RAF Rivet Joint

[Willard Whyte]

http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1213/hc06/0684/0684_ii.pdf

Seems to suggest that it is resources for through-life support that has been approved until March '25.

On 23 June 2011 the Chief of Defence Materiel signed on behalf of the Secretary of State for Defence a Memorandum of Understanding for Sustainment and Follow-on Development that had been signed by the USA Under-Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) earlier that month, covering a Cooperative Agreement to provide support and capability updates for the USA and UK fleets of Rivet Joint aircraft and ground systems. This agreement runs to 31 March 2025.

One hopes that capability beyond '25 will be subject to ongoing assessment.

[Squirrel 41]

Willard -

That AIN piece (http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/2013-10-30/rivet-joint-airworthiness-questioned-uk-maa?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter) states that the USAF are intending to operate RJs to 2042, so I would expect (hope?) that the RAF will do the same.

S41

[Willard Whyte]

Indeed, my point was that support has only, thus far, been approved until '25. Logic would suggest that keeping our RJs in parallel with the USAF's beyond that date would be sensible from economic and capability points of view.

[alfred_the_great]

Surely this is a good thing. Operational Capability has been delayed at the hands of airworthiness process. Job is truly jobbed.

[Chugalug2]

downsizer:-
It seems the MAA is getting cold feet wrt RJ....
The MAA should have cold feet wrt to the MAA! So far it's claim to fame seems to be to scrap fleets because of concern over their airworthiness or as here before they even get an RTS.

They are incapable of ensuring the airworthiness of such fleets, or indeed of any fleets because the system was effectively sabotaged in the late 80's by the malevolent actions of Air Officers, mainly by replacing highly skilled, properly trained, and experienced engineers with unskilled, untrained, and inexperienced equippers who were ordered to suborn the Regulations, and did so.

The MAA is thus compromised still and unable therefore to do its job. It needs to be wrested from the MOD, and made completely independent of it. Ditto the MAAIB, which in turn must be independent of the MAA. Then and only then can the slow reform of Military Air Regulation and Investigation begin. The competency problem will remain and will require the "sistering" of these two functions with the CAA and AAIB respectively, with Civilian DG's to head them. Or we can just carry on and wait for the Airworthiness Related Accidents to continue...

[VX275]

The U.S. official praised the contribution of the newly-trained British crews. He also noted that the UK had been given “unprecedented and total” access to the highly classified SIGINT systems on the Rivet Joint.

Stuff the SIGINT systems, I reckon it'll be the total lack of access to design and qualification data for the airframe that's got the MAA's back up.

The only way you could satisfy today's post Hadden Cave airworthiness requirements is to start with a modern design not one that started out life on a 1940's drawing board.

[Squirrel 41]

Forgive me for being stupid, but is anyone empowered to read across the USAF RTS to the RAF? I seem to recall being told that this was what happened with the C-17, and was the reason/excuse for 99 Sqn crews to wear US flying suits.

S41

[Party Animal]

Stuff the SIGINT systems, I reckon it'll be the total lack of access to design and qualification data for the airframe that's got the MAA's back up.




That is of course if such data still exists and/or is still accessable?

[Roland Pulfrew]

S41

I can't answer your question , but
I seem to recall being told that this was what happened with the C-17, and was the reason/excuse for 99 Sqn crews to wear US flying suits.


The reason for the US flight (should that be flight?) suits was because we were renting the aircraft. Under the contract they had to be operated in the same way as any USAF ac and that included flying suits and head sets. Not sure what the excuse is now though - maybe we really don't want to lift that stone!!

[dervish]

The only way you could satisfy today's post Hadden Cave airworthiness requirements is to start with a modern design not one that started out life on a 1940's drawing board.


I might have the wrong end of the stick here but surely the point is that the pre and post Haddon Cave requirements need not have changed. It was the implementation that was wrong, not the regulations. But the MAA has started rewriting the regulations for no apparent reason. People now infer the poor regulations were to blame, not those who ignored them. In other words, the MAA exists to help some senior people cover their arses. I still think this summary has got it pretty much right.

https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/8-the-military-aviation-authority-maa

[Chugalug2]

Hammer, Nail, Head, dervish! The RAF has two choices, to protect its aircrew and pax, or to protect retired and serving Air Officers and their Staffs. So far it has chosen the latter option for the past 26 years, at the cost of many Airworthiness Related Fatal Air Accidents.
It shows no sign of changing, hence the compromised Haddon-Cave report, hence the compromised MAA, hence the absence of effective UK Military Airworthiness Regulation, hence unairworthy military airfleets. That has nothing to do with the Regulations, but everything to do with those who cannot or will not enforce them.
Rebadging and rewriting is simply rearranging the deck chairs as the water rises ever higher. The RAF, as the major military air operator, has to bite the bullet and realise that self regulation doesn't work and in aviation it kills!

[alfred_the_great]

The RAF has one choice - to maintain Operational Effectiveness to do any task asked of it by HMG.

Nothing more, nothing less.

[Corrona]

Chugalug states

"They are incapable of ensuring the airworthiness of such fleets, or indeed of any fleets because the system was effectively sabotaged in the late 80's by the malevolent actions of Air Officers, mainly by replacing highly skilled, properly trained, and experienced engineers with unskilled, untrained, and inexperienced equippers who were ordered to suborn the Regulations, and did so".

As a current PT Engineer Officer I often find myself wondering about what existed before and the real reason we find ourselves in the apparently crazy position we are today. Please forgive the thread drift but perhaps some one could elaborate on the pre "late 80's" airworthiness system and explain exactly what it was that was done to that system.

[Chugalug2]

Corrona:-
perhaps some one could elaborate on the pre "late 80's" airworthiness system and explain exactly what it was that was done to that system.
Someone already has:-
https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/8-the-military-aviation-authority-maa
dervish had already posted the link above my post. With the nights drawing in I commend it to anyone who wants, like you, to understand
about what existed before and the real reason we find ourselves in the apparently crazy position we are today.
It was nothing less than deliberate sabotage of UK Military Airworthiness, perpetrated at the highest levels of the Royal Air Force in order to achieve a short term financial solution to fiscal incompetence... also perpetrated at the highest levels. Its long term consequences have been tragic and profound, witness as you say the chaotic situation that pertains today.
What's to be done? First, the RAF has to face up to and own up to what was done, the cover up has to end now, and the MAA and MAAIB have to be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Then, and only then, can the work of airworthiness reform begin. It will take a long time to do that, which is ironic given that the damage was done by just a few men issuing a few illegal orders over 25 years ago.

[NoVANav]

Bravo Sierra! Once again a newly established governmental organization must justify itself by harassment, micromanagement, delay and "officiousness". Only then will everyone take them 'seriously'. "We must correct the errors of the past by being a**h**** today, no matter that we are attacking the wrong issue."
It is the same on the US side of the Atlantic wrt "new" offices.

Review: KC/RC-135s are scheduled to operate through 2042; E-Systems/Raytheon/L-3 Com facility at Greenville have maintained and modified the RC-135 fleet for over 40 years. The Big Safari Project Office has managed this program and others (U-2s, RPV, all other "special" USAF aircraft programs). Specific RC-135s have flown over 40000+ hours without any major problems. (I don't remember any airframe problems with any -135. Most accidents are due to mistakes by the aircrew.)

I can understand the USAF telling the MAA offices to stuff it. Perhaps the MoD can do a quick overpaint of the RAF markings, slap on stars and bars, fly the Airseeker to Mildenhall and begin ops training under a "false flag", or with a token USAF body on-board. After all, at present the RAF long-range SIGINT capability is zip, zero, nada (as we say over here).

(4000 hours in KC/RC-135s; survivor of KC-135 - F-4C Phantom mid-air collision; RC-135U Air Staff program manager)

[chopper2004]

Back to the C-17 question, why wouldn't aircrew want to wear flight suits, as its operational and combat flying and landing near the front line. Were the Lyneham WIng, and Brize squadrons all wearing no.2 during operations from Corporate to Granby and Deny Flight to Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom?

I'm guessing that the then Lyneham lot wore flight helmets for the likes of delivering aid to Sarajevo etc etc like our American cousins did. If you look at Tim Laming's publication on the Bosnia Air War, a good photobook (done with help from an ex gf's brother whose a professional photographer) , there's a nice photo of a Ramstein Fat Albert pilot with CS vest, nice little automatic and HGU-55P. The same b/w photo was used in the USAF Yearbook 1993 published by the RAFBF.

Unless one is 007 and arrive in a penguin suit into a firefight :cool::E

In a Hollywood type National Lampoons or Hotshots production one could imagine a crew of Air Seeker / Rivet Joint, decked out in penguin suits and a red rose in the lapel :ugh::ok::E:p

Cheers

[BEagle]

The reason for the US flight (should that be flight?) suits was because we were renting the aircraft. Under the contract they had to be operated in the same way as any USAF ac and that included flying suits and head sets. Not sure what the excuse is now though - maybe we really don't want to lift that stone!!

If I recall correctly, after a Hercules operational accident one of the aircrew was delayed in evacuating from the wreckage because his CS95 caught on something? There were no DPM flying suits available back then, so use of CS95 had been approved - but no-one had done a compatibility assessment.

If US flight suits have been fully assessed for compatibility with the C-17, what would be gained by spending a lot of time and effort, not to mention money, on re-assessing UK flying suits / AEA for use in the aircraft?

[Wensleydale]

If US flight suits have been fully assessed for compatibility with the C-17, what would be gained by spending a lot of time and effort, not to mention money, on re-assessing UK flying suits / AEA for use in the aircraft?

And the US winter cold weather flying jackets are rather nice and warm.

[dragartist]

Beags,
It was not the CS 95 but the garment he had on top that caused the problem.

It is true that CS 95 was included in the back of the MAR before it became the RTS. but this was highly caveated "at the discretion of the CO or simmilar" It might even have been a Service Deviation. The main issue with CS95 was fire retardance (or lack of).

The choice was: you might fry in a crash or look like the blokes in the back during any escape and evasion. The CO had to decide which scenario was most likely.

Not seen any 1 piece DPM flying kit but a FR two piece that looked like CS95 was introduced for the RW boys. Not sure if any of the FW crews were scalled for this.

I am guessing but was the US grow bag more comfortable to wear for a long duration on a C17. Do they offer the same level of protection in a fire?

I think what is important to note about this so far as Clearances/Airworthiness/Flight Safety matters are concerned all these things should be considerd in the round. I believe the main thing folks on here are worried about with this 135 is will the wings fall off? It will not matter if the crew are equipped with UK or US Growbags.

One of my ILAFFT moments concerns gloves. Down the back of our R you can imagine gloves did not help the knob twiddleing and button pressing. We had an emergency evacuation on landing at Wyton once and my mate burned his hands baddly comming down the rope. He fell off and would have been flattened by the rest of the formation eating team following (OK I embelished that last bit). After that I always wore my gloves during take off and landing. Having worked along side some of the AEA team and seen the RAFCAM films all I can say is the flying kit our guys are issued with is far beter now than it was 10 years ago.

[Jet In Vitro]

Fire protection properties of USAF flight suits is better than RAF flight suit.

[dragartist]

Thanks JIV, If that is the case who signs the AECs to say the UK ones are ALARP?

Sorry, I know this does not answer the question about the wings falling off the RJ.

I am tending towards the view of NoVANav.

I did have to laugh about the Pocock article and the mention of QQ being referred elsewhere by the USAF. I wondered why our MoD are sub contracting their responsibilities again. Lend me your watch and I will tell you the time. What happened to the Structural Integrity Group we had in the Royal Air Force?

[Squirrel 41]

NoVANav said:

The Big Safari Project Office has managed this program and others (U-2s, RPV, all other "special" USAF aircraft programs). Specific RC-135s have flown over 40000+ hours without any major problems. (I don't remember any airframe problems with any -135. Most accidents are due to mistakes by the aircrew.)

Completely agree that the UK should read it the USAF RTS across, but weren't there some problems with the tails (hence the use of ex-airline 707 tails)? And on a pedantic point, wasn't RIVET AMBER assessed to be an airframe problem leading to its loss?

S41

[Jet In Vitro]

Drag artist. You make a good point which has not been missed by the Aircrew, FC, AI and AT at Waddo.

[Jet In Vitro]

Royal Aeronautical Society | Event | Project AirSeeker (Rivet Joint) (http://aerosociety.com/Events/Event-List/1147/Project-AirSeeker-Rivet-Joint)

Is this the start of the shaping exercise.

Get your excuses in early.

[Chugalug2]

NoVANav:-
Most accidents are due to mistakes by the aircrew.
Yes, BoIs find the same thing on this side of the pond. Mind you, witnesses with evidence of serious airworthiness shortcomings tend not to be called before the board despite volunteering themselves to do so. Tends to skew the outcome somewhat!

Corrona, I should have added in my reply to you that many of the facts stated in the link that dervish and I posted were included by Haddon Cave in his report, yet strangely he attributed the start date to 1998 even though the evidence was dated between 1987-96, which he bizarrely characterised as a Golden Era of Airworthiness! Now why should he do that, and why should the very foundation of the MAA be based on such contradictions?

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

wasn't RIVET AMBER assessed to be an airframe problem leading to its loss?


Not that anyone knows exactly what happened to Rivet Amber anyway, but that airframe managed to bring the crew home despite the turbulence encounter...it was only when it was flown again despite visible damage to a known weak area that it mysteriously disappeared...

One trusts that all 707 derivatives had the fin attachment mod some decades ago?

[NoVANav]

For Squirrel41 and Torque...
The AMBER loss is still open to question but, according to one of the crew who was not on the flight (if I remember the last presentation I saw), discussed the lack of completion of a TCTO which might have caused a problem. Not related to anything about current RIVET JOINTS or the -135 airframe in general.

With regards to the 707 tail sections being used on the -135: When the decision to re-engine some KC-135As with TF33-PW-102 turbo-fan engines from retired 707 airliners the increased thrust also required the use of the larger, broader span, horizontal stabilizers and elevators. ALL RC-135s with turbofan engines (original build and mods) had the larger horizontals as original build. A much earlier ('50s) Boeing modification increased the original -135 "short tail" to the standard 707 height.

[CoffmanStarter]

A piece in the Sunday Times today under the headline ...

"Safety fears ground spy plane"

The article mentions "concern" over the RAF RC-135's having single-skinned fuel pipes ... where a connection is then made in the same paragraph with the AFG 2006 Nimrod loss.

Humm ...

[Squirrel 41]

NoVANav,

Many thanks for that - helpful. RIP RIVET AMBER.

But I'm still at a loss why the RAF can't / won't read across the USAF's RC-135 clearance. Given the insanity of things over here at the moment, we could be offering the USAF a deal of three new RC-135s.... our munificence doesn't just extend to the USMC and cheap Harriers, you know....! :ugh: (Ok, I don't actually think that we'll bin the RJs - not even we're that stupid.)

S41

[Stitchbitch]

Bit off topic but as USAF flight suits were mentioned above, the RAFs own flying suit will soon look like the American one, yes, someone has finally noticed you don't wear flying scalves/cravats anymore and realised a high neckline provides better protection from flash fires..nice one CAM :)

[Squirrel 41]

JTO -

Thanks, very interesting. But surely this must have been known (or at least have been knowable) at the time that we decided to go down the RJ route? Presumably, the pressure on CAS is to get the jets flying, and thus to assume the risk, whilst telling the engineers to keep a very close eye on the jets. (Oh, and hope.)

This shouldn't be a major problem (until it's a problem, of course.) But on a serious point, the USAF have safely operated RJs for many years, and I presume that their fleet is monitored very carefully. Are we in effect saying that RAF engineers aren't up to this job, but USAF engineers are? Without casting aspersions, if senior folk believe that, then grounding RJs is the least of our concerns.

