Apache

[suckback 6]

I realise that there are a lot of pongo teddies lying in the corner of this place. However, I would just like to know, do any of you left out there really want to fly the Apache...?
I know its the dogs k..b as an attack helicopter, but surely the jobs going to be **** , you all seem to be getting p*ss all flying in aircraft that are cheap and 'simple' to maintain, when you eventually bring this one on line isn't it just going to be worse?
Form an orderly queue outside my office!!

[PurplePitot]

No Thanks..

[before landing check list]

As a 16 year Army vet who has flown multiple helos. I would not fly guns in general and absolutly not fly the Apache because to begin with there are no peacetime missions for the airfram. Thus you will spend most of your time in simulators and the other tidbit going to/from the firing ranges shooting dummy warheads. And the OR rate is very low, because of it's complexity. The marines have a better idea updating the Cobras instead. this is only a opinion. Have a blast.
j

------------------
carpe diem

[Jeep]

i know plenty of army doctors, but do we really have vets too?? cooks, bandsmen, even plant ops and rat catchers, but vets?? please dont be shouting that too loud :)

[Jeep]

suckback,

there are approx 400 - 500 army pilots. age 25-40 plus, cpl - lt col. if you take a small percentage of them, do you think they will get enough volunteers to fill 48 x 2 seats at front line? after all they will only be involved in the following:

state of the art video games
refuelling from the back of ascot
formation all weather
exotic range/deployment locations
weapons galore
airshows static and whizzing
no more westland wheels/ml handlers
no more NVG
working off the back of ships
airconditioning galore

not everyones cup of tea, but for the younger chap, i suspect there are a few that might want it :)

[Ack2Main]

Yeah but if westland are going to build it, are the engines going to **** oil all over the floor.

[Jeep]

i was very impressed with the engine bay of an apache i crawled over once deployed on ops, it was spotless, not a drip of oil. my thought at the time - this would be nice to have to clean on standards. i think it was a T700. of course the RR version will be mounted at the very same angle, and all the oil scavenge/seal/other oil probs of the other generation of RR gas turbines will not be evident in the new machine.

of course the proof will be on the dispersal they have just built. if the new machine marks a dispersal like the lynx does, cocking its leg like a dog for a pee, then we will know pretty quickly.

they have thought of that at RR haven't they?

"wonder if i should get my civvie mate to patent the 'bean can with a hook' for the exhaust area"

any comments from the chaps that have flown the WAH model? does it dribble?

[This message has been edited by Jeep (edited 28 May 2000).]

[JHC Wilton]

Remember that RR didn't design an engine for the WAH - it was thrust(!) on them by Portillo. They didn't even know whether it would fit.
They've obviously shoehorned them in under the cowlings but I reckon the RTM's must be too powerful for the WAH transmission.
So, either the transmission has been uprated (unlikely) or the beast is going to be TQ limited (probably).
That is probably why only test pilots will be flying it for some time to come I fear.
Boscombe loves FADEC!

[Jeep]

I hardly think it was thrust on them by that nice chap with the lovely smile, RR would put it in the next ford family car if they could make money on it!!

No gearbox changes, simple laptop onto the FADEC, each pilot has his own settings depending on their body weight, mood of the day and 'are we going to, or returning from the airshow'.

Slightly different subject, but a wessex pilot said to me the other day, he could lift more than other pilots cos of the way he flew. does it have a MAUM? any wessex aircrew that can operate a puter?

[PurplePitot]

Hi Jeep - I have seen some serious overcontrollers in my time (and so have you!) all they are doing is spilling lift which is why a good pilot can lift more!!

[Desert Rat]

I would rather have v.d. in my medical file than Apache hours in my log book!!!

__D-Rat_____________________________

[Jeep]

never heard that one before DR, did however hear an american say 'would rather have a sister in a cathouse than brother on chinooks' sort of similar eh?

[PurplePitot]

er..mention the apache word again and the moderator will kick us off (again)

[Cyclic Hotline]

U.S. Army grounds Apache helicopter fleet

WASHINGTON, Dec 15 (Reuters) - The U.S. Army said on Friday it was grounding its fleet of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters because of a potentially dangerous tail rotor problem.

The decision to ground all 742 Apaches as a safety precaution came late Thursday after the discovery of a faulty tail rotor "swashplate'' assembly, the service said in a statement.

Failure of the assembly could result in the loss of an aircraft and crew injuries, the statement said.

The Army said it was seeking to determine the cause of the fault and how many of its AH-64 helicopters, built by Boeing Co. (NYSE:BA - news), are affected.

The Apache fleet was previously grounded in November 1999 after the Army found suspect rotor bearings and transmission problems following crashes.

Six Army Apaches crashed last year, including two during training in Albania before the NATO air campaign against Kosovo. But the Army said the rotor bearings had nothing to do with the crashes in Albania.

Army officials said investigators found that a heating process used by Boeing to make the bearing assembly extra hard led to stress corrosion fractures in the bearing.

[Lu Zuckerman]

The following paragraph came out of a report prepared by The United States General Accounting office. The report is titled: APACHE HELICOPTER; Serious Logistical Support Problems Must Be Solved to Realize Combat Potential. This report was written in 1990.

Tail Rotor Swashplate: The tail rotor controls the lateral movement of the aircraft. The tail rotor blades, which are the control surfaces, are actuated by a rotating swashplate. The swashplate bearing fails prematurely, causing the swashplate seize and the aircraft to lose control. Such a failure caused a fatal crash in August 1987, prompting the Army to replace the swashplate every 250-flight hours. The swashplate bearing is not repairable by the Army and is replaced by the manufacturer under contract. Army documentation indicates several factors may have contributed to the tail rotor problems, including (1) inadequate bearing load capacity (actual loads exceeded design loads by 138%), (2) improper design techniques regarding the use of dissimilar metals, and (3) inadequate testing. One possible cause of the increased loads was the repositioning of the tail rotor lower on the tail assembly and increasing the diameter of the tail rotor to improve flight-handling performance during development. The prime contractor redesigned the swashplate bearing, and the Army began testing the new design in October 1989. On the basis of its’ performance in testing, the Army is installing the new swashplate on fielded aircraft as the old swashplates reach the 250-hour replacement interval.

These are my words. From what was said in the first post the failure was traced to a manufacturing process. When I wrote the FMEA for the Apache systems I specifically pointed out that faulty heat treat, inadequate vacuum degassing and hydrogen embrittlement could all result in failure of a component. What happened in this accident could have been prevented by proper quality control at the manufacturer. The major problem is one called batch sensitivity. If one unit in a manufacturing process is bad then it is likely that all or most of the parts in that same process are also potential failure candidates. This same thing happened recently on the Robinson helicopters where they found a cracked yoke and because of that they are going to replace all yokes from that same batch.

Its’ a shame that the crew and aircraft were lost but it was totally preventable.


------------------
The Cat

[Cyclic Hotline]

In talking about this model with various colleagues who have operated them, the general consensus, is that it is a piece of junk. The basis of that conclusion is not limited to operational performance and reliability, but the very clearly demonstrated inability of the manufacturer to produce quality parts, or effectively correct problems with the aircraft, systems or vendor produced sub-assemblies.

I would consider that most of these reports are accurate, as they are identical to the problems experienced with their commercial products!

The Border Patrol is now seriously considering whether it really wants any more MD600's, after the General Accounting Office (GAO) questioned the aircraft's ability to meet it's mission, reliability and availability requirements.

When MDHC operated the commercial programme, prior to the Boeing purchase, they demonstrated virtually every means on how not to run an effective commercial helicopter manufacturing and support operation. The commercial machines still have the same problems they had when they were first produced, and in many cases the "fixes" that have been attempted are as bad as the problems they were designed to overcome. There are consistent problems with quality control, and regular problems with parts that are modified, but are then unusable with the adjoining parts and assemblies.

