Norways first AW101 on its side

[Smokeyboy]

Norway received it's first AW101 last Friday. Now it's laying on it's side on the Apron in front of the hanger. Do not know the circumstances.

[Smokeyboy]

www.aftenbladet.no/lokalt/i/qnpGLe/Det-nye-redningshelikopteret-har-veltet

[FNTC]

Flipped over during ground testing with the rotor running. D'oh...

[FNTC]

https://sa.mnocdn.no/images/ade5b23a-7207-4179-917b-56bd17c44d96?fit=crop&q=80&w=2048

[Wil Neverbee]

Please could someone from Norway translate this paragraph from the news article link into English.

– Helikopteret veltet mens det hadde rotor og motor i gang, og drev det vi kaller bakkekjøring. Rotorbladene har tatt nedi bakken ved velten, sier Stordal.

thanks,

Wil.

[FNTC]

"The helicopter flipped over while the engine and rotor were running, and it was performing what we call ground driving. The rotor blades have touched the ground during the incident, says Stordal"

[Wil Neverbee]

Thanks, "ground driving" is what I would call "ground running" I suppose. Google made a strange translation and called it "back driving" which confused me.

Wil.

[FNTC]

Yes, kjøring usually means driving, but could mean running (engines) as well, so I guess they might have been just running the engines while being stationary. Not sure if it was moving on the tarmac or not.

[birmingham]

Ouch!

Fortunately only pride seems to have been hurt! Looks expensive though.

[Wil Neverbee]

Carefully lift it back onto its landing gear and then send it back to Leonardo, they will repair it good as new. They have done similar before (Merlin Mk.3 ZJ133 which fell over in the desert at El Centro in the USA).

Wil.

[cyclic]

Boss, you're not going to believe this but....

[Cazalet33]

A three point landing.

Nice bit of design that they aligned the three points of contact three-dimensionally for the beast to land on.

They think of everything when they design these things!

OK, so it also landed on its main rotor, but a boffin can't be expected to think of everything.

[SASless]

The rotor blades have touched the ground during the incident, says Stordal"

No ****, Sherlock!

[BluSdUp]

I was thinking of starting a new positive thread here , the other day,about the new Norwegian SAR Helicopter arriving. And its progress!
Was looking forward to some positive news in the Fling Wing department for a change.

Good thing no casualty's, except my national pride and tax money.
Both of which we have plenty off......!

Standing by for a debrief!
( Someone is paying for a long "Wet Brief", good thing its weekend!)
Good luck to all!
Cpt B

[heli1]

Carefully lift it back onto its landing gear and then send it back to Leonardo, they will repair it good as new. They have done similar before (Merlin Mk.3 ZJ133 which fell over in the desert at El Centro in the USA).

Wil.

And the Nigerians more recently did the same thing. Lot of power in those BERP rotor blades!

[BluSdUp]

According to an Airforce spokesman: " The personnel doing the testing was two experienced pilots.Performing a test program.
Also Stavanger Aftenblad reports Hovedredningssentralen was informed of the incident.( Havari)
Something I suppose they promptly acted on as soon as the awful racket next door stopped! ( SAR HQ Norway, Main Rescue Central, Hovedredningssentralen, HS, is located across from the RNoAF 330 Squad at Sola , SVG).

From his wording it is unclear to me if it was Norwegian officers or factory test pilots behind the wheel!
I am sure they take euros or sterling in the officer mess if the latter.

[Nigerian Expat Outlaw]

Memories of the Aberdeen taxying Tiger ?

NEO

[Aesir]

According to an Airforce spokesman: " The personnel doing the testing was two experienced pilots.Performing a test program.

Probably a translation from Aftenbladet newspaper.

Han forteller at to erfarne flygere var om bord i maskinen da den veltet. Fire personer oppholdt seg på utsiden.

Actually I believe a "Flygere" could also be construed as Airman or Aircrew. It is common in Norway for mechanics to do ground run on helicopters since pilots are rather expensive to call out there for startups. Ground resonance is a possibility then.

Any native Norwegian speaker care to comment?

[Lonewolf_50]

I don't know this aircraft, but I'll ask those who do: might this be as simple as the nose wheel not being locked, or in a fore and aft alignment, and the torque being applied a bit too rapidly? If not, sorry for the question out of ignorance.

[pedroalpha]

Such a shame.
I was really very pleased to note that Norway had selected a proven airframe from a European manufacturer for its long-term SAR programme.
Pedro

[Winnie]

Probably a translation from Aftenbladet newspaper.



Actually I believe a "Flygere" could also be construed as Airman or Aircrew. It is common in Norway for mechanics to do ground run on helicopters since pilots are rather expensive to call out there for startups. Ground resonance is a possibility then.

Any native Norwegian speaker care to comment?

Native Norgie living in Canada...

Flyger is the term for Pilot, can also be Flyver. The paragraph states "Two experienced Pilots"

There also were 4 people outside the aircraft at the time of the accident.

The military would not let an Engineer (flight mechanic) do the runs. Minimum 1 winged pilot in the captain's seat.

H.

[M609]

https://gfx.nrk.no/P9UImTSxaP5xwGMS0H6Y_Q1-oRE84jBeAThM6jMMEyJQ

[BluSdUp]

I speak and read both norwegian languishes, that is not the problem.
The way it is written it says it was two pilots.
For a military spokesman it is worded a bit strange: "The persons on board belonged to the personnel doing testing on the helicopter."
" Two experienced pilots was at the controls when it happened."

Military officers always refer to other personnel as soldiers ( Privats) or Officers.
Anyway.
We shall know soon enough .
Lets hope it is not a mechanical problem. We need the new capable Aw101!

[gulliBell]

"The helicopter flipped over while the engine and rotor were running, and it was performing what we call ground driving. The rotor blades have touched the ground during the incident, says Stordal"

My hunch is "ground driving" = ground taxiing, they were light on fuel, whipped it around the corner a bit too fast and she rolled over...hard to believe it would roll over on a stationary ground run.

[AAKEE]

My hunch is "ground driving" = ground taxiing, they were light on fuel, whipped it around the corner a bit too fast and she rolled over...hard to believe it would roll over on a stationary ground run.

Nope.

”Bakkekjøring” should be read as Ground run.
I dont know anything about this particular case, but some helos tail rotor thrust is capable of flipping it over, perhaps in conjunction with wind.

[M609]

https://www.aftenbladet.no/lokalt/i/J1Wk5j/Fortsatt-uklart-hvorfor-det-nye-redningshelikopteret-veltet-pa-Sola#&gid=1&pid=1

Some more close ups

[heliduck]

Nobody wants to be the first person to put a scratch in any new toys.....Now that’s out of way.

[[email protected]]

Dynamic rollover or Ground Resonance.

TR thrust is pushing to the right so a crosswind from the left would make it worse - lack of into wind cyclic and a light weight (higher vertical C of G) all combined could easily create the right conditions for dynamic rollover.

