JAL incident at Haneda Airport

[Bergerie1]

ATC Watcher, Thank you for your post. Unfortunately, and I hate to say this, in order to grab the attention of politicians and the public, multiple deaths are required. The JAL accident in Tokyo, and the many near-misses in the USA, provide us professionals with enough warnings. But, I suspect, not to those who might be able to influence mandates. GPWS and TCAS only came after sufficient political will was generated, I fear it will be the same for the types of warnings in the cockpit which I am advocating.

[Hollywood1]

Originally Posted by waito

And with respect to taxi instruction for the Coast Card crew:

It was real life at least some 20 years ago to hear Tower: "Airline123, good day, 2 landings ahead" on initial contact from outbound traffic. Why would they say that??? Take a guess

So I repeat my former opinion, an instruction to the Coast Guard crew could have been JA722A Tokyo TOWER Good evening, one Landing ahead, you're No.1 for departure, taxi to holding point C5. (NOTE: This is a suggestion, not fake fact)
Takes 1.5 more seconds but gives great Situation Awareness.

When holding short of any runway, you always assume there is traffic approaching that runway. Why else would ATC ask you to hold short? If there's no traffic, then ATC would not ask you to hold short, but clear you for take-off. Furthermore, you can monitor approaching traffic on your TCAS display. I always do when I'm holding short waiting for line up or take-off clearance and I assume most pilots would too as part of their situational awareness..

[Phlipt]

You don't have to look far from home... Google "Follow The Greens LHR".

But I'm not sure how a fully interlocked, fail safe signal system would work for an airfield. What would be your means of positive, failsafe vehicle detection?

[waito]

Originally Posted by Hollywood1

When holding short of any runway, you always assume there is traffic approaching that runway. Why else would ATC ask you to hold short? If there's no traffic, then ATC would not ask you to hold short, but clear you for take-off. Furthermore, you can monitor approaching traffic on your TCAS display. I always do when I'm holding short waiting for line up or take-off clearance and I assume most pilots would too as part of their situational awareness..

Oh yes, I forgot about that. That had the potential of giving another hint to the Dash-8 crew - a swiss cheese hole could have been removed. Before entering a runway, XPDR should be switched to active mode.

Are aircraft operating from Coast Guard are mandated to have TCAS in Japan?

What does the display in the A350 show, if the Dash-8 had Transponder active?

[VR-HFX]

That is why a very bright endoscopy needs to inserted into the JCAB and the whole ATC system in Japan. Anyone who has any experience of the JCAB, either riding jumpseat or sticking their noses into Japanese airline ops would know that they are part of the problem and not part of the solution. All of the local pilots and most of the foreigners working on contract in Japan are too afraid to state the bleeding obvious that this was an accident waiting to happen.

[Matt2725]

Originally Posted by Old Carthusian

It would be very difficult to go against or challenge your superior particularly in Japanese culture. The surviving pilot has stated in interviews that it was the consensus of the whole crew that they had permission to take off. Consensus decisions are very important in Japan and generally never overruled.

Indeed. I do suspect it was the consensus of one however, with 5 others afraid to challenge their captain.

[PeteMonty]

Originally Posted by Saab Dastard

This is the official transcript of the ATC communications:



Unless and until any OFFICIAL corrections are made to this, please desist from discussing any other "versions" of the comms.

Thanks.

Why all this 'cloak and dagger' about not discussing the coms? All other subjects and accusations are being allowed to be discussed freely on here, this amateur, totally ill-informed platform of people trying to hash out what is what with scant uncorroborated information. So why shut down discussion over what was said?

You say this is the official transcript, is it?! I was under the understanding this has come from mainstream media and not any 'official' source? Who has carried out what checks on this transcript to confirm it's authenticity and robustness?

I have listened over and over to the liveATC recordings. They are also not official. They are what someone has recorded on amateur equipment clearly some distance from the airport. I say this because they do not have the replies from all the ground (such as the Dash-8 in question) and the audio quality is very poor. Trying to clean up the audio of the clearance given to the Dash-8, I do not hear what is written on this 'official transcript'. And the transmissions to other aircraft around it also do not match.