The parts and logistic system is absolutely the worst in the business, with a very low volume of parts available downstream, and regular non-availability of parts from the factory. I would have no difficulty believing that this is the identical situation in the military programmes. I would add, that I have met a lot of very committed and capable individuals within the organisation, but it simply is one of the worst organised operations in it's field.

This opinions are not exclusive to me, and I would recommend that anyone interested in an independent account of these programmes read the following reports from the GAO;

MD600- <A HREF="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=gg00201.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao" TARGET="_blank">http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.c gi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=gg00201.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao</A>

Apache logistics- <A HREF="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=ns99140.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao" TARGET="_blank">http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=ns99140.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao</A>

I think that an example of the "inside" knowledge on the Apache, was the battle with the Marine Corps over the replacement of the Cobra.

The Apache may be Boeing by name, but it is definitely McDonnel Douglas by nature!

[This message has been edited by Cyclic Hotline (edited 16 December 2000).]

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Cyclic Hotline

You stated the followinng

The Apache may be Boeing by name, but it is definitely McDonnel Douglas by nature!

It should read, The Apache may be Boeing by name But the problems started with Hughes helicopters. Mc Donnell Douglas unwittingly bought a piece of crap and Boeing inherited it.

The following letter was posted elsewhere on another Apache thread.

August 30, 1999

Editor, Rotor & Wing
1201 Seven Locks Road
Potomac, Maryland
20854

Dear Mr. Persinos,

I am submitting this letter in response to your column in the July issue of Rotor&Wing as well as the article by Giovanni de Briganti in the August issue. Both of these articles addressed the failings of the AH 64 Apache Helicopter. The purpose of this letter is to shed light on the reasons why the Apache was and is such a poor performer. The letter will be broken into several segments referencing the following:

 Why the Apache has such a low degree of reliability and availability.

 The operational philosophy of the U S Army Aviation Command and how it influenced the training of Apache pilots and maintenance personnel.

 What the U S Army told the pilots regarding the survivability of the Apache relative to the ZSU 23-4 weapons system.

 How the Apache performed when placed in a combat situation.

 The investigation of the Apache by the Government Accounting Office outlining the serious logistical support problems and how these problems effected the Apaches’ combat readiness.

 The Apache night vision system: the selection of the vendor and how responsive the system is to combat demands.

In 1973 the writer was a technical consultant hired by Hughes Helicopters to prepare the response to the U S Army RFP for an attack helicopter. The writers task was to establish the Maintainability program per Mil documents 470 and 471 and to define the design for maintainability parameters for the various systems in response to the Army requirements, These included the number of maintenance personnel that would be involved in various maintenance activities and the length of time that the Army prescribed for each of those various maintenance actions. These activities involved extensive interface with the Hughes design team. It was obvious to the writer that the so called design team had exceeded their level of competence. Hughes Helicopters, at that time was not technically competent to take on a program as complex as the Apache. To top it off, they had absolutely no idea regarding Reliability and Maintainability and, for the length of the program that was managed by Hughes, that situation would not change. By the time McDonnell Douglas took the program over, the design with all its’ faults was cast in concrete.

The writer performed his assigned task and the response to the RFP was submitted to the Army. Having finished his assignment, the writer went on to other pursuits. Several months later, the writer was called back, as the entire submittal had to be re-written. With the completion of the re-write, the writer went to work for Bell Helicopter International in Iran as manager of service engineering and Reliability and Maintainability. Three years later, the writer returned to California and was invited to return to Hughes Helicopters as a senior R&M specialist with responsibilities of incorporating Reliability and Maintainability into the design of the AH 64 Apache. When the writer returned to Culver City he was shocked. Absolutely nothing had changed. It was as If the writer had left work on Friday and returned the following Monday. The only thing that did change was a sign in the Project Engineering offices. This sign had 10 elements defined in their order of importance to the contract. The first was performance and the second was Reliability and Maintainability. Upon his return, the writer looked at the sign and performance was near the bottom of the list followed by Reliability and Maintainability.

Absolutely no progress had been made relative to incorporating Reliability or Maintainability into the design. It seems that Hughes like many other defense contractors discovered that the incorporation of R&M into the design equates to increased costs. In dealing with engineering management, the writer felt that he was talking to a brick wall. The department managers absolutely refused to discuss R&M and they refused to recognize that the R&M requirements in the specification applied to engineering. After all, they told the writer,” R&M was not included as a part of the engineering design portion of the spec and therefore was not their responsibility”. This situation is quite common in the defense industry. When the military prepares the specs for a piece of equipment, they segregate R&M from engineering and in some cases, they include R&M as a part of the commercial section of the spec which further separates R&M from engineering. Not only were the department heads non-responsive to the requests of R&M, they were in most cases not qualified to manage a design program as complex as the AH 64 Helicopter. Examples of this were the department head of the hydraulics group. His claim to fame was the design of the shock strut for the Hughes 269 Helicopter landing gear. He also sat in the tail of the Spruce Goose monitoring the control actuators for leakage. This early on relationship with Howard Hughes placed this man in the position of a “House Guest”. This kept the man on the payroll no matter how ineffective he was in the performance of his assigned duties.

The head of the structures design group had in his resume’ that he supervised the design of the skid gear for the Model 269. This in no way equipped him to head up the design of such a complex helicopter. Since Hughes had never built a helicopter to Mil Specs prior to the Apache, they had never had to interface with R&M and Human Factors Engineers and they elected to ignore personnel from those groups. Later on they realized that the pilot interface could not be ignored so, the engineering department hired an ex Army helicopter Gun Ship pilot to supervise cockpit design.


The engineering department not only ignored R&M, the also ignored the Logistics Support organization. The engineering department viewed the input of these organizations as an infringement on their authority.

The R&M group was just as guilty of not having qualified management personnel. The department manager was a long time quality control manager while the manager of Reliability had a background in statistics. The manager of Maintainability was a former clerk who kept records on the Hughes OH 6. None had any experience in R&M. R&M was a part of the quality assurance organization which was headed by a “House Guest” that spent most of his time on a golf course. He had long ago exceeded his level of competence. The entire management structure was weak and because of their lack of understanding of the requirements of the spec and the importance of R&M in the design, they would not support the R&M personnel in arguments with engineering.

On one occasion the writer prepared a memo to be sent to the U S Army R&M program office in St. Louis. This memo outlined 27 different elements of the design that impacted R&M. This memo had to be submitted by a specific date relative to the contract start date. The memo was prepared well in advance of that date and it was submitted to the Manager of R&M for approval and he was to forward it to the Army program office. Instead, the memo ended up on the desk of the assistant chief engineer who was not involved in the review of R&M related material , and he refused to forward the memo on to the Aviation Directorate. The assistant chief engineer refused the writers requests to release the memo and would not say why. He later stated that he disagreed with the writer in his use of the terms shall and will. When the writer showed the assistant chief engineer a U S Army writing style document that upheld the writers use of the terms shall and will, the memo was returned to the writer. But by that time, it was too late. The Army accepted the design as it was and not as it should be. Each of those 27 items would later manifest themselves when the AH 64 went into service.

On frequent occasions, engineering would deny the requests of R&M to review the drawings while they were being created. R&M by contract was required to sign off on the drawings. Instead, the engineering department would accumulate several hundred drawings and they would call the R&M personnel on a Saturday giving them about two hours to perform their review. If the review could not be
Completed in that time, the drawings would be rolled up and the engineering department signed them off for R&M.

The engineering department suffered from the NIH (Not invented here) syndrome. During a final design review for the flight control system, the writer suggested that a component in the cyclic, collective and directional control systems be classified as Reliability Critical.
The component was a shear pin. The pin would be broken when the cyclic, collective or directional control system jammed and the pilot exerted sufficient force to break it. This allowed the effected control system to be operated “Fly by wire”. The writer raised the point three times during the meeting and three times he was told to shut up by the lead flight control engineer who was directing the meeting. In attendance at the meeting was a U S Army rep. He just sat there and listened. Evidently, the writer must have ticked the design engineer off by doing what was he was supposed to do. Fifteen minutes after the meeting was over, the writer returned to his office to be told that he was fired. The writer left that Friday and two months later, the U S Army rep that sat in on the meeting told engineering to make the shear pin a design critical item.