[malabo]

The Nigerian one was laying on its left side, this one is on the right - less chance they have anything in common. Been a few 92's that got inadvertently airborne on startup from the collective creeping up (like the elastomerics do to a 412). The 101 is a pretty well-respected SAR machine here in Canada, the only losses were from low-time pilots messing up autopilot use during night/low level.

[llamaman]

You'd have to be going some to put a 101 on it's side during a ground run. It's a pretty stable machine in that environment so would either have to be gross mishandling or mechanical failure.

[cattletruck]

Conditions do look a bit slippy, perhaps that was a contributing factor.

[BluSdUp]

I understand You fly the AW101. What kind of mechanical failure would lead to this result?
Secondly, what error would a crew do to end up with such a catastrophic result?
Is the AW101 much different handling from the SeaKing the crew came from?
How good is the simulator the crew was trained in in Your opinion?
It was daylight and some gusty winds at the day,but nothing dramatic.
Looking forward to an insiders observations.

Any other AW101 drivers out there who care to comment on the handling peculiaritys and performance versus the SeaKing?

[davigal]

I understand You fly the AW101. What kind of mechanical failure would lead to this result?
Secondly, what error would a crew do to end up with such a catastrophic result?
Is the AW101 much different handling from the SeaKing the crew came from?
How good is the simulator the crew was trained in in Your opinion?
It was daylight and some gusty winds at the day,but nothing dramatic.
Looking forward to an insiders observations.

Any other AW101 drivers out there who care to comment on the handling peculiaritys and performance versus the SeaKing?

Hi guys, I’m a formal EH101 driver, 1500 hrs on it, the problem this machine has on the ground is that it has to be taxied without using the tail rotor thrust. It uses exclusively the main rotor thrust. The front wheel has a mechanic hydraulic steering and if you use the tail rotor you may encounter the situation the gentlemen faced. Other cause is the taxing with autopilot on. Unlike the other helicopters, the Merlin has to be taxied, to avoid any unwanted input on the TR, with the feet on the ground and apply breaks with the feet only on request. Is stated on the manual that taxi with the AP on is highly dangerous due to the heading hold function of the TR embedded in the system. Taxing with the autopilot on may induce rollover due to the increased thrust of the TR during any turn to maintain heading with the AP on (trim release microswitches are on the pedals).
Third and last option maybe that on the struts, there are some selectors to harden the struts when the helicopter is parked on a moving deck or in windy conditions, failure to release those may incur in a unbalanced taxi and possible ground resonance/dynamic rollover, I.E. one released one not or both unreleased.
Hope this helps understand my view but I’m not a test pilot or investigator.
Bye

[JohnDixson]

Is there anyone viewing who can amplify on the underlying reasons behind this design concept?

[tottigol]

Any possible relation?
Alert 5 » JMSDF CH-101 crashes - Military Aviation News (http://alert5.com/2017/08/17/jmsdf-mch-101-crashes/)

[fadecdegraded]

Hi guys, I’m a formal EH101 driver, 1500 hrs on it, the problem this machine has on the ground is that it has to be taxied without using the tail rotor thrust. It uses exclusively the main rotor thrust. The front wheel has a mechanic hydraulic steering and if you use the tail rotor you may encounter the situation the gentlemen faced. Other cause is the taxing with autopilot on. Unlike the other helicopters, the Merlin has to be taxied, to avoid any unwanted input on the TR, with the feet on the ground and apply breaks with the feet only on request. Is stated on the manual that taxi with the AP on is highly dangerous due to the heading hold function of the TR embedded in the system. Taxing with the autopilot on may induce rollover due to the increased thrust of the TR during any turn to maintain heading with the AP on (trim release microswitches are on the pedals).
Third and last option maybe that on the struts, there are some selectors to harden the struts when the helicopter is parked on a moving deck or in windy conditions, failure to release those may incur in a unbalanced taxi and possible ground resonance/dynamic rollover, I.E. one released one not or both unreleased.
Hope this helps understand my view but I’m not a test pilot or investigator.
Bye

That’s quite a list and all makes sense.
One would think that there’s a pre taxi checklist with so many scenarios that could catch you out

[davigal]

Is there anyone viewing who can amplify on the underlying reasons behind this design concept?

The design on the nose wheel steering is self explanatory, a helicopter nearly 17 tons is better taxied of course with a nose wheel steering system, like on medium size airplanes on rather that stressing the fuselage with a tail rotor steering system. The strut design is as well justified because the helicopter design is originally for maritime/offshore use and whoever has been in the offshore/navy world knows how uncomfortable is having a helicopter parked on a deck that is rolling on a period that is in counter face to the period of the rolling deck on a sea state due to the struts that are working hard to keep the helicopter parallel to the ground as per the design of any dampener. Going further on the possible causes, it has been mentioned PIO (pilot induced oscillation) it happened to me either in flight with an underslung load of 2,5 tons and during landing on a deck. Someone has named it as ground resonance but is clearly PIO because increases with the time and even if you get airborne and remove the pivoting point (ground resonance cause) the aircraft still shakes increasingly. It can result in a loss of control and catastrophic consequences. The pilot should release momentarily the controls and the aircraft instantaneously stops shaking..... good luck with that!!! 😁

[pants on fire...]

Customer: 'Ello, I wish to register a complaint.

(The owner does not respond.)

C: 'Ello, Miss?

Owner: What do you mean "miss"?

C: I'm sorry, I have a cold. I wish to make a complaint!

O: We're closin' for lunch.

C: Never mind that, my lad. I wish to complain about this chopper what I purchased not half an hour ago from this very boutique.

O: Oh yes, the, uh, the Norwegian Blue...What's,uh...What's wrong with it?

C: I'll tell you what's wrong with it, my lad. 'E's dead, that's what's wrong with it!

O: No, no, 'e's uh,...he's resting.

C: Look, matey, I know a dead chopper when I see one, and I'm looking at one right now.

O: No no he's not dead, he's, he's restin'! Remarkable bird, the Norwegian Blue, idn'it, ay? Beautiful plumage!

C: The plumage don't enter into it. It's stone dead.

O: Nononono, no, no! 'E's resting!

C: All right then, if he's restin', I'll wake him up!

(shouting at the cage)

'Ello, Mister Polly Parrot! I've got a lovely fresh cuttle fish for you if you show...(owner hits the cage)

O: There, he moved!

C: No, he didn't, that was you hitting the cage!

O: I never!!

C: Yes, you did!

O: I never, never did anything...

C: (yelling and hitting the cage repeatedly) 'ELLO POLLY!!!!!

Testing! Testing! Testing! Testing! This is your nine o'clock alarm call!

(Takes parrot out of the cage and thumps its head on the counter. Throws it up in the air and watches it plummet to the floor.)

C: Now that's what I call a dead parrot.

O: No, no.....No, 'e's stunned!

C: STUNNED?!?

