to pick your nose?'":hmm:

Jack

It would probably have grated even more as his son was a Lynx pilot. And landed on Hermes during the conflict.

[Mogwi]

Lovely (true) story; The late great Fred was sent ashore by LM to find out how we could help them out. On return LM asked what the escorts had asked for and Fred answered “Send more CAP, Sir”. LM explained that he had to keep a couple of SHARs in the anti-shipping rôle in case 25 de Mayo hove over the horizon (they were hidden aft of the island, so that the admiral didn’t see them).

Next question was “Did you see my son?” To which Fred answered in the affirmative. LM then asked if his son had sent him a message, to which Fred answered “Yes, Sir, he said SEND MORE EFFIN CAP!”

Fred dismissed!

Mog

[Shaft109]

I'd like to ask a more general question but vaguely in keeping with the thread about a term I've heard - "Happy ship" vs I suppose an Unhappy ship. Having never been to sea would anyone care to elaborate?

[MENELAUS]

Just a general feeling about the way that the ship
is run and therefore the general atmosphere onboard. Bear in mind that that bit of floating ( or submerging ) metal becomes your home very quickly and you form attachments to it. And the people therein.
Hermes had the nickname the Happy H. Quite where it came from Lord knows and I’m not sure it was overly applicable during Corporate… see the foregoing. It was however quite well run as a fighting unit. Others better placed than me but the carriers in general had a good reputation, Eagle, Ark and the later Ark and Illustrious. Perhaps it was just the space available and the work.
In general terms the old man on any ship or boat ( sub for you landlubbers) had more than his part to play in the atmosphere on the ship. But it was management at every level that counted and the senior rates were the real man managers. Led usually by the Master at Arms or Coxswain on lesser ships or subs. It could also just boil down to the actual material state of the ship, (Hermes was in a dreadful state from age, as were Plymouth, and the rest of the Type 12’s, some of the RFA’s. Some limped home with damage {just about} .like Glasgow etc). Exeter had a terrible hammering, saw lots of action, had been dragged off an exercise on the wrong side of the planet, had a green ships’ company that wasn’t trained fully or worked up properly, yet managed to survive Bomb Alley reasonably intact and was an extremely ‘ happy ship’. I doubt that any one reason could be pinned down for that. It would make for an interesting case study some day.
Finally the ships’ programme ( applicable obviously in peacetime) had its part to play. A decent time ashore, as opposed to a “gash run”, and a bit of vitamin D etc worked wonders for morale. In that part of the world the only decent run would have been Buenos Aires or Montevideo; we were frankly a bit PNG in one and we used the other for disembarking prisoners ( a story for another day ). And we were a bit short on sunshine. However I had visited both with the Navy in pre conflict days and they were excellent. And great for morale.. and indeed queues outside the sick bay, for certain parts ( pun intended ) of the ships’ company.
Witness that recent execrable offering about the carrier on TV where a) there are no vantage points to occasionally watch flying ops { vital for morale for the non flyers } and therefore they are locked down in the Stygian doom for days on end and b) they went all round the Far East and couldn’t get off due to Covid and c) had Covid outbreaks on board and were confined to their mess decks and quite frankly I’ve no idea how they avoided a mutiny.
I was fortunate to serve in primarily happy ships. Despite some fairly dire circumstances on occasion.

[petit plateau]

As SLXOwft said, I too can vouch that 1980s Dartmouth staff were indeed still teaching the RAF's underhand behaviour in the matter of the CVA01 etc cancellation of the 1960s (whether rightly or wrongly; and indeed whether it was necessary or not). There was definitely a sense in that period (and since) that the RN had to work extra hard simply to maintain its viability as a reasonably rounded force.

Regarding skippers being fairly grim individuals the RAF shouldn't feel particularly singled out. If you take a read of Bartosik's behaviour you'll appreciate that they could be even more grim to their own brethren. This is only one of many such dits I've heard over the years,

"During his time in command of London he was involved in a notorious incident. Having sacked his second-in-command in the newly commissioned guided-missile destroyer London in late 1965, he was sent the strong character Mike Henry as a replacement. When London arrived in Singapore for maintenance work Bartosik, for unspecified reasons, had him placed under arrest in his cabin. Mike Henry endured this treatment, but the Fleet chaplain had to intervene with the Captain of the Fleet to obtain his release."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jozef_Bartosik

[Union Jack]

As SLXOwft said, I too can vouch that 1980s Dartmouth staff were indeed still teaching the RAF's underhand behaviour in the matter of the CVA01 etc cancellation of the 1960s (whether rightly or wrongly; and indeed whether it was necessary or not). There was definitely a sense in that period (and since) that the RN had to work extra hard simply to maintain its viability as a reasonably rounded force.