S41

[Jet In Vitro]

Let's hope that a a decision is made soon. I suspect an RTS will be given when the embarrassment outweighs the risk. It was known that RTS was not going to be easy at the first acceptance meeting. At the second which was the final acceptance meeting, the IPT decided that as the platform had been in service for 35 years plus, no further testing or acceptance activity would be needed.

[dervish]

I can't find a link but this was discussed when MoD announced the RJ would be in the same configuration as the US version, making read across easier. Someone pointed out here this would be highly unlikely which was followed by a less bullish MoD admission that there were challenges ahead.

[Chugalug2]

Squirrel 41, I'll leave JTO to address the points you make, but I'd just like to address the broader business of UK Military Airworthiness provision if I might.
Unbeknownst to me, and most of my fellow aviators at the time, a whole army of dedicated people were employed to ensure that the aircraft that I flew were airworthy (Chipmunk, Jet Provost, Hastings and Hercules in my case). Most of them were engineers, both CS and military, who ensured that these aircraft were constructed and operated iaw the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations.
The principle hurdle was the award of the Release to Service into the RAF or other UK Services. For this to happen the Controller Aircraft had to assure himself of the airworthiness of the aircraft (both in terms of construction and of operating, the latter being determined by Boscombe Down). Then and only then could the aircraft be offered for RTS which was the responsibility of ACAS, Both men had to agree and sign as such before the Scruggs Mk1 could go into Squadron service.
All that worked well, indeed worked better year by year as the system was honed by experience, until something went wrong. The something in my case was the tragic crash of a Hastings at Abingdon 6 July 1965, killing all 41 onboard. The cause was found to be the failure of the elevator outrigger bolts, thus removing all elevator control. Every RAF Hastings (not sure how many, say 60 odd?) was grounded until a repair requiring 1000s of man-hours to carry out (other problems at the tail empennage had been found as well). I was at Sydney at the time and spent the next two months, after the rest of the crew other than two groundcrew had returned to Changi, carrying out a weekly STI of starting up, taxying, shutting down the a/c. Even when I returned to Changi, as the rectification team had turned up at Kingsford-Smith, it was weeks before the Squadron was back to normal.
So that is what happened in the past. It contrasts sharply with what happened in the early 90's when the Chinook HC2 was granted an illegal RTS (CA had granted switch on only clearance, ie for ground instructional use only, the a/c was still being tested by Boscombe Down who grounded their aircraft as being "positively dangerous", and yet the a/c was already in Squadron service!). 29 people died at Mull, the BoI did not "discover" that the aircraft was grossly unairworthy (the positively dangerous bit was the FADEC coding, as well as UFCMs being experienced in 1,2,or all 3 axis!), the pilots were "found" to be Grossly Negligent, and the RAF still does not accept that they weren't. Yet this was a period that Haddon-Cave described as a Golden Period of Airworthiness!
The cover up of that scandal, that emanated from the even greater one that preceded it, of the deliberate dismantling of the airworthiness system that I described above, by sacking the majority of the engineers, CS or uniformed, who would not obey illegal orders to suborn the Regulations but sign them off as complied with anyway, continues to this day. Many of those who compromised themselves may still be in post today.
That is why the MAA cannot assure airworthiness, because it no longer knows how to. Every fleet is affected, not just the RJ, and the default solution of rewriting the Regs, grounding fleets or refusing RTS's to those that do not comply with them is a nonsense. There is now no RAF fleet that can be deemed airworthy IMHO, because the necessary system of continuous audit, both before and after entry into service, has not been maintained. Those that knew what they were doing are no longer there to do it.
What happens re the RJ, I have no idea. What must happen to the MAA and the MAAIB is to be made independent of the MOD and of each other, and then learn (via the CAA and AAIB) how to do their jobs again.

[Squirrel 41]

JTO-

What an informative post. Thank-you!

The basic C-135 has spanned almost all of the jet age so standards have evolved and so has the RJ. The USAF will have learned a great deal about the aircraft over the last 50+ years and they will have enhanced the design many times, over many upgrade programmes. Some of these upgrades will have been to address immediate safety concerns whilst others will have been taken on an opportunity basis. This means the aircraft will in some regards be at the cutting edge of capability and safety, whilst others will be in the 'ain't broke so don't fix it' category.

It always struck me that KC-135s are more Trigger's Broom than any other current aircraft I can think of - started life as a J-57 powered derivate of a the Dash-80 prototype, got a new 707 tail (see NoVANav's helpful post upthread), got two sets of new engines, reskinned wings, new(ish) cockpit and has been modified for umpteen different missions. I wondered how much of the original is actually left - and how do you go about auditing it from a standing start?

I think the presumption we must all avoid is that 'different' is 'unsafe' when we look at the way USAF has developed and maintained the fleet on a timescale that precedes my birth. The USAF is not stupid and if it needs to resolve an issue it is not short of professional drive or resources. Looking at our own recent history we must be careful that we measure up to our own standards. Equally, the USAF is capable of making almost unbelievable leaps of faith - see their recent accident reports for examples.

Excellent points, well made.

Above all, this is a partnership and partners need to be honest friends to effectively work together.

Amen to that.

S41

[Squirrel 41]

Chugalug2,

Many thanks for this- the Mull of Kintyre was before my time, so I hadn't appreciated that it didn't have a compliant RTS. Let's hope that they get it right from here on in.

S41

[Chugalug2]

S41:
Let's hope that they get it right from here on in.
Can't see how the can, unless they start doing as I suggest in my last para. Can you?

[Chugalug2]

JTO, the problem isn't with people so much as with the system. It was compromised, both in Regulation and Investigation, because it could be. While both systems are part of the MOD they still can be I fear. You say that the MAAIB is sorted. In what way? It is not even independent of the MAA as I understand it, let alone the MOD, or has that changed? The civvie system didn't get the way it is by chance, but of necessity. Operator, Regulator, and Investigator must be separate and independent of each other, or things like Mull can happen again and again. They mustn't!

[Chugalug2]

All well and good, but independence isn't assured by physical location, but by design. With all due respect to the present DGs of the MAA and the MAAIB, their careers and pensions are at the discretion of the operator, ie the RAF/MOD. That isn't independence in my book. Of course the MAAIB and MAA must be manned by Service personnel, they can't possibly function otherwise, but they must be established outside of the MOD and headed by civilian DGs. That is independence. "Effective" independence is not. :sad:

[Chugalug2]

So reliable Military Air Accident Investigation is assured not by the MAAIB, but by the AAIB? In that case make the obvious change and merge the two! I know that I am making waves here, and having served myself I know the irritation caused by those outside making grandiose suggestions of what to do or not to do, but this is all about the needless waste of blood and treasure.
Whether the RAF puts its hands up to the blatant misdeeds done in its name that I described above I very much doubt, but it is out there now and in the public domain. That is why the solution to this mess cannot be the usual MOD fudge and has to not only work but be seen to work. The key to all this is independence, real guaranteed independence, just as it is with the CAA and the AAIB. The RAF in particular, as the major military air operator, has to accept that or remain forever under suspicion of exerting undue pressure on its Airworthiness and Investigating personnel. The obvious solution is for those personnel to be seconded to a civilian led regime outwith the MOD. The MAAIB set up that you describe seems perfect for that, wedded with its civilian opposite number and working with it. All it needs is for it to be the military arm of the AAIB and headed by a civilian DG, rather than of the MOD with a Service DG. I emphasise that none of this is about the people concerned. It is about the system, which must be "Mull proof"!
Ditto all the above re the MAA and CAA of course.

[Squirrel 41]

Chug,

I'm an outsider when it come to the engineering points, but such a system mirroring AAIB / CAA / JAA seems very much in the RAF's own interests (NB, the Service's interests are not necessarily the same as the interests of certain individuals in the RAF.) Let's hope JTO is right.

S41

[Chugalug2]

Squirrel, the reason I rant on about all this (and how I long to be able not to) is that we are way past simply placing trust or hope in these matters. We all of us here know how unforgiving of such platitudes Aviation can be.

The UK Military Airworthiness System is one of Self Regulation, as is that of Military Air Accident Investigation (JTO's claims to the contrary notwithstanding). If ever there were a "British Disease" that is surely it, and we are all aware of how it has spectacularly failed in many other walks of life recently. The difference here is that:-

Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation it Kills!

[dervish]

I cannot see how any DG could distort an investigation and be confident that not one of the standing army of civilian investigators that are not under his control would fail to mention it to anyone!

I highly recommend reading the evidence to Lord Phillip. One of the AAIB investigators revealed he had not been shown relevant evidence, prompting him to seek a meeting with Phillip. I agree the AAIB are superb and so too a co-located MAAIB but investigations are only as good as the evidence they obtain or are granted access to.

[Jet In Vitro]

WAVE rumour this week was Tuesday 12 is the day planned for the new shinny jet to arrive.

[Rivetman]

Jet In Vitro, correct.

09:30 arrival scheduled for 12th so let's hope it's not raining too much that day or perhaps a visit to East Midlands will be required!!!!!

[NoVANav]

I talked with one of the UK air attachés this week at our Washington Branch meeting of the RAeS. The first RC is due to Waddington sometime this week. It will then move to Mildenhall when the runway work begins.
The concerns about the different board discussions are being addressed and there should be no delay with putting the Airseeker into service by the IOC date next October.

[Jet In Vitro]

Rivetman, or a hint of any cross wind!

Good luck. I hope they have a good day and are allowed to fly the aircraft as intended soon.

JIV

[Rivetman]

JIV,

Fortunately no crosswind forecast-only a damp runway expected later today. Believe the 51Sqn 'toy' is now on a refuelling stop Bangor with an arrival time still circa 09:30 today.

Thereafter the interesting issue will be next flight, under UK MAA regulations with a UK crew and to a UK TAA authorised RTS. Don't believe this will be as easy as many knowledgeable RAF Officers at Waddington expect. It is one thing (and relatively easy) for MOD/ Defence Equipment to deliver an aircraft to a US Design; Certification and Qualification standard and 'off the shelf' however under current MAA Regulations in the UK it is something else getting someone within the DH chain to take ownership of the risk. This will now be the challenge and will be the key issue is getting 664 into the air again over the coming months - though my guess is it is highly unlikely to fly again in '13 and perhaps well into '14.

To all those involved in the programme obtaining the relevant legacy certification evidence and deriving a UK compliant certification strategy for 664 I wish you well - the day of reckoning has now arrived!!

[Rhino power]

ZZ664 has arrived, callsign Vulcan51...

-RP

[Willard Whyte]

Think I saw it on whilst I was on the school run* this morning.

*no, I don't run per se.

[ursa_major]

Note the upright Y in the titling :ok:

http://www.igniter.org.uk/avpics/fl/wdn13/rc135-zz664.jpg

[beerdrinker]

The first of the 3 Rivet Joint / Airseekers for the RAF touched down at RAF Waddington at about 0940 this morning.

Quite important UK Military Aviation News I would have thought. But nothing yet on the UK’s Premier Aviation magazine’s web site.

BD

PS Don't worry. Doesn't matter, Flight has mentioned the second A400M for the Armee de l’Air.

[ursa_major]

0940CET maybe, 0848Z by my watch when it landed.

[VX275]

Sod's Law will ensure it'll now be broken during Anti-Det maintenance, or some component unobtainable from the supply chain will go out of life during the time the PT and the MAA will take putting all the paperwork for RAF flights in place. ;)

[OafOrfUxAche]

The first of the 3 Rivet Joint / Airseekers for the RAF touched down at RAF Waddington at about 0940 this morning


Come back Rhino, all is forgiven. There was everyone thinking you were full of sh1te but Beerdrinker has saved the day...

[TroutMaster]

Is it too much to ask for others not to post accurate flight timings and details on a public forum? Blimey.

Or did I miss the memo where OPSEC was discarded? Has it really just gone away now? Bead...frickin'...window! :ugh:

If, however, OPSEC doesn't apply to you, (your missus, her tennis partners and their friends, etc)....kindly disregard and keep posting other people's detailed business to your hearts content. :D

But it would be greatly appreciated if you didn't...!

TM

[denachtenmai]

Nice to see the goose flying again :ok:
Regards, Den.

[ian16th]

Flight International might not mention it but.........

U.K. Takes Delivery Of First RC-135 Rivet Joint (http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_11_12_2013_p0-635893.xml)

[Jet In Vitro]

Hurray, is there a slot next to the Vulcan to park it.:ok:

[thowman]

Good to see the journos getting it right

First British rivet joint aircraft delivered to RAF Waddington | This is Lincolnshire (http://www.thisislincolnshire.co.uk/British-rivet-joint-aircraft-delivered-RAF/story-20066385-detail/story.html#axzz2kRz1fUiB)

[CoffmanStarter]

RAF Press Release here ...

Air Vice-Marshal Phil Osborn, Director of Capability at Joint Forces Command said ...

“The delivery of the first of 3 Rivet Joint aircraft to the UK is a critical step in the re-establishment of a world class UK airborne signals intelligence capability. I know that the RAF and Defence are looking forward to operating this key capability and building on the unique history of 51 Squadron. We plan to have our AIRSEEKER programme comprising all 3 Rivet Joint aircraft, with their highly skilled aircrew, groundcrew and analysts, fully operational by mid-2017.”

RAF Airseeker Arrival (http://www.raf.mod.uk/news/archive/first-british-rivet-joint-aircraft-delivered-to-the-uk-12112013)

http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/FCA2645A_5056_A318_A8718B9833D2D0F9.jpg

http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/FC94CA09_5056_A318_A8F33657F47C9DED.jpg

http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/FC8AC19F_5056_A318_A8DCE6874DFA2B7E.jpg

Image Credit : MOD RAF

[Biggus]

Mid 2017 - is that correct?

Surely by then all the currently qualified aircrew will be tourex/posted?

[beerdrinker]

Who ferried it - An RAF crew, a USAF crew or a L3 crew

[bobward]

An oxymoron surely? Especially when the article talks about Nimrod, and shows a picture of a VC 10.......:sad:

[Lima Juliet]

:D:D:D Bravo!

Other defence companies should take note - delivered on time, in budget and to the agreed spec! :ok:

LJ

[Eminence Gris]

LJ,

With no RTS the latter aspect remains to be seen.

EG

[Lima Juliet]

Chug

when the Chinook HC2 was granted an illegal RTS

Could I ask you to clarify where in UK Law it legislates military RTS? I'm just curious what deemed it illegal.

LJ

[Lima Juliet]

EG

I guess we'll wait and see...

LJ

[Chugalug2]

LJ:-
Could I ask you to clarify where in UK Law it legislates military RTS? I'm just curious what deemed it illegal.

It's Military Law not to make a false written statement or certification. That applies to all that are subject to Military Law, in particular it applied to ACAS. He received a CAR from Controller Aircraft that granted "Switch on Only" clearance for the Chinook HC2. Apart from being an almost useless Controller Aircraft Release, and possibly unique, it made the aircraft effectively inoperable other than for ground training purposes only. You could switch on the comms/nav suite but not use it let alone rely on it.
Despite that, ACAS signed an RTS and the aircraft went into Sqn service, even though it was still undergoing the BD testing regime, who as we now know grounded their aircraft because it was "positively dangerous" and urged the RAF to do the same. The very next day ZD576 crashed, killing all 29 on board.
I believe that the RTS procedure is now different and under the auspices of the MAA. The above arrangement was supposed to be foolproof, as both men (CA and ACAS) had to sign together that the aircraft type was airworthy and fit for service. It would seem that the system, the men and the aircraft all failed that test. The system has been altered but is still compromised in that the operator (MOD) issues its own RTS's (via the MAA). Neither the accident nor the actions of ACAS have yet been properly investigated, despite evidence being supplied to Haddon-Cave, Lord Philip, and the Provost Marshal.