O: Yeah! You stunned him, just as he was wakin' up! Norwegian Blues stun easily, major.

C: Um...now look...now look, mate, I've definitely 'ad enough of this. That parrot is definitely deceased, and when I purchased it not 'alf an hour ago, you assured me that its total lack of movement was due to it bein' tired and shagged out following a prolonged squawk.

O: Well, he's...he's, ah...probably pining for the fjords.

C: PININ' for the FJORDS?!?!?!? What kind of talk is that?, look, why did he fall flat on his back the moment I got 'im home?

O: The Norwegian Blue prefers kippin' on it's back! Remarkable bird, id'nit, squire? Lovely plumage!

C: Look, I took the liberty of examining that parrot when I got it home, and I discovered the only reason that it had been sitting on its perch in the first place was that it had been NAILED there.

(pause)

O: Well, o'course it was nailed there! If I hadn't nailed that bird down, it would have nuzzled up to those bars, bent 'em apart with its beak, and VOOM! Feeweeweewee!

C: "VOOM"?!? Mate, this bird wouldn't "voom" if you put four million volts through it! 'E's bleedin' demised!

O: No no! 'E's pining!

C: 'E's not pinin'! 'E's passed on! This chopper is no more! He has ceased to be! 'E's expired and gone to meet 'is maker!

'E's a stiff! Bereft of life, 'e rests in peace! If you hadn't nailed 'im to the perch 'e'd be pushing up the daisies!
'Is metabolic processes are now 'istory! 'E's off the twig!
'E's kicked the bucket, 'e's shuffled off 'is mortal coil, run down the curtain and joined the bleedin' choir invisibile!!

THIS IS AN EX-CHOPPER!!

[roybert]

Nobody wants to be the first person to put a scratch in any new toys.....Now that’s out of way.
I agree Heliduck but most individual I know just hit a hidden corner with a ballpeen hammer to put the dent it to get it over with. This is a little extreme

[davigal]

That’s quite a list and all makes sense.
One would think that there’s a pre taxi checklist with so many scenarios that could catch you out

I see your point and I agree with that but my original reply was for a post asking what are the possible muscle memories for a driver which is an ex sea king qualified. If you were an ex sea king pilot you probably remember that the sea king is taxied with the thrust of the tail rotor using a tail wheel that’s free of moving. It’s s total different concept and it may induce fresh qualified pilots in error. I had to force myself the very first flights (100 has or so) not to step on the pedals. As I wrote below the causes could be also PIO (pilot induced oscillation).

[JohnDixson]

Davigal, thank you for the additional info. But all the issues mentioned, the design challenges with larger helicopters have been successfully addressed with non powered, fully castering nose wheels. The only large US helicopter exception to that statement is the CH-47, and Boeing went to a powered left rear gear in 1964, and not because of size or gross weight, but because of a main rotor design issue: the droop stops were set so tight that taxi pedal inputs larger than 3/4 inch resulted in droop stop contact and in many cases, failure of the droop stop, with embarrassing consequences during the subsequent shutdown sequence.

I’m just being curious, as I’ve been to Yeovil and they are very good, therefore my thinking is that they wouldn’t have wanted to make their system that much more complicated unless there was another consideration in play.

[SASless]

I begin to appreciate Mr. Sikorsky and Mr. Boeing's Engineers more and more.

Sometimes simple is in fact better.

The Chinook's power steering system and castering Aft gear could cause enough heart ache but the 101 seems a tad too complex for some reason.

[davigal]

I begin to appreciate Mr. Sikorsky and Mr. Boeing's Engineers more and more.

Sometimes simple is in fact better.

The Chinook's power steering system and castering Aft gear could cause enough heart ache but the 101 seems a tad too complex for some reason.

I agree, simpler is better but....on the other hand, pilots are called pilots for a reason. I’ve flown that machine and I had to stop when I left the navy sadly, I assure that all the mishaps happened are pilot error. I don’t see any harm in having an assisted steering wheel as in the airliners. As I said all the pilots that come from a simplex system background, tend to have more snags to deal with regarding muscle memory before adapt with all the new machines. One other snag, is not only an AW issue is the trim on the collective that is a common feature on all the helicopters with 4 axis autopilot. People that come from simplex system background sometimes fail to lower completing the lever and leave it partially lifted with just enough torque to generate vibrations that could induce in “resonance” which effectively is not resonance but PIO when taxing. Again I agree in simpler better, but I don’t see nothing complex in steering with a switch in the cyclic rather using the pedals. Is just adapting and thinking a bit outside of the box we’re tailored all in due to the extreme experience we have on more simpler aircrafts.
Cheers

[dangermouse]

Nosewheel steering design requirements for 101 (info for SASless)

The NWS system operates the way it does due to the RN requirement for the aircraft to be recovered into a ships hangar with no-one on deck (itself a pretty tough requirement to meet on a frigate in the north atlantic). Based on Lynx experience the RN aircraft is required to have a deck lock (harpoon) at the centre of rotation of the aircraft, that engages into a grid on the deck, the aircraft is then orientated towards the hangar by spinning around the deck lock with the nosegear at 90 degs (castored). The Lynx manages this by having the main gear orientated outboard with a free castoring nosegear, this works fine but the gear orientation has to be carried out by groundcrew and when locked outboard prevents any ground handing (the Lynx was not required move into the hangar independently, the Merlin was). This was deemed unworkable on the 101 given the size of the aircraft and the need to also have the capability to enter the hangar (mainwheels must remain fore/aft) with no one on the deck. Therefore a powered castoring nosegear system was selected. This moves the gear to 90 degs so the aircraft can be orientated correctly to allow the automatic deck handling shuttles to engage the u/c legs to pull the aircraft into the hangar.

Now as you have a powered castoring nosegear it makes sense to use some of the capability to allow ground steering to be carried out, the NWS has 50 degs of movement either side of fore/aft to allow steering during ground taxiing to take place. There are speed limits for using this system and for higher speeds either use of differential main gear braking or the tail rotor can be used to control heading. Obviously disengaging heading hold is a good idea when ground handling, FRCs include the appropriate limits and warnings which have been mentioned previously.

So as the RN aircraft uses that system specifically to meet a basic RN requirement, for commonality across 101 variants they all have it.

The strut change mentioned by davigal is specific to naval variants of the 101 and allows the main gear damping value to be selected from 'soft' to 'hard' to prevent excessive aircraft motion when embarked on ships, it is manually selectable from outside the aircraft and the status is included in the preflight walkaround checks. I suspect that the Norway aircraft not being a naval variant doesn't have this option in any case

In any case I don't think we can imply anything as a cause of the incident as the nosegear is obviously orientated fore/aft in the photos.

[Xmit]

For ground taxying the AW101, we recommend that the non-handling pilot puts his or her feet firmly on the inner section of the yaw pedals to resist any unwanted input from the handling pilot. This also breaks the yaw channel microswitches so, even if the AP is still engaged, the heading-hold will not affect the pedal position.