Regarding skippers being fairly grim individuals the RAF shouldn't feel particularly singled out. If you take a read of Bartosik's behaviour you'll appreciate that they could be even more grim to their own brethren. This is only one of many such dits I've heard over the years,

"During his time in command of London he was involved in a notorious incident. Having sacked his second-in-command in the newly commissioned guided-missile destroyer London in late 1965, he was sent the strong character Mike Henry as a replacement. When London arrived in Singapore for maintenance work Bartosik, for unspecified reasons, had him placed under arrest in his cabin. Mike Henry endured this treatment, but the Fleet chaplain had to intervene with the Captain of the Fleet to obtain his release."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jozef_Bartosik
To be fair to the late Captain Mike Henry, you missed a bit in your quotation from Wiki, and in order to keep a proper perspective on the current thread subject, it may also be helpful to see what, with deference to Chugalug and apologies for quoting myself, he and I posted in 2015, vide:

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The highest rank they obtained, at least as far as I am aware, was Wing Commander. - Chugalug

That is rather sad for many reasons in view of their outstanding war service, and provides an interesting, and perhaps equally sad, contrast with the post war career of Rear Admiral Józef Bartosik CB DSC, as will readily be seen by reading between the lines in both

Rear-Admiral Joe Bartosik - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1575688/Rear-Admiral-Joe-Bartosik.html)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%B3zef_Bartosik

The reference in the latter to Commander (later Captain) Mike Henry in which the then Captain Bartosik is quoted as saying 'that he considered Henry unsuitable for an important submarine appointment "understood to be impending"' is of special interest since the appointment concerned was as Commanding Officer of HMS RESOLUTION (Port Crew), the first Royal Navy Polaris submarine, and subsequently as Captain of the 10th Submarine Squadron, consisting of the four SSBNs.https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

Jack
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Thanks for those interesting links, UJ. It seems that Bartosik was very much the exception, both for good and for bad! I guess that generalisations about the Poles, or any other group of people for that matter, are best avoided as every one is an individual. There is no doubt though that as a group they very much enhanced the Royal Air Force, both in their finest hour and thereafter.

Danny good point about sons and daughters, and their sons and daughters in turn. The RAF especially should be proud of its Polish constituents and hopefully will always contain them in that way.
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Fiat lux!

Jack

[BSD]

For a further insight into the Falklands campaign a recently published book mostly about the land battle, written from a Welsh Guardsman's perspective and focusing on how the Galahad tragedy occurred "Too thin for a Shroud" is a very sobering read.

Appalling.

[Timelord]

For a further insight into the Falklands campaign a recently published book mostly about the land battle, written from a Welsh Guardsman's perspective and focusing on how the Galahad tragedy occurred "Too thin for a Shroud" is a very sobering read. I recommend reading a variety of accounts.

Appalling.


He tells his story from his perspective as a very junior officer. I think it is fair to say that there is another way to describe the events leading to the Sir Galahad tragedy that places the blame in a different place.I recommend reading a variety of accounts.

[BSD]

Reading around the subject more fully is good advice Timelord. It may be that as a junior officer his view might not be complete but as a non-military lay person this book has shocked me. Very much.

I shall indeed endeavour to read more.

[Mogwi]

Probably the most sobering 40 minutes of my life CAPing at 10k overhead the Galahad and Tristram that evening, watching the superhuman efforts of the helos trying to rescue the Welsh Guards. A thoroughly avoidable debacle with massive loss of life.

Luckily, we caught the second wave but not before one of them had hit F4 north of Lively Island. Then came the long, dark transit back for my first ever night deck landing - in a thunderstorm with 90 secs of fuel remaining. But that is another story.

Mog

[OvertHawk]

Reading around the subject more fully is good advice Timelord. It may be that as a junior officer his view might not be complete but as a non-military lay person this book has shocked me. Very much.

I shall indeed endeavour to read more.

Ewan Southby-Tailyour's work would be a good place to go next if you wish to read more on the subject.

[Bergerie1]

Mog, Tell us more. That is a very interesting story - only 90 secs of fuel left on a dark and dirty night!!

[Ken Scott]

Mog, Tell us more. That is a very interesting story - only 90 secs of fuel left on a dark and dirty night!!

Or you could just buy his book…!!

​​​​​​​A fine read, it will give you all the detail you might want.

[SLXOwft]

Ewan Southby-Tailyor's work would be a good place to go next if you wish to read more on the subject.