Why am I saying this? Because what was said and by whom is for me as a pilot one of the biggest factors in this. I do not trust this 'official transcript'. It is not accurate. The recordings that are out there in the public domain are poor quality and miss vital parts of the conversation. Not least the departure clearance (not takeoff clearance, two different things but the departure clearance would have set the CG pilot up to be expecting certain things from tower) that would have been given on ground. But also the readback from the CG pilot of the clearance tower did give him is totally missing from these amateur audio recordings (because he was on the ground and had insufficient signal power to break through on whatever was doing the recordings). We are solely relying on this 'offical transcript' for that information and like I say, I don't think that transcript is correct or even official. If the actual genuine official transcript of ATC was available in the public domain, then why isn't the ground transcript also 'out there'?

The crew discussing the plan/clearance amongst themselves wasn't necessarily because it wasn't heard and the captain wanted clarity. It may have been because the plan all along had been something out of the ordinary. I would discuss that with my crew as PIC. "They wasn't us to do jump in front of this lot, expedite cos of a runway switch etc etc". I can for sure see this being a talking point in the cockpit. We simply don't have the information on what was said when by whom and what was read back. Everything else is speculation without this!

[Expatrick]

Originally Posted by waito

And with respect to taxi instruction for the Coast Card crew:

It was real life at least some 20 years ago to hear Tower: "Airline123, good day, 2 landings ahead" on initial contact from outbound traffic. Why would they say that??? Take a guess

So I repeat my former opinion, an instruction to the Coast Guard crew could have been JA722A Tokyo TOWER Good evening, one Landing ahead, you're No.1 for departure, taxi to holding point C5. (NOTE: This is a suggestion, not fake fact)
Takes 1.5 more seconds but gives great Situation Awareness.

"you're No.1 for departure"

While I understand the reasoning for passing this information, does its inclusion (in a requirement for an aircraft to hold), specifically use of the word departure, not create the possibility of a misunderstanding by a busy / fatigued crew?

[DarkPenguin]

Originally Posted by PeteMonty

I have listened over and over to the liveATC recordings. They are also not official. They are what someone has recorded on amateur equipment clearly some distance from the airport. I say this because they do not have the replies from all the ground (such as the Dash-8 in question) and the audio quality is very poor. Trying to clean up the audio of the clearance given to the Dash-8, I do not hear what is written on this 'official transcript'. And the transmissions to other aircraft around it also do not match.

Why am I saying this? Because what was said and by whom is for me as a pilot one of the biggest factors in this. I do not trust this 'official transcript'. It is not accurate. The recordings that are out there in the public domain are poor quality and miss vital parts of the conversation. Not least the departure clearance (not takeoff clearance, two different things but the departure clearance would have set the CG pilot up to be expecting certain things from tower) that would have been given on ground. But also the readback from the CG pilot of the clearance tower did give him is totally missing from these amateur audio recordings (because he was on the ground and had insufficient signal power to break through on whatever was doing the recordings). We are solely relying on this 'offical transcript' for that information and like I say, I don't think that transcript is correct or even official. If the actual genuine official transcript of ATC was available in the public domain, then why isn't the ground transcript also 'out there'?

Why should the ground script matter? Ground doesn't give you permission / clearance to enter a runway. If you would listen carefully to the recordings available on LiveATC u can hear that an aircraft is instructed to taxi to holding point C5. And that Aircraft reads back the clearance to taxi to holding point C5. There is no evidence of any clearance that would include runway 34R except of landing clearances.
So pretty much what is written on the transcript can be heard (more or less) on the recordings available.

[sizziano]

Originally Posted by Jasonbay

Also, I believe it is SOP (at least it is for the FAA) for TWR to advise pilots performing intersection T/Os what the available rwy TORA is, and for the pilot to confirm that it is adequate for the the available T/O performance of the departing aircraft. In all likelihood, this would have been in the form of a call "722A, line up and wait/cleared for takeoff, runway 34R at C5. xxxx feet available." Or "722A, verify able to accept intersection departure [note: not "takeoff" since this is an interrogatory not imperative/clearance] from runway 34R at C5. xxxx feet available."

The FAA only requires informing an aircraft of distance remaining to military aircraft or obviously if the pilo requests it.

[GarageYears]

Forgive this somewhat confused question - my background is 35 years of flight simulation development for various large sim manufacturers - but relates to a system for Airbus aircraft - namely the Airbus ATSAW (Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness) which was phased for Step 2A (operation in air) and Step 2B (operation on ground).

I have been aware of this system for approximately 10 years, with the executive summary being a significant improvement to the current TCAS cockpit display, plus additional information in the MCDU via specific traffic pages.