[Martin the Martian]

TroutMaster, I assume you have never frequented sites such as FighterControl or UKAR, or even FlightRadar 24.

[TroutMaster]

Martin, is your point that it's okay to break OPSEC here because others do on other sites?

Why is it okay at all, anywhere?

I suppose it depends on perspective. If you are safely on the ground and know about timings because you are close to the program, or know someone who is (and you want to impress the hell out of everyone), then you might be inclined to post with a certain abandon. Dr Pepper, and all that.

However, if you are sat in the jet, you will be disinclined to publicly post your operating times, (or, say, if you have family in the jet).

Anybody know any interesting stories about people in the job posting things up that they shouldn't?

I do, it wasn't a happy outcome.

Sorry to be all doom and gloom, just making a point of order.

TM

[dervish]

Chugalug

Good reply. IIRC from the evidence to Phillip the FADEC was not allowed in the aircraft either which is a hell of a constraint when you want to start up engines!

[TEEEJ]

5M6MZLAisHc&feature=related

[OafOrfUxAche]

TEEEJ,

How did you manage to subvert the 'minimum 10 characters in a post' rule? Do tell!

[Willard Whyte]

Martin, is your point that it's okay to break OPSEC here because others do on other sites?

Why is it okay at all, anywhere?

I suppose it depends on perspective. If you are safely on the ground and know about timings because you are close to the program, or know someone who is (and you want to impress the hell out of everyone), then you might be inclined to post with a certain abandon. Dr Pepper, and all that.

As a result of our free and capitalistic society members of the public have ready access to watches and cameras, amongst other things. Pretty sure some spotter watching from the provided area just off the A15 (N53 10'33 W 0 30'45) could just as easily post the info. Tough job making a 'plane the size of an RJ invisible in broad daylight and good weather.

[BEagle]

Ugly



.

[Toadstool]

Ugly

Best get rid of it then.

[The Helpful Stacker]

Lumpy


Sneaky

[Squirrel 41]

Dumb question time.

Are the engines / engines + pylons interchangeable with the E-3Ds?

S41

[Lima Juliet]

Squirrel 41

I believe that E-3D is CFM56-2A and RJ is CFM56-2B. The E-3D has thrust reversers but the RJ doesn't. Also E-3D's CFMs create more thrust but weigh more (due to reversers)

LJ

[TroutMaster]

Willard and Just This Once.....u seem to be trying to be clever, but you have missed the point. The spotters spotted the plane as it came in, having been (disappointingly) forewarned. The press release was after it landed.

OPSEC was broken when the landing time and refuelling point was posted at @0220. Do try to follow the story.

Let's be clear, though, you long time posters think this is okay, right?

It's an interesting debate no?

Do you think it's okay to post timings like this?

Are you military? Good debate, eh?

TM

[Wensleydale]

Pretty short debate as the flightplan is published at the scary classification level of 'unclassified' and is sent to numerous FIRs. In equal regard the flight details are broadcast free-to-air.



Much like all the operations over the Balkans back in the 1990s then!

[Wensleydale]

Like This you mean

[Wensleydale]

How did you manage to subvert the 'minimum 10 characters in a post' rule? Do tell!

I suppose he used the same method as my previous post. Simples!

[TroutMaster]

The debate worked out fine. You obviously have no real appreciation of OPSEC. Flight Plans are 'free to air', but finding them (and any other info) is so much easier when people in the know helpfully post up accurate routes and timings. The last person I know who, (using his position in the RAF), released timings in this manner to a spotters site got a formal warning. I recall MP's went through that person's PC hard drive. That's not open to any debate whatsoever, it's a fact. That flight was flightplanned, and it wasn't that long ago...

I'm astonished that some (military, or ex military) people take this careless, 'what's the point' attitude. It's an attitude I would expected from someone who doesn't give a damn about the safety of the people on board, and, to a lesser extent, the job they are trying to do.

Well, some people do still care about both.


TM

[Party Animal]

You obviously have no real appreciation of OPSEC


Actually Trouters, I'm not sure you do! Aircraft details and timings should not be advertised when they are related to 'operational' events. The delivery of a brand new aircraft that has been widely advertised in a variety of media outlets has no more risk attached to it than any typical airshow weekend where the display timings are advertised well in advance. Similarly, it is probably safe to say that a Typhoon will be flying at Coningsby tomorrow. That is not restricted information and even less rocket science or OPSEC breaking.

In this case, how exactly do you percieve the safety of those on board was compromised by a bunch of spotters discussing the arrival time? Likewise, how does it impact on the job the crew were trying to do, i.e, deliver an aircraft from A to B?

[Willard Whyte]

Well said PA.

TM, get a life. Oh, and stop trying to be so patronising - it makes you come across as a bit of a c0ck.

[NoVANav]

OPSEC is defined as "Operations Security". Since this is a factory delivery and "operations" will not begin officially until next year then the flight does not meet the definition.

BTW, when we deployed from the US to the UK we had an air-refueling over Maine, flying non-stop. Not sure why they would stop except the RAF aircrew are not qualified for boom A/R.

[TEEEJ]

OafOrfUxAche,

I have no idea? I just posted the You Tube link and it accepted my post.

Some nice images of ZZ664 at following links.

Photos: Boeing RC-135W (717-158) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/UK---Air/Boeing-RC-135W-(717-158)/2345356/L)

Photos: Boeing RC-135W (717-158) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/UK---Air/Boeing-RC-135W-(717-158)/2345355/L)

Photos: Boeing RC-135W (717-158) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/UK---Air/Boeing-RC-135W-(717-158)/2345354/L)

[Squirrel 41]

Leon - many thanks!

[dragartist]

Did Fly Fisher manage to get his D Notice placed?
Do we know what paperwork was used to this fly this jet into the secret airbase near Lincoln and when are we going to reap the benefit by flying the thing?

[Heathrow Harry]

Are we going to rename thm ?

"Rivet Join" is so......... non RAF -

surely we should call it "Campania" or similar

Or get the tabloids in a frenzy by calling it "Duchess"

[TheChitterneFlyer]

it makes you come across as a bit of a c0ck


That statement implies that he/she knows a bit about something... not a complete c0ck then!

[Jet In Vitro]

HH,

If the navy can have a ship called DUNCAN how about Nigel or Trevor!


I still think SENILE fits in with SENTINEL and SENTRY.

[Heathrow Harry]

"Steptoe" perhaps................

[Gnd]

The only problem with BCE is they are so anti aviation that doesn't belong to them that being a lodger is totally useless and far to much trouble, ask those that have left ( and those that are trying to use it?):confused:

[dragartist]

X referring to the thread on the training pipeline being clogged got me wondering about crewing the back end in future years when all the Nimrod guys have retired. Is it necessary that the folks that sit down the back are actually in the RAF? I think I saw on here that there was some seedcorn activity going on with our US partners. Not to be confused with the MPA Seed corners.

If it's not classified can someone say if there is a "4th Aircraft" RCT for training as part of the AirSeeker "system"

[Toadstool]

DA, sent you a PM.

[NoVANav]

Backend crew on the RJs need to be military. Various international laws and military regs make it difficult to fly "other-than-military" on a military mission. If you have 'civilians' on a reconnaissance flight then you could be considered a "spy" vs. "reconnaissance" mission. Very BIG differences on how that is treated under international law. (One reason you never see "spy" used to officially describe any reconnaissance platform-U-2, SR-71, RC-135s, etc. Only the sensationalist press uses "spy plane" in this context). You can fly members of other services to fill the backend seats if you need the experience, but they need training on the system and equipment. I don't see how that ameliorates the training problem.
RJ crewmembers also undergo all the usual aircrew training: altitude chamber, egress training, etc.

Bottom line: Plan to train the crewmembers you need to accomplish the mission. Having enough linguists in the more esoteric languages, who can be aircrew, is always a problem. In that case you fly with a less than full-up crew.

[OafOrfUxAche]

Is it necessary that the folks that sit down the back are actually in the RAF?


Backend crew on the RJs need to be military


Surely that excludes the RAF from crewing the RJ at all?:confused:

[Lyneham Lad]

Some nice images of ZZ664 at following links.

Photos: Boeing RC-135W (717-158) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net

Photos: Boeing RC-135W (717-158) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net

Photos: Boeing RC-135W (717-158) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net

That was a very quick respray after it landed! (Ref links in Post #360).

[AtomKraft]

I heard it's already known as the 'Airsneaker'.

Sounds likely!

[Jet In Vitro]

Why would you stick labels on the aircraft? When will it fly again. Surely the longer it is left on the ground the more it will deteriorate?

[Jet In Vitro]

Which is the most unhappy RAF Sqn at the moment. The Geese were not happy in the pub last week even though they have a new toy.

If I was top Goose I would be seriously worried.

[ShotOne]

Of course it's not a "spy plane". Only baddies have spy planes. We have reconnaissance aircraft.

Ps, novanav, how would a civilian involved in the air refuelling of a military attack be regarded under international law?

[Biggus]

A valid target...?

[ShotOne]

Agreed, biggus...although in either case the issue of employment status hardly arises if they've been blown to smithereens

[Squirrel 41]

Ps, novanav, how would a civilian involved in the air refuelling of a military attack be regarded under international law?

They'd be considered combatants under Geneva law - (banter aside) they are clearly making a material contribution to combat operations.

Merry Christmas to all, including the Geese. Hope you get flying again soon.

S41

[Jet In Vitro]

Are we there yet?

Is it the biggest paper weight in NATO?

[FATTER GATOR]

. Jet In Vitro Are we there yet?

Is it the biggest paper weight in NATO?



You should know mate, why don't you let us in on it instead of fishing around for someone to sound off.

[Jet In Vitro]

Just asking, during last few weeks have seen a great deal of media attention on the arrival of the first Rivet Joint SIGINT aircraft, acquired from the Americans.

Air Commodore Portlock describes it with enthusiasm as “a fantastic capability. With it comes a complete integration and interoperability with the US which we’ve not had in this area before, and we look forward to fielding it on operations next year.”

As a tax payer I was wonder are we getting what we paid for yet?

[Toadstool]

JIV

why didn't you ask those 'unhappy' members of the Sqn who you see in the pub? I am sure they would tell you.

[Willard Whyte]

As a tax payer I was wonder are we getting what we paid for yet?

Dunno, but I noticed it looked jolly nice sat on the secure pan at Wad the other day, as I drove past.

One wonders if that's a 'permanent' parking solution given the lack of parking paces for 3 RJs and however many E-3s we have (that aren't a pile of spares).

[Phoney Tony]

Bloke down the pub told me they were building an extension to one of the hangars for RJ.

JIV,

Try asking MoD or NAO under FOI for the info you are so desperate to find out.

[Jet In Vitro]

The quote was from IQ Defence. I suspect they meant the flurry of media interest when the first aircraft arrived.

A quick google of 'UK RJ' reveals many articles over the last few years with many in the last 2 months which I think is recent in programme which started in the early 90s.

There have not been many updates in the very short term. Hence my questions.

Clearly I have touched a nerve.

Sorry.

Off down the pub, may buy some unhappy geese a pint.

[dragartist]

Is anyone allowed to say why they flew the jet over to the damp climate of UK if they did not intend to fly it on ops or training. Would it have been better to have kept it at Greenville till we were ready to use it?


As I understand things the formation eating team have been training in the UK with the USAF and I believe the aircraft are to the same standard. (or is this just a rumour!).


Must be very frustrating for the guys at Waddo. The bill will have been paid but we do not appear to be getting any benefit. Imagine if it was a revenue earning airline. The shareholders would be up in arms.

[NoVANav]

If the jet is ready any company will want to move it off their ramp and deliver to the customer. No liability if a hail storm or tornado does damage. Greenville does not have extra hangar space to store completed aircraft. And, you get credit for an "ahead of schedule" delivery, with possible bonus dollars involved.
Besides, there is a lot more to an operational jet than the flying. Aircraft and backend equipment maintenance folks can work and learn on the real thing at Waddo. You can also run the backend on the ground and do almost complete operational training on the systems.
And, I am sure, all the various offices mentioned in previous posts who must "sign off" on how safe it is want to 'see' the real thing. A trip to Waddington is much cheaper than to Greenville. Even if the steaks are MUCH better in Texas.


Bill

[BUCCANEER SCAMP]

Word is the RJ's off to Boscombe Down early Feb....:oh:

[Single Spey]

Buccaneer Scamp - what route, A1 M1 M25 M3 or via the M5 (it's still a bit wet round Tewkesbury though)? :rolleyes:

[Stitchbitch]

Buc Scamp why the :oh: , if it does come down (looks nice parked at Waddo) then it would be flown/evaluated by the RAF (which you'd hope would have been done state side), so the process should flow nicely? :E

[BUCCANEER SCAMP]

Single Spey :D:D:ok:

I thought it was Waddington new gate guard

[Heathrow Harry]

has to wait until 6th April and the new Financial Year before they can fill 'er up for the trip...................

or, more likely, awaiting a suitable collection of politicians and SO's to be assembled and photographed on its "arrival"

[dragartist]

Could be a very good reason to take it to Boscombe- We used to take the Nimrod there to weigh it. Very accurate it was too. Always an overnight to allow the fluids to drain for a weigh fist thing in the morning

Trying to draw a parallel: did Sentry spend long there?

Boscombe used to bring the mobile unit to us to do EMC and Tempest. Always a laugh seeing our Tefal men* with theirs.

*from the TV advert of the 80s era

[Jet In Vitro]

January 24, 2014, 8:24 AM

The UK Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) is taking a leading role in a forum that aims to harmonize requirements within Europe for military airworthiness. The move would help the aerospace industry design future pan-European products. But although the forum is basing the requirements framework on European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, there is no intention to create a pan-European regulatory agency for military aircraft, according to Air Vice-Marshal Martin Clark, the MAA’s technical director. “Regulation will remain a national responsibility,” he told AIN.

In the absence of such a scheme, Airbus and the nations procuring the A400M sought EASA civilian certification of Europe’s new airlifter. This was achieved last March, but now the aircraft must pass examination by the national military airworthiness authorities of each acquiring country. In the UK, the entry into Royal Air Force service of the Voyager tanker/transport was delayed last year, as the MAA sought assurance that the military modifications to the Airbus A330 were fully understood and assured. The two supplemental type certificates (STCs) that Airbus Military obtained “did not cover the full extent of the military modifications nor their operation,” Air Marshal Dick Garwood, the director general of the MAA, told AIN.

Clark said that the MAA is “reasonably confident” that it will be able to issue a military type certificate for the A400M. This will be a first for the MAA, which was set up in 2010 in the wake of the Nimrod MR.2 crash in 2006 and a subsequent review that criticized the safety oversight of British military aircraft. Some new platforms entering service in the UK since then have been delayed “because of the need to have a more in-depth understanding of airworthiness,” Garwood said. He is unapologetic about the increased scrutiny. “The review called for an independent regulator that fosters continual improvement in safety culture, regulation and practice,” he told AIN. “It’s not acceptable for industry to have sole intellectual ownership of airworthiness, for aircraft on the military register,” Clark added.

One of the delayed platforms is the Thales Watchkeeper UAV for the British Army. But Clark noted that the MAA issued a statement of type design assurance (STDA) last October. The UAV still needs a release to service (RTS) authorization, but that is the responsibility of the Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) organization, he added. Regarding the Rivet Joint SIGINT aircraft for the RAF, Garwood admitted that “complex work” must still be done before the 50-year old airframes can be cleared for service. The first one has not flown since it was delivered to the UK last November. Garwood noted that the initial operating capability date for this aircraft is still 10 months away. Work is being done by the DE&S and user community to provide safety evidence to support RTS,” he added.

