JAL incident at Haneda Airport
It would have been the work of seconds to confirm with ATC that the a/c could enter the active runway. But there was also an element of losing face and admitting to not having understood a transmission made in English.
In case it has not been mentioned, the committee investigating the crash notes in their interview with the Airbus pilot that he reported losing all ability to steer or brake immediately following contact at touchdown, and the aircraft felt 'uncontrollable', as though it was in an unchecked slide.
In Japanese, Yomiuri Newspaper online.
ＪＡＬ機パイロット、衝突後「ブレーキやハンドル機能せず」「機体が滑っている感覚」 : 読売新聞 (yomiuri.co.jp)
In Japanese, Yomiuri Newspaper online.
ＪＡＬ機パイロット、衝突後「ブレーキやハンドル機能せず」「機体が滑っている感覚」 : 読売新聞 (yomiuri.co.jp)
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Nowhere is there any verified information that the Captain asked for confirmation from the crew. JP7000 quoted a news report which said that the captain said the crew agreed that they were cleared for take-off. Despite the fact that we don’t know what the Pilot said in Japanese, that is not the same thing. But this thread has turned that third hand unverified information into a fact that the Captain asked the question and then bias-led conclusions have been drawn.
Nowhere is there any verified information that the Captain asked for confirmation from the crew. JP7000 quoted a news report which said that the captain said the crew agreed that they were cleared for take-off. Despite the fact that we don’t know what the Pilot said in Japanese, that is not the same thing. But this thread has turned that third hand unverified information into a fact that the Captain asked the question and then bias-led conclusions have been drawn.
But they just run with it because of some complete misinterpretation of Japanese culture.
(sometimes worst offenders being those that have worked here but living in a sheltered subculture )
Nowhere is there any verified information that the Captain asked for confirmation from the crew. JP7000 quoted a news report which said that the captain said the crew agreed that they were cleared for take-off. Despite the fact that we don’t know what the Pilot said in Japanese, that is not the same thing. But this thread has turned that third hand unverified information into a fact that the Captain asked the question and then bias-led conclusions have been drawn.
Pegase Driver
Thanks for reminding us of that.
For me, until we see a transcript of the Dash 8 CVR and of the GND frequency we will not really know the reason why the Capt of the Dash entered the runway and apparently started take off 40 seconds later.
We only have the sole survivor's word that they all had their headphones on and had agreed that they had permission to proceed, right?
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There is one additional Reason plate that could be added at almost no cost.
The cost would be a handful of meetings at ICAO plus some "getting used to the new rules" for pilots and controllers.
The rule would be that any entry on an active runway must be positively announced by the aircrew.
With 2 groups of scenarios:
- the entry just follows a clearance received at the holding point; then the positive announcement is just the clearance read-back. So no change to current procedures in this scenario.
- the entry is based on a clearance received earlier on during taxi; an additional announcement must be made by the pilots when entering the runway (new procedure).
In the latter circumstances, the crew would have to positively announce on the tower frequency:
"Lining up and waiting, runway 34R" or
"Crossing runway 34R" or
"Lining up and taking off, runway 34R" (unlikely as take-off clearance are usually not issued long in advance)
This wouldn't be a dramatic change as, in uncontrolled airports, it is part of standard phraseology to announce the entry on a runway.
And, of course, if such a change is enacted, there will be a leading up time during which many crews will forget the announcement and will receive a gentle reminder from the (trained) tower controller.
The cost would be a handful of meetings at ICAO plus some "getting used to the new rules" for pilots and controllers.
The rule would be that any entry on an active runway must be positively announced by the aircrew.
With 2 groups of scenarios:
- the entry just follows a clearance received at the holding point; then the positive announcement is just the clearance read-back. So no change to current procedures in this scenario.
- the entry is based on a clearance received earlier on during taxi; an additional announcement must be made by the pilots when entering the runway (new procedure).
In the latter circumstances, the crew would have to positively announce on the tower frequency:
"Lining up and waiting, runway 34R" or
"Crossing runway 34R" or
"Lining up and taking off, runway 34R" (unlikely as take-off clearance are usually not issued long in advance)
This wouldn't be a dramatic change as, in uncontrolled airports, it is part of standard phraseology to announce the entry on a runway.