Hughes Helicopters was not equipped internally from a design and manufacturing standpoint to develop and manufacture the AH 64. From the very beginning, the design of the major life cycle items were farmed out to other firms. The only firm that the writer could interface with was Ryan Aeronautics in San Diego. Ryan assisted in the design of the fuselage and they built the entire airframe at their San Diego facility. The writer made twice-weekly visits to Ryan and found them to be very cooperative although none of the suggested changes could be incorporated because Hughes engineering would not approve them. All other vendors were off-limits to R&M

When McDonnell Douglas took over the program, all of the design flaws were cast in concrete. It didn’t take them long to realize that a major shake up in management was required. Most of the top managers that were let go ended up at Hiller Helicopters where it didn’t take them long to run that program into the ground.


Hughes Helicopters was not alone in the mismanagement of the AH 64 program. The U S Army shared much of the blame. The Army had recently cancelled the Cheyenne and they were looking for a replacement. The writer had worked on the Cheyenne program and he quickly realized that it was extremely complex and could not be maintained by the standard issue Army helicopter Mechanic in a combat situation. The Apache was even more complex and less maintainable in the field. The Army at that time was loosing a lot of maintenance personnel due to expiration of their first enlistment. Because of this, the Army was reluctant to send a new recruit to maintenance school to be trained on such a complex system as the AH 64. Instead, the new recruits would attend a basic maintenance-training program that was not system specific. These trainees would then be sent to Apache support companies where they would work under the direction of an experienced mechanic. To support this concept, the Army directed Hughes to develop technical manuals that were made for someone with a Junior High level education

There were more pictures than text and the pictures showed things such as a component with further smaller pictures of screws and nuts on that component. The text would direct the mechanic to pick out a specific screwdriver or a specific wrench and to place the tool as shown. Next to that was a picture of a clock with an arrow to indicate clockwise or counter clockwise direction. The text would then tell the mechanic how many turns to rotate the tool. Some of the illustrations were very complex. They were like the old medical texts that had multiple layers that could be peeled away to show the inner workings of the device. The total cost of this program was over 16 Million Dollars and the books were so expensive and so heavy that they could not be taken out to the aircraft. The Army had to revert to the same system used to support other aircraft in the fleet. Work cards that could be printed out and then discarded. There is no telling how much this added to program costs.

The Army also had their problems in the training of Apache pilots. Normally after training a pilot in basic flying skills he would be streamed into an organizational unit flying a specific type of helicopter where he would learn advanced skills. Many pilots that had been selected to fly the Apache were later found to be unable to adapt to the monocular sighting device on their helmet. This meant that his previous training to get to that point had been wasted. Later the Army tested all pilots early on to see if they could adapt to the monocular sight prior to being assigned to Apache training. By that time the Army had wasted Millions of dollars.

In every combat assignment the Apache proved to be a poor performer. In Panama the black boxes had to be opened up and dried out using a hair dryer. The boxes were designed for use in a European combat situation and not the high humidity of the tropics. In Desert Storm the Apache was used as a stand off weapon and never got “Down and Dirty” because the Army had come to understand that the Apache was not as invulnerable to ground fire as the design specification said it should be and, it didn’t stand up well to the dusty and sandy conditions. In the Balkans two Apaches’ were lost. One to pilot error and one to systems malfunction. Up to their transfer to that area of operations, the Apaches’ had been mainly maintained by civilian contractors. In the Balkans,they were being maintained by lower skilled Army personnel. Another situation that may have been rectified since the writers direct involvement, was the night vision system had to be operated for fifteen minutes to allow the cryogenic generator to bring the system down to operating temperature. This meant that if the Apache had an emergency flight assignment at night, the pilots would be flying blind for the first fifteen minutes.

The Army also lied to the pilots of the Apache relative to its’ invulnerability to the ZSU 23 weapons system. This was the primary weapon that would be used against the Apache if it were to attack a group of Warsaw Pact tanks.


This weapon was also being supplied to all of the governments that were in league with the Warsaw Pact. The U S Army commissioned a study by a so-called”Think Tank” to study the effectiveness of the ZSU 23 against the Apache. It was their considered opinion that the ZSU 23 was inaccurate, It had a low degree of reliability and that if the ZSU 23 did hit the Apache with one round, the pilot would have sufficient time to evade any further hits by dropping below the tree line. The uninitiated reader should understand that the ZSU 23 has a rate of fire of 1200 rounds per minute and that if one bullet hit its’ mark, there would be forty or fifty rounds right behind the first round. When the writer was on contract with Agusta helicopters he took a two week holiday in Yugoslavia. While there, the writer watched a T V program which was describing the weaponry of the Warsaw Pact. One of the weapons demonstrated was the ZSU 23. In the demonstration the weapon was pointed on a line parallel to a stand of trees. A helicopter popped up from behind the trees and in an instant the weapon acquired the helicopter and was pointed directly at it. The helicopter then dropped below the tree tops and at that time the gun was turned off. The helicopter was allowed to fly away and the gun was turned on. It immediately started to fire and it swept an arc approximately 30 to 45 degrees on either side of center. The trees started to explode. It looked like there were hundreds of chain saw wielding loggers in the tree stand felling trees as fast as they could. It appeared to the writer that if a hail of 23mm bullets didn’t hit the helicopter,it would be destroyed by a falling tree.

In 1990 the U S Congress commissioned the United Stated General Accounting Office to study the Apache and its’ poor performance relative to logistical support,reliability and other problems effecting the Army’s’ ability to maintain high availability rates. This report was requested by The Honorable Les Aspin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services and The Honorable John D. Dingell Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. The report went on in great detail to describe the problems of the Apache and , in reading the report, the writer felt that it was “Déjà vu all over again” Referring back to the 27 items outlined in the report which the Army never received, almost every one was addressed as a failing in the design of the Apache. The writer felt vindicated, but at what cost.

Another problem as perceived by the writer was the selection of the vendor for the TADS/PNVS. The problem didn’t arise when the contract was let but it did show up much later. As previously indicated the problem may have been in the writer’s own perception. At the award of the AH 64 contract the Army assigned a colonel to manage the program. This individual was influential in the selection of prospective vendors and signed off for the Army when a vendor was selected. The colonel was eventually promoted to one star general a position he maintained until his retirement.

This is where the writer sees the problem, as shortly after his retirement the General went to work as a Vice President of the firm that was the successful bidder on the TADS/PNVS. This is done quite often but the government specifies a waiting period. The writer feels that the waiting period had not expired. In fact, the waiting period had not even started.

The writer quite often questioned his superiors and the assigned Army personnel about how the Army would react to the discovery that the Apache could not be maintained in the field and that it would cost almost twice what Hughes Helicopters had bid to get the contract. Their collective response was that the Army would approach the Congress and request a supplemental budget to make up the difference in operational costs.

The writer has been involved in several programs which include the following helicopter designs; Agusta A 129, The Bell AH 1J, The Bell-Boeing V 22, The AH 64 and the Cheyenne. All of these air vehicles are designed to get “Down and Dirty “ in support of the ground forces. It is this writers opinion that the first four designs will not survive when exposed to a hostile environment. The pilot workload, under these conditions, will be so severe, that he, the pilot will be overcome while operating his systems, while trying to evade hostile enemy ground fire. He will be incapacitated by the IOP. The IOP or Intensity Of Pucker will manifest itself under these conditions and the pilot’s attention will soon be diverted from his assigned mission and he will be thinking mainly of protecting his butt.. The V 22 and the Comanche are made mainly from composite material which means that if either of these aircraft sustains major damage whether in peacetime or in battle, the aircraft will be lost to the operating unit because repairs can only be accomplished at the factory or depot. True, on paper a composite airframe can be shown to be more reliable than a metal airframe but when a metal airframe suffers damage it can be repaired locally. Even when a metal airframe has to be taken to the depot, it can be repaired in less time and at lower cost. It is this Writers personal opinion that the best combat attack helicopter ever made was the MD Defender. The U S Army could purchase 14 MD Defenders for every Apache. Look at the cost effectiveness and multiplication of the weapons capability when a unit commander has 112 MD Defenders instead of 8 Apaches. The MD Defender only requires one pilot so the only difference would be in the number of pilots that would be required. From a pilots point of view there are no sophisticated elements in the MD Defender and if the airframe is involved in an accident or it is shot down it is highly survivable.