My understanding is this is an existing capability of the Airbus aircraft, based on the ability to receive ADS-B IN by the aircraft??? At least I thought so?

The page below, is from an Airbus presentation on the capabilities of ATSAW for phase 2B "Operation On Ground". If I understand this correctly it does require all aircraft support ADS-B OUT, and I think it was stated that the CG aircraft was not equipped with ADS-B.

Can any Airbus qualified crew comment on whether this system is in operational use now? It would seem that such a capability would have allowed the approaching aircraft to detect the runway was occupied and avoided the situation, EXCEPTING of course the CG aircraft was missing the necessary ADS-B OUT transmitter. My point here is surely, if such ADS-B systems are available and could alert a crew on approach, therefore preventing such accidents, that ALL aircraft operating from commercial airports (particularly large international airports) should be mandated to have the necessary equipment, i.e. ADS-B OUT as a minimum.

[jumpseater]

Originally Posted by Expatrick

"you're No.1 for departure"

While I understand the reasoning for passing this information, does its inclusion (in a requirement for an aircraft to hold), specifically use of the word departure, not create the possibility of a misunderstanding by a busy / fatigued crew?

Re “departure”.
It shouldn’t do and whilst not impossible I think extremely unlikely to have contributed to the misunderstanding that clearly occurred.
“Departure” isn’t used in the take off clearance phraseology at any point, so the word is unlikely to trigger throttles up responses. The takeoff clearance typically ICAO standard:

ABC123, Runway XX, Wind xxx degrees, xx knots, Cleared for Takeoff.

The takeoff clearance should always be at the end of the ATC transmission, and correctly read read back by the aircrew.

Informing a crew they’re number X gives them a prompt, nothing more, on where they fit into the ATCO’s current plan which can obviously change. If sequences change, the controller subject workload, should advise each crew of their new position in the sequence to keep everyone in the loop.

[JapanHanuma]

My understanding is that the word "takeoff" must be included for any instruction to be perceived as a takeoff clearance, and that instructions which require mentioning the takeoff but do not actually provide takeoff clearance use the word "departure" instead. So Haneda ATC were following international procedures here.

Honestly it is very hard to understand how:

• The pilot could obtain runway clearance from what the ATC said
• The pilot could obtain takeoff clearance from what the ATC said
• There could be consensus in the aircraft that the plane had takeoff clearance

The runway clearance is a very peculiar phrase and takeoff clearance requires the word takeoff. Haneda is also the home airport of the JCG and there is little reason to believe that the DHC crew would not have sufficient experience dealing with Haneda ATC.

[Expatrick]

Originally Posted by jumpseater

Re “departure”.
It shouldn’t do and whilst not impossible I think extremely unlikely to have contributed to the misunderstanding that clearly occurred.
“Departure” isn’t used in the take off clearance phraseology at any point, so the word is unlikely to trigger throttles up responses. The takeoff clearance typically ICAO standard:

ABC123, Runway XX, Wind xxx degrees, xx knots, Cleared for Takeoff.

The takeoff clearance should always be at the end of the ATC transmission, and correctly read read back by the aircrew.

Informing a crew they’re number X gives them a prompt, nothing more, on where they fit into the ATCO’s current plan which can obviously change. If sequences change, the controller subject workload, should advise each crew of their new position in the sequence to keep everyone in the loop.

Okay, thanks for that.

[jaytee54]

Originally Posted by DType

V sorry, really dumb question:-<br />If two parallel runways (34R and 34L??) were active, maybe the coastguard crew did see the approaching JAL aircraft lights and assumed they were headed for 34L?

Absolutely right!
The crux of the matter is that when the coastguard entered at C5 and lined up on 34R, the copilot WILL have looked to his right, any pilot would, and checked the runway and approach path, but as the parallel runways are quite close, an aircraft with landing lights at 3-4 nm would be assumed to be landing on 34L.
But what made them think they could line up without specific verbal clearance and readback? Could a call have been stepped on?
When Tower cleared them to C5 holding point, "you're number 1", he could have added (number 1) "for departure. Landing traffic at 3 miles." to complete the mental picture.
With all that lighting clutter I don't believe the Tower could have seen the Dash-8 enter the runway, and I can't imagine the A350 crew seeing it line up from 3 miles, or seeing it at all from right behind at night, HUD fitted or not.
So what about SMR? Was it fitted, and in use?
We should stop using Swiss cheese; switch to good solid cheddar!