And, of course, if such a change is enacted, there will be a leading up time during which many crews will forget the announcement and will receive a gentle reminder from the (trained) tower controller.
I don't know the status of the CVRs and FDRs for the two aircraft. The investigating authorities are not required to give updates other than the ones detailed in the officially required process. Not all details are shared with the public.
Pegase Driver
There is one additional Reason plate that could be added at almost no cost.
The cost would be a handful of meetings at ICAO plus some "getting used to the new rules" for pilots and controllers.
The rule would be that any entry on an active runway must be positively announced by the aircrew.
.
The cost would be a handful of meetings at ICAO plus some "getting used to the new rules" for pilots and controllers.
The rule would be that any entry on an active runway must be positively announced by the aircrew.
.
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.
- the entry is based on a clearance received earlier on during taxi; an additional announcement must be made by the pilots when entering the runway (new procedure).
In the latter circumstances, the crew would have to positively announce on the tower frequency:
"Lining up and waiting, runway 34R" or
"Crossing runway 34R" or
"Lining up and taking off, runway 34R" (unlikely as take-off clearance are usually not issued long in advance)
This wouldn't be a dramatic change as, in uncontrolled airports, it is part of standard phraseology to announce the entry on a runway.
- the entry is based on a clearance received earlier on during taxi; an additional announcement must be made by the pilots when entering the runway (new procedure).
In the latter circumstances, the crew would have to positively announce on the tower frequency:
"Lining up and waiting, runway 34R" or
"Crossing runway 34R" or
"Lining up and taking off, runway 34R" (unlikely as take-off clearance are usually not issued long in advance)
This wouldn't be a dramatic change as, in uncontrolled airports, it is part of standard phraseology to announce the entry on a runway.
The other large concern to my mind is:
- A crew having a runway incursion is a predictable event (there are x runway incursions per airport per year)
- There was ample time available to the controllers to detect this error (45 seconds is a long time from an ATC perspective)
- There was an automated system intended to assist in preventing this accident one of the key capabilities of which had been intentionally disabled
Preventing runway incursions is essential but effectively mitigating them is just as essential. Both parts of this system failed and thus far we are only really focussing on the former on this thread.
- A crew having a runway incursion is a predictable event (there are x runway incursions per airport per year)
- There was ample time available to the controllers to detect this error (45 seconds is a long time from an ATC perspective)
- There was an automated system intended to assist in preventing this accident one of the key capabilities of which had been intentionally disabled
Preventing runway incursions is essential but effectively mitigating them is just as essential. Both parts of this system failed and thus far we are only really focussing on the former on this thread.
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Luc, we try to avoid making a new rule after every single accident .and we should not do it. Here for a yet unknown reason , an apparently well trained captain lined up on an active runway without authorization. Until we know and understand why , let's not rush into rulemaking decisions. The current phraseology works very well. for hundreds of thousands of pilots and controllers every day all around the world . .
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Nowhere is there any verified information that the Captain asked for confirmation from the crew. JP7000 quoted a news report which said that the captain said the crew agreed that they were cleared for take-off. Despite the fact that we don’t know what the Pilot said in Japanese, that is not the same thing. But this thread has turned that third hand unverified information into a fact that the Captain asked the question and then bias-led conclusions have been drawn.
I agree with ATC Watcher, any changes to rules and/or procedures need to be very carefully considered before implementation. Knee jerk reactions soon after an incident or accident are very rarely useful and somtimes downright dangerous.
Respectfully, the current Rule is deficient and was a huge factor in the Tenerife accident. Had the rule been changed after Tenerife (to announce entering any runway, Mars excluded) we would not have 5 dead. Big responsibility making calls on how thousands of pilots will behave. I'd feel a lot better knowing my pilot just announced entry into the runway on each SLF take-off? Peace
ASMGCS provides a lot of information, significantly improves situational awareness of the ATC, reduces controller workload and can reduce coordination between controllers. But ATC equipment is too dependent on the supplier, and there is a lack of standardisation, colours, fonts, visual and aural alerts, let alone where the display is positioned for ease of reference. Is it logically positioned so that it is part of the ATC scan, or has the display been retrofitted into the console after the control tower was constructed?
Sorry, but adding additional words isn't necessarily going to make it safer.