[Roland Pulfrew]

Maybe it would have been better to move the aircraft to Offutt where it could have joined the fleet, been beyond the reach of the MAA and been flown by joint UK/US crews, rather than sitting on the ground in the British winter decaying away slowly?!?

[dragartist]

No Rolland, That would only work if they painted stars and stripes on them!


I do see where you are coming from but the Duty Holder who signs off the RTS or what ever they call it these days accepts responsibility for the engineering (configuration/Design etc) as well as the operation. he (or it could be a she) is looking for the independent advice to cover his @rse as Garwood describes above. Now that said the advice will be highly caveated and probably recommend that the Duty Holder takes a view on the risks of not having evidence to fill every single gap. I am not at all close to this programme nor ever have been but I guess the team will have difficulty getting eyes on every single certificate of design (F100A or equivalent) for every single widget. I think we are being told that the aircraft are re-manufactured to zero flying hour condition. I am sure they have been stripped and inspected down to the last rivet and cleat.


They sure look resplendent and I hope they do as good a job as the jet they replace.


The KURs at IOC will be more than just doing circuits and bumps.

[denachtenmai]

:drag.
I hope they do as good a job as the jet they replace.
Hope they do as good a job as the jet that was replaced by the jet that is being replaced :p
Regards, Den.

[Heathrow Harry]

ten months for heavens sake....

If the balloon goes up somewhere next month they'll be out of Boscombe in 3 days and working for sure - and then returned for another 10 month wait no doubt when they've proved themselves in action

[Chugalug2]

HH:-
ten months for heavens sake....and counting...as you so rightly say this aircraft is desperately needed in service now, so why isn't it? Here is an even more obvious illustration of what has befallen UK Military Air Safety than a Fatal Airworthiness Related Air Accident, tragic though that be.


The genesis of this static display at Waddington can be traced back to 1987 when the attack by VSOs on UK Military Air Safety dates from. That resulted not only in Airworthiness Related Air Accidents involving 62 fatalities but a seriously inhibited Military Air Capability, as illustrated by this thread. Despite the cost in blood, treasure, and capability, none of those VSOs involved has been brought to account, but on the contrary continue to be protected by their successors. As a result the reform of Military Air Regulation and Investigation that is so desperately needed goes on undone.


Instead of making both independent of the MOD, they remain wholly in-house, and thus as exposed to undue interference as ever. An independent Investigator could revisit many past BoIs into Airworthiness Related Fatal Air Accidents and find that the Regulator was seriously at fault, and that the BoIs had been subject to flagrant pressures from above to hide that very fact. That can't happen until the MAA and MAAIB are made independent of the MOD and of each other.


If it takes a static display at Waddington to remain for even more months in order to achieve that urgent reform, then that will be time well spent.


Self Regulation doesn't work and in Aviation it Kills!

[EAP86]

Chug,
"thus as exposed to undue interference as ever"
I heard it was the MAA's certification process that was keeping it from flight...

EAP

[Chugalug2]

I daresay that you are right, EAP86. The issue isn't that an RTS is still to be granted, but rather on what basis it will be if it is granted. In short can the airworthiness of this aircraft, or for that matter any other aircraft, be assured by the MAA, and if so how? The regulations and procedures have been lost together with the people who knew about both.


If you set out to subvert and suborn, all the above must be lost or they can be produced as evidence of your illegal acts. Once lost they can only be regained by a long and arduous process of reform, outside of your malevolent control. The MAA (and the MAAIB) as presently constituted cannot do that. The present default of rewriting those regulations and procedures from a new Year Zero is a nonsense, just as it would be if any other Regulator tried to do it.


Grounding fleets, or refusing and delaying the RTS of new ones, does not signify competent regulation. Only the continuous uninterrupted maintenance and enforcement of gradually evolving Regulations and Procedures does that... but they weren't.

[alfred_the_great]

You forget process, especially "safety case" process rules all.

[tucumseh]

You forget process, especially "safety case" process rules all.

Maintained Build Standard > valid Safety Case > valid Release To Service.

A simple chain, and break any link or fail to demonstrate each is intact, and the RTS cannot be issued. That is the systemic and organisational failure that led to the Nimrod Review and cancellation of MRA4.

In the case of Rivet Joint, the mandated regulations imposed on DEC and procurers would require them to confirm the robustness of this audit trail before even seeking approval to proceed. The scrutineers must verify it before granting approval. And, throughout the entire procurement and in-service phases, it must be the subject of continuous assessment.

What can go wrong if you follow the regs? We know what goes wrong if you don't. ZD576. XV230. XV179. ZG710. MoD/MAA are on record as agreeing with the instructions not to.

[Davef68]

I understand that the 2nd aircraft will enter production this year with the final one some time after that.

The third is/was still serving on operations as a USAF tanker last year.

[Al R]

RAF Waddington in line for £35.4m runway upgrade | Lincolnshire Echo (http://www.lincolnshireecho.co.uk/RAF-Waddington-line-35-4m-runway-upgrade/story-20778900-detail/story.html)

Must be about to close then.

[Willard Whyte]

It wasn't that long ago that a significant proportion of the runway was 'refurbished'.

[Al R]

"During the rebuild, aircraft will temporarily relocate to alternative operating bases across the county."

Massive undertaking to take all the groundscrew as well.

[Willard Whyte]

I suppose Coningsby is the obvious choice. It means the crews can be dic..., err, shuttled around as required.

[Wensleydale]

"I suppose Coningsby is the obvious choice. It means the crews can be dic..., err, shuttled around as required"


..to say nothing of the T&S Budget savings.

[Jet In Vitro]

Will there be some form of RTS (limited evidence) ready to let the ac fly anywhere before the rwy is dug up.

[Wander00]

I bet we could do with RJ around at the moment...............

[Avtur]

I am sure they are busy already.

[AARON O'DICKYDIDO]

Cranwell is not too far away!

[Willard Whyte]

OK for Shadow, perhaps for Sentinel, not so good for the bigger boys.

[air pig]

Why not Scampton for everyday use and somewhere else for major servicing. How long will it take to resurface the runway, is the other question, could it be done on a 24 hour a day basis?

RJ, send them to Mildenhall, if that's an option if they cannot use Scampton or another station.

[Rhino power]

Runway resurfacing is not an excessively long process, a crew did Schipol airport a few years back at night, over a period of a couple of weeks I seem to remember and, the airport remained operational at all other times...

Surely Mildenahll would be the obvious bolthole? All the engineering and ground support is already in place, it would just need the RAF air/ground crews to complete the picture?

-RP

[VX275]

The important thing for the RJ isn't the resurfaced existing runway, its how much longer they are going to make it, so that the first thing an RJ doesn't have to do once airborn is go look for a boom equipped tanker.

[MPN11]

My reading of the scenario is that it is a complete rebuild (and extension) which involves creating multiple layers of a new deep substrate. Resurfacing is a different, and relatively simple, task ...

... unless, as happened at Scampton in the 80s, the contractors didn't bother with the friction course as they were running out of time/money. Day One of ops on the new surface, on a rainy day, revealed a skating rink. "Stand down Scampton Wing." :cool:

[Avtur]

The important thing for the RJ isn't the resurfaced existing runway, its how much longer they are going to make it, so that the first thing an RJ doesn't have to do once airborn is go look for a boom equipped tanker.

Exactly! I believe the issue that was raised circa 2008 when mumblings of RJ were becoming more pronounced, was that the Waddo runway was short by about 1000 ft for an ops sortie of any useful length, as the USAF ODM required the field lengths to be factored.

Lets hope things changed...

BTW; the R1 used Conningsby during the big dig of 2004.

[Avtur]

Oh, and talking of boom tankers, how does the UK plan to do "National" sneaky-beaky missions that require AAR?

[TwoStep]

Oh, and talking of boom tankers, how does the UK plan to do "National" sneaky-beaky missions that require AAR?

The question that no-one in the UK MoD is willing to answer, or does that mission exist anymore?

[BEagle]

Oh, and talking of boom tankers, how does the UK plan to do "National" sneaky-beaky missions that require AAR?

By doing a deal with AiM to include booms on the last 4 Voyagers at discounted cost, given that the current aircraft haven't met the contracted requirements yet??

[dragartist]

I think NoVaNav explained the AAR sketch several posts back. He appears to be Mr RJ on PPRuNe so far as I am concerned.


I think the limitation on sortie length is more likely to be the supply of rations for the Formation Eating Team.

[NoVANav]

dragartist,

I'll ask the RAF ass't Air Attaché at the local RAeS chapter meeting at the UK Embassy next week. He is working the RAF RJ here in the U.S.

However, I believe the agreement is for USAF KCs to provide refueling when needed. Similar to the agreement for KCs with drogue systems to stand alert in the UK to replace the Victors when they all were in the South Atlantic for Operation Corporate.

[cokecan]

and what, pray, is the solution for getting our Boom only RJ's down south in the event of Op CORPORATE 2.0?

being the suspicious, underhand soul that i am i rather doubt we've a promise that the KC's will support our RJ's on national missions further than 20South...

[downsizer]

I bet one would be near the Ukraine now if we were allowed to use them.:\

[Jet In Vitro]

Surely we are safe now the RAF have deployed the E3!

[CoffmanStarter]

JIV ... It's NATO that has deployed the E3 NOT the RAF ...

[Avtur]

By doing a deal with AiM to include booms on the last 4 Voyagers at discounted cost, given that the current aircraft haven't met the contracted requirments yet??

And the probability of that happening?

[Jet In Vitro]

Just thought I would ask again. As a tax payer.
Is the aircraft going to fly soon?

I spotted it again outside, near the grass at Waddington. It looks great but being on the ground is not why it was bought.

[Heathrow Harry]

saves us all a bucket load of cash tho'

probably waiting for the new financial year when (hopefully) there is an allocation for fuel.................... :ok:

[Lordflasheart]

JIV - Just thought I would ask again. As a tax payer.
Is the aircraft going to fly soon? ........ It looks great but being on the ground is not why it was bought.

Maaybe something to do with the fall-out from this ?

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/513926-usaf-kc135-crash-bishkek-5.html

LFH

[beerdrinker]

From Flight Global today:



The UK Military Aviation Authority (MAA) expects to within weeks reach a decision on the airworthiness of the Royal Air Force’s RC-135W Rivet Joint surveillance aircraft, which should be introduced operationally from later this year.

US company L-3 Communications is modifying three 1964-vintage KC-135R tankers to the Rivet Joint signals intelligence-gathering configuration for the RAF, with the first having been delivered to its Waddington air base in Lincolnshire last November. The aircraft has not been flown again since its arrival, as certification activities continue.

“We’ve been given some big boxes of paperwork, and our team will take 20 working days to assess Airseeker and the release to service recommendation,” says Air Marshal Dick Garwood, director general of the MAA. “Then we will tell ACAS [the assistant chief of the air staff] what we think about this aeroplane: is it safe, or is it not.”

[Sandy Parts]

wow - some plain speak there - makes a change from the usual business buzzword waffle - well done!

[cessnapete]

Surely even the MOD haven't spent millions on a 'new' RAF type, to have it grounded after delivery!!

[Wensleydale]

"Surely even the MOD haven't spent millions on a 'new' RAF type, to have it grounded after delivery!!"


The RAF/MOD has had big issues with air worthiness over the last few years and has been pilloried from many sources over its lack of ensuring the safety of the people who fly the aircraft. Unless the aircraft is proved to be safe and fit for purpose then it will not fly... You cannot have it both ways.

[Biggus]

I think the point cessnapete, and indeed most taxpayers, was trying to make is something along the lines of....

".... wouldn't it have been a good idea for the MAA to have done its homework, and be pretty sure it would be able to recommend release, before the UK actually purchased the aircraft?...."

From the outside, it looks like a ridiculous situation where the MOD has bought an aircraft that it could subsequently deem unfit to fly in service use.



As someone not particularly in the loop on this issue, it may just be an issue of timescales, maybe the RJ was ordered before the MAA came into fruition, or rules for the recommendation for release changed after the order for RJ was placed?

Perhaps someone more enlightened on this issue can, politely, provide some more insight?

[Davef68]

IIRC the original plan to buy RJ was announced (to 51 Squadron at least*) during ACM Torpy's tenure as CAS, so predates the formation of the MAA by a year or so.

* It's on here somewhere

[Biggus]

D68,

Thanks for the input!!



One could also ask....

".... why didn't the MAA look through these 'big boxes of paperwork' prior to the aircraft arriving in the UK?...."


I presume the 'paperwork' was readily available from the manufacturer at any stage, since it is not a 'new' product.

No doubt in this case it's probably all about the number of properly qualified MAA personnel available for the task and their current workload and priorities. But I must say, from the outside it doesn't look slick from a PR point of view. If the NHS built a brand new hospital that then stood empty for several months I'm sure the press would have a field day!

[Kitbag]

If the NHS built a brand new hospital that then stood empty for several months I'm sure the press would have a field day!

Only if they knew about it, this (https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=Eyf97LAjjcY) is allegedly based on a true story

[Single Spey]

I presume the 'paperwork' was readily available from the manufacturer at any stage, since it is not a 'new' product

Ah, therein lies the rub - it is a new product - one of a kind - a sort of bespoke conversion of a particular airframe.

[Biggus]

Sorry, perhaps I wasn't being precise enough in my use of English.


I meant that it wasn't (presumably?) a 'new' product to L-3 Communications, as opposed to the RAF, for which it is definitely a new aircraft type.

I therefore thought that, as the firm doing what was for them (presumably) a 'standard conversion', L-3 Communications would have the "big boxes of paperwork" available for the MAA to read whenever they wanted to.

Hopefully that clarifies my previous comment!

[Single Spey]

But it is a new product in that the starting baseline aircraft will almost certainly be unlike any other used for conversion in terms of hours, mod standard, etc etc. And the next airframe will also start from a different baseline. And will there really be a paper trail going back some 50 years?

[PhilipG]

Am I reading into this thread that the MAA will have to do three complete reviews of the paperwork as all three base aircraft are slightly different?

This I think it brings the concept of the MAA recommending approval for the F35B as an audited as proven safe aircraft into question.

With the different branches of the US military deciding to declare IOC with different versions of the hardware and software, does the MAA have the resources to audit the software releases etc or can the MOD rely on US approval? It would seem not from the Rivet Joint experience.

[Biggus]

S Spey,

Thanks for the informative reply!

Looks like it could be a can of worms...

[Wensleydale]

"With the different branches of the US military deciding to declare IOC with different versions of the hardware and software, does the MAA have the resources to audit the software releases etc or can the MOD rely on US approval? It would seem not from the Rivet Joint experience".


It shows that the decision to reduce the DES from 25,000 to 5,000 and make Civil Servants redundant was a little silly (as predicted back in 2010 when I finally left).

[sprucemoose]

At the risk of wading in where there are many ingrained opinions at play - I don't believe that it was ultimately the MAA's decision to order Rivet Joint, so a bit much to blame them if it's found unsafe.

And a clarification from the original article - the large boxes of paperwork are not from L-3, they are from DE&S, so no, this couldn't have been done previously.

[Lynxman]

The MAA cannot certify Airseeker as the original Boeing certification evidence no longer exists, and that's assuming it existed in the first place. The creation of the MAA raised the airworthiness bar leaving Airseeker unable to meet the new criteria for service entry.

[tucumseh]

The creation of the MAA raised the airworthiness bar leaving Airseeker unable to meet the new criteria for service entry. The bar hasn't been raised. It is just that PTs and ACAS are now required to clear it, whereas under previous regimes they were allowed to make false declarations that they had cleared it, knowing that they had not. See Chinook ZD576, Tornado ZG710, Nimrod XV230, Hawk XX177 etc etc. If Airseeker can't clear the bar, then that would be because the PT hasn't set its sights high enough in the first place. Same as Nimrod MRA4.