Ground handling accidents are not the sole preserve of the AW101!

[FC80]

These systems seem to be inviting Mr Murphy to the party - why not have WOW switches disabling AP functions on the ground?

[JohnDixson]

Thanks for the design info DM. In some other forum it would be informative to read the RN’s views on the Lynx system vs the Canadian haul down for frigate recovery ops.

[dangermouse]

I think the RN view is that until you are actually firmly on the deck it is better to not be attached to the ship at all!!

Surely an issue with the haul down is getting the aircraft to connect to the ship whilst hovering (how is that done?), I guess that needs a team on the deck, the RN view is probably that (certainly for Merlin) the deck is unmanned, which given the sea states required to operate in, is safer than having people on a wet moving deck.

Both Merlin and Lynx/Wildcat have significant subminimum pitch available to stick the aircraft on the deck until the harpoon engages (which takes a few seconds at most) only when secured by that are the engines shutdown and either the aircraft moved into the hangar or lashed down.

[alphadog]

Customer: 'Ello, I wish to register a complaint.

(The owner does not respond.)

C: 'Ello, Miss?

Owner: What do you mean "miss"?

C: I'm sorry, I have a cold. I wish to make a complaint!

O: We're closin' for lunch.

C: Never mind that, my lad. I wish to complain about this chopper what I purchased not half an hour ago from this very boutique.

O: Oh yes, the, uh, the Norwegian Blue...What's,uh...What's wrong with it?

C: I'll tell you what's wrong with it, my lad. 'E's dead, that's what's wrong with it!

O: No, no, 'e's uh,...he's resting.

C: Look, matey, I know a dead chopper when I see one, and I'm looking at one right now.

O: No no he's not dead, he's, he's restin'! Remarkable bird, the Norwegian Blue, idn'it, ay? Beautiful plumage!

C: The plumage don't enter into it. It's stone dead.

O: Nononono, no, no! 'E's resting!

C: All right then, if he's restin', I'll wake him up!

(shouting at the cage)

'Ello, Mister Polly Parrot! I've got a lovely fresh cuttle fish for you if you show...(owner hits the cage)

O: There, he moved!

C: No, he didn't, that was you hitting the cage!

O: I never!!

C: Yes, you did!

O: I never, never did anything...

C: (yelling and hitting the cage repeatedly) 'ELLO POLLY!!!!!

Testing! Testing! Testing! Testing! This is your nine o'clock alarm call!

(Takes parrot out of the cage and thumps its head on the counter. Throws it up in the air and watches it plummet to the floor.)

C: Now that's what I call a dead parrot.

O: No, no.....No, 'e's stunned!

C: STUNNED?!?

O: Yeah! You stunned him, just as he was wakin' up! Norwegian Blues stun easily, major.

C: Um...now look...now look, mate, I've definitely 'ad enough of this. That parrot is definitely deceased, and when I purchased it not 'alf an hour ago, you assured me that its total lack of movement was due to it bein' tired and shagged out following a prolonged squawk.

O: Well, he's...he's, ah...probably pining for the fjords.

C: PININ' for the FJORDS?!?!?!? What kind of talk is that?, look, why did he fall flat on his back the moment I got 'im home?

O: The Norwegian Blue prefers kippin' on it's back! Remarkable bird, id'nit, squire? Lovely plumage!

C: Look, I took the liberty of examining that parrot when I got it home, and I discovered the only reason that it had been sitting on its perch in the first place was that it had been NAILED there.

(pause)

O: Well, o'course it was nailed there! If I hadn't nailed that bird down, it would have nuzzled up to those bars, bent 'em apart with its beak, and VOOM! Feeweeweewee!

C: "VOOM"?!? Mate, this bird wouldn't "voom" if you put four million volts through it! 'E's bleedin' demised!

O: No no! 'E's pining!

C: 'E's not pinin'! 'E's passed on! This chopper is no more! He has ceased to be! 'E's expired and gone to meet 'is maker!

'E's a stiff! Bereft of life, 'e rests in peace! If you hadn't nailed 'im to the perch 'e'd be pushing up the daisies!
'Is metabolic processes are now 'istory! 'E's off the twig!
'E's kicked the bucket, 'e's shuffled off 'is mortal coil, run down the curtain and joined the bleedin' choir invisibile!!

THIS IS AN EX-CHOPPER!!
I wish this site had an upvote sistem .:ok:

[GipsyMagpie]

These systems seem to be inviting Mr Murphy to the party - why not have WOW switches disabling AP functions on the ground?
I suspect the new AFCS which has been introduced on Norwegian variant had exactly that function. It's a complete refresh of the original system.

[Xmit]

How would such a system work? If I were taking off from the deck of a small ship at night (or any time actually) I would want to be assured that the AP was fully engaged prior to lifting. A WOW switch would prevent that, unless it had some kind of override - which would compromise any protection. The AW101 does indeed have a WOW override - but as far as I know it's not routinely used.

[dClbydalpha]

How would such a system work? If I were taking off from the deck of a small ship at night (or any time actually) I would want to be assured that the AP was fully engaged prior to lifting. A WOW switch would prevent that, unless it had some kind of override - which would compromise any protection. The AW101 does indeed have a WOW override - but as far as I know it's not routinely used.

There's a difference between the SAS and the AP modes.

[Xmit]

There's a difference between the SAS and the AP modes.

The AP on the AW101 is 100% authority attitude and heading hold system. It isn't SAS. It does have a manual trim mode which is similar to SAS, but it's not routinely used because it deprives the pilot of AFCS modes (IAS, BAR, RAD holds etc).

[dClbydalpha]

The AP on the AW101 is 100% authority attitude and heading hold system. It isn't SAS. It does have a manual trim mode which is similar to SAS, but it's not routinely used because it deprives the pilot of AFCS modes (IAS, BAR, RAD holds etc).

Xmit, are you referring to the SEP20 or the AWAC200?

[Xmit]

Xmit, are you referring to the SEP20 or the AWAC200?

SEP20. Now I have to add some more characters!

[dClbydalpha]

SEP20. Now I have to add some more characters!

:). The Norway AW101 uses the later AFCS, which determines if it is on ground.

To my knowledge the SEP20 provides stability augmentation through the fast acting but limited authority series actuators, responding to dynamic disturbances. Only the parallel actuators, for AP, have full authority.

[Xmit]

That's correct, but with ASE only engaged (ie no AFCS modes) the parallel actuators still operate and extend ASE authority to 100%. Although slow compared with the series actuators, they are certainly fast enough to give problems on the ground if the ASE is malfunctioning or misused.

Maybe this isn't the case with the new system. The SEP20 has a manual trim mode which takes out the parallel actuators but, as far as I know, it's never used except during initial flying control demo sorties.

[[email protected]]

But the parallel actuators need to move the controls in order to get into an open-loop condition and extend the authority of the series actuators, this should be noticed by the pilot.