Hopefully The writer has shown some of the basic reasons behind the poor performance of the AH 64 Apache. Just think, what would the Apache be if the writers’ memo got delivered on a timely basis.

Very truly yours, S L Zuckerman






------------------
The Cat

[Heliport]

http://www.boeing.com/rotorcraft/military/ah64d/images/ah64new.jpg


MESA, Ariz., July 13, 2001
The first U.S. Army AH-64D Apache Longbow combat helicopter equipped with initial enhancements that will be introduced during the second multiyear production program completed its first flight Thursday at The Boeing Company in Mesa, Ariz.
The pre-production Apache Longbow, which flew for 23 minutes, was equipped with numerous system updates that incorporate commercial off-the-shelf technologies to reduce costs and allow for future growth while extending product operational life.
The enhancements also will provide a foundation to support the Army's emerging digitized battlefield requirements. "This first flight is a significant milestone for the program," said Al Winn, vice president for Apache programs. "It not only marks the start of the second multiyear production effort for the U.S. Army for 269 aircraft, but it also drives home our belief that Apache will remain a potent and relevant weapon for our customers for decades to come."
Representatives of Apache team companies from around the world were on hand to witness this first flight. "We are proud of our role in enhancing the features and capabilities of this superior product," said Martin Soltau, Apache program manager at Smiths Aerospace, United Kingdom. Smiths Aerospace UK produces the improved electrical power management system used in the Apache Longbow.
The first multiyear II helicopters - the sixth lot of U.S. Army Apache Longbows — will come off the production line in early 2002. Through 2006, the Army's fleet of AH-64D Apache Longbows will grow to 501 helicopters. Next-generation Apache Longbows continue to make their presence known around the globe through a growing customer base that includes Egypt, Israel, Singapore, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Several international competitions also are under way.
In addition to the remanufacturing of 269 aircraft, the second multiyear contract includes maintenance and operator training devices, spare parts, logistics and support services.

[Lu Zuckerman]

2001 technology mounted on a modified 1970s airframe and supported and steered by a rotor system that was developed in the 1960s. The systems are what make the helicopter and so far they have performed well. The airframe and the rotor systems are another story. The helicopter is unreliable and has poor maintainability characteristics. It is also very vulnerable to ground fire.

[Heliport]

from Defence Helicopter. . </font><blockquote><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica">quote:</font><hr /><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica">Apache Hellfire problems exaggerated by UK press . .Headlines in UK newspapers -- the Daily Telegraph on Monday 25 March and the Daily Mail on 26 March -- saying that the British Army’s new WAH-64 Apache Longbows cannot fire their Hellfire missiles are likely to prove untrue.. .. .The reports, also carried by the Telegraph’s website and Defence Systems Daily’s web news service, cite an MoD test report leaked to the Daily Telegraph and claim that debris from the missile’s rocket motor could cause ‘catastrophic damage’, to the tail rotor or main rotor leading to the loss of the aircraft. . .. .The United States Army says it’s a non-issue for them and that they have never experienced any significant damage from such a cause. . .. .A source close to the UK Apache programme told Defence Helicopter that firing trials had revealed some ‘pitting’ of the tail surfaces resulting from particles from a plug (a weather seal) covering the exit of the rocket motor. The plug is designed to vaporise when the motor ignites, but was not behaving normally in this case. . .. .‘This is a non-issue for the US Army’, a source within the service told Defence Helicopter on Tuesday 26 March. The source went on to say that the problem had been overcome by fitting missiles with re-engineered sealing plugs. . .. .Apaches have been launching Hellfires successfully since the late 1970s at least and have fired them in combat on numerous occasions, both during Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1984 and in Desert Storm in 1991. . .. .The newspaper reports that US Army Apache crews fighting in Afghanistan have been instructed only to launch Hellfires from pylons on the right side of the aircraft so that any debris would be well clear of the tail rotor on the left side. If true, this restriction is likely to apply to older, unmodified missiles only and is a far cry from not being able to fire the weapon at all. . .. .The UK MoD bought all its Hellfires (AGM-114K laser-guided and AGM-114L Longbow radar versions) as a direct commercial sale from Lockheed Martin, so the fix will be negotiated between them. The weapons themselves are assembled by Thales Air Defence (formerly Shorts Missile Systems) in Belfast which could apply the fix already engineered in the US. </font><hr /></blockquote><font size="2" face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica">Any Rotorheads with personal experience?. . . . <small>[ 27 March 2002, 21:08: Message edited by: Heliport ]</small>

[The Nr Fairy]

Heliport :. .. . Already a thread running on Mil Pilots - <a href="http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/ultimatebb.php?ubb=get_topic;f=46;t=002668" target="_blank">Apache Problem ?</a> with some responses if people want a quick look.

[Lu Zuckerman]

I posted this on the Military thread. .. .Impingement of rocket motor debris (remnants of the plug and pieces of the solid propellant) on the tail rotors of helicopters is an old problem. On the Cheyenne they were concerned about not only the tail rotor but also the pusher propeller being hit by debris so they placed deflectors on the exhaust end of the missile carrier to deflect the exhaust downward. But, being of ribbed construction much of the exhaust was allowed to pass through while eliminating the solid parts, which were deflected downward. This was for the TOW missiles.. .. .When the Apache was designed it carried TOW missiles and FFAR rockets and I suggested that they incorporate the same deflectors on the TOW missile carriers and they refused. The Hellfire Missile was made available to the Apache designers later in the design process and the TOWs were eliminated.. .. .Much later while working on the Agusta A-129 I suggested that they incorporate the deflectors on the TOW/HOT missile tubes and they complied. Later on the 129 was equipped with a sighting system similar to the Apache and Hellfire missiles were installed. I do not know if the deflectors were retained.

[Vfrpilotpb]

Well if it was a proper "Apache" it would make do with the bow and arrow, like all us little injuns all used, Eh! and beside that why not do away with the old tail rotor and use some horse's to blow through a Notar system, Must be heap big plenty spare horses in two motors, or is that too far forward for the mil boys. <img border="0" title="" alt="[Big Grin]" src="biggrin.gif" />

[ppheli]

This story was not from Defence Weekly. It was from Defence Helicopter and hosted on Rotorhub.com as I saw it this morning.

[Heliport]

Ooops!. .Quite right.. .Now edited.

[Lu Zuckerman]

