Another Southwest close call
Originally Posted by EXDAC
I did not see any statement that suggests there was 16 seconds of data missing
The next line down:
Originally Posted by AVHerald
What happened in these 16 seconds is described in an internal memo circulating in Southwest Airlines stating...
That is not in dispute but it does not say there was no data between those times. It only provides the aircraft state at those two times. I do not know what data set they were looking at or whether there was data missing in that dataset. ADS-B Exchange data is all sourced from amateur enthusiasts and does not get included in other ADS-B data repositories. It is very likely that different ADS-B tracking sites will have different data points.
I didn't spend much time working on 737 avionics and it was some time ago. I don't know the potential for mode confusion. The profile suggests to me that the FO was flying an FD that was still in approach mode but I'm not saying that is what happened.
I didn't spend much time working on 737 avionics and it was some time ago. I don't know the potential for mode confusion. The profile suggests to me that the FO was flying an FD that was still in approach mode but I'm not saying that is what happened.
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Originally Posted by Exdac
ADS-B Exchange data is all sourced from amateur enthusiasts and does not get included in other ADS-B data repositories. It is very likely that different ADS-B tracking sites will have different data points.
ADS-B exchange captures data from the ADS-B output, just like all the other "repositories". I doubt that it is anything special or more accurate. There might be a user, close-by, who can capture the data when no FR24 user exists; that would be the only reason you have the data for that 16 seconds whereas FR24 doesn't.
Originally Posted by Exdac
The profile suggests to me that the FO was flying an FD that was still in approach mode but I'm not saying that is what happened.
time mm:ss // baro alt ft // gps alt ft // alt rate ft/min // gps gs kt
12:21 1100 1250 -1024 151
12:27 1000 1150 -896 150
12:35 900 1025 -768 149
12:39 875 1000 -320 151
12:40 875 1000 -128 154
12:41 875 1000 256 158
12:42 900 1025 256 161
12:43 900 1025 256 165
12:44 900 1025 128 169
12:45 900 1025 0 172
12:46 900 1025 -256 176
12:47 875 975 -1216 186
12:49 800 975 -2752 191
12:51 700 825 -3712 200
12:52 600 725 -4160 204
12:58 400 500 -64 231
13:00 475 550 2752 235
13:01 525 575 3904 236
13:02 625 675 4928 235
13:03 700 775 6080 231
13:04 875 925 7424 221
13:06 1100 1100 8192 216
Pesky
There is that pesky physics thing. Instrument problems either recorded or not, and (gasp) another uncommanded descent..."inadvertent" and robust push, followed by thrust levers full forward. There could be many billions of dollars riding on "inadvertent"
To the linguist, vocabulary is not matching up to reality. Too many Boeings giving up controlled flight to gravity
To the linguist, vocabulary is not matching up to reality. Too many Boeings giving up controlled flight to gravity
OK, that's great, and supports my supposition that they didn't "bust" the MDA while descending. The FO actually levelled off (probably thinking he was climbing because of the thrust trying to pitch up, and the acceleration illusion). Looks like he started the GA at around 12:41, with GA thrust and speed starting to increase. As the speed increased, so would the sensation of climbing (steeply) and the pitch force so he has started pushing the nose down... from level flight. To go from level at 900ft to 600ft and -4000fpm over 12 seconds would be doable. Difficult, but doable.
Southwest has some work to do, based on those numbers.
Southwest has some work to do, based on those numbers.
Ca
CapnBloggs
"As the speed increased, so would the sensation of climbing (steeply) and the pitch force so he has started pushing the nose down... from level flight"
That's alarming to say the least...nothing to see outside, IMC... He should not be flying... Sensation.
Something wrong with FD? VS? Alt?
At this point, Climbing is part of the plot, no?
This meets criteria for JetLOC, YES?
Was DFDR read? What was trim set? What were elevators deflection to recover? G loads? Time enough for NTSB initial...anyone?
Eleven days to report the dutch roll accident, now this? Calhoun got some splainin' to do...
Didn't Reuters use to read PPRune??