I agree with the sentient expressed above -re MAA and the boxes of evidence. They should have been working alongside the PT for the last 4 years to ensure that nothing came as a surprise when the recommendations were drafted for ACAS. However, the MAA DG's comments imply this hasn't happened. Their jobs are to avoid the avoidable, and manage the unavoidable. The boxes he speaks of should be the latter.

As Wensleydale said, in so many words, it is unlikely the MoD has sufficient people of junior enough grade to do the work. All this should be basic stuff to the most junior CS in DE&S. Few, if any, at this grade work in the MAA, which says it all.

[Biggus]

Is the process about to be undertaken by the MAA likely to be credible, or is it potentially just a case of smoke and mirrors?

On the one hand, given its track record in this area, the MOD wants to be seen to be doing things correctly, hence considerable open publicity on this matter. The MOD wants to be able to say that they have done it thoroughly and correctly.

On the other hand, given some comments here about the possible lack of historic evidence, if the case for recommendation is not proven, will the MAA have the gonads to say so, thus creating a massive white elephant, or will the political pressure to recommend release be overwhelming?



Please note, I am not deliberately trying to call into question the integrity of any individual involved in this process, and I apologize if anyone feels that to be the case. However, if the MAA were a truly independent body, as many on here have asked for, there might be more faith placed in any of its decisions.

[tucumseh]

Excellent questions Biggus.

The political pressure (both internal MoD and from Government) will be immense. We know this pressure often prevails over common sense and regulations. Chinook HC Mk2 for example. Nimrod was scrapped because it could never be certified and it would be slightly embarrassing for a replacement for a Nimrod variant to go the same way. The fact MoD have admitted "challenges" merely illustrates their utter failure to learn lessons over the last 20-odd years. The ludicrous Wg Cdr Spry thread here on pprune encapsulates the problem. The Flight Safety organisation can't get basic definitions right, even when MoD regulations get them spot on.

-re historical evidence. The rules governing technical and financial approval require this issue to be squared away under, at worst, a risk reduction programme, long before any development or production contract is let. Lack of such evidence has been regarded as a standing risk on all aircraft and equipment programmes since the Chief Engineer created the risk in 1991 (by issuing directives that savings should be made at the expense of safety). All aircraft PTs know it must be mitigated up front. I'd bet my house this has been largely ignored, in part because it is a career killer to implement this legal obligation and discover a problem. Nimrod MRA4 again.

Additionally, and as stated before, one cannot simply buy an aircraft, especially the avionics suite, "off the shelf" from the US. Our Home Office dictate certain parts of the specification which the US don't even know about (and they don't tell us of their equivalent). If the project has been planned assuming the aircraft will just be delivered and flown immediately, then some rather significant parts of the build standard and clearance process have been ignored entirely. Again, mandated risk reduction stuff on Day 1.

Another problem, as discussed above, is a distinct lack of corporate knowledge, not unrelated to the horrendous uncertainty anyone working in DE&S faces at the moment.

I think it will enter service, but the operational constraints and limitations may mean in some respects it is a dumbed down version of the R. Or perhaps the long delay means MoD are beavering away getting it up to spec.

[Heathrow Harry]

If MAA don't approve RivetJoin after we've bought it and its been in service for years with the USAF I doubt the Treasury or No. 10 will ever allow the RAF to buy another aircraft ever again......................

And everyone involved with turning it down will be on the s*** list forever - no promotion, no gongs

I'm sure that thought isn't in their minds at all tho'......... :bored:

[Jet In Vitro]

The original decision makers involved in this Project have moved on. Many have left.

Those in the decision chain now must be strong and ensure the system is safe. Saving embarrassment and face saving is not an option.

[Davef68]

Be interesting to see the reaction if we reject as unsafe a design that the USAF uses.

[It's Life Jim 208]

This all seems like something from a "Yes Prime Minister " sketch. We scrap an excellent platform (R1) because another version of that platform is declared unsafe (MR 2) after spending miliions developing an advanced version (MRA 4).

We then buy an older platform (EC-135) from some one else who is already using it quite happily. But... we can't use the newly purchased platform because of the red tape put in place (quite correctly) after a fatal enquiry into a crash of the original platform concludes that better safety checks should have been in place. Said safety checks are put in place but they now prevent us flying the newly aquired platform.

Where were the checks and balances, project management, forward planning, risk assessment- whatever we want to call it that should have checked to see if we could have been cleared to fly the new platform if we went ahead and purchased it?

If the Red Tops decide to focus on this one they will have a field day, surely.:eek:

There has to be a simple answer, if the spams are flying it and they consider it safe, can someone not have a B**ls to sign it off as safe for RAF crews to fly in, surley with rank comes responsibility, lets say if Chief of the Air Staff flies on the first 5 sorties and declares , there you go boys I'm okay, crack on (yes I know if only it was that simple but aparrently thats what the Indian Air force bosses are doing).:ugh:

[Wensleydale]

So we crack on with the US certification, and there is either an accident, or the mission system makes an error resulting in collateral damage or a blue on blue? The chap(s) who signed off the system is then hounded by ambulance chasing lawyers on behalf of the families and people on this forum write how we should have done things properly. YOU CANNOT HAVE BOTH RISK AND SPEEDY INTO SERVICE NOW THAT CROWN IMMUNITY IS NO LONGER WITH US! That is why we have lost maritime capability and probably why we will lose other capability in the future - especially with the reduction in manpower in the support organisations.

[LowObservable]

Jim 208

That all works well as long as you then fly the jet through its entire career without a major mishap.

[Engines]

Wensley and Jim,

In all my working life as an engineer, I never once thought about 'ambulance chasing lawyers' when making decisions. However, I thought quite a lot about the safety of those who were flying the aircraft that I had signed off as serviceable. And I can speak for all my engineering colleagues.

As Tuc and many others have tried to get over on this thread - you can get aircraft and new equipment into service safely, effectively and quickly. There is no compromise as long as you do the job properly first time. And honestly, it's not rocket science (except, maybe, for rockets).

But it's a job for engineers, one we do for the aircrew because we damn well care. We know we can't solve 'world peace' every time an aircraft is bought , or modified. We know the kit is needed at the front line. We know when something is acceptably safe and when it isn't. And we work with aircrew to get those decisions right. We do this because we are professionals.

A little while back, I had an interesting conversation with an aircrew VSO, who loudly and aggressively informed me that if he had his way, he would buy the aircraft he wanted direct from the US Armed Force concerned, and fly them in the UK 'under US rules'. He went on to inform me that the 'airworthiness concerns' being voiced by 'engineers who don't fly' were 'an attempt to justify their existence'.

And this was a VSO who was, at the time, a full Duty Holder. Go figure.

You do not, repeat, not, get CAS into an aircraft, get him to pole it around for 5 sorties, and then ask him to say 'there you go boys, I'm okay, crack on'. Look, you really don't.

Some aircrew need to understand this. When they don't they start applying pressure to 'just get the aircraft into service', asserting that 'they can get over the little problems engineers obsess over' (another actual quote from another aircrew officer just a few weeks ago). Then, things suddenly get 'political'. This is happening right now, and it needs to stop.

If (and it's an 'if, I hope I'm wrong), someone decided that we could buy old USAF airframes off the shelf with US kit in them, and didn't do the 'due diligence' required to get them cleared for UK service, then I sincerely hope they stay on the ground until they are fixed so that they are acceptably safe for use.

However, I more sincerely hope that they did do the necessary preparation, and that the aircraft get into service as soon as possible. Our dedicated and professional aircrew deserve nothing less.

Best Regards as ever to all those trying to do the right thing for the right people,

Engines

[Chugalug2]

HH:-
If MAA don't approve RivetJoin after we've bought it and its been in service for years with the USAF I doubt the Treasury or No. 10 will ever allow the RAF to buy another aircraft ever again......................
And everyone involved with turning it down will be on the s*** list forever - no promotionhttp://cdncache-a.akamaihd.net/items/it/img/arrow-10x10.png (http://www.pprune.org/#), no gongs
I'm sure that thought isn't in their minds at all tho'......... :bored:

What goes around comes around! The genesis for this debacle dates back to the late 80's and 'is coming to a unit near you soon'. Your comments are well made HH and point to the urgency of making the MAA and the MAAIB independent of the MOD and of each other. High visibilty situations like MRA4 or RJ are simply the tip of this ginormous iceberg. There probably isn't an aircraft or system in service that won't upon investigation prove to be unairworthy, as the SI into the tragic death of Flt Lt Cunningham has shown us.

Reversing the effects of the deliberate and malevolent attack on UK Military Airworthiness by RAF VSOs in the late 80s/ early 90s is going to take decades. Like any such long march it can only be started by taking that first step. That must be by the RAF biting the bullet, admitting what happened, and taking action against the willful suborning of Mandatory Regulations and the issuing of Illegal Orders. That will take leadership...is it there?

[tucumseh]

Read what Engines said!

Throughout my career I came across very few aircrew who were “anti”. But I well remember the last one who was. He wanted me to cancel a trial of kit his superiors had declared Safety Critical, pack my bags and go back to AbbeyWood. He’s dead, killed by a non-engineer’s decision that functional safety could be ignored and a false declaration made that the work had been satisfactorily carried out. This kit was not fitted or being used correctly in the aircraft he was flying on his last flight. The non-engineers actions were withheld from the BoI and Coroner, and the MoD/MAA continue to support him.



It only takes one like that to get to Star rank and the system is in trouble. He did, and it is....... MoD engineers, Service and Civilian, knew how to get it right first time, and were within a whisker of doing so when this fraud was perpetrated upon us (and aircrew). It is almost always cheaper and quicker to simply implement the regs. Every accident or issue we discuss here has that same common denominator. Avoidable if the regs had been implemented. Yet, still, MoD/MAA rail against anyone who says this. Instead, they re-write the regs, somehow implying they are to blame. And cause so much confusion in the process their own Flight Safety centre doesn't know if they're full bored or countersunk. (Neither, you're being screwed ).

[Wensleydale]

Engines,


Fully agree with your post.. however, ambulance chasing lawyers are certainly a consideration these days. Ask an ex-colleague of mine who spent a long time with the threat of legal action hanging over him because he did what a senior officer ordered him to do. (Thankfully it was all dropped because he kept a good paper trail). There but for the grace of God perhaps?

[Engines]

Wensley,

Yes, I agree that the lawyers are very much more in evidence than they were. I have recent experience of this being used, but not in the way I expected - being told that if my actions delayed a project, the MoD could be sued for 'undue delays'. Note no mention of the MoD running the risk of being sued for taking short cuts with basic airworthiness management.

I agree that things have changed, but the basics of ensuring a safe and effective product for the aircrew haven't, and that's what Tuc keeps pointing out. Neither have the basics of military discipline - if an order's not reasonable, you don't have to obey it. Here's my (not very warry) story.

My first ever front line embarkation. I'm a very junior Lieutenant aircraft engineer. During an ORI, but not at war. Aircraft lands on with blade leading edge strip (old rubber type) severely holed and lifting. I tell the crew to shut down. Senior Pilot angrily tells me to sign the aircraft fit for the next sortie. I refuse. He then gives me a direct order to do as I am told and sign the aircraft as serviceable. I drop the volume, request a word in a quiet space away from the flight deck. I quietly tell him that I'm the engineer, he is the pilot, and I will get the aircraft fixed as fast as possible, and only then will he get the aircraft to fly. If he's unhappy, get another engineer.

Pause.

Senior Pilot asks me if I'm sure I'm right. I say yes. he nods, turns and walks off. Here's the postscript. We had a truly outstanding relationship from that point forward. I would have jumped over the proverbial cliff for him, and I know he'd have done the same for me.

If things have changed, I'm truly sorry for those who have to work in the system. But I suppose what I'm trying to say is that whatever the system, as long as aircrew and engineers behave professionally and honourably, the system can recover. In fact, I think that's the only way things will get better - by people taking responsibility whenever they are required to. Perhaps I'm being naive, but that's where I stand.

Best regards as ever

Engines

[It's Life Jim 208]

Okay, then what is the best and safest solution to the problem? (I was only joking about the CAS and his five trips by the way). After 32 years in the service I know that would never happen).

Is there a clear way out of this mess? If the original Boeing and USAF documentation is not avaialable from the 60's, where do the MOD safety people start?

Is their an estimate of when I might actually see an RJ stooging around the MATZ above me?

[Squirrel 41]

Engines, Tuc, Wensleydale et al,

Many thanks for such an informative (if depressing) review. I have two questions (or had, It's Life Jim 208 has asked the one about "When?").

The second is what is the level of assurance required? I don't suppose that a 1964 KC-135 is as inherently safe as a 2013 built A330 Voyager - if only because of the FBW protection in the Airbus. So how do you get to a place where something like the RJs can get certified? How much assurance is "enough"?

Thanks in advance,

S41

[Engines]

S41,

The simple (but probably not reassuring) answer is not the actual amount of 'assurance', but the development of a proven and auditable safety case that demonstrates that operation of the aircraft is sufficiently safe.

By 'sufficiently', I mean that the safety case shows that the aircraft meets the target laid down in MAA RA1230, which says:

The cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) leading to the death of any aircrew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.

How long does that take? As long as it takes to assemble all the evidence and analysis to underpin the claims made in the safety case. (I've probably got some of the detailed terminology wrong here, but I think I'm fairly close).

If the original Boeing and USAF documentation isn't available (and let's be clear, there's a decent possibility that it never existed in the first place) then the PT is having to develop new evidence based on analysis and/or read across from other airframes. As Tuc so often (and rightly) reminds us, doing that after the aircraft has been built and flown for many years is not an easy task.

Hope this helps

Best Regards

Engines

[tucumseh]

The cumulative probability of the loss of an aircraft due to a technical fault and the cumulative probability of a technical failure of the aircraft (inclusive of its systems, structure and stores) leading to the death of any aircrew or passengers, should both be assessed to be of the order of one in a million per flying hour (probability of occurrence 1x10-6 per flying hour) when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration. There is clearly a lot more to this than this rather simplistic statement in MAA documentation. The subtleties of safety, airworthiness and fitness for purpose must be considered.


Firstly, it rather bodyswerves the concept of functional safety. Tornado ZG710 would, probably, have passed this test, yet was functionally unsafe because its IFF failure warning systems were not integrated and the failure to reply to the Patriot interrogation was not notified to the crew. (See BoI report, ACM Burridge’s comments and recommendations – which were ignored). That failure left them with a Build Standard that “COULD result in loss of life”; which is the definition of Safety Critical. The regulations decreed the aircraft, at that Build Standard, could not be put to the use for which it was intended. It was “airworthy” in the sense it could be flown in a very benign environment, with restrictive limitations. However, the management rulings of the day (by DGAS2 and XD5) decreed that the IPT need NOT integrate the warnings. DE&S and the MAA continue to support these rulings. Ministers continue to uphold them. Sort that one out and you’re half way to fixing the systemic failures that plague MoD.

The last bit is important.... “when operated within the conditions used for the airworthiness demonstration.” What is that? The initial “airworthiness demonstration” is typically carried out in the Proof Installation aircraft, very often without systems that would be considered operationally “No Go”. That is partly why you have a Part 2 (Service Deviations) in the RTS. Each subsequent change to the Build Standard MUST be tested and trialled and the subject of an update to the Safety Case. This last is where the system falls down, especially when the change is a Service Modification. Again, the same 2 Stars ruled that this regulation, mandated upon MoD by Secy of State, could be waived. Worse, that a false declaration could be made that it had been complied with. (See Chinook HC Mk2 RTS). It is this lack of a valid Safety Case which compromises any current airworthiness declaration. Without it, the RTS cannot be validated. The RTS is the Master Airworthiness Reference.