Lifted from the Military forum:. .. .Please excuse the excessive use of the servers memory.. .. .Here is some of the history of the Apache and its’ design evolution as well as explaining its’ poor performance in the field:. .. .Even though the AAH-64 was a better design than the Bell AAH-63 Hughes should never have received the contract because they were incapable of designing and supporting the helicopter.. .. .There was minimal talent in the engineering department to fully flesh out the design and this resulted in the farming out of the design and construction of the major elements of the helicopter to include the fuselage. The gearboxes were designed and built by Litton Gear Systems. The hydraulic system was designed and built by Parker Bertea. The landing gear was designed and built by Menasco. Contract engineers at Hughes did the Basic design of the fuselage and Ryan Aeronautical finalized the design and Ryan also built the fuselage.. .. .Hughes AAH-64 Design manager: Claim to fame was the design of the skid gear for the model 269.. .. .Hughes AAH-64 Hydraulics design manager: Claim to fame was the design of the shock absorber on the 269-skid gear and he monitored the hydraulic servos in the tail of the Spruce Goose.. .. .Product support was having a difficult time in supporting the LOACHs in Vietnam and the support for the civil 269s and the 500 was also minimal. And, the ramp up to support the AH-64 was a very steep curve, which required the hiring of additional personnel to include technical writers and technical illustrators on a contract basis.. .. .The support concept required by the US Army was based on a concept developed by the USAF. The Army did not want to invest a lot of technical schooling on a first term enlistee so the first term enlistee was sent to a basic aircraft maintenance school that taught helicopter basics and equipped the man to use tools. When the enlistee finished his first hitch and he re-upped he would then be sent to a factory school on the AH-64. The concept required that the first time enlistee would work under the guidance of an experienced mechanic and use the technical manuals developed to support the Apache. The manuals addressed the first echelon maintenance on every component on the helicopter. If the newbie was directed to remove a specific part he went to the tech manual and looked at the picture of that unit. The instructions were highly simplified telling the man to use the green screwdriver and insert it in a specific screw and he was told to turn the screw counter clockwise until it came out. Next to those instructions was a picture of a clock and counter clockwise was illustrated. These books cost about $5000.00 per copy and because of that they could not be brought out onto the flightline so Hughes had to put all of the manuals on either microfiche or on microfilm so that they could be printed out. The technical manuals and the additional rewrite cost over $16,000,000. The tech manuals were like old medical manuals that showed the different levels of the internal workings by peeling back the individual pages.. .. .What was eventually demonstrated was that the Apache was too complex for US Army mechanics and contract mechanics had to be hired to perform the first and second level maintenance.. .. .Regarding the poor reliability and maintainability of the Apache, these concepts were totally alien to Hughes and they were totally ignored. As senior maintainability engineer I identified 27 different problems that impacted Maintainability and availability. It was within my purview to send this material directly to the Army R&M engineers in St. Louis, Missouri. Somehow it got sent to the assistant chief engineer and he refused to allow it to go out because I had used the term shall instead of will. By the time I had located an Army writing style manual to justify the use of shall as opposed to will it was too late as the material; was time sensitive and the design was frozen. Almost every one of those 27 items manifested themselves and many were included in the GAO report referenced above.. .. .The manager of R&M was a quality engineer with no background in R&M. The Reliability manager was a statistics engineer with no experience in Reliability or helicopters and the manager of maintainability was a former records clerk on the OH-6 program and he had no experience in maintainability. The design manager would not let the R&M engineers talk to the designer or the vendors and he would not let us review the design drawings. What he did do was to gather up several hundred drawings and call us in and he gave us an hour to review and sign off the drawings or to possibly reject them. If we didn’t finish the job in that one-hour the engineering department would sign them off for us. It would normally take an hour to review the average drawing and this was followed up with a discussion with the designer of that part or system. Naturally, we could not review the drawings for impact on Reliability and Maintainability and what was bad was incorporated into the design with no over sight.. .. .I could go on-and-on but I think you get the point.. .. .One other thing, the Apache was originally bid at 6 Million per unit (A Model). That eventually went up to 16 Million and now with the added equipment (D-Model) I can’t count that high.. .. .When MacDac took over the major part of the engineering management staff was let go. Most of them ended up at Hiller and they drove the FH 1100 program into the ground in one year.. . . . <small>[ 29 March 2002, 17:38: Message edited by: Lu Zuckerman ]</small>

[owe ver chute]

I am trying to find some sort of official acknowlagement of this problem. Standby.:cool:

[Wunper]

This puts it into the right perspective from the WHL Apache Head shed note the contact number if more detail required.

UK Press looking for a scoop as usual ;)

Wunper

""""""""

RECENT ADVERSE PUBLICITY FOR APACHE

· No doubt you have all seen the spate of adverse publicity for Apache and its Hellfire Missile in the UK National Press.

· The reports are largely incorrect and whilst containing a grain (excuse the pun as you will see later) of truth greatly exaggerate the consequences of a known issue

· The version of Hellfire missile bought by the UK from InSys (formerly Hunting Engineering Ltd) not WHL are configured with a motor that does have a debris problem

· The debris comes from a so-called “grain spacer” (the aforementioned pun).

· It is by no means clear that this debris represents any safety hazard and the UK are undertaking trials to quantify the risk

· The UK will either accept a minor risk or adopt a US developed modification that removes the grain spacer from the design The US has incidentally cleared for Operational use Hellfire missiles fitted with the same motor as the UK

· In the meantime, WHL has issued the Certificate of Design that permits the Army to fire the missiles in Training pending a full Operational release. This approach was adopted in agreement with the Army.

· Contrary to UK press reports, Apache has acquitted itself well in Afghanistan as can be seen from the attached Army Times report

· Also attached is the text of a short article from rotorhub.com which counters the adverse press reports

· It is not WHL policy to publicly rebut this sort of adverse publicity because it can become counterproductive. We have issued a statement to the MoD press office dealing with the issue. We will seek positive press opportunities.

· UK Apache continues to be one of the MoD’s most successful equipment programmes and you should all be proud of your contribution to that success

· If any of you are approached by any members of the National or Local Press you should politely decline to comment but redirect them to David Bath, Director Public Affairs on tel 01935-702007. Please advise me if anyone makes such an approach to you.

· Positive progress has recently been achieved on a wide range of fronts. eg software qualification, Certificates of Design, UK flight trials, first flight of #27 and #28 on Monday 25 March and excellent availability of Apache at Middle Wallop, to name but a few.

· Thank you and keep up the good work.

Chris Haynes
Head of Apache
27 March 2002


"""""""

[Used Ink]

I have it on good authority that the Apache has flown over 1000 hrs in training and there are 20+ QHI's trained/qualified on type.

Now then, what a good opportunity to prove both man and machine with the war looming in the gulf.

The aircraft are in service, the groundcrew are trained, there are enough qualified aircrew (albeit QHI's) to man at least a flight and the tactics will be spot on (QHI's again).

This is the ideal opportunity to prove to the other services that we can deal with the beast. (or answer b, lets just not go!)

I'm suprised the papers haven't picked this one up!

[BlueWolf]

This is a personal opinion.

I'm way too rusty now on current types for it to be classed as a proper informed one, and I'm more than happy to be corrected; but.....

IMHO, the Apache is a white elephant.

It's too expensively high-tech, too fragile, too unproven and too costly to actually risk it in combat.

I know it can't be proven without going into battle, but you have to admit, it is very expensive, and very fragile.

If I may further humbly suggest.....send the AH-64 back to the Yanks, and swap them for some more Chinooks. Then, buy some AH-1Zs instead?

Just a thought.

[solotk]

AH-1W/Z is the way to go....

http://www.bellhelicopter.textron.com/content/companyInfo/pressReleases/PR__020328_0930.html

http://www.bellhelicopter.textron.com/products/MilitaryHelicopters/ah1w/

Hell they must be good, after all, the other team has them in depth :(

[rivetjoint]

Can the Apache fire its load yet without clogging up its tail rotor?

[A/Tpr Cooper]

Used Ink, I am curious, in a previous thread (which has now disappeared) wasn't it you who was suggesting that the Apache program should be cancelled?
You appear to have a keen disliking for QHI's, you are having a pop, is it that you've had a bad 6 monthly recently, or maybe you've been turned down for a course. I remember a few years ago an old and bold Lynx pilot who had a dislike for QHI's, he got out of the Army slating every last one of 'em, the thing is he got back in to become a QHI!!
You are also digging at the AH, again have you been knocked back there as well.
It would be my advice that instead of sounding off and talking ****e, keep your opinions to yourself and direct your energy into areas which you have some impact, though I can only wonder what that might be. The corps needs unity right now, not gob****es.

[fenestronuk]

Agree with you A/Tpr Cooper, although I am unsure what the A in A/Tpr stands for.

Blue Wolf, the AAC has wangled the best AH on the market and you want to trade it in for some modified Huey. Jeez the AAC's biggest enemy isn't us (RAF) its the AAC.

We had a superb AH presentation up here (Shawbury) last week from one of the QHI's being abused above. It was excellent and he appeared to know exactly what he was talking about and fielded some testing questions without batting an eyelid.

