Southwest Low Altitude Alert OKC
I have flown into OKC a gajillion times to do stuff as a FAA AME. Not entirely sure if I’ve ever landed south, but regardless, there ain’t much out there to fly into. I think I’ve usually landed 35L, but the airport is west of town, and there’s not a lot around it that looks “airporty” so I think it would be a very reasonable thing to fly a visual approach at night.
Some years go, Part 135 Co, IFR with snow on LOC 6 approach at KPNE at night.
Captain flying left MDA with call runway in sight. Route 1 a well lit highway looked very enticing to him. I objected and it all worked out. I have seen that error. Can’t forget it after all these years.
Back to OKC, at 500’ AGL it is reasonable to assume aircraft should be about 2 miles from the runway using rules of thumb method. The runway environment would be very evident at that distance.
Seems like a total disconnect. Still can’t understand where EGPWS was.
Captain flying left MDA with call runway in sight. Route 1 a well lit highway looked very enticing to him. I objected and it all worked out. I have seen that error. Can’t forget it after all these years.
Back to OKC, at 500’ AGL it is reasonable to assume aircraft should be about 2 miles from the runway using rules of thumb method. The runway environment would be very evident at that distance.
Seems like a total disconnect. Still can’t understand where EGPWS was.
You may well ask: if it was late at night and the crew sounded like they were half asleep, why didn’t they just do the ILS/RNAV and let the AP take the strain until shortly before landing? Part of the answer would be that tiredness/fatigue is insidious and almost impossible to self-diagnose: you can implement what you realise the next day wasn’t the greatest idea but it seemed fine at the time because half your synapses were on strike.
in context of suggestion for comparing risk management approaches, with pressure - at least to some degree - on airline company management from an established and probably aggressive activist investor, will this particular airline conduct such an analysis and comparison? Is it something that any and every large and established airline company will be expected to do just as a result of the "incident" occuring?
I'm just an SLF/attorney but something has stayed with me about certain events, incidents or occurences reportedly happening with this airline company. It's not the incident in Austin - as significant as that incident was. Rather, it was the comment from some poster on some thread a while back that the "overspeed clacker" sounding during the approach phase of flight or - maybe I misunderstood, it might have been after touchdown on the runway - that the sound was known as the Southwest Victory Song. As a mere layperson, that seemed like either the overspeed sound device (of course I don't know what the overspeed clacker looks like or how it works) is superfluous, or its evidently consistent activation was a sign of something possibly more risky in flight operations than it should be. I hope it doesn't turn out actually to be the flight deck equivalent of a snipe hunt.
With risk management being noted here, in a context of very similar flight operations at the same airport and same time (within minutes), and an activist investor no doubt lurking about, the point is, what if anything do these specific activist-investing people bring to an internal company discussion about this incident? "Nothing", presumably, would be the anticipated answer. And yes of course it is for management to do, yet the activist mindset is that while they're smarter about everything, they're also above everything else too, everything other than abstruse MBA-speak.
I'm just an SLF/attorney but something has stayed with me about certain events, incidents or occurences reportedly happening with this airline company. It's not the incident in Austin - as significant as that incident was. Rather, it was the comment from some poster on some thread a while back that the "overspeed clacker" sounding during the approach phase of flight or - maybe I misunderstood, it might have been after touchdown on the runway - that the sound was known as the Southwest Victory Song. As a mere layperson, that seemed like either the overspeed sound device (of course I don't know what the overspeed clacker looks like or how it works) is superfluous, or its evidently consistent activation was a sign of something possibly more risky in flight operations than it should be. I hope it doesn't turn out actually to be the flight deck equivalent of a snipe hunt.
With risk management being noted here, in a context of very similar flight operations at the same airport and same time (within minutes), and an activist investor no doubt lurking about, the point is, what if anything do these specific activist-investing people bring to an internal company discussion about this incident? "Nothing", presumably, would be the anticipated answer. And yes of course it is for management to do, yet the activist mindset is that while they're smarter about everything, they're also above everything else too, everything other than abstruse MBA-speak.
Knock off a lot of SW pilots withr spotless records. Never heard of this. These are the guys that made their bones flying in in oüt of MDW. 600 ft overrun or you‘re ingesting a car after wrecking a concrete wall.
My post included all the disclaimers it should have included. I didn't originate the comment, I just noted it in context of this incident. If offense was taken, that occurrence does not mean offense was meant.
in context of suggestion for comparing risk management approaches, with pressure - at least to some degree - on airline company management from an established and probably aggressive activist investor, will this particular airline conduct such an analysis and comparison? Is it something that any and every large and established airline company will be expected to do just as a result of the "incident" occuring?
I'm just an SLF/attorney but something has stayed with me about certain events, incidents or occurences reportedly happening with this airline company. It's not the incident in Austin - as significant as that incident was. Rather, it was the comment from some poster on some thread a while back that the "overspeed clacker" sounding during the approach phase of flight or - maybe I misunderstood, it might have been after touchdown on the runway - that the sound was known as the Southwest Victory Song. As a mere layperson, that seemed like either the overspeed sound device (of course I don't know what the overspeed clacker looks like or how it works) is superfluous, or its evidently consistent activation was a sign of something possibly more risky in flight operations than it should be. I hope it doesn't turn out actually to be the flight deck equivalent of a snipe hunt.
With risk management being noted here, in a context of very similar flight operations at the same airport and same time (within minutes), and an activist investor no doubt lurking about, the point is, what if anything do these specific activist-investing people bring to an internal company discussion about this incident? "Nothing", presumably, would be the anticipated answer. And yes of course it is for management to do, yet the activist mindset is that while they're smarter about everything, they're also above everything else too, everything other than abstruse MBA-speak.
I'm just an SLF/attorney but something has stayed with me about certain events, incidents or occurences reportedly happening with this airline company. It's not the incident in Austin - as significant as that incident was. Rather, it was the comment from some poster on some thread a while back that the "overspeed clacker" sounding during the approach phase of flight or - maybe I misunderstood, it might have been after touchdown on the runway - that the sound was known as the Southwest Victory Song. As a mere layperson, that seemed like either the overspeed sound device (of course I don't know what the overspeed clacker looks like or how it works) is superfluous, or its evidently consistent activation was a sign of something possibly more risky in flight operations than it should be. I hope it doesn't turn out actually to be the flight deck equivalent of a snipe hunt.
With risk management being noted here, in a context of very similar flight operations at the same airport and same time (within minutes), and an activist investor no doubt lurking about, the point is, what if anything do these specific activist-investing people bring to an internal company discussion about this incident? "Nothing", presumably, would be the anticipated answer. And yes of course it is for management to do, yet the activist mindset is that while they're smarter about everything, they're also above everything else too, everything other than abstruse MBA-speak.
I looked up the source of my recollection. Thread, started May 24, 2019, "MAX's Return Delayed by FAA [etc.]", post by lambourne, 3254, Oct. 20, 2019. (The poster described what sounded like approach and landing.)
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 27th Jun 2024 at 02:29.