Part of the above ruling and practice upheld by the Nimrod/Chinook 2 Star (DGAS2) was that “if it works on the bench, it will work and be safe in the aircraft”, so testing and trialling at the new Build Standard was, and is, often waived. That is, the “airworthiness demonstration” baseline often omits complete systems. That was the case with IFF, for example. So, this definition, combined with extant rulings and practice, is very restrictive and could, and often does, produce an aircraft that is unsafe and not fit for purpose. (Remember that during the XV179 C130 inquest, the IPTL claimed he did not know how to achieve and maintain fitness for purpose. I am always reminded of a young civilian clerical officer who supported me in the late 80s. He knew, and could be trusted to manage the administrative side of such routine work. Billy, I hope you read this!)



Now, as Engines says, try applying that retrospectively to a 50 year old airframe. The chances of the OEMs having the relevant evidence, and a robust audit trail of every change (and Change, if you know the difference!), is very remote indeed. But we (UK) cannot complain. We can’t produce such evidence for our newest aircraft, never mind 50 year old ones. And that is why the IPT would have had a problem seeking funding to attempt to reconcile these conflicts (the risk reduction activity I mentioned). Requirement Scrutiny would immediately reveal that the same issue applied Pan-MoD, opening up a can of worms. Which is why conducting Requirement Scrutiny can be an offence in MoD, despite being a legal obligation. Another ruling by the same people.

[Wensleydale]

Tucumseh,


May I also add the muddying of water caused by using COTS (components off the shelf) which was encouraged by our lords and masters in order to save money - however this has made the configuration of aircraft within a fleet nearly impossible to manage... it has been suggested that a new installation in a COTS fleet has to be fully tested for every aircraft because the configuration for each aircraft (if known) is different. This is particularly problematical for complex aircraft - especially when fitted with highly classified equipment and software.

[tucumseh]

Wensleydale

Very true. After many years of sensible people avoiding COTS like the plague, for these very reasons, the Defence Scientific Advisory Council (not just scientists, but including users at, typically, SO1 level, and reporting direct to SofS) issued a report in 2000 completely trashing the notion as too risky. (MoD refuses to release it, which is why you keep your own copy!) There are exceptions in various domains, but usually not in airborne equipment.

You mention configuration management. Nailed it. The RAF Chief Engineer withdrew ALL funding for CM in 1992/3 and, while partly resurrected, the gaps were never plugged. And subsequent generations of staff were taught it was a waste. Without it, the Safety Case can NEVER be validated. This is the remedial work the MAA should have been concentrating on instead of re-writing the regs. But doing so would reveal the underlying reason for their very existence, which they do not want to acknowledge.

[tucumseh]

W

To be entirely fair, I should add that I once saw a vacancy notice at AbbeyWood for a Configuration Manager for EFA (Typhoon). But I often wondered where they got a sufficiently experienced candidate from, given they had graded it very low. Thier counterparts in industry are usually quite senior, same as Risk Managers. Very often the RM is by far the most senior grade in the company team. In MoD it is a peripheral appointment, ditched at the first hint of savings. Always assuming you're given the post in the first place. The two are linked. Failure to maintain CC is ALWAYS a standing risk in MoD.

[Engines]

Guys,

As ever, Tuc does a great job of filling in the important gaps I left in my brief post. The concept of 'functional' safety (aka fitness for purpose) is one I've been trying to get across to requirements managers for around seven years now, and Tuc is right on the money when he identifies the level of ignorance around the risks of assuming that if kit works on the bench (or worse, on the demo stand at the air show) it will work on the aircraft.

Perhaps this will help: here's my own (admittedly imperfect) 'take' on what I see as the three elements of safety.

First - the basic 'airworthiness' aspect - will the item stay in one piece/not catch fire/not fall out of the sky/not poison you/last the required service life, stop working next to a radar, etc. This is where a lack of airframe and systems related information on Rivet Joint could pose an issue.

Second - the 'Functional Safety' bit, or 'Fitness for Purpose': Does the item work as intended? Does it work with the other kit on the platform? Does it tell the aircrew when it is working and when it isn't? Is it reliable? Can it be used in a safe manner? This is where HMI issues can come in. (Example - requiring ten button presses to select an emergency frequency isn' a good thing). On Rivet Joint, this should pose less of an issue, but US sourced kit (or COTS kit) has a habit of springing some nasty little surprises - 'Hey, why isn't that light coming on when I press the button?', etc.

Third - does it support safe operations - does the radio have the required range and clarity, does the aircraft deliver the capability required to stay safe - does the DAS kit work, do data links link, etc. On Rivet Joint, this area will depend on high level agreements for information exchange with the USAF - I would guess (but don't know) that this should be less of an issue.

This is my own personal list - it's probably not right for all projects, but i've found it useful. I'm totally relaxed if others disagree.

The key to achieving all of this safety stuff in a quick and effective manner is a good set of requirements. If the team takes the time to set down a clear and achievable set of requirements in enough detail, the contractor and the PT have a fighting chance of getting across the line in good order.

And this is where the problems, in my view, usually arise.

If the requirement for Rivet Joint was 'we'll have three of those lovely Rivet Joint aircraft just like you've got, please' (I exaggerate to make my point) then problems are bound to arise. If the requirement was 'We'll have three RJ aircraft, but they've got to meet the UK's Air Safety requirements as set down in MAA regs xxxxx' then the issue would be getting the US Government to sign up to that. They would not have.

My personal observation is that too many Requirements Managers I have worked with on aircraft related projects are simply not equipped to do the job. It's not that they are aircrew (as most of them are), it's that they are aircrew who have not had the required training in systems engineering and requirements management. They are often freshly promoted SO2s straight out of flying jobs. As a result, many of them just don't understand what a good requirement set looks like, or what it takes to produce one. I would say straight away that there have been exceptions, and very good ones, who were keen, technically aware, very experienced and happy to learn. But they were exceptions.

Starting out with a poor requirements set throws the risks straight on to the project managers and engineers in the PTs, who are sometimes short of experience and technical expertise, or detailed knowledge about the systems they are dealing with. Again, not their fault, but it's another link in the accident chain.

Of course, variation in configuration within a (supposedly consistent) fleet of aircraft is just another honking great link in the chain. It's a source of real worry that this variation is often deliberately introduced by the customer (those RMs again) with no declaration of the consequent potential safety hazard.

Hope this ramble (sorry for length) is of passing interest to some people out there.

Best Regards as ever to all those trying to get over the line in good order,

Engines

[Shackman]

I see that the airworthiness issues surrounding the ac have finally made today's Sunday Times. However, I am intrigued that MOD have now decided that (quote)'an alternative method of issuing a safety certificate has been devised!

So we lose one aircraft type (and the whole MR/R1 capability) that can't meet a new MAA system, buy a much older airframe just for the R1 that also can't meet the new airworthiness system, and immediately kick it all in to touch so that no one gets egg on their face (but presumably much scrambled egg on their hats).

After being involved in conversations in both the crewroom and Ops room conversations at Aldergrove the day before Mull of Kintyre regarding the HC2 Chinook when Boscombe effectively grounded theirs I had hoped I would not see yet another occurrence of the safety case being over-ridden. I'm sure the ac (RJ) is probably perfectly safe, but if we have an airworthiness system - no matter how flawed as Tuc has well argued - it should not be circumvented.

[reds & greens]

Not wanting to give too much away (look at my user name); but, put simply, I'd leave the service at the first sign of a posting on this aircraft.
I'm not chasing promotion and I'm not going to give myself an ulcer through worry - I will, however, only sign what is correct when people's lives are at stake.

[tucumseh]

Boscombe effectively grounded theirs I had hoped I would not see yet another occurrence of the safety case being over-ridden. I'm sure the ac (RJ) is probably perfectly safe, but if we have an airworthiness system - no matter how flawed as Tuc has well argued - it should not be circumvented.


I'm afraid such an over-rule is not only permitted, but as I've often said MoD and Ministers (and lately the Head of the Civil Service) have consistently ruled that it can not only be made by unqualified people, but the person who has the airworthiness delegation can be disciplined for refusing to obey an order to make a false declaration that the regs have been met.

As ever, it is the implementation of the regulations that is lacking, not necessarily the regs themselves. More recently however, it has become apparent many in the MAA don't actually understand them. Hardly a surprise given the ethos of the last 20-odd years.

[Phoney Tony]

Picking up on an earlier point. The RJ has never been 'operationally tested'. Title 10 rules are paid lip service with BS claiming rapid refresh of capabilities to satisfy many UORs and being a 'black programme' make testing a nugatory process. Development and acceptance test is carried out to a degree.

If the press reports are correct, there are not enough qualified personnel to carry out the work required to correctly certify aircraft.

Embarrassment is now starting to out weigh risk.

[tucumseh]

If MoD/MAA finds an acceptable way of certifying the aircraft, excellent. No issue with that.

However, the very fact that, not for the first time, it has been admitted as a major risk is a major cock up in the first place. It clearly indicates mandated regulations were completely ignored and lessons from past failures, and notable successes, ignored. So much for the MAA and oversight.

The exceptionally high probability of encountering airworthiness problems in MoD programmes has been a standing risk for well over 20 years. That risk MUST be mitigated before approval is sought to proceed. You MUST demonstrate a "route map" to achieving certain fundamental milestones.

For example, the ability to bring the design Under Ministry Control, Transfer to PDS, Attaining Airworthiness, a funded and viable plan to Maintain Airworthiness and so on.

In confidence terms, and uppermost in one's mind throughout, is the Transfer to PDS. Every MoD Technical Agency and Programme Manager should know the 4 page Transfer form backwards, and if you get that right you are 95% of the way there, the other 5% being "unavoidables" (like political interference). It establishes that you have a valid, compliant Safety Case. Unsurprisingly, this is precisely what the Chief Engineer pulled the funding for in the early 90s and what was subsequently taught to be a "waste of money". And I wonder where the Transfer procedure is articulated now, given the mandated Def Stan was cancelled a few years ago without replacement.

Predictable, predicted, notified and ignored. Again.

[Druid77]

According to this link

RAF rewrites safety rules to fly old jets after being told £660m purchase was useless | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2603460/RAF-rewrites-safety-rules-fly-old-jets-told-660m-purchase-useless.html)

‘If the aircraft is safe for the US Army Air Force, it must be good enough for the RAF to fly.’
------------------
Well that's all right then. Brits have never disagreed with the US over airworthiness......................

[Davef68]

I know it's the Mail, but....

The RC-135 Rivet Joint jets, built in 1964, were gathering dust in a ‘boneyard’ for retired planes in the US when the RAF bought them as a replacement for its Nimrod spy aircraft

That would include the one still flying ops as a KC-135 last year then - and it's downhill from there!

[GreenKnight121]

Especially with the line "US Army Air Force"!

The Mail must be employing senile WW2 veterans!


Picking up on an earlier point. The RJ has never been 'operationally tested'.

Except in numbers, by the USAF, for decades! Yes, there IS a world outside the UK, strange as it may seem to you.

Perhaps the MoD is trying to make sense of what they have seen given that the type has been flown by the USAF for decades.

Exactly - and they are being modified from a type the USAF has operated for >50 years.

And each airframe has extensive maintenance documentation, and has been modified to a set configuration identical to that the USAF is currently operating.



But the detractors will continue to blather about "no documentation" and "no configuration control" as if anything not generated and controlled by the RAF doesn't exist.

[tucumseh]

But the detractors will continue to blather about "no documentation" and "no configuration control" as if anything not generated and controlled by the RAF doesn't exist.

One assumes this means you reject the need for a Safety Case?

“No documentation” and “no configuration control” were major contributory factors in the deaths of many of our UK servicemen. This Rivet Joint problem has been noted before by MoD, in 2011 if I recall, so the “blathering” has come from them. Much to their credit I suppose; a frankness which was lacking in the past.


The article is based on yet another MoD admission, in the 2013 MAA annual report. In it, the new DG repeats the 20 year old fact that MoD lacks experienced and competent (not the same thing) engineers. What he doesn’t say is that this shortage was a direct result of two of the main perpetrators of the airworthiness scandal decreeing, in 1991 and 1996, that MoD did not need engineers to manage any part of engineering programmes. One fallout from these decisions was the policy that permitted non-engineers to have airworthiness and technical delegation; in fact, self delegation.

However, I agree with your last comment. There is too much reinvention of wheels and duplication. There also happens to be a perfectly good procedure in MoD for using foreign certification and, as far as possible, reading across. I mentioned the transfer to PDS. What PDS Category is the aircraft and its kit? 1,2,3,4,5 or 6? A simple question, but if not addressed problems accumulate and bite you just as you’re looking to issue certification. The decision must be made up front, as it is a major decision point regarding achieving and especially maintaining airworthiness. Not least due to funding and complex contractual arrangements.



The MAA has not revealed precisely what is causing concern at the moment, but MoD did reveal itself when the decision to buy these aircraft was announced. They claimed they would be exactly the same configuration as those used by the US. The problem here is that such a configuration would (in part) breach not MoD rules, but those imposed on MoD by our Home Office. It was too simplistic a statement, something noted on pprune at the time. If that truly was the level of thinking, then problems were inevitable because much else would be ignored.

[ancientaviator62]

tuc,
as I recall every RAF a/c has to have a 'Design Authority'. I believe the USAF usually take up this role for their a/c. When we bought the C130K Marshalls became our design authority for it. Who is the design authority for the Rivet Joint a/c ?

[tucumseh]

Sorry Ancient, I too am ancient and don't know.

There doesn't HAVE to be a company appointed as DA, but it is wise. For example, MoD was the DA for some aircraft engine types when we had a dedicated Aero Engine Directorate and, importantly, experts in the field. You do get ridiculous extremes; for example, in 1991 Alcock's regime wanted to cancel all avionic DA contracts and take over DA-ship at Harrogate, led by Supply Managers. However, his incompetence was never in doubt and we headed that off. His reaction was to chop safety funding so we couldn't do the job either, so maybe we would have been better off letting the suppliers (mis)manage it. But it shows you how little very senior people understand about such an important subject.

What the regs say (or said, as they've been cancelled, but I have my own copy here) is that if the original DA does not want the job, is not suitable, or no longer exists, a Design Custodian can be appointed (along with the System Co-ordinating Design Authorities/Custodians, as required). The latter is the basis of all systems integration and functional safety. The MoD must make arrangements for the DC to hold a certified copy of the Master Drawings, and a contractual arrangement must be made with the holder of the Masters for upkeep. A good example is most US-sourced avionics. Joyce Loebl in Gateshead became our best known DC; and a very good job they made of it too. Very often the difficulty is persuading a UK company to take on the responsibility, knowing that in the background there will be hassle with the OEM - especially the US I'm afraid. They treat us like s##t and over-charge to the point of fraud. I remember being quoted a cool £1M (not $) to amend a drawing by inserting a zener diode. (The effect of the diode was to double the available crypto variables in the aircraft, thus meeting Home / Foreign Office requirements following a complaint from Italy).

There are many ways of skinning this cat. MoD could buy the Design Rights and hand them to a UK company, who would become the DA. I don't know if this is what happened on C130K and Marshalls, but it is hard to believe Lockheed sold us the Design Rights. I'd say Marshalls are, more correctly, the Design Custodian. Certainly, during the XV179 inquiry, they didn't have access to data you'd expect a DA to have.

A little known policy, and certainly seldom implemented properly, is that the named representative of the DA or DC is an MoD-approved appointment. If we are considering appointing a company as a DA, we ask them to propose their man, and we (his opposite number in MoD, the named Technical Agency) vet and approve him. We can sack him at any time. (I've only had to do it once, in about 1992). This TA post is precisely the experience the MAA confirm is lacking. Find me someone in DE&S who knows this stuff! (EVERY engineering project manager should, be it Air, Land or Sea).