Chapters XVII and XVIII of Reasons in Writing to be precise and should be read in context with Chapter 8 of Michael Clapp's Amphibious Assault Falklands (wriiten with the help of Ewan Southby-Tailyour)

Loss of the Chinooks and Wessii on Atlantic Conveyor was part of the root cause, others were politics, unfamiliarity with amphibious ops, disobeyed orders from CTG 317.0, break down in communications, cap badge rivalry, general fog of war etc.

Probably a whole '5 Brigade v 3 Commando Brigade - Falklands' thread for another forum.:sad:

The reanimation of this thread allows me to ask Mog a question that has been niggling me.

LM explained that he had to keep a couple of SHARs in the anti-shipping rôle in case 25 de Mayo hove over the horizon (they were hidden aft of the island, so that the admiral didn’t see them).
I presume that this would be for two unlucky pilots on a last ditch suicide mission with retarded iron bombs - did planning get as far as the attack profile? Or was there a theory 2 inch could render the flight deck u/s?

[Mogwi]

Mog, Tell us more. That is a very interesting story - only 90 secs of fuel left on a dark and dirty night!!

The sortie was meant to be a “training” trip to complete my night deck qual and was supposed to be my first inky-poo landing. We were scrambled to cover the Tristram and Galahad after the first attack and witnessed the carnage from the overhead.

I was just approaching Bingo fuel when a further attack developed and the two of us got stuck into 4 Skyhawks at extremely (below 50’) low level. I splashed 2 with AIM9, one at V close range and one who evaded, then emptied my 30mm at a third without a gunsight (but managed 1 hit on the port flap) before pulling off. My #2 splashed him with a L and we both headed home without enough gas to get there.

luckily the ship headed towards us at max speed which allowed us to just make it back for a straight-in, glide approach from 90 miles, only touching the throttle for the first time at about 500’ as we cleared the cloud. Loads of braking stop, power and flare, followed by “expeditious” VL with the fuel low level lights flashing madly.

300 lbs remained on shut-down (200lbs/min in the hover) and pilots notes suggest up to 300 can be unuseable depending upon attitude (aircraft not pilot!).

Luckily they kept the bar open for us.

Mog

PS I am now very close friends with the fourth guy, who got back to Argentina being towed by a Herc, as fuel peed out the back of his Skyhawk as fast as it went in the front.

[Mogwi]

I presume that this would be for two unlucky pilots on a last ditch suicide mission with retarded iron bombs - did planning get as far as the attack profile? Or was there a theory 2 inch could render the flight deck u/s?

We did have a planned attack profile using a mix of 2” rockets and KRT against the Type 42s but this would have been a 2-ship, KRT only, low-level attack. Not good!

Mog

[charliegolf]

KRT for the slow of thinking Mog?

CG

[SASless]

PS I am now very close friends with the fourth guy, who got back to Argentina being towed by a Herc, as fuel peed out the back of his Skyhawk as fast as it went in the front.

Seems the Oppo's had their own share of Heroes as in most Wars where folks on both sides rise to the occasion when needed and earn the respect of their foes.

[Timelord]

KRT for the slow of thinking Mog?

CG

K=thousand, Ret= retarded. Therefore 1000lb retarded bombs as opposed to KFF free fall bombs.

[charliegolf]

K=thousand, Ret= retarded. Therefore 1000lb retarded bombs as opposed to KFF free fall bombs.

Cheers TL

[albatross]

PS I am now very close friends with the fourth guy, who got back to Argentina being towed by a Herc, as fuel peed out the back of his Skyhawk as fast as it went in the front.

Would his first name be “Hector”? Was he CASO at UNIKOM Kuwait/Iraq?
If so …a very nice guy.

[Mogwi]

Would his first name be “Hector”? Was he CASO at UNIKOM Kuwait/Iraq?
If so …a very nice guy.

The very one. Nice guy and very lucky. He was also behind me without me knowing it but his guns jammed! Mind you, I was doing 600+ at the time.

Mog

[Mogwi]

41 years ago today saw the first aerial action in the Falklands with attacks by 800NAS on Stanley and Goose Green airfields at (very!) low level and the first four A2A kills. Just to show the balance, these were a Canberra and Dagger to the RN pilots and 2xDaggers to the RAF exchange pilots.

Interestingly, three of the four pilots concerned were instructors from the training squadron (899NAS) who, like me had been co-opted to join the front-line outfits at 24hrs notice.

Mog

[minigundiplomat]

K=thousand, Ret= retarded. Therefore 1000lb retarded bombs as opposed to KFF free fall bombs.

I always wondered why senior officers used 'RAF Ret' when they left.

[BEagle]

I always wondered why senior officers used 'RAF Ret' when they left.

Oh of course, I'm sure you did....