A line up clearance is read back, a take-off clearance is read back, a cross the runway instruction is read back and an enter runway (to taxiway via the runway) is read back. And these items or elements are checked by the ATC and if omitted, then the pilot is asked to confirm. If there is doubt then it is clarified.
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Ongoing high numbers of runway incursions show the current primary system of voice between ATC and pilots needs fixing. Not an automation fan, but technology already exists, adoption growing globally.
Expanding regulations for ground, all commercial AC could be rapid, starting as recommendation followed by phase-in period. Maritime did it with AIS (like ADS-B) and DSC, much of the fleet operating well before IMO / MA compliance dates. Open-worded ANC recommendations freeing AAs, CANSO etc to write their own detailed standards would accelerate agreement process.
Rollout to existing ADS-B enabled systems just a UI software patch for ATC screens and cockpits - warnings and/or traffic light system.
Or am I missing something ?
Expanding regulations for ground, all commercial AC could be rapid, starting as recommendation followed by phase-in period. Maritime did it with AIS (like ADS-B) and DSC, much of the fleet operating well before IMO / MA compliance dates. Open-worded ANC recommendations freeing AAs, CANSO etc to write their own detailed standards would accelerate agreement process.
Rollout to existing ADS-B enabled systems just a UI software patch for ATC screens and cockpits - warnings and/or traffic light system.
Or am I missing something ?
Pegase Driver
Sailplaneflyer : No , would not help much and you use the wrong example in mentioning Tenerife, . Thanks to Bergerie1 and missy above , to confirm what I said, ao no need to add much .Just remember that all the recent runway incursions that hit the media would not have been prevented with what you propose. But sticking to standard phraseology would have most likely prevented them all , including here.
Finally a bit of Humor to add to this : before posting always remember these two Earl Wiener's basic laws :
Finally a bit of Humor to add to this : before posting always remember these two Earl Wiener's basic laws :
Whenever you solve a problem you usually create one. You can only hope that the one you created is less critical than the one you eliminated.
There is no simple solution out there waiting to be discovered, so don’t waste your time searching for it.
There is no simple solution out there waiting to be discovered, so don’t waste your time searching for it.
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I'd like to think that there has been significant change in the 46 years since Tenerife. No-one would argue that it's less safe. Better and more standard phraseologies including only using the words "take-off" when included in a clearance to take-off, that is, "cleared for take-off". Improved markings or signs to identify runway exits. Improved cockpit procedures and crew resource management. Development of technologies for air traffic controllers for situational awareness and alerting such as runway incursion monitoring. Now days, Advanced Surface Movement Guidance & Control Systems (ASMGCS) provide routing, guidance and surveillance for the control of aircraft and vehicles. And aircraft equipment and pilot procedures (Mode S transponder and flight id).
ASMGCS provides a lot of information, significantly improves situational awareness of the ATC, reduces controller workload and can reduce coordination between controllers. But ATC equipment is too dependent on the supplier, and there is a lack of standardisation, colours, fonts, visual and aural alerts, let alone where the display is positioned for ease of reference. Is it logically positioned so that it is part of the ATC scan, or has the display been retrofitted into the console after the control tower was constructed?
Sorry, but adding additional words isn't necessarily going to make it safer.
A line up clearance is read back, a take-off clearance is read back, a cross the runway instruction is read back and an enter runway (to taxiway via the runway) is read back. And these items or elements are checked by the ATC and if omitted, then the pilot is asked to confirm. If there is doubt then it is clarified.
ASMGCS provides a lot of information, significantly improves situational awareness of the ATC, reduces controller workload and can reduce coordination between controllers. But ATC equipment is too dependent on the supplier, and there is a lack of standardisation, colours, fonts, visual and aural alerts, let alone where the display is positioned for ease of reference. Is it logically positioned so that it is part of the ATC scan, or has the display been retrofitted into the console after the control tower was constructed?
Sorry, but adding additional words isn't necessarily going to make it safer.
A line up clearance is read back, a take-off clearance is read back, a cross the runway instruction is read back and an enter runway (to taxiway via the runway) is read back. And these items or elements are checked by the ATC and if omitted, then the pilot is asked to confirm. If there is doubt then it is clarified.