The reason for this is that, uniquely, he is granted financial and technical delegation powers far in excess of many in MoD. The sole purpose is that he may commit our money and expedite safety matters without seeking MoD approval or contract amendment. This is what makes nonsense of the MoD Commercial claim that only they can commit us to contract. THIS is why the lead question on many investigations should be to this named individual, asking what he did about it when informed. The question is NEVER asked, indicating a breakdown in the safety management system. (The answer would almost always be he hadn't been given the correct delegation). Often, the correct question is asked, but of the wrong company (Chinook ZD576, Red Arrows XX177, Sea King ASaC, Tornado ZG710 for example), which simply illustrates how important is it to establish and record these boundaries of responsibility for all aspects of the programme.

[Phoney Tony]

DA for platform and Mission System is BIG SAFARI and not USAF.

[LowObservable]

GK121 - To be fair to the Daily Fail, when the original KC-135 was ordered, the USAF had existed for less than seven years.

[ancientaviator62]

tuc,
I am sure that we always referred to Marshalls as the DA for Europe in respect of the C130K. We could of course have been parroting nonsense, but Marshalls seemed to act as a DA in respect of most things to do with the 'K'. The tanker comes to mind when fatigue data was required in respect of repeated overweight take off operations. I have a vague (all my recollections are so !) notion that the rushed initial Chinook buy threw up the question as to who would be the UK DA as Boeing refused to be.

[ancientaviator62]

I have just noticed that in the HEART Report Marshalls is described as the Sister Design Authority (SDA). So my recollection is not so far adrift, unlike my taking this thread ! Apologies.

[Lynxman]

RA5101(2) States:

Design Organization Appointment
5101(2) The PTL shall appoint a Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization to be responsible for a particular item or range of items.

A number of responsibilities come with this appointment, notably as stated in the AMC for RA5102(1):

1. When a contractor is appointed Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization, his responsibilities to the MOD should include:
a. Design of the materiel, including all necessary development and testing, to the requirements of the contract specification.
b. Preparation, updating and custody of specifications, drawings and other data associated with the design of the materiel.
c. Preparation, collection, analysis and maintenance of data comprising evidence of design and system safety in accordance with a Safety Management Plan agreed with the PTL.
d. Submission of reports, as required, on progress of the work.
e. Preparing an appropriate certificate of design and its submission for MOD
acceptance (See RA 5103).
f. Ensuring that the design will be suitable for production in facilities agreed between the contractor and MOD.
g. Design of packaging as required for the materiel.
h. Preparation of, or supply of information for, the necessary technical
publications.
i. Collaboration with the relevant PT and it’s agencies in the preparation and provision of information for maintenance of the materiel.
j. Post design services.

The DO must also have DAOS approval.

[GreenKnight121]

One assumes this means you reject the need for a Safety Case?

You assume very incorrectly, and in an insulting manner!


My position is that there is more than enough documentation to make up a valid Safety Case as long as the UK is willing to admit that other nations are capable of designing and operating aircraft safely without following UK protocols, and to look outside its own borders for the information on which to base its decision.

The question is whether the Safety Case is to ignore all non-UK-generated design, operation, maintenance, and configuration documentation (in this case a massive amount of all the above is available from the USAF) in deciding whether the aircraft is, in fact, safe to fly as intended - or to accept such documentation where it presents a clear and comprehensive picture.

A second question is whether any documentation not produced in the RAF-approved manner, form, and style is to be ignored, or if "non-UK-standard" documentation can be accepted if the information contained therein can fill the mandatory information sections of the UK requirements.



The sentence you used to make your crap assumption relates to those who, both in the real world and in this thread (and related ones) insist that Rivet Joint (or insert other US aircraft designation as applicable) "has never been 'operationally tested'." (see Phoney Tony), or "has no documentation" (see many posters on Chinook, etc) - when there exist mountains of documentation and massive operational experience and testing from outside the UK.

How anyone can get from there to claiming I say no Safety Case is needed is incomprehensible.

[tucumseh]

Sorry Green Knight but you used a slightly derogatory term ("blathering") to describe those who advocate configuration control and documentation. I twitch because it was precisely those failures, openly admitted by MoD in the 90s, that should have prevented the Chinook pilots being blamed in the first place. They were the very first signposts to the fact the aircraft was not airworthy; and indeed highlighted from the very beginning - but unfortunately not understood or pursued. Too often, both here and in MoD, we have people saying they are a waste of money, when in fact doing it correctly is money in the bank. They are pre-requisites to a valid Safety Case and I think I'd rather have people blathering on about them than ignoring them. We should be looking at the people who don't want to talk about them, and who issue instructions (a) not to do the work and (b) sign to say it has been done.



My position is that there is more than enough documentation to make up a valid Safety Case as long as the UK is willing to admit that other nations are capable of designing and operating aircraft safely without following UK protocols, and to look outside its own borders for the information on which to base its decision.

I fully agree and said so above. However, I also noted that MoD doesn't always have the luxury of buying to the same build standard, and any variations MUST be reflected in the Safety Case. THIS is where MoD has historically failed, again because of senior staffs deeming it a waste of moeny.

I wonder if the Build Standard reflected in the Boeing Safety Case in the US is the same as the proposed UK one? We are told they are the same, but I'm not so sure.

[tucumseh]

A number of responsibilities come with this appointment, notably as stated in the AMC for RA5102(1):

1. When a contractor is appointed Design Organization or Co-ordinating Design Organization, his responsibilities to the MOD should include:

a. Design of the materiel, including all necessary development and testing, to the requirements of the contract specification.
b. Preparation, updating and custody of specifications, drawings and other data associated with the design of the materiel.
c. Preparation, collection, analysis and maintenance of data comprising evidence of design and system safety in accordance with a Safety Management Plan agreed with the PTL.
d. Submission of reports, as required, on progress of the work.
e. Preparing an appropriate certificate of design and its submission for MOD
acceptance (See RA 5103).
f. Ensuring that the design will be suitable for production in facilities agreed between the contractor and MOD.
g. Design of packaging as required for the materiel.
h. Preparation of, or supply of information for, the necessary technical
publications.
i. Collaboration with the relevant PT and it’s agencies in the preparation and provision of information for maintenance of the materiel.
j. Post design services.

The only problem I have with this is that it calls into question MAA's understanding of the fact items (a) through (i) are also a SMALL PART OF (j).

The purpose of Post Design Services is to "Maintain the Build Standard". That is a pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case (as a given issue of the Safety Case is based on a given Build Standard), so is contracted in the same contract. There are 17 primary components of a Build Standard, each with secondary components. The above list (a - i) comprises both primary and secondary, so there is a significant part missing.

Where is that fully articulated in the MAA documentation, and where are the mandated procedures for implementation, now that the Def Stan has been cancelled without replacement? The above smacks of being made up at a brainstorming half hour, when all they had to do was update and re-validate existing mandated policy. But that would be to admit there was nothing wrong with the "old" regs, which would divert attention back to those who decreed them unnecessary. In any case, I really do doubt if MoD still has a copy of the "old" regs. I know D/Stan doesn't.

And where is the necessary training and expertise, given the formal appointment of the Technical Agency (who manages all this stuff) requires donkeys years of previous experience and proven competence? The MAA and Bernard Gray have admitted this doesn't exist, so what recruitment standard is now applied? By definition, the standard required for delegation has been diluted; something reported often and consistently from the early 90s.

MoD's problems in this area stem from the verifiable fact, confirmed by the likes of the Inspector of Flight Safety, Lord Philip, Director Internal Audit, Equipment Accounting Centre and more, is that in the period 1991-93 the RAF Chief Engineer issued instructions that ALL of the above should cease forthwith. Haddon-Cave accepted this, but despite the raft of evidence claimed it was 1998. (Presumably all the above backdated their reports!) The day the MAA acknowledge this truth is the day I'll walk away.

[BEagle]

Some interesting information about the RAF Chief Engineer of that period appear here: https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/executive-docs

:eek:

[Chugalug2]

This is a sorry business. Chickens are coming home to roost in their flocks now. The age old default of the MOD whereby it treated each incident, each accident, each loss of life, as a one off that bore no relationship to any other, is seen as the lie that it is.

UK Military Airworthiness is in tatters, totally dysfunctional, and in the hands of amateurs. tuc shows above the schoolboy howlers that are their daily output. Every time they are faced with the consequences of their own ignorance the solution is to draw up a new list of regulations, procedures, or mere soundbites.

The men and women of our Armed Forces deserve far better than this. The defence of the nation deserves far better than this. As tuc says, the one thing that prevents meaningful reform is the dead hand of the MOD, that will not admit to the willful destruction of Air Safety wrought as policy from the late 80's. That is why the MAA, together with the MAAIB, must be made independent of the MOD and of each other. Then, and only then, can it begin the task of regaining the original regulations, restoring the necessary expertise, and reforming the provision and maintenance of UK Military Airworthiness. Time is of the essence, and any delay will cost us more avoidable accidents and more needless loss of life.

Self Regulation Doesn't Work, and in Aviation It Kills!

[Rigga]

Tuc said:
"I wonder if the Build Standard reflected in the Boeing Safety Case in the US is the same as the proposed UK one? We are told they are the same, but I'm not so sure. "

I would be absolutely gob-smacked if the Safety Case in each Directorate was even remotely the same.
The UK and US spec's should reflect those nations individual expectations and standards. The differences are clearly stated as such in the MAA's declared aspiration to align with future US mil certification processes for Apache and F-35.

They only have to bend the current rules slightly to achieve that.

[GreenKnight121]

tucumseh (http://www.pprune.org/members/65525-tucumseh)

Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: uk
Posts: 2,043


Sorry Green Knight but you used a slightly derogatory term ("blathering") to describe those who advocate configuration control and documentation.

NO I DID NOT!

I very specifically and clearly used that word in reference to those who claim that the massive mountain of documentation provided by the USAF does not exist, as it had not been generated inside, and in accordance with the processes of, the UK!


You continue to deliberately and maliciously twist and falsely misrepresent my statements, and you have both been reported to the moderators and placed on my "block" list.

[tucumseh]

Green Knight


For Goodness sake, no need for a little paddy. I would not say your post is as clear as you imply, but if that is what you meant, so be it.


I very specifically and clearly used that word in reference to those who claim that the massive mountain of documentation provided by the USAF does not exist, as it had not been generated inside, and in accordance with the processes of, the UK!

If I were MoD, I wouldn't pay too much attention to USAF paperwork, in the same way I wouldn't expect them to pay too much to ours. What I'd want to know is what work the company charged with stripping, inspecting, making good, rebuilding, testing, trialling our 3 aircraft has to do to achieve this; especially the making good bit. One assumes they weren't simply fueled up and flown as is.

Then, given the airframes are 50 years old, I'd want to know if the standards and materiel from 50 years ago are still applied (or CAN be applied) and, if not, what DIFFERENCES there are, how to record them, make sure they actually ARE recorded, and WHO will underwrite them. In other words, how many Production Permits and/or Concessions have been necessary, and who signs them? Because, those differences, even just one (and there are probably hundreds) constitute a major risk to a programme that was predicated upon buying the exact same standard as the US (which is what MoD announced in the beginning to allay these fears).

And, all the while and in parallel, this work is being plugged into the Safety Case update and reveiwed at each change, because if the audit trail is broken at any point then, by definition, MoD is going to have to be seen to ignore Haddon-Cave and the Secy of State.

And what does the original DA (Boeing?) have to say about this? Would you, in their shoes, be keen to put your name on the line for the sake of 3 resurrected airframes being flogged cheap to patch up a major cock-up? Indeed, have they a mechanism in place for approving such changes to a 50 year old design? If not, or if they are unwilling to sign up to the new Build Standard, or have doubts about the ability to maintain it, then who will?

I can't help wondering why such a risky programme was endorsed and approved in the first place. By MoD's own admission, they knew from the outset the airworthiness regulations could not be satisfied, but proceeded "at risk". I'd say DE&S/MAA don't have that authority. Was it a political over-rule, due to the embarrassment of no longer having ELINT? My guess here is DE&S are being blamed unfairly. I'd also want to know if the MAA had the authority to play the red card, and if they tried.

[Bannock]

Shiny New MMA anyone ?

Exclusive: P-8 Poseidon Flies With Shadowy Radar System Attached (http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/exclusive-p-8-poseidon-flies-with-shadowy-radar-system-1562912667)

Add an Elint package and some geeks and we get 3 fleets for the price of one.

Was going to mention AEW but thought that might be too controversial.. Bugger !:ok:

[Willard Whyte]

If I were MoD, I wouldn't pay too much attention to USAF paperwork,


The MoD will have collective coronaries just checking the spelling, all those 'izes, 'ors instead of 'ours, 'ibers instead of 'ibres, etc.

One wonders if the onboard safety equipment includes an ax? And is the aircraft painted gray or grey? Will the MoD 'metricate' everything, they managed to avoid it on the E-3 thank goodness...

[Wensleydale]

Ah yes - the documentation provided...


If I remember for the entry of the E-3D into service....the US equivalent of the aircrew manuals arrived at Waddington some time after the aircraft and we (the aircrew) were asked to make observations. Sadly, all of the diagrams referred to an E-3C - there was not a picture that contained an E-3D with a refuelling probe and the engines were Pratt and Witneys and certainly not CFM-56s. We shortly realised that we would have to write our own manuals based upon the existing USAF manuals. Unfortunately, the classified documents did not arrive until a year later and were blatantly WRONG in several areas! The difficulty in correcting these documents was that we had no facilities for changing these documents and they went on for many years uncorrected - unfortunately, when teaching subjects such as radar, the students were often confused because their instructor (me) was telling them something different to the manuals (if they actually bothered to get them out).

[Rigga]

Like Tuc, I would have no real interest in the supplied paperwork apart from referencing where it fitted into my own research and requirements.
In my past I have been 'told' to certify several airliners that I discovered didn't have "paperwork" going back the length of service and I failed to sign, much to the boss's obvious frustration. But without my signature on the dotted line they (three 757s) didn't go anywhere (not on my signature and not in that airline, anyway).

[ancientaviator62]

Wensleydale,
when we first got the 'one off' C130K we had exactly the similar problems, especially with the servicing manuals. We were fortunate to have regular contact (OK beer calls) with the Mildenhall Herc detachment who were able to point us in the right direction, and we the aircrew on 47 were very lucky to have an experienced C130 pilot as our exchange officer Add to this the introduction of the new stock computer at Hendon, as they tried to convert Lockheed part numbers, Federal Stock numbers and good old section and refs and you can see why we had a problem.

[Davef68]

I'd imagine the issues with these would be even greater, as whilst the majority of USAF RC-135s have been under L-3 (and it's predecessors) control for a long time, the RAF's aircraft have spent most of their life as KC-135s (presumably under Boeing design control) - I may be wrong, but I don't think any of the USAF RC-135Ws spent any great time as tankers (if at all), most being 135B models originally.

[bit-twiddler]

I understand one of the stumbling blocks is in the maintenance - How can you guarantee that the replacement parts match the original items the safety case was drawn up against?

Say, for example, part of the fuselage needed changing and L3 swapped it with a part off the rest of the RJ fleet which had an incomplete history and completely different flying hours, then what happens.

As to the reason for going down the RJ/Airseeker route instead of the original Helix upgrade plan - I'd guess that when Helix became unaffordable (due to them realising that extending the R1 was not solely it's current running costs because of the infrastructure support it enjoyed from the maritime variant?). It looks like they revisited earlier, pre-Haddon-Cave, proposals without fully considering the implications.

[Rick777]

Am I the only one that finds it amazing that someone would spend many millions for an airplane and them get into a huge argument with themselves over whether they can actually fly the airplane ?