To create a demand that would cause the parallel actuators to move, an input from a sensor would be required or a demand from a pilot input (using the beeper trim for example).

[Xmit]

But the parallel actuators need to move the controls in order to get into an open-loop condition and extend the authority of the series actuators, this should be noticed by the pilot.

To create a demand that would cause the parallel actuators to move, an input from a sensor would be required or a demand from a pilot input (using the beeper trim for example).

Yes - one would hope that the pilot would notice that the contols were moving....but sadly that's not always the case.

Sometimes pilots don't physically monitor the controls, especially on the ground, and insidious movement, pehaps caused by a sticky trim switch or malfunctioning parallel actuator, might catch the unwary.

It's also worth saying that AFCS issues on the ground aren't confined to the AW101!

[BluSdUp]

The Norwegian Blue!

Thanks a lot!
I almost lost my medical.

Thanks to You and John Cleese!

I was sitting peacefully having breakfast at a hotel restaurant when checking the latest on this thread.
Hysteric laughter and heaving for air, when reading Your post!

The local CAA was just ca 100 meters away and I think another crew was considering contacting them ......

I recovered , and agreed with myself never to read pPrune in a public place anymore.
Thanks, You made my day.
Cpt B

[industry insider]

Sometimes pilots don't physically monitor the controls, especially on the ground, and insidious movement, pehaps caused by a sticky trim switch or malfunctioning parallel actuator, might catch the unwary.

Surely one of the most basic requirements covered in one's first flying lesson?

[lowfat]

Dauphne auto piot is a class example and led to fatalities . It inches the disk lower at the front and the disk you walked out of safely takes your head off when you return. ALWAYS approach and leave a dauphne from the side.

[Xmit]

Surely one of the most basic requirements covered in one's first flying lesson?

Agreed, but you'd be surprised how frequently we see pilots of all experience levels making this error - both on the ground and in the air. Perhaps the capability and reliability of modern autopilot systems, which can encourage pilots to operate routinely 'hands off', has a lot to do with this.

[[email protected]]

Dauphne auto piot is a class example and led to fatalities . It inches the disk lower at the front and the disk you walked out of safely takes your head off when you return. ALWAYS approach and leave a dauphne from the side. is that when you forget to blip the trim release after landing? The only reason it will beep the disc down at the front is because you didn't recenter the series actuators and re-datum the AP computer by pressing the trim release in after landing.

[lowfat]

Im an engineer that had the misfortune to spanner Dauphanes The disk motoring forward was demonstrated to me after I walked into the disk from the front. The fatality was the Dubai Incident.

[[email protected]]

It doesn't just do it by itself - it has to be assisted by a pilot who doesn't know his AP system.

2 options - disengage the AP after you land or depress the trim release to recentre the actuators - then the disc won't move.

[lowfat]

Well the incident in Dubai killed the operating Pilot. He got out rotors running to assist the passengers and walked into the blades on his return. I believe it was some time before he was found. Helicopter still running as if nothing was wrong.

[chopjock]

Norways first AW101 on its side

How can this be the first? At least not yet anyway!

[Phone Wind]

Well the incident in Dubai killed the operating Pilot. He got out rotors running to assist the passengers and walked into the blades on his return. I believe it was some time before he was found. Helicopter still running as if nothing was wrong.

Can you give more information on this? Which year and which company?

[[email protected]]

Well the incident in Dubai killed the operating Pilot. He got out rotors running to assist the passengers and walked into the blades on his return. I believe it was some time before he was found. Helicopter still running as if nothing was wrong. And you want to blame the aircraft for that???????

[industry insider]

The fatality was the Dubai Incident.

Wasn't there one on the Viking B in 1992 to a Bond 365N where the rotor struck and killed a member of the helideck crew?

[FC80]

And you want to blame the aircraft for that???????

I'm not familiar with the Dauphin but if you design a disc that motors forward to head chopping height after you land unless the pilot does something... guess what - at some point the oul Swiss cheese holes are going to line up.

[[email protected]]

Any AP with attitude hold functions can do this, its not unique to the Dauphin - if you don't redatum the AP by using the trim release or by beeping to a new datum or just disengaging the AP, the computer will go into an open loop condition and motor the disc to try and give you the attitude you last demanded of it.

Normally you would expect that it would try to regain the hover attitude if you haven't redatumed it and that would usually make the cyclic and the disc beep back/up at the front so if the AP was at fault in the Dubai incident then the pilot must have done something very odd with the AP.

[FC80]

Any AP with attitude hold functions can do this, its not unique to the Dauphin - if you don't redatum the AP by using the trim release or by beeping to a new datum or just disengaging the AP, the computer will go into an open loop condition and motor the disc to try and give you the attitude you last demanded of it.

Normally you would expect that it would try to regain the hover attitude if you haven't redatumed it and that would usually make the cyclic and the disc beep back/up at the front so if the AP was at fault in the Dubai incident then the pilot must have done something very odd with the AP.

The S-92 automatically disables attitude hold on the ground via WOW which seems to me to be a sensible design feature, although all the usual caveats regarding covering the controls and being aware of disc position obviously still apply.

Anyway, getting kind of off topic here... or maybe not, depending on what the Norgie report says :)

[industry insider]

Normal practice used to be to disconnect the AP after landing. Controls should always be covered by one crew member while anyone is near or under the disc. Is this still procedure or has it changed?

[FC80]

Normal practice used to be to disconnect the AP after landing. Controls should always be covered by one crew member while anyone is near or under the disc. Is this still procedure or has it changed?

Not sure if that was directed at myself or not.

There is no need (and no SOP) to disconnect AP lower modes after landing on the 92. ATT mode deselects automatically.

The 225 I believe even has a disc centring button on the cyclic for ground use, which would imply to me that the parallel actuators of the AP are still in play.

Not aware of SOP for the AW101.

[dClbydalpha]

Not aware of SOP for the AW101.

No details on SOPs, but the AFCS disengages AP modes on ground. SAS and ATT remain engaged in a reduced capacity with the ATT datum reset automatically.

[Mary]

Very unfortunate accident in Norway, but I had heard there was an incident or an accident involving a large heli in KSA a couple of week's ago? Anyone know if it was an EH101 too? Are they linked?

[Ian Corrigible]

I had heard there was an incident or an accident involving a large heli in KSA a couple of week's ago? Anyone know if it was an EH101 too? Are they linked?

Reported - based on photographic evidence - to be an S-70A-1 Desert Hawk. See Saudi heli crash (https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/601547-saudi-heli-crash.html).

I/C

[HeliComparator]

Normal practice used to be to disconnect the AP after landing. Controls should always be covered by one crew member while anyone is near or under the disc. Is this still procedure or has it changed?

