Another Southwest close call
Apologies, should have researched myself. Keeping information like this secret is a crime, imo. Airframers and airlines have a ''Duty 0f Care"...
For all the public knows this could be MCAS.
MAX has a record of unresponsive controls in a seemingly spontaneous descent... It could be MCAS for all anyone knows. If it is, next charge against Boeing could be manslaughter...If PE, so be it, the public should know either way. Next time I fly, I'll take the "BUS"
"Company Memo..." Right
I think the report on this one is going to be interesting reading, although from the account above it seems the PF lost control as soon as they initiated the GA, for reasons yet to be properly established, then the PM took a long time and a GPWS caution followed by a warning to work out that not all was well and intervene.
All of us have been in high workload situations but as a crew they do appear to have been a long way behind the aeroplane for quite a while. You had one job...
All of us have been in high workload situations but as a crew they do appear to have been a long way behind the aeroplane for quite a while. You had one job...
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Fair Cop... However, we have an accident under investigation involving major spontaneous a/c commands based on "sensors"...also, wiring faults killing several hundred folks. Equipment occasionally fails. If failure is sourced back at the factory...well.
Fair Cop... However, we have an accident under investigation involving major spontaneous a/c commands based on "sensors"...also, wiring faults killing several hundred folks. Equipment occasionally fails. If failure is sourced back at the factory...well.
Is there anything in the available data that precludes that scenario?
So many possible scenarios without knowing the facts. It's possible it was a coupled approach and prior to initiating the missed the FO clicked off the autopilot while leaving the autothrottle on.
Ok, lets assume AP was engaged in approach mode. Does this imply AT was also engaged? I don't know 737 modes but I keep going back to this quote -
---begin---
PM should monitor thrust application which is also dependent on auto throttle engagement or not. First push should be enough for a reduced and sensible climb rate or approx 80 / 85 pc N1 dependent on variant.
---end---
---begin---
PM should monitor thrust application which is also dependent on auto throttle engagement or not. First push should be enough for a reduced and sensible climb rate or approx 80 / 85 pc N1 dependent on variant.
---end---
It is physically possible for AP to be on without AT; but other than a deferred AT, or being in the middle (not beginning) of some mode confusion cluster**** episode, I would estimate this to be done approximately zero times in the history of 737's.
Practically speaking, the "or not" in the quote refers to the AP+AT both off state.
Isn't it possible that AT was not engaged, PF pushed up the throttles and intended to activate TOGA but did not. PF then fixates on the PFD FD or HUD guidance cue and fails to maintain a scan of the FMA and raw data.
Is there anything in the available data that precludes that scenario?
Is there anything in the available data that precludes that scenario?
Last edited by Vessbot; 20th Jun 2024 at 21:08.
(Earlier people mentioned dual channel approaches, in which the AP also stays on and flies the goaround, but this is only possible on an ILS where this approach is an RNAV).
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The aircraft levelled off and had a thrust setting that maintained speed. Why would manually advancing the throttles come with an airpeed loss? There was no climb.
Do we expect that there will ever be a public report? All I have heard is that FAA is investigating. I have not heard of any reason for NTSB to become involved.
Do we expect that there will ever be a public report? All I have heard is that FAA is investigating. I have not heard of any reason for NTSB to become involved.
The aircraft levelled off and had a thrust setting that maintained speed. Why would manually advancing the throttles come with an airpeed loss? There was no climb.
Do we expect that there will ever be a public report? All I have heard is that FAA is investigating. I have not heard of any reason for NTSB to become involved.
Do we expect that there will ever be a public report? All I have heard is that FAA is investigating. I have not heard of any reason for NTSB to become involved.
The aircraft levelled off and had a thrust setting that maintained speed. Why would manually advancing the throttles come with an airpeed loss? There was no climb.
Do we expect that there will ever be a public report? All I have heard is that FAA is investigating. I have not heard of any reason for NTSB to become involved.
Do we expect that there will ever be a public report? All I have heard is that FAA is investigating. I have not heard of any reason for NTSB to become involved.
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Actually, for most of Southwest’s 53 year history, autopilot usage without auto throttles was the norm. A/T use is relatively new.
Sailv
With respect, you are quoting from a memo filtered ("interpreted") through FlightOps, the Union, legal, and engineering. Include Boeing, and is "quoting" the flight crew.
All solids removed via filtration...with Boeing's record of intimidation, there were implied threats.
No pilot would use "inadvertent", which implies he was not in control of his actions...the reported flight profile is not possible in a large commercial jet airliner. It describes JetLOC
CapnBloggs int the only one having nightmares
All solids removed via filtration...with Boeing's record of intimidation, there were implied threats.
No pilot would use "inadvertent", which implies he was not in control of his actions...the reported flight profile is not possible in a large commercial jet airliner. It describes JetLOC
CapnBloggs int the only one having nightmares
Last edited by BugBear; 20th Jun 2024 at 22:41.
I should have qualified with "NG and later." Is this true, even then? If so, I stand corrected. Maybe it's too much other-operator-perspective warping my view, but it's hard to imagine.
Given that neither pilot seems to have any idea what was happening why would you trust a statement that the autothrottle advanced the throttles? Isn't it normal practice to manually advance the throttles while activating TOGA?
Vessbot
Vessbot. So what happens when go around is selected and the Flaps have been left out 15 degrees. With power coming up, and the FO feels the Nose get light, could he have pushed too hard?
Thinking over rotation, could MCAS deploy? His saturation level as high as it was, could he have Retracted Flaps then gotten as alarmed with Pitch Rate down and then pulled back? With unexpected MCAS deployment, well, talk about saturation. Seeing the FO's mess, was Captain as unsure of the flight path as PF?
The "leaked report" gains credibility for having been "leaked". ... Coming upon a leaked report should raise doubts as to its credibility for those used to technical explanations...
It reads like a seventh grade book report....
Thinking over rotation, could MCAS deploy? His saturation level as high as it was, could he have Retracted Flaps then gotten as alarmed with Pitch Rate down and then pulled back? With unexpected MCAS deployment, well, talk about saturation. Seeing the FO's mess, was Captain as unsure of the flight path as PF?
The "leaked report" gains credibility for having been "leaked". ... Coming upon a leaked report should raise doubts as to its credibility for those used to technical explanations...
It reads like a seventh grade book report....
Last edited by BugBear; 21st Jun 2024 at 02:24.
It's not a "report." It's an internal memo "To: All Pilots." from the Southwest Director Flight Safety Programs & Assurance.
Perhaps 7th grade is ... is the ice thin over here? I think it says what it needs to say in a way that avoids differential equations and Navier–Stokes equations.
Presuming MCAS is given the correct AoA it will add the correct amount of trim to provide the correct control column feel. AFAIK it will be a smooth, continuous adaptation to pitch and speed.
Perhaps 7th grade is ... is the ice thin over here? I think it says what it needs to say in a way that avoids differential equations and Navier–Stokes equations.
Presuming MCAS is given the correct AoA it will add the correct amount of trim to provide the correct control column feel. AFAIK it will be a smooth, continuous adaptation to pitch and speed.