The RAF won't have to fight to get AH (and we do want it) because you are going to end up giving it to us on a plate if you don't follow the advice from A/Tpr Cooper. You should be renamed Cry Wolf not Blue Wolf.

[BlueWolf]

fenestronuk, that's exactly what I'm suggesting. Well spotted.

The Cobra is proven. The Apache is too expensive and too delicate to ever be proven, IMHO.

We know it works fine against civilians and the lightly armed (Panama, Gaza etc), and where AA capability has been taken out already (DS1).

But when the enemy is capable of hitting back - for example, the Serbs - the sheer cost of this massively advanced, awe-inspiring piece of technological wizardry is simply far too great to risk exposing potential weaknesses in its survivability.

By all means, take it to war. If the Defence budget allows you to give it a crack, and the thing manages to destroy some targets instead of itself, and it proves of value in the face of danger....I mean this quite seriously and genuinely, the sauce bottle is poised above my slice of humble pie.

I love the machine, I really do, and I honestly wish you the best. I want it to work. I just happen to think that the Cobra is a much safer bet, and far better value for money.

I have nothing to do with the AAC, by the way.

Good luck.

[Always_broken_in_wilts]

It can't go anyway as there are only QHI's currently qual'd on type............................and as we all know those who can do and those who can't...........instruct:p

all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced

[mutleyfour]

Here we go again.....

used Ink

Its too early in the programme....good grief..why don't we ask if Typhoon will be making an appearance?

Stop trying to feed the press with mumbo jumbo, as I'm sure they are not V interested.

Blah Blah Blah

[ORAC]

Too delicate?

In Shah-e-Kot, Apaches Save the Day

The soldier's weather-beaten face was streaked with tears of gratitude. Just days earlier, separated from his buddies and pinned down by intense fire from al-Qaida soldiers in the ridgelines around the Shah-e-Kot valley, he thought he was going to die. Then, like fire-spitting avenging angels, Apache attack helicopters sliced through the thin mountain air pouring rocket and chain-gun fire on his would-be killers.

"We came in and took the fire away from him," said Capt. Bill Ryan, the commander of those Apaches. He said it matter-of-factly, as if there were nothing remarkable about piloting a helicopter through hails of bullets and rocket-propelled grenades to save a man's life.

Now safely back at Bagram Air Base, that soldier had come to thank his deliverers.

As Operation Anaconda wound down, a string of well-wishers stopped by to pay homage to the dozen or so Apache pilots who had kept the al-Qaida troops at bay. Not every visitor broke into tears. But all echoed the sentiments of Lt. Col. "Chip" Preysler, commander of 2nd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment. Preysler's battalion was one of two that flew into the teeth of entrenched al-Qaida positions March 2, the first day of the operation. Their very lives depended on Ryan's seven Apaches for close air support.

When he came out of the battle nine days later, Preysler immediately sought out Ryan. With a smile on his face and his hands spread wide, he said, "You guys have huge balls."

The Apache exploits on this first day of the battle of Shah-e-Kot have done much to bolster the reputation of an aircraft that saw its battlefield role called onto question after its role in Albania in 1999. In that bleak period in the helicopter's history, 24 Apaches were sent to Task Force Hawk for use in the war against Yugoslavia. But the choppers were held back from combat after two crashed and two pilots died during mission rehearsals. The Apache community complained that ignorant journalists and casualty-averse Pentagon officials had unfairly turned their beloved killing machine into a scapegoat.

Now, three years later, the contrast could not be starker. The Apache drivers are being lauded as heroes, and their helicopter is receiving what to many pilots is praise long overdue.

With al-Qaida fighters so close to U.S. troops that close air support from "fast mover" jets was often out of the question, the Apaches became the only fire support available to ground commanders. In the crucial hours of that first day, when the carefully scripted battle plans had been rendered irrelevant and the outcome hung in the balance, Apaches saved the day.

"The weapon that changed the face of the battle for us was the Apache," said Col. Frank Wiercinski, commander of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)'s 3rd Brigade and in charge of all conventional U.S. troops in the battle.

"I was just so impressed by its capability," he said. "I had never seen the Apache in combat before, though I've always trained with it. I am a firm believer right now that a brigade combat team commander needs his Apache battalion in an air assault division - its ability to protect us en route, its ability to set the conditions on the landing zones and then its close combat attack capability to take out fires. Artillery is a wonderful asset, but you need an observer, you need a sensor, and then you've got the artillery [tube] as the shooter. An Apache can do all of that, and it's always moving."

On station in the valley from dawn on the battle's first day, the Apaches flew again and again through withering small arms, heavy machine-gun and rocket-propelled grenade fire to provide fire support to the beleaguered infantry troops.

Five Apaches were present at the start of the battle, a sixth arrived later that morning and a seventh flew up from Kandahar to join the fight that afternoon. None of the helicopters was shot down, but four were so badly damaged they were knocked out of the fight. The fire the Apaches braved was so intense that when the day was over, 27 of the 28 rotor blades among the seven helicopters sported bullet holes, said Lt. Col. James M. Marye, the commander of the 7th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment.

Marye's aviation task force included the Apaches of Ryan's A Company, 3rd Battalion, 101st Aviation.

Beneath the cold numbers are tales of heroism and extraordinary achievement. None are more dramatic than the story of Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jim Hardy.

At about 6:45 a.m., an RPG exploded under the nose of Hardy's Apache, sending shrapnel slicing through the helicopter's innards.

"I looked up and there was a black puff of smoke, like World War II flak," said Chief Warrant Officer 2 John Hamilton, who was flying nearby.

"There was major damage to that aircraft," Ryan said. "They had lost the weapons systems and the target-acquisition systems."

Despite the fact that Hardy's Apache was now essentially unarmed, he stayed on station. He later told Hamilton that his plan was to fly up the valley and draw fire, allowing the other Apaches to engage enemy gunners once they had revealed themselves.

About 10 minutes after an RPG struck Hardy's aircraft, another hit the Apache piloted by Chief Warrant Officer 3 Keith Hurley, smashing into the left Hellfire missile launcher. "The RPG struck me on the left, rocked the aircraft, and a microsecond after that, a bullet came through the cockpit," Hurley said. By the end of the day there were 13 bullet holes in Hurley's aircraft.

Lights immediately started flashing on Hurley's control panel, warning him that he was hemorrhaging oil. Hardy, one of the company's most experienced pilots, realized Hurley was in trouble, and got on the radio.

As Hurley recalls it, Hardy told him, "I've got to go back to the [Forward Arming and Refueling Point], fall in trail and follow me, and we've got to go quick."

The two wounded Apaches headed for the FARP, a way station for the helicopters roughly halfway between the valley and their temporary base in Bagram, north of Kabul. They didn't make it very far. About a mile west of "the Whale," the humpbacked ridgeline that marked the western edge of the valley, more lights came on in Hurley's cockpit, including one that told him he had no fluid left in his transmission.

"I called off the lights to Mr. Hardy and he said, 'You've got to land, you've got to land now,' " Hurley said.

The two landed in a dried-up riverbed, within range of the al-Qaida positions. With bullets flying around him, Hardy, who Hurley described as "the unit maintenance god," shut the helicopters down and went to work on Hurley's aircraft.

"He did sort of a triage of the aircraft, examining it like a doctor," Hurley said.

Hardy took the three one-quart oil cans that each helicopter carried as spares and poured all six quarts into Hurley's [transmission]. Then he told Hurley they were going to swap helicopters and fly back to the FARP.

"He told me, 'Don't dick around, when I get it started, I'm going,' " Hurley said. Hardy was drawing on his deep knowledge of the Apache to take a calculated risk.

With Hurley's chopper leaking fluid like a sieve, he knew the six quarts of oil he had just poured in would not last long. But he also knew that the Apache's [transmission] was supposed to last 30 minutes without oil before seizing up.