Not with the later designs like the 225 and presumably the S92. The AP is engaged after start, remains engaged the entire time - ground taxiing, flight, landing on a moving deck etc - and only disengaged just before shutdown. It is automatically in a different mode on the ground which prevents any “disc motoring”. The advantage is that it’s one less thing to be able to forget (had a few 332s lift off offshore with AP disengaged, nearly crashed) and/or if you have to lift off in a hurry eg when taxying you have the AP straight away. It doesn’t use the WOW switches on the undercarriage (fortunately, as they are not the most reliable) but rather an algorithm that looks at several parameters and has various fallback modes should those parameters be unavailable. I imagine the 175 will be much the same.

Although the 101 is somewhat older tech, there’s a fair chance it’s similar.

[Ex Machina]

The 612 variant of the AW101 uses a variety of sources to assess the on ground condition: WOW status, collective position, engine torque, Nr and airspeed. Once the ground condition is established, the control gains of the pitch roll and yaw axes are reduced by 50% to avoid ground resonance when on the ground or during take-off or landing.

[roscoe1]

Notwithstanding all of the good information above, is there anything new and reasonably reliable on this event? I imagine that as accident investigations go this has to be a relatively easy one. New aircraft mostly in one piece, no fire, no fatalities or serious injuries (as far as I know), no weather or other aircraft involved, likley had a FDR and CVR and aircraft at home base, all make life easier for investigators. I would imagine there might have been factory reps on site.

[dangermouse]

I am sure those that need to know...know

those that don't will have to wait until a formal statement is made

(although Norwegian AW101s have been seen flying in Yeovil since the incident....)

DM

[[email protected]]

Essentially shorthand for pilot error then......

[BluSdUp]

I was just a trip across the fjord to Stavanger today and enjoying a windy ferry crossing. Remembering when Sleipner sunk and when Alexander Kielland flipped over, and how the great 330 Sq saved a lot of lives.
Today we had another storm with a name, Birk , I think.

The other day I talked with an old mechanic from the PBY Catalina. Interesting chap. Like a cat , used most of his nine lives.

The 330Sq first flew out of Island in 1941 and is Norways oldest operational squadron.

Anyone knows if the factory pilots was involved in this or was it my local heros !
Anyway
Lets bring on the new bird.
Looking forward to see and hear it, I can "ident" a Seaking by the sound.
And the fact they are out when the rest of us are cancelling the trip to the woodshed until the weather gets better.

A merry Xmas to all and especially You SAR folks
Cpt B

[dClbydalpha]

A merry Xmas to all and especially You SAR folks
Cpt B

All the best wishes for a quiet Christmas to the Boys and Girls of 330 Sqn.
Safe flying.

[GenuineHoverBug]

The final report on the accident from the Armed forces accident investigation commission (SHF) was published recently.
It lists 12 safety recommendations and 8 measures that has already been implemented.
The complete report is available on their web page here (https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/forsvar/statens-havarikommisjon/havarikommisjonen/helikoptervelten-242.-november-2017-med-aw101-pa-sola-flystasjon/id2625487/) (Complete report in Norwegian only)

This is the published English summary:

On November 24th 2017, a Norwegian AW101-612 rescue helicopter rolled over during start-up. The helicopter was the first AW101 Norway had received and was operated by the unit OT&E AW101. Two pilots were seated in the helicopter when it rolled onto its right side outside an Air Force hangar at Sola air base. No one was injured in the incident, but the helicopter suffered comprehensive damage.

The incident happened during ground run of the helicopter’s engines following a compressor wash. The investigation has shown that the collective was in a higher position than usual when the rotor was accelerated. Thus, the rotor blades were at an angle of attack capable of producing a significant amount of lift. Because the rotor was accelerated using two engines rather than one, it achieved full rotational speed. The combined forces from the main rotor and the tail rotor, were sufficient to make the helicopter roll over.

Over time, ambitious timelines in the project for acquisition of new rescue helicopters, combined with delays in the development of the helicopter, had created a situation of persistent time pressure for all parties involved. The time pressure and the ongoing development of the helicopter, training aids and documentation, caused challenges in regards to the training that pilots and other personnel from OT&E AW101 received from the provider. Combined with the fact that several of the pilots did not have the experience and continuity that the training program was based on, this led to known and unknown shortcomings in the pilots’ skills and competencies after completing training. The constant demand for progress, negatively affected quality assurance in various parts of the organisation, and contributed to elevated and unidentified operational risk.

No sudden or unknown technical malfunction contributed to the incident. A number of human and organisational factors contributed to the incident developing without anyone identifying or correcting the deviations. Among these were shortcomings in the crew’s system knowledge and experience with the AW101-612, insufficient risk awareness, deviations from the checklist, shortcomings in the training received, and imprecise checklist wording.

After the incident, the Air Force cancelled operations with AW101 in Norway until further notice, and initiated an additional training program for OT&E AW101 personnel. Changes were made to how the unit was organised, including adding two new crews. Planned, complementary training was given by the helicopter provider to compensate for known training deltas. The Air Force took measures to clarify and strengthen the role of the Air Force part of the project organisation in shielding, supporting and supervising the activity of OT&E AW101. The Inspectorate of Air Operations gave increased priority to AW101 by increasing staffing in the helicopter department and performing inspections of OT&E AW101.

The accident investigation board has compiled a list of safety issues related to the incident and to the broader organisation involved in acquisition and operations of the AW101, and give recommendations that may help improve safety in the Armed Forces. Several of the recommendations have already been addressed by the measures listed in the previous paragraph. For some recommendations, there is still reason to consider additional measures. This includes, but is not limited to, quality assurance of the technical documentation of the helicopter, and the role of the defence sector in the project board.

[jimf671]

There is mention of the helicopter experience of personnel in key project positions. It also notes that such OT&E units do not carry experience on the next OT&E task but are formed anew for specific aircraft OT&E tasks.

Are there any Norwegian speakers out there who can dig out more of the highlights?

[[email protected]]

But a fundamental element of starting the rotors on any helicopter is to ensure the lever is down.

[MightyGem]

Yes, but sometimes it isn't. I'm sure some of us on here have discovered that. :O

[Winnie]

Fundamentally it stated that in skipping the AFCS Check (since they were not going to fly) they also skipped the flight controls position check. This likely led them to advance throttles (flick the knob) to Flight on engines 2 and 3, the collective was at 45%, or 7 degrees of pitch, the cyclic was not centered and the machine lifted onto its side. Very generalized.

It also stated that the Check list states that due to elastomerics in the rotor head the collective will be partially up, and to NOT attempt to lower until there is hydraulic pressure.

Cheers
W.

[[email protected]]

On Airbus aircraft with elastomeric heads you can overcome them and latch the lever down without hydraulic power but they aren't as big as the 101 or it might just be design differences.

Given the checks that they skipped and the relative unfamiliarity with the correct lever position combined with poor training continuity, all the holes in the swiss cheese lined up again.

[212man]

It also stated that the Check list states that due to elastomerics in the rotor head the collective will be partially up, and to NOT attempt to lower until there is hydraulic pressure.

