Another Southwest close call
I don’t know how the Boeing works but usually at my Airbus operator we keep the A/P engaged until we’re fully visual, so we can keep our workload low and reduce the margin for error for something as demanding as a go around… food for thought maybe seeing as keeping the automatics in probably would’ve avoided this whole situation?
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When I flew the 737, other than an autoland (with both APs engaged on the ILS) the AP would drop out when you hit the TOGA buttons.
Last edited by Speed_Trim_Fail; 16th Jun 2024 at 09:03.
If your only experience of going around was in the sim and you remember having to push against power and trim, plus you had low hours on type…
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I thought 737s auto-go-arounded on both APs (which meanwhile had to unwind all the nose-up trim) but could be a bitch with a disconnect. Didn’t have them in my old 737 days but would RNAV approaches be single AP?
If your only experience of going around was in the sim and you remember having to push against power and trim, plus you had low hours on type…
If your only experience of going around was in the sim and you remember having to push against power and trim, plus you had low hours on type…
I’ve no idea what the max is like to fly, personally having made the transition to FBW I haven’t got much desire to return to the 737. Or lose my tray table
Last edited by Speed_Trim_Fail; 16th Jun 2024 at 20:08.
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I simply do not understand how a FO could perform this poorly or how the Captain could allow it to happen.
I can understand the F/O's performance as they have become overwhelmed by the dynamic changes in attitude, speed and physical forces that cannot be replicated in the sim. I dont know the Captains experience but if he knew that the F/O was new to the operation then he should have been PF on the first attempt. Yes F/O's have passed all the checks but to throw them into a situation where the weather is not going to be user friendly is just asking for trouble. let them get used to the aircraft and operation during benign conditions then as they get more comfortable which can take years then let them be the PF on a dark stormy night. A lot of Captains have come unstuck trying to give low time F/O's experience.
I can understand the F/O's performance as they have become overwhelmed by the dynamic changes in attitude, speed and physical forces that cannot be replicated in the sim. I dont know the Captains experience but if he knew that the F/O was new to the operation then he should have been PF on the first attempt. Yes F/O's have passed all the checks but to throw them into a situation where the weather is not going to be user friendly is just asking for trouble. let them get used to the aircraft and operation during benign conditions then as they get more comfortable which can take years then let them be the PF on a dark stormy night. A lot of Captains have come unstuck trying to give low time F/O's experience.
Having read the leaked report, and looked at the speed and altitude profile for the excursion below minimums, I find the crew performance far more alarming than the "clickbait" is alarmist.
I simply do not understand how a FO could perform this poorly or how the Captain could allow it to happen.
I simply do not understand how a FO could perform this poorly or how the Captain could allow it to happen.
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In one big airline I know of the FO is the go-around man. CPT focuses on finding visual references and if no contact call before minimums it's a go-around. To think that the left seat is more current and proficient in flying than the right seat is a fallacy these days.
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US airlines operate a bit differently. Unless the FO is "high mins" (under 100hrs on type), he/she would be expected to handle all 3 of those situations you mentioned. The CA may ask a relatively inexperienced FO if he's comfortable with a particularly challenging approach, but at some point, you'll have to give the FO a chance to do it. The report even states the CA elected to have the FO fly the approach in order to build experience.
The FO is trained as well as the Capt, and is expected to fly in the same circumstances. Exceptions always exists, but I trust any FO in my company to fly any situation.
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Likewise here (Europe/UK). FO is trusted to handle thrust levers/RTO and taxi the aircraft.
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RNAV 17 routing is just off the coastline and the descent was over the ocean.
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It would be interesting to know what the FDs were commanding. If the PF went around not in TOGA mode, they would still probably be targeting the threshold elevation + 50’ on an RNAV; similar to the high speed low altitude takeoff Emirates did in Dubai.
Whatever, it seems to have been a gross mismatch between attitude and power. Another factor is the possibility of (unknown) reduced g sensitivity in the PF, so pushing over leads to more pushing over, etc. I am surprised that this situation was allowed to develop this far by the PIC/PM as it had gone way beyond hinting and tipping...
Whatever, it seems to have been a gross mismatch between attitude and power. Another factor is the possibility of (unknown) reduced g sensitivity in the PF, so pushing over leads to more pushing over, etc. I am surprised that this situation was allowed to develop this far by the PIC/PM as it had gone way beyond hinting and tipping...
EXDAC, the 400ft was the descent after the Missed Approach was in progress.
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