[minigundiplomat]

Oh of course, I'm sure you did....


Mmmm this is awkward.....

You're Squadron Leader Beagle RAF Ret aren't you?

[Ken Scott]

retd
retd is a written abbreviation for retired. It is used after someone's name to indicate that they have retired from the army, navy, or air force. ... Commander J. R. Simpson, RN (retd).

I appreciate that using the correct abbreviation for ‘retired’ would render your ‘joke’ unamusing but then it wasn’t really very funny anyway…!

[Union Jack]

I appreciate that using the correct abbreviation for ‘retired’ would render your ‘joke’ unamusing but then it wasn’t really very funny anyway…!
A nice quotation from Collins in the full post, although curiously enough it is not usually considered necessary for former naval officers to add *any* :) abbreviation on the basis that they have simply moved from the Active List to the Retired List, and liable for recall up to a certain age. The principal exception of course would be for clarity such as when writing to newspapers for example.

Jack

[langleybaston]

A colleague at RAF Nicosia was so incensed by a fellow weatherman signing forecasts as Lt Cdr A B C Cxxxxx RN Retd that he decided to use his own retired rank as a post-nominal ....... JT RAF [National Service] B Sc.

S Met O was sufficiently amused that he let the joke run.

[Ninthace]

I did try to put Lt Cdr rtd in my post nominals on the RAF list when asked while going through RAFC, but the powers were not in favour.

[Mogwi]

A nice quotation from Collins in the full post, although curiously enough it is not usually considered necessary for former naval officers to add *any* :) abbreviation on the basis that they have simply moved from the Active List to the Retired List, and liable for recall up to a certain age. The principal exception of course would be for clarity such as when writing to newspapers for example.

Jack

I believe that this originated in the Elizabethan (?) era, when Naval Officers were gentlemen who returned to their estates when no longer required for duty - but retained their commissions and were subject to recall should the Bally Foreign Johnnies get uppity again. Or even foreign cousins 🙂.

Mog

[langleybaston]

I believe that this originated in the Elizabethan (?) era, when Naval Officers were gentlemen who returned to their estates when no longer required for duty - but retained their commissions and were subject to recall should the Bally Foreign Johnnies get uppity again. Or even foreign cousins 🙂.

Mog

But no Lt Cdrs in those days of course. Lt to Captain I believe, with appointments as Commanders of vessels not established for a Captain.

[As for Commandrs RN being entitled to scrambled egg on the cap, I think that has the same root]. Hardly aviation but Wing Commanders have bare peaks.

[gzornenplatz]

When I arrived at Stanley in February 1983 it was to discover that the Army ran the the ferry to the dormitory ship in Stanley harbour, the Navy's choppers were available to those who needed (or wanted) to go to other parts of the islands and the RAF ran the catering. The slogan was "Sail Army, Fly Navy, Eat Crab"

[SLXOwft]

LB,

Lieutenant Commander is an import from the rebel colonies' navy. They were Senior Lieutenants before 1914.

Officers holding the rank of (Master and) Commander were listed as such in the Navy List from the early 1700s with the date of appointment to the rank. The rating of the ship indicated the necessary rank of its captain but a commander was still a commander if he held no appointment in command of a ship.

I presume a wing commander's hat/cap design dates from the brief period they were lieutenant colonels. Either that or it was pinched to give air commodores an extra one.:E

Anyway back to aviation ...

[Get me some traffic]

I always thought it was....."Fly Navy, Sail Army, Walk sideways??"

[Widger]

French Navy ranks make more sense, Captains of Corvette, Fregate, or Vaisseau

[nonsense]

The sortie was meant to be a “training” trip to complete my night deck qual and was supposed to be my first inky-poo landing. We were scrambled to cover the Tristram and Galahad after the first attack and witnessed the carnage from the overhead.

I was just approaching Bingo fuel when a further attack developed and the two of us got stuck into 4 Skyhawks at extremely (below 50’) low level. I splashed 2 with AIM9, one at V close range and one who evaded, then emptied my 30mm at a third without a gunsight (but managed 1 hit on the port flap) before pulling off. My #2 splashed him with a L and we both headed home without enough gas to get there.

luckily the ship headed towards us at max speed which allowed us to just make it back for a straight-in, glide approach from 90 miles, only touching the throttle for the first time at about 500’ as we cleared the cloud. Loads of braking stop, power and flare, followed by “expeditious” VL with the fuel low level lights flashing madly.

300 lbs remained on shut-down (200lbs/min in the hover) and pilots notes suggest up to 300 can be unuseable depending upon attitude (aircraft not pilot!).

Luckily they kept the bar open for us.