[dervish]

Rick777

Assuming that's a typo and you mean "argument"..........:ok::ok::ok:

[cokecan]

Ricky,

no, you're not. if the RAF has bought this aircraft and then decides its never going to be safe to fly i wouldn't bother wasting money on a 'happy 100th Birthday' card for the RAF...

nobody minds the RAF nut-stranglers sitting down and saying that an aircrafts history, or non-existant history, means it should never leave the ground again. they do however mind if the RAF has just bought it, and persuaded ministers to make public pronouncements on the cleverness of buying this particular aircraft.

would you go car shopping with a bloke who only last week had taken a car for a test drive, bought it, and then - upon getting home - decided to send it off for scrap as it would never pass an MOT? no, and neither will ministers.

Nimrod, RJ, F-35B/C/B - all these embarrassing episodes under one government and that government is going to start doubting the competance of the people supposedly managing those programmes...

[Chugalug2]

Just a reminder that this situation didn't just suddenly happen. It is the inevitable and logical consequence of the actions of certain RAF VSOs almost 30 years ago and of the subsequent cover up of those actions since, let alone any serious effort by the RAF High Command to correct them.

As you say cokecan, hardly the setting for any celebration in 4 years time, unless of course it bites the bullet, admits what happened, and sets about putting things right, starting with calling for the MAA and MAAIB to be freed from the MOD and from each other.

Now, deep breath in and hold....

[Biggus]

Rick777 and cokecan,

I realize that this thread is getting quite long, and 500+ posts is a lot to read. However, if you go back and read my post 433, and some of the replies, especially 434, you will see a partial explanation of the situation you refer to - i.e. buying an aircraft that your own procedures then won't let you operate.

Between the RJ being ordered, and it being delivered, things within the MOD/RAF changed, including the creation of the MAA and the procedure for accepting an aircraft into service. Thus the RJ was ordered under one set of "rules", but was delivered under a different set due to the passage of time.

While this doesn't excuse the situation, and the problem (risk) should have been seen coming and mitigated earlier, it does help explain how it occurred.



I have used the phrase "rules" quite generally. tucumseh and others are far more knowledgeable on these issues and the many sins that appear to have been committed, and are still being committed, in this area for the past 25 odd years. Their posts are more enlightening about the situation in general.

[cokecan]

oh absolutely, these problems are the result of actions/decisions decades old, but they are to the outsider (and i include the rest of the government in that..) all coming together at the same time.

it looks, again, to the outsider, like the RAF (collectively, regardless of how unfairly) couldn't find its arse with both hands.

while i've seen individuals blamed, it can only be the truth that a whole generation or more of senior RAF officers have conspired in this airworthiness abortion - as happened with Chinook ZD576 and the subsequent cover up, Nimrod XV230 etc...

on the evidence, you wouldn't trust the RAF to run a welk stall without killing the saturday girl.

[caped crusader]

Wensleydale's post about documentation revived memories of the E-3D trial programme.

Apparently when the Boscombe Down team set about planning the E-3D trial programme it looked at the agreed contractual method of testing for the respective aircraft and mission systems.

Against some items it read "PV" meaning it had been previously verified and did not need to be tested. This had been agreed by the civil servants managing the project in the then MOD PE.

When the team asked for proof of how the systems had been tested the reply was that proof of verification was not part of the contract. I believe this led to a separate contract having to be set up for the documentation to be provided.

[1.3VStall]

Cutting through this sorry saga to the chase - does anyone have the remotest idea when/if this aircraft will fly again?

[Wensleydale]

"Cutting through this sorry saga to the chase - does anyone have the remotest idea when/if this aircraft will fly again?"

According to local television which has picked up on the story, the MOD has stated that the aircraft will be "operational" by the end of the year.

[dervish]

Between the RJ being ordered, and it being delivered, things within the MOD/RAF changed, including the creation of the MAA and the procedure for accepting an aircraft into service. Thus the RJ was ordered under one set of "rules", but was delivered under a different set due to the passage of time.


Are you 100% sure of this? Not arguing but I'm not convinced. Nimrod was scrapped after Haddon-Cave, who reported end 2009. The MAA is 4 years old this month. As tuc mentioned above, one of the main problems was probably the announcement that RJ was to be exactly the same as a US aircraft, then they realized the advice it couldn't be was correct all along. Over a year between delivering an "off the shelf" aircraft and entering service means something is wrong. Smells like someone just assumed the safety case would be a box tick and they parked it in a corner.

[Lonewolf_50]

“No documentation” and “no configuration control” were major contributory factors in the deaths of many of our UK servicemen
Not just in the UK. :{
What I'd want to know is what work the company charged with stripping, inspecting, making good, rebuilding, testing, trialling our 3 aircraft has to do to achieve this; especially the making good bit.
Overhaul at the depot level which is combined with a conversion/reconfiguration requires massive documentation. I think what you refer to is in all of those boxes. If it isn't, trouble ahead.
Then, given the airframes are 50 years old, I'd want to know if the standards and materiel from 50 years ago are still applied (or CAN be applied) and, if not, what DIFFERENCES there are, how to record them, make sure they actually ARE recorded, and WHO will underwrite them.
I read this as "configuration changes made in the process of getting them over to the RAF customer." Did I understand you correctly?
Because, those differences, even just one (and there are probably hundreds) constitute a major risk to a programme that was predicated upon buying the exact same standard as the US (which is what MoD announced in the beginning to allay these fears). So long as the configuration record is sound, I'd reckon on the MoD staff being able to reconcile. That, however, isn't always as simple as it sounds. :mad:
I understand one of the stumbling blocks is in the maintenance - How can you guarantee that the replacement parts match the original items the safety case was drawn up against?
Access to the drawings, which can get tricky when one deals with vendors, subs, qualified vendors, and such. They either conform to print/spec or they don't. If access to the drawings and specs is not part of the package ... oh boy, a few more pounds (add zeroes to the right as necessary) will be needed to get that included. (I hear that the term "contract modification" causes some program managers to become apoplectic :p ).

[tucumseh]

Lonewolf

I agree with your assessment, except;

So long as the configuration record is sound, I'd reckon on the MoD staff being able to reconcile.That would be a fair assumption if talking about an organisation that understands that CC is mandated and a fundamental pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case.

However, this is MoD we're talking about, and it is well over 20 years since our airworthiness leaders pulled the plug on funding and the need for staff to implement these regulations. In March 1999, our Chief of Defence Procurement (4 Star, Sir Robert Walmsley, retired Admiral) confirmed in evidence to the Public Accounts Committee that CC was lacking on whole aircraft fleets (the specific question was on Chinook) and then made his position on this quite clear by upholding disciplinary action against staffs who dared to insist it be carried out. This remains MoD's formal position.

Following the original 1991 policy, these issues became standing risks on any MoD aviation programme. That is, the policy meant you must assume you WILL hit problems. At first, perhaps minor; but as time progressed and gaps in CC increased, they would become major showstoppers. Regulations governing approvals require such risks to be mitigated. It is one reason why one cannot insert "100%" against the probability of occurrence in a risk register. If it is 100% you CANNOT seek approval to proceed. You MUST deal with it beforehand.

The situation on Rivet Joint would seem to be that MoD recognised the risk but did not do anything about it; at least not in a timely fashion or before seeking approval to proceed. This may sound like a simple case of deciding to deal with it in parallel with the main programme - in MoD's words, "proceed at risk". However, the dangers are obvious. MoD's risk management strategy has, for many years, been; By all means identify the risk, but wait to see if it becomes a problem before doing anything. This policy, enthusiastically implemented by many VSOs, has killed many. 7 on the Sea King ASaCs. 2 on Tornado ZG710. 29 on Chinook ZD576. And many more. The chances are that, once approval was granted, risk management was off-loaded onto some untrained junior; as it was on Nimrod MR2. On that programme, the hapless individual was named and shamed by the **** Haddon-Cave, but the VSOs who consciously denied him the training and resources to do the job were praised. That ethos has not yet changed for the better.

[Lonewolf_50]

Thanks for that explanation. The old problem of "doing more with less" generally leads to crap outcomes in some way.

Hoping that the research into the condition of the aircraft proceeds apace and they get to serve their intended purpose. It's a great capability.

[cpants]

For consideration by the United Kingdom’s
Military Aviation Authority (MAA)

Subject: The Airseeker Program.

When I made a protected disclosure to the United States Congress in 2008, I was unaware of a proposal by the United Kingdom to purchase three retired KC-135 aerial refueling tankers from the United States. The old U.S. tankers would be converted into RC-135 Rivet Joint spy planes, under contract by L-3 Communications, as a replacement for the UK’s own faltering spy plane known as the Nimrod (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawker_Siddeley_Nimrod). The non-airworthy condition of Rivet Joint 62-4127, as described in my disclosure to Congress, was strikingly similar to the non-airworthy condition that led to the 2006 destruction of Nimrod XV230 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Air_Force_Nimrod_XV230) over Afghanistan. Suspending my security clearance and covering-up the RC-135 maintenance problems were despicable acts, possibly orchestrated by senior defense officials to secure a 1.3 billion dollar aircraft purchase by the UK, and to supplement the United States’ own intelligence-gathering fleet utilizing British funds.

I intended to post the remaining sixty-three pages of my Congressional disclosure to this chapter, but the remaining sixty-three pages contain aircraft technical data protected by either the Export Administrations Act of 1979 (Title 50) or the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22). Absent this technical data, the remaining sixty-three pages would inaccurately reflect the other substantiated aircraft maintenance problems of the 55th Wing and the RC-135 program.

Now that I have retired and the blackmail has ended, I’m providing this book to demonstrate how harassment, intimidation, and reprisals are used to control the Federal workforce when management fears that it has been caught doing something unethical or illegal, thus the title, “Cowardice in Leadership”.

I am willing to post a link to the book "Cowardice In Leadership" if it is permitted by this forum.

[NoVANav]

At the risk of "stirring the pot", all the questions about the C-135 airframes, conversions, records, etc. is what we call BxxxSxxT!

I have about 4000 hrs in both KCs and various RCs in ops; survived a KC mid-air collision with an F-4C that took our boom off, smashed the rear fuselage and dented/damaged the left horizontal and elevator; was Air Staff program manager for one of the RC versions (RC-135U, Combat Sent); and have remained familiar with new block versions, L-3 COMM operations at the Greenville, TX support facility and how the Big Safari office manages the program after retiring from USAF and moving to the space recce realm.

To say that there is anything "wrong" with the airframe, conversion to RJ standard, testing, understanding airframe problems or documentation is totally unacceptable. The particular KC airframes converted to RJs 18, 19, 20 come from the last block of KC-135s built, in the batch just before the RC-135Bs, from which the current RC-135Vs and Us are derived.
The Greenville facility (Majors Field) has had cognizance of the RC-135 program since the late '60s when the original aircraft were modified (then under E-Systems Corp). A very expert location, with a workforce dedicated to developing, integrating and supporting special missions aircraft. This same facility is responsible for many other modifications, including E-4 airborne command posts and others, Bundes Marine 'Peace Peak" SIGINT Atlantiques, and Saudi RE-3s. In fact, during my last visit a few years ago I glimpsed an RAF Canadair Sentinel on the ramp.

The RJs are modified and upgraded every three years in what is called Phase Depot Maintenance. PDM is a complete major parts removal inspection, repair, upgrade and re-wire of aircraft and mission systems. For example, I have even seen entire aft fuselage skin panels replaced due to urine corrosion from the aft loo due to poor crewmembers' "aim" during airborne ops. The process of converting a KC to RC configuration is even more detailed. Boeing work in the past decades has mostly been confined to wing skin replacement in the 1980's (entire C-135 fleet mod) and re-engining to the CFM F108-201 fanjets.

This is all to say that these aircraft are not safe due to some paperwork plans floated to correct MoD/RAF internal problems over the years is wrong. There is a very valid reason the MoD/RAF bought the jets "to the same standard" as the USAF. Interoperability is one, but more importantly, there are fewer problems when the jets are the same as the rest of the fleet. Fleet-wide maintenance, problem identification, upgrades all flow smoothly. The RAF RJs will become part of a fleet of 20 and enter the upgrade cycles in the same flow as the USAF jets, with the exception of UK life support (life rafts, etc,) and putting the galley water heaters back in for "brew ups".


I recently heard the Australian ambassador speak on defence issues "down under". The one thing he emphasized, when asked about the recent order for Boeing P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft was, "You get the best equipped, lowest maintenance, highest operational rate from equipment bought from the U.S. IF you buy the exact same version the U.S. is also operating."
I would hope the U.K. has finally figured this out after the Spey-powered Phantoms (costing 3 times a regular F-4) turned out to be slower at a lower max altitude. The Aussies learned the lesson with the Collins boat fiasco.

After the decades-long tail of the Comet-derivatives, Comet, Nimrod, Nimrod AEW (a 'good' one there) and finally the MRA.4 total waste, I believe the RAF is getting the best bank for the buck in the -135. After all, Boeing designed and built it to '50s standards ("overbuilt" I'd say) and it has been modified, humps added, trailed 5-mile long aerials, had more sections cut-out for sensors, added B-47 wing racks for jammer pods, long noses, bulbous noses, round noses, extended fuselage tails, more than four different engines, chin bulges and just about every other external indignity added. "Flying" through the flak of UK bogus paperwork will be, as you say from the BoB book, "A Piece of Cake"!

This long post is to attempt to set the record straight, Having engaged in long, enjoyable nights debating aircraft with many Brit friends, I am under no illusion that this will end the petty back and forth. I do enjoy the blather. Additionally, I would discount the previous post as from someone with a very bad personal ax to grind about 55th maintenance. Usually individuals on this track have many other personal issues.

Bill

[tucumseh]

Two very interesting posts there by cpants and NoVANav.

The former goes much further than MoD has been prepared to admit. Please do post a link. If such information was presented to Congress in 2008, before the RJ contract was let, then I think MoD's commercial director will be very interested if it wasn't disclosed as part of negotiations. If it WAS disclosed, MoD are in the clag - again.


And MoD have actually admitted what NoVANav says is wrong. (It isn't a rumour started here on pprune; we are simply discussing the issues MoD have revealed). That doesn't mean NoVANav is wrong. Far from it. The problem could be MoD doesn't understand the information provided from the US. Perhaps the breakdown is in the link between Boeing and L3(?). Immaturity of understanding is itself a good reason not to release the aircraft. In fact, it is mandated.


The one thing I'd say is I wouldn't be so dismissive of something that, at face value, is utterly outrageous. MoD claimed the Chinook and Nimrod were airworthy. Independent Reviews accepted the fact they were not, known not to be by senior officers and this fact covered up. No one would believe these senior officers would lie about this to the bitter end, but they did. And no one would believe the MAA would continue this deceit, but they do.

[Heathrow Harry]

A lot of people - the Great British Public, the press, MP's, the Treasury..... - are going to have a lot of questions if the RAF ground Rivet Joint on the basis it "is not airworthy" when dozens of the damn things are swanning around the sky and have been for years without serious problems

No doubt people of the "Common Sense party" & "Health & Safety gone mad" views will also be heard

From the outside it seems that the MoD is saddled (or saddled itself) with a Safety system that impedes the acquisition of anything but new aircraft documented to UK Standards

I leave it to wiser men and women to decide whether this is a good thing or not.........................

:confused::confused:

[Cows getting bigger]

Indeed. Sometimes it is easier to present reasons for saying 'no' than finding ways of saying 'yes'.

I'll go back a few years when I was presented with a particular task where we needed to paint a nice Red Cross on the side of one of the RAF's finest support helicopters. The helicopter det EngO decided to ring Hels back in the UK to get approval; the answer was no. A quiet, 'offline' chat with EngO resulted in a nice pair of red crosses, a completed task and no dead puppies (or even pilots).

[Lordflasheart]

Tucumseh - pm sent.

Anyone else want the book link mentioned above ? - please pm me.

LFH