Hardy was gambling that he could nurse Hurley's Apache 50 miles to the FARP in less than half an hour. The alternative was to strap two of the four pilots onto the side of Hardy's helicopter, leaving Hurley's Apache behind as a dead loss. Hardy's gamble paid off. Twenty-six minutes after taking off under fire from the riverbed, the two damaged Apaches landed safely at the FARP. Hardy's colleagues were in awe.

"There are not a lot of folks out there who would have taken that aircraft off the ground," Ryan said. "It was an incredible action by Mr. Hardy."

Hamilton said: "He's a hero, no doubt about it."

Marye recommended Hardy for a Distinguished Flying Cross. He also recommended Ryan, who continued flying despite being nicked on the chin by a bullet, for the Silver Star and several other pilots for the Air Medal with "V" device.

(source: Army Times, 03-25-02)

[MightyGem]

And what about Desert Storm. US Army Apaches flew the equivalent of Italy to UK to take out Iraqi radar sites in Iraq to clear the way for the air war to start. A battalion destroyed 140 vehicles in 30 minutes.

The reason they never worked in the Balkans was because when they deployed the crews weren't fully up to speed.

[Sloppy Link]

A-B-I-W

I would like to point out that you are correct in what you say....Those that can, do, those that can't, instruct. Don't forget that those that can't instruct become....examiners!

:D

[flygunz]

That is a really good read and for those of us fortunate enough to fly Apaches or just work with them this comes as no suprise. I think you have to accept some degree of 'talking it up' from the Army Times which after all, has a mandate to deliver all that is good in the US Army and not dwell on anything detrimental. But for me the capability of the Apache has never been in doubt and I'm delighted to see that it's proving itself in harsh conditions.
I've followed this thread with some interest and wonder about the agendas of some people.
The UK Apache training programme run by the AAC for the Army on behalf of the entire Armed Forces will continue and succeed despite the sniping by ill informed puppets, it will not deploy to the gulf to prove itself because the bigger picture wont allow that, also the US seem to be proving it very well so why take that risk?
The last point and not one to be missed is the absoloute bravery and dedication shown by these US Apache Pilots, hats off!!!

[Dunhovrin]

I fink the Apache will only prove itself in the eyes of the rest of the Army is when it can delivery 3 MFOs and padre to G40 at 2am on a winters night:=

[mutleyfour]

Dunhoverin....you can't use your chat up lines in here, regardless of alcohol consumed!

:) :) ;)

[Dunhovrin]

Ahh but they work! Pulled a postman last night! Poor sap came over to chat up our girls who drank his beer then 'cked off for a ciggie leaving the dude cornered by me giving it "Postman? Wow - I used to fly helicopters me".

[Sorry to divert - that's all chaps - crack on!]

[SASless]

Thank you ORAC for reminding BlueWolf of reality....me thinks he had to be pprune fishing....no one could have such a post for real. The Gulf War seemed to answer those questions for once and for all.....the latest concerns about ingestion of rocket exhaust can be mitigated by tactics.....but then the Brits always have had trouble accepting American aircraft.....remember the absolute bashing the Chinook received....and now they are the backbone of the heavy airlift for the UK Forces. I guess they will have to train some line pilots to go do combat with the Iraqi's....why QHI's just cannot be used to engage the enemy....they are probably too busy slanging one another's techniques to actually get involved with the real purpose of the mission ....(to engage and destroy the enemy).

Heck....I bet they could find more than enough American pilots to fill the cockpits on a contract basis much as they did during the last big war when Americans flew Spitfires while wearing odd colored blue uniforms. Pity, there is no european gunship that can do the job and the Apache is all that is available.

I guess we could lend-lease some old worn out Cobra's....but by British military standards....it would about 2010 before they could be accepted, tested, manned up and deployed. By then it will all be over but the shouting. Course, that begs the question...where they gonna get the bodies to fill the cockpits....the written exams will take a year to do before the flying training could be done.

[mutleyfour]

What a load of twaddle.......You cannot send an aircraft that isn't in front line service yet to the Gulf. It really is as simple as that.

As for buying up a shed load of Cobra's from the US...do you really think they have a bunch of those things sitting on a dockside awaiting shipment to whoever might bid for them.

Finally why rag the QHI's who are busy as ten men learning to fly the machine efficiently in order to train the first line pilots, of which I might add, there is no shortage!

[BlueWolf]

Believe it or not SASless I do appreciate ORAC's reality checks, and sometimes even your own ;)

I'm tucking into my pie even as I type.

However, I still think AH-1Z represents better value for money, and I still believe that a Serb with an anti-aircraft gun is capable of posing a danger to helicopters.

[Used Ink]

A/Tpr Cooper: Thank you for your comments.

Yes I did start the thread about cancelling the WAH-64, didn't it go well.
Just because I mention QHI's, doesn't mean I dislike them. They just so happen to be the only ones who are able to operate the machine at present.
Bad 6 monthly, after all these years, ha,ha! The only course I was turned down for, was the boat handling course in Portsmouth last summer.
No, I'm not a retread, though, what was all that about?
As I've mentioned previously, hats off to those selected. I cant even suss out Ace Combat4 on PS2.

You said, " It would be my advice that instead of sounding off and talking ****e, keep your opinions to yourself"

I reply, "Isn't that why we all come to pprune? And I have to keep my opinion to myself because it doesn't agree with yours. Perhaps I think you are talking ****e, Comrade!"

Finally, you said," The corps needs unity right now, not gob****es."

I ask,"Why do we need unity if it's all hunky dory?"


(did you think of your nick-name yourself? I remember you from...ooooo...way back, along with Hooper)

"Lighten up Francis"

[mutleyfour]

Used Ink, either your playing devils Advocate or your a complete ******!

How does 9 reg put up with your ego!

[Used Ink]

Mutley, it's supposed to be discussion inducing. But Devils Advocate (eggy drink?) sounds better I suppose. Some may see it as being a right **** though.

(they just put up with it!)

[A/Tpr Cooper]

Used Ink I've copied my thread and see no mention of you being a retread!
You're fascination with the AH is a little odd. Are things in your own unit so good that the only thing to worry about is another unit miles away, or does unit loyalty stop you from hanging your dirty linen in public.
I tell you what, worry about the lads flying out to the Gulf, who have little to be happy about, and then worry a bit more for those who are going to have to replace them in about 6 mths if it goes pear shape. I know what I'm bothered about!!!!!



Used Ink, I am curious, in a previous thread (which has now disappeared) wasn't it you who was suggesting that the Apache program should be cancelled?
You appear to have a keen disliking for QHI's, you are having a pop, is it that you've had a bad 6 monthly recently, or maybe you've been turned down for a course. I remember a few years ago an old and bold Lynx pilot who had a dislike for QHI's, he got out of the Army slating every last one of 'em, the thing is he got back in to become a QHI!!
You are also digging at the AH, again have you been knocked back there as well.
It would be my advice that instead of sounding off and talking ****e, keep your opinions to yourself and direct your energy into areas which you have some impact, though I can only wonder what that might be. The corps needs unity right now, not gob****es.[I]Used Ink, I am curious, in a previous thread (which has now disappeared) wasn't it you who was suggesting that the Apache program should be cancelled?

[Junglie]

Dear All

You all seem to be squabbling amongst yourselves at the moment, i can't see what it is that you have to complain about.

You have managed to secure in the apache the finest attack helicopter the world has ever seen. You have denied the ownership of it to the RAF (well done) and have massively impressed me with your new approach to introducing it.

A/Tpr is right you should all be sticking together on this one as if you don't there are plenty of people out there who would gladly take over the capability!!

Went to a presentation by your big boss the other day in London village and was very impressed with the totally forward thinking manner in which the AAC are looking to totally transform their all arms doctrine to incorporate this awesome fighting machine. For once i think they may not be looking at this aircraft as a Land Rover with rotor blades!!

Used Ink - Can't imagine what planet you are on to suggest sending it to the Gulf now, shows a total lack of experience of how these things work. Do you want these things to go out there and tot up their accident record?? These aircraft and crews need more time in the cockpit and the ground crews need more experience working with them in temperate climes let alone desert conditions.