The S92 is the same. Here's the note I wrote in our Ops Manual Pt B 12 years ago.......

Prior to rotor engagement, the collective will rest in a midrange position. Monitor collective position during initial rotor engagement. As Nr increases through approximately 20% and hydraulic pressure increases, the CM2 shall depress the collective trim switch and move the collective to the full down position.. Avoid using the collective trim switch until hydraulic pressure builds.

(CM2 is the RHS pilot)

On top of that, with CT-7 engines (not sure if this variant is CT-7 or RTM 322) you can do the entire engine rinse and dry procedure without engaging the rotor!

Pity the same lessons have to be relearned!

[dangermouse]

On that 101 they would have had No1 engine in Accessory drive and full flight control hydraulics available before the AFCS check or rotor start. The FRCs do not state that the AFCS check is 'before flight only', they are after No1 starting and before any rotor start, there is no implication they can be skipped. The flight displays have a real time indication of control positions to the pilot so no need to rely on 'feel' either, so no excuses just bad airmanship.

I understand that one of the pilots had flown the aircraft from the UK so hardly unfamiliar, I am sure that LH would not have 'signed him off' as competent if the training pilots felt otherwise.

DM

[Winnie]

@Dangermouse, there is a whole series of pages in the report on the psychology of what was done and not done, but it is too long for me to translate.

@Crab, there was mentioning that the instructors had told the pilots that it wasn't necessary to have the hand on the collective during the accelerating of the rotor. The AW101-612 has a force trim release on the collective, so this is considered "why" neither pilot had their hands on the collective lever, so this is why they did not. It ALSO stated in the checklist to NOT ATTEMPT to lower the collective until hydraulic pressure was coming up, preceded with a CAUTION.

Other than that, the report also notes that with the limited experience on type (26.2 and 13.1 respectively in the aircraft, and 60ish in the sim), rush during training had many of them hot-switch rather than do full starts etc., it (the report) questioned why they didn't do a full start checklist, as there would have been training value for both of them.

The report also states that the AFCS checks often failed if completed before rotors turning so they would have waited until after Rotors Turning to complete. Unfortunately the "Full, Free and Clear" check of all flight controls is after the caption AFCS CHECKS, hence they didn't complete them, thus missing the non-centered controls.... That are prominently displayed on the PFD...

[dClbydalpha]

@Crab, there was mentioning that the instructors had told the pilots that it wasn't necessary to have the hand on the collective during the starting sequence, so this is why they did not...

I thought it said that PM did have his hand on the collective. The issue being not noticing that it was already high.

[Winnie]

It does, but there are a lot of factors involved, so my paragraphs of paraphrasing isn't really enough, but I can't be bothered to translate 64 pages from Norwegian to English... Too lazy.

[SASless]

Lots of dithering back and forth about all of this....but perhaps we should consider the concept that if you need a Checklist to start up an aircraft correctly then perhaps you are in the wrong business.

Checklists are supposed to be "Aids" or "Guides" and not replace good old fashioned airmanship....a notion that means you know your aircraft, its systems, and how to properly operate the aircraft.

Lord sakes....how old fashioned are we to think one would know the proper position of the flight controls before rotating blades and why ever would we think one of the two pilots would have their grubby mitts on the those flight controls.

How novel is it to think one. of the things you might consider checking is the actual position of the flight controls?

If you have a Force Trim/Mag Brake and associated Trim Release Switch for the Collective...that one would think to click the switch to ensure the mag brake is set to the physical position of the collective?

If you have a Fllght Control position display on the PFD and still have not tweaked to an unusual Collective or Cyclic position....and have not put your mitts on those flight controls....and you do skip over the Checklist entry that would have told you to check the Flight Controls.....well....I think you are really in the wrong business.

This is just another helicopter and the basic methods and practices do transfer over to new and different types even though there are technical differences in how they are applied....but the concepts are the same.

[jimjim1]

As now expected google translate declined to translate the report.

"The page you requested was too large to translate."

However, why not split the file up into pieces and translate them individually and then re-assemble the file - bound to be a web site for that.

https://www.onlinedoctranslator.com/en

I have translated it and uploaded it to google drive.
The document linked below was created by the above random website and security concerns may apply. I am reading it, you need to choose :)

https://drive.google.com/open?id=1DlpJ62GuV1rEa3DfAkqKFsSoAR3RdFjV

Let me know if link is not working for you.

Original
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/c527acf72d764354814a8e5cad3bf287/shf-rapport-2019_01-om-luftfartshendelse-med-aw101-24.nov.2017.pdf

[Winnie]

@Sasless, I agree mostly, however, there is blame to be put on multiple organizations in this case, including the Norwegian Air Force AND Leonardo Helicopters... Lack of training from one, or rather lack of relevant training, lack of knowledge between different variants etc from LH. Lack of continuity of flying from the Air Force, some of the OT&E pilots had not really flown in a year. or more... But read through the whole thing that jimjim1 posted. it may give some clarity. But blaming the crew alone for this fu$kup is a little rich.

We all make mistakes, just try to minimize the impact of such mistakes...

[dangermouse]

Winnie firstly thanks for translating and posting the relevant bits for us non Norwegian speakers, and thanks Jim for translating the whole thing

secondly as I stated earlier with No 1 engine in accessory drive the flying control hydraulics are powered so the statement It ALSO stated in the checklist to NOT ATTEMPT to lower the collective until hydraulic pressure was coming up, preceded with a CAUTION isnt relevant to this case.

thirdly are you absolutely sure that full and free checks come AFTER the AFCS checks, the report states that they are done after No1 engine starting (to confirm that there are no control restrictions?) before the AFCS check is requested and then the rotor started. As this was skipped then another swiss cheese hole was lined up

However, the report does seem to highlight that the training received wasn't all it ought to have been.

DM

[Winnie]

@Dangermouse there was a picture of the FRC (Flight Reference Card) that had AFCS CHECKS in bold, with thee full free and clear for each individual control immediatelyafter and not in bold type.

I put the collective lever warning as a reply to Crab et al, as a warning I understood to be PRIOR TO STARTING. Same with a 214ST which I have lots of time on, or my 135, which I have some time, on. You will likely break the lever if you try...

Cheers
H.

[SASless]

Winnie....there are contributing factors for sure.

But at the end of the day.....beginning with day one of a Pilot's training....in the most primary of trainers right the way to finding himself sat in the newest, most sophisticated high tech aircraft he has flown....basic skills and concepts transfer from one aircraft and level of complexity to the next.

Likewise, one's experience and progression upwards in levels of supervision, training, and safety carries the similar kinds of transferable skills and practices.

Why all of the failures that set the crew up for failure went un-noticed or acted identified and rectified?

These are not complicated ideas here I am talking about.

An example....a very simple one....in Bell Helicopters starting with the Bell 47 and forward....on two bladed systems....we learned to never start the aircraft with the blades fore and aft.....for the simple reason if they are cross ways....you cannot forget and start the aircraft with the blades tied down.