Bugged Bear
"As the speed increased, so would the sensation of climbing (steeply) and the pitch force so he has started pushing the nose down... from level flight"
That's alarming to say the least...nothing to see outside, IMC... He should not be flying... Sensation.
Something wrong with FD? VS? Alt?
At this point, Climbing is part of the plot, no?
This meets criteria for JetLOC, YES?
Was DFDR read? What was trim set? What were elevators deflection to recover? G loads? Time enough for NTSB initial...anyone?
Eleven days to report the dutch roll accident, now this? Calhoun got some splainin' to do...
Didn't Reuters use to read PPRune??
Bugged Bear
Last edited by BugBear; 18th Jun 2024 at 15:26.
I've seen enough. I'll have nightmares tonight! 
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it is beyond reason to assume Captain "just let this happen'" Beyond counterintuituve...Comes now whistleblower First Officer X?
However you look at this it is not a good day at the office. I train on the 737, the latest variants. I would never claim to be the fount of all wisdom but the data from this incident is alarming. A 4k/ min descent followed by an 8k/min climb is not the hallmark of a well briefed, trained or structured go around. Regardless of somatographic issues, press TOGA, smoothly pitch to 15 degrees nose up, call go around flaps 15, positive climb, gear up, select a roll mode, follow the flight director accurately. If you have to engage the autopilot make sure that you are in trim. Remember with alt acquire and / or autopilot engagement the speed window opens. PM should monitor thrust application which is also dependent on auto throttle engagement or not. First push should be enough for a reduced and sensible climb rate or approx 80 / 85 pc N1 dependent on variant. I don’t know why or how that was not trained @ Southwest, an airline I have long admired. I hope very much that these issues are not becoming a trend. The 737 go around has its peculiarities not least with the pitch power relationship but it is not difficult if trained properly, briefed and rehearsed if a go around is anticipated.
Last edited by olster; 18th Jun 2024 at 20:11.
However you look at this it is not a good day at the office. I train on the 737, the latest variants. I would never claim to be the fount of all wisdom but the data from this incident is alarming. A 4k/ min descent followed by an 8k/min climb is not the hallmark of a well briefed, trained or structured go around. Regardless of somatographic issues, press TOGA, smoothly pitch to 15 degrees nose up, call go around flaps 15, positive climb, gear up, select a roll mode, follow the flight director accurately. If you have to engage the autopilot make sure that you are in trim. Remember with alt acquire and / or autopilot engagement the speed window opens. PM should monitor thrust application which is also dependent on auto throttle engagement or not. First push should be enough for a reduced and sensible climb rate or approx 80 / 85 pc N1 dependent on variant. I don’t know why or how that was not trained @ Southwest, an airline I have long admired. I hope very much that these issues are not becoming a trend. The 737 go around has its peculiarities not least with the pitch power relationship but it is not difficult if trained properly briefed and rehearsed if a go around is anticipated.
You can say that again! -4,000fpm below 1,000RA is deep into GPWS hard warning territory - at least that appears to have been heeded. What the PM was thinking during the whole sequence IDK but from what has been unearthed so far this was LOC, as they were so far off a nominal profile in terms of height and speed. No wonder it’s under investigation and I’d have thought it would have been caught by FOQA anyway.
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Only half a speed-brake
https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports/aaib...737-8k5-g-fdzf not the first time this has happened.
Not wishing to stir the pot too much:
+ speedtape confusion (pitching down to avoid the overspeed barberpole descending from atop the PFD onto the IAS index)
+ negative g dis-orientation (untrained against, the sensation of being lifted into the harness might cause a subconscious push to "get down" or "stop the levitation".
Both work in nasty harmony if you just busted your G/A alt, compounded by the FDs pointing to pitch-down. In case you already had started to trim (high speed) nose-down to overcome the NU force on the yoke and the finger becomes a little suck on the PT rocker ... you are riding the tiger on the tail in no time at all.
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I don’t know why or how that was not trained @ Southwest, an airline I have long admired. I hope very much that these issues are not becoming a trend. The 737 go around has its peculiarities not least with the pitch power relationship but it is not difficult if trained properly, briefed and rehearsed if a go around is anticipated.