I accept that this is a place for opinions and frankly yours is wrong!!:p :p

[Zoom]

SASless, I disagree that the Brits always had trouble accepting American aircraft - witness the C-47, PBY, B-24, B-50, P-51, F-86, C-130, F-4 and many others. I would say that we accepted and operated them well enough. And I can think of 3 American jets that I would like to see in the RAF in place of the Typhoon.

But back to the Apache, which looks like an efficient piece of kit that will do a good job in the hands of the AAC. However, it shouldn't deploy to Iraq because war is not justified - yet. But that's all covered elsewhere.

[PPRuNe Pop]

Hate to interject, but should a thread start to get a bit inflamed I like to remind those who do it to reflect - just before they click on the submit button. It saves such a lot of aggro.

So back to the thread.............................

[mutleyfour]

Hopefully used ink has found another site to antagonise :yuk:

[Always_broken_in_wilts]

gazed skywards today to find the beast on the go around at the wiltshire airbase:cool:

not at it's most impressive doing "IF" but nice to see it anyway.

all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced

[gingergreeny]

Isn't it about time we realised the cab is here,it's a quality aircraft and when its ready and operational will do its job as it has been designed to do.Those people who doubt its viability within the AAC must have personal reasons for not liking the aircraft(not being selected for training perhaps!).As for deploying it to the gulf well i can only liken it to asking my 3 month old son to fix an AFCS fault on a lynx.(a)It would be pointless and (b)It would be pointless.[COLOR=blue]

[mutleyfour]

I have been advised that Used Ink hasnt the faciltiy of a means to answer on this forum at the moment...so I tip my hat and wish him well, and look forward to his safe return.

[Lu Zuckerman]

I originally posted this on Rotorheads in a thread on the Apache.
It caught a lot of flack. let's see what happens here.

I was involved in the initial design of the Apache.

The US Army lied to the pilots of the Apache relative to its’ invulnerability to the ZSU 23-4 weapons system. This was the primary weapon that would be used against the Apache if it were to attack a group of Warsaw Pact tanks.

This weapon was also being supplied to all of the governments that were in league with the Warsaw Pact. The U S Army commissioned a study by a so-called ”Think Tank” to study the effectiveness of the ZSU 23-4 against the Apache. It was their considered opinion that the ZSU 23-4 was inaccurate, It had a low degree of reliability and that if the ZSU 23 did hit the Apache with one round, the pilot would have sufficient time to evade any further hits by dropping below the tree line. The uninitiated reader should understand that the ZSU 23-4 has a rate of fire of 1200 rounds per minute and that if one bullet hit its’ mark, there would be forty or fifty rounds right behind the first round. When I was on contract with Agusta helicopters I took a two-week holiday in Yugoslavia. While there, I watched a T V program, which was describing the weaponry of the Warsaw Pact. One of the weapons demonstrated was the ZSU 23-4. In the demonstration the weapon was pointed on a line parallel to a stand of trees. A helicopter popped up from behind the trees and in an instant the weapon acquired the helicopter and was pointed directly at it. The helicopter then dropped below the treetops and at that time the gun was turned off. The helicopter was allowed to fly away and the gun was turned on. It immediately started to fire and it swept an arc approximately 30 to 45 degrees on either side of center. The trees started to explode. It looked like there were hundreds of chain saw wielding loggers in the tree stand felling trees as fast as they could. It appeared to the writer that if a hail of 23mm bullets didn’t hit the helicopter, a falling tree would destroy it.

[mutleyfour]

Interesting......

lets not forget however that in order to acquire the target the ZSU 23/4 would need to turn on its radar system...into action go AH (RFI/DAS/FCR)systems and before you know it missiles are on route - splash one 23/4.

[Always_broken_in_wilts]

MF,
Going back to my rotary days I thought the ZSU thing aslo had an optical aquire capability?

Meaning it would not have to "lite up" and bearing in mind it's cyclic rate and low level aquisistion capability it's a fairly scary thought.

all spelling mistakes sre "df" alcohol induced

[mutleyfour]

Correct......but we did start this discussion with the helicopter being behind trees which would stop optical tracking and force the use of radar scanning. This coupled with the use of the words on and off for the gun would imply that radar was used throughout.

All im saying is that yes the 23/4 is a big problem to older helicopters without any defensive aids, but in todays climate you'd have to be a brave man to turn one of those things on....as you would attract a monumental amount of attention to yourself.

Ask the guys and girls that operate the no fly zones

[Lu Zuckerman]

How many trees do you expect to find in Iraq? You have to understand that the Apache was designed for a major land war in Europe and it was the Army’s' version of the A-10 Warthog in that it would get down and dirty with the tanks and armored vehicles. With the installation of the hellfire missiles the Apache could be used as a standoff weapons system. A further development was the inclusion of a mast mounted mm Wave RADAR which allowed the apache to observe the enemy while hiding behind trees or natural obstructions such as hills or rock projections.

I will adjust my first comments to state "How many trees, natural obstructions, hills or rock projections do you expect to find in Iraq"?

The ZSU-23-4 I believe has RADAR, optical and IR sighting capability and if it is used by the armed forces of Iraq it can defeat all of defensive systems on the Apache except the M1
Mk1 eyeball of the pilot gunner and then they may be on an even playing field.

And if the fighting is at night there is an excellent chance that the static corona discharge from the blades will provide a very good target.

:eek:

[SASless]

Lu.......

These youngsters fail to remember.....Even the bad guys have good days!

Lu's point...despite its delivery is valid.....Grenada proved him correct....read up on the losses there.

If the weapon is in a very open area....and only the Apaches are around....and if the gunner uses optical sighting.....and is patient....an Apache is in trouble big time. After that....I dare say....it will be 72 Virgins time for the gunner and nearby mates. They can also hide in built up areas.....low flying helicopters....particularly with the "hover in place" tactics can make you a very easy target if the bad guy can see you.

Young lads....do not underestimate your enemy....they are thinkers too....expect the worst...hope for the best...but be prepared. You run around thinking you are invincible and bullet proof...and you will get a rude shock.

[mutleyfour]

OK...answer me this.....during the gulf

How many aircraft were lost to ZSU 23/4? (Rotary)

Note....

I know of at least one ZSU 23/4 destroyed by Apache/s

I appreciate the complexity of the issue, and i also understand the defensive as well as offensive capability of the UK AH. There are several factors at work here and I was merely responding to the situation described in Yugoslavia....which is as SASless described in the ideal AH environment...

[flygunz]

Like a lot of ageing Military Helicopter Pilots I spent most of my time flying an unarmed aircraft with the prospect of fighting ADAs like the ZSU with a 9mm pistol. Having spent a number of years flying the AH64 I know what I would rather be in if faced with any ADA. I think Lu is barking up a tree here and I cant really see the point of the argument. Who cares what the US Military said or did not say to their Pilots? Maybe its their own fault for being so gullable.
The Apache is an awesome machine, but like any helicopter is not invulnerable or invisible but in the right hands will survive longer than any unarmed aircraft in the same environment.

[owe ver chute]

The 64 last saw active service in Afgahnistan, where it got right into the mix, up close with the GI's, doing what it is very good at. Let us not forget that it is a weapon of war, and it pilots young and old will have to put themselves in harms way in the execution of their orders. The good news was, every aircraft flew back and every pilot got home alive. The 64 did what it said it would on the tin!
I think that every soldier realises that the hierarchy tell the odd white lie in order to make the lads feel good before going over the top. I reckon telling pilots "the bad guys in ZSU's can't hit you", isn't such a whopper.
Good luck to everyone in the Attack fraternity who is doing the job in the sand right now.

[solotk]

Lu,

The RPM on the Zsu - Is that per gun, or all 4? if it's per gun, then thats 4800 rpm, or a blizzard of lead.

The Canadians used an improvised Sherman in the latter days of WW2, mounting 4x .50 cal Brownings, as an ANTI-INFANTRY device.

It worked bloody well too, from all reports. Does the Zoo have a ground to ground capability?