There are other reasons...but that is the simple thing.

Like wise....keepijng your hands on the flight controls is a standard practice that if used prevents some serious uh ohs....and with two pilot crews...it is easy to have one set of hands free for that purpose.

Most aircraft with elastomeric bearings do have odd Collective characteristics at start unlike the old style bearing heads so why if you moved from one type to another would that not be a transferrable bit of monkey memory?

How many mistakes did the Mishap Crew make in this roll over....have you counted them?

Gann once said....."Rule books are paper - they will not cushion a sudden meeting of stone and metal."

In this case we can substitute "Checklists" for "Rule Books" don't you think?

[212man]

As I said earlier - is there actually a need to engage the rotors to do a drying run?

[dClbydalpha]

As I said earlier - is there actually a need to engage the rotors to do a drying run?
The maintenance procedure calls up a ground run after the wash, so in terms of procedure then I suppose yes.

[212man]

The maintenance procedure calls up a ground run after the wash, so in terms of procedure then I suppose yes.
My question arises because on the S92 with CT-7s it is possible to do the entire procedure with the brake on because the engines are not required to run above idle Ng. It’s a drying run - do you think there’s a lot of difference in how dry an engine is after 2 minutes at hundreds of degrees C vs at hundreds of degrees C plus a bit more?

[Winnie]

SASless, there were many mistakes by the crew, I did not count, and I do agree. I recently moved from a steamchicken (212) to an EC-135.... Huge difference.

I think the most pressing thing that I read in the report was the crews had requested time in a helicopter, ANY helicopter, just to get the feel back, but were rebuffed with "you'll get the feel back quickly!"

I have never sat in a 101 so have no clue, but initially the collective position apparently is higher than what thy were used to from a 412, and the throw is relatively small in the 101? Who knows, but there were a multitude of poor habbit things that the crews were taught in Yeovil, that led to many of the mistakes.
Being

hand on the collective during start (have mag brake so no need)
advancing # 2, a couple second wait then # 3 EMSS (checklist said not to do simultaneously, so the didn't, but also didn't wait until the rotor had spun up to operating RRPM, which would have triggered some response as 1 engine isn't powerful enough to accelerate the rotor alone), this was learned from the instructors
AFCS check (prior to starting rotor) not done, because 1 they weren't going flying, and 2 it often failed pre-rotor start so they had started doing it later..
Not centering the controls (due to where it was after the AFCS check in the checklist.

I'm not making excuses, just trying to point out there were a multitude of learned factors that caused them to line all the holes in the cheese up...

Personally, I think the government in Norway/MOD (Norway) is to blame for most of it, due to not hiring all the necessary staff, and Leonardo, for not having the proper training materials ready/available, and MOJ (Norway) for being cheap with the training money. After all, there was a HUGE amount of money spent on this, spending a few additional hours on actual aircraft time would have proven beneficial. But that is Norway in a nutshell, "Spare seg til fant" (save yourself poor). Pinch pennies and throw big money away.

[SASless]

If a Rotors stopped, engine run will suffice....would you be happy. if an Engineer and not a Pilot did that procedure?

[FH1100 Pilot]

212man axed:As I said earlier - is there actually a need to engage the rotors to do a drying run?
Perhaps not, technically. And with perfect hindsight we can say that they shouldn't have turned it up. But we have to delve into the mind of the helicopter pilot a little. (We don't have to delve deeply...and can't, really because with most of us there isn't much depth there.)

Consider: It was a new machine and none of the pilots had much time in it. So these two jokers were tasked with doing a ground run...a "dry run" if you will, and all that was required was running the engines. Is there a pilot among us who would not engage the rotor and bring her up to speed? I would have. You too, most likely. Admit it. (And I'm using the collective "you" here, not the cyclic "you" aimed at 212man.)

But here's the thing. And I keep harping on this all the time. If you take a helicopter rotor up to operational speed, you have to assume that you're going flying. Because...you know...you are. Even if the blades don't happen to be at an angle of attack to lift the helicopter off the ground, they're very capable of doing just that. It's like doing a "taxi test" by running a fixed-wing down the runway at takeoff speed with all the control locks in place: Stupid! No one would do that. But we dumb helicopter pilots do it all the time!

Let's cast our memory back a bit to the famous accident where the police 206B came off the dolly and ended up on its side. We've all seen the video, right? It was "just" a ground-run. We can tell from the uncowled state of the aircraft that the pilot was not intending to fly. He probably had his foot up on the doorsill, propping the door open as all of us 206 drivers do when it's hot out. More importantly, since this was just a ground-run, he probably had the cyclic and collective frictions on tight. Hey, we're not going flying, right? And then the dolly starts rolling because of the famous "SUDDEN GUST OF WIND!" The pilot grabs the controls and inadvertently gets the thing airborne. Only now...yikes!...ohmygod...damn!...what the...how the...damn...ohhhhh no...BOOM.

Sing it with me now! "Another one bites the dust...hey!"

So here's the lesson: Treat EVERY turn-up of the main rotor as a flight. Don't go to 100% unless you're ready, willing and able to be airborne.

[BluSdUp]

Compressor was , Eh!
Well that is demanding stuff.!
QUIT PISSING AWAY MY TAXMONEY!
We get you new C130s ,,,,,,,,,,CFIT!
We finally get you new SAR heli, and you start washing them!!
We get you new Frigates and you broadside a Supertanker and promptly sink!

What is the latest tactics?
Killing Putin by laughter!!!??

I retired from the reserves some years ago, but expect a letter any day now!

[Ex Machina]

Compressor was , Eh!
Well that is demanding stuff.!
QUIT PISSING AWAY MY TAXMONEY!
We get you new C130s ,,,,,,,,,,CFIT!
We finally get you new SAR heli, and you start washing them!!
We get you new Frigates and you broadside a Supertanker and promptly sink!

What is the latest tactics?
Killing Putin by laughter!!!??

I retired from the reserves some years ago, but expect a letter any day now!

Which is exactly why the report reads like a very political attempt to shift the spotlight away from Air Force and onto the MOJ and the OEM.

There will almost always be systemic failures that contribute to accidents, but in this case the causal factor was nothing more than a schoolboy error and someone needs to take ownership of that.

[etudiant]

Which is exactly why the report reads like a very political attempt to shift the spotlight away from Air Force and onto the MOJ and the OEM.

There will almost always be systemic failures that contribute to accidents, but in this case the causal factor was nothing more than a schoolboy error and someone needs to take ownership of that.

Any organization that is unused for decades will corrode internally. The various NATO forces are surely cases in point.
Norway's recent loss of a frigate illustrates the problem, poorly trained but politically correct crew on a ship whose damage control checked the boxes but did not work, so an avoidable accident turned into a total loss.
German in service rates for military equipment suggest Norway's performance is the norm, not the exception for NATO>