Mog

PS I am now very close friends with the fourth guy, who got back to Argentina being towed by a Herc, as fuel peed out the back of his Skyhawk as fast as it went in the front.

https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80032738
Oral history recording, reel 18.

[Union Jack]

French Navy ranks make more sense, Captains of Corvette, Fregate, or Vaisseau
The Royal Canadian Navy (and the other Canadian Services) has got there already since they now obligingly offer both English and French, as well as male and female options for all Canadian Armed Forces Ranks (https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2022/02/update-caf-modernizes-military-ranks-french.html)

Curiously enough, Widger's interesting suggestion does not completely hold water (SWIDT) because French Navy officers other than what the Royal Navy calls Warfare Officers have an entirely different range of rank titles, and finally, whilst we may have a few vessels, we ain't go no corvettes any more!:D

Jack

[langleybaston]

Corvettes!

Whilst holding, awaiting a forecasting course, aged 22, I was posted to one of our weather ships, believed to be converted corvettes, wandering around a mythical spot in the Atlantic. Said to roll on a lawn, said to be aground on the bottles and cans, said to be crewed by reprobates, drunkards and those of unclean thoughts.
And I was to be Senior Met Man. At 22, unable to grow a beard.
I have never moved so fast to call in favours in my life, and successfully sloped shoulders to become computer programmer and operator, gopher and bagman to the Chief Forecast Research Officer.
Alls well that ends well.

[MPN11]

https://www.weatherships.com/home-page

Read all about them!

[HOVIS]

https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/80032738
Oral history recording, reel 18.
Thanks, I thought it was a familiar account.
Mog, thankyou by the way. 👍

[Union Jack]

Corvettes!

Whilst holding, awaiting a forecasting course, aged 22, I was posted to one of our weather ships, believed to be converted corvettes, wandering around a mythical spot in the Atlantic. Said to roll on a lawn, said to be aground on the bottles and cans, said to be crewed by reprobates, drunkards and those of unclean thoughts.
And I was to be Senior Met Man. At 22, unable to grow a beard.
I have never moved so fast to call in favours in my life, and successfully sloped shoulders to become computer programmer and operator, gopher and bagman to the Chief Forecast Research Officer.
Alls well that ends well.
Still trying to decide whether that narrowed or broadened the pool of prospective crew members....:D

To help LB decide whether he made the right decision all those years ago, both in terms of the crews, and the work and conditions in which they operated, may I suggest that he has a look at Ocean Weather Ship Crews (https://www.weatherships.com/crew-photos/ships-crew-page-1) If I may continue the thread drift, it's particularly interesting to be reminded from the photographs that the very notable submariner, Lieutenant Commander Alastair Mars DSO DSC* Royal Navy, served in the WEATHER REPORTER (the former Castle Class HMS OAKHAM CASTLE) following his discharge after being court martialled in extremely controversial circumstances which would never have been considered permissible today.

Jack

[Shackman]

Ah - now the thread is drifting so far away I am reminded the 'pleasure' of those long slogs by Shackleton out to 15 or 20W so as to drop Christmas Trees and Lindholm containers full of mail and other assorted goods to the Ocean Weather Ships (I and K IIRC).

PS - I still think the weather forecasts were more accurate and usable overall than with all today's super computers, radar and other gubbins. Could John Stagg have provided a better forecast for D Day today?

[lightonthewater]

Working for a UK shipowner, an old boss of mine insisted on being known as 'Captain Xxxx, retired' and accorded the respect due to his Royal Navy service, as we were encouraged to believe. It came out in due course that he was indeed a retired captain, but not a naval one: he had been a captain in the army, which, though honourable, does not have quite the same status. His credibility never recovered .

[langleybaston]

Still trying to decide whether that narrowed or broadened the pool of prospective crew members....:D

To help LB decide whether he made the right decision all those years ago, both in terms of the crews, and the work and conditions in which they operated, may I suggest that he has a look at Ocean Weather Ship Crews (https://www.weatherships.com/crew-photos/ships-crew-page-1) If I may continue the thread drift, it's particularly interesting to be reminded from the photographs that the very notable submariner, Lieutenant Commander Alastair Mars DSO DSC* Royal Navy, served in the WEATHER REPORTER (the former Castle Class HMS OAKHAM CASTLE) following his discharge after being court martialled in extremely controversial circumstances which would never have been considered permissible today.

Jack

Grateful for the references, I shall have a good look to see what I missed. Looking at the photos I did meet some of the OWS team in later career, they appeared about as normal as any Met people do. I leave others to judge ! I did work for the cleverest and nicest bloke in the Office instead, a truly great meteorologist, our equivalent of Turing.