[waito]

Originally Posted by GarageYears

Forgive this somewhat confused question - my background is 35 years of flight simulation development for various large sim manufacturers - but relates to a system for Airbus aircraft - namely the Airbus ATSAW (Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness) which was phased for Step 2A (operation in air) and Step 2B (operation on ground).

I have been aware of this system for approximately 10 years, with the executive summary being a significant improvement to the current TCAS cockpit display, plus additional information in the MCDU via specific traffic pages.

My understanding is this is an existing capability of the Airbus aircraft, based on the ability to receive ADS-B IN by the aircraft??? At least I thought so?

The page below, is from an Airbus presentation on the capabilities of ATSAW for phase 2B "Operation On Ground". If I understand this correctly it does require all aircraft support ADS-B OUT, and I think it was stated that the CG aircraft was not equipped with ADS-B.

Can any Airbus qualified crew comment on whether this system is in operational use now? It would seem that such a capability would have allowed the approaching aircraft to detect the runway was occupied and avoided the situation, EXCEPTING of course the CG aircraft was missing the necessary ADS-B OUT transmitter. My point here is surely, if such ADS-B systems are available and could alert a crew on approach, therefore preventing such accidents, that ALL aircraft operating from commercial airports (particularly large international airports) should be mandated to have the necessary equipment, i.e. ADS-B OUT as a minimum.

Maybe user vilas is available, he might know, and if it's an option for airlines on the A350.

I am interested if it was available on the incident aircraft. And what are the prerequisites for it to cover the situation in Tokyo. You mention ADS-B Out on the other aircrafts. That's it? I assume the Transponder Mode must be TA or TA/RA?

[SRMman]

Flying Roland, ref your post 891. As I have pointed out earlier Fig A2 is not supported by the evidence of the crash damage. The pictures of the A350 engines IMO do not show symmetrical horizontal damage to both sides of both nacelles (as would be caused by impacting the horizontal TE at high speed).

[ams6110]

Originally Posted by jaytee54

... With all that lighting clutter I don't believe the Tower could have seen the Dash-8 enter the runway, and I can't imagine the A350 crew seeing it line up from 3 miles, or seeing it at all from right behind at night, HUD fitted or not...

Are any commercial aircraft fitted with infrared cameras viewing ahead? Such equipment would easily see an aircraft with running engines on the runway, even it if was hard to see by eye at night in the clutter of other lighting. The heat of the engines would stand out clearly against the runway.

[Sailplaneflier]

Originally Posted by Sailplaneflier

No. There are differences: More importantly, though, had the Dash-8 pilot called out "taking active RWY 34R" it would have potentially jogged the attention of the Tower and the three pilots on board the JAL heavy to the dual use of the active.
.

Originally Posted by fdr

[b]]Such a call will increase the potential for operational comms to be missed from the additional use of a limited bandwidth. It is hard enough to get all calls in with ATC out of LAX or ORD, or JFK already. Each call would add, what, 5 seconds of airtime from the aircraft, and would require to be acknowedged, another couple of seconds of response, for how many movements per hour? HND is doing around 90 movements an hour peak, which is pretty high. ATL does 860,000 a year, or 100/hr on average, and there are super peak periods for operations there, that is a lot of aircraft, with split concourses and freqs, but it is still busy. I would think that there needs to be higher staffing in the ATC at HND, as well as upgrade of the alerting systems to support the human ATCOs.

Originally Posted by fdr

In this case, it appears a pretty normal evening went bad, and few of the anomalies were particularly surprising. Given the near routine state of runway transgressions in the USA of late, it is hardly reasonable to state that an SA error by the JCG crew was that exceptional that it was unable to be envisaged. What is unfortunate is that all of the other safeguards to having 2 cockpits at the same point in space and time were not functioning in a manner that could recover the SA error

Originally Posted by framer

That was in reference to a suggestion to add another radio call as an aircraft enters a runway. The above quote about limited bandwidth is correct in my mind. The extra call would undoubtedly result in other calls being missed at some airports. As an example, a report I recently read on a minor ground collision between two aircraft stated that in the two minutes leading up to the collision, the frequency was in use 92% of the time.
Adding another transmission on top of the current line- up instructions and read backs is not the answer. It’s like reinforcing the gate when part of the fence is down.

Originally Posted by andrasz

Please read the relevant posts and transcript. This was never said. The exact phrase was "Good evening, No. 1., taxi to holding point C5". The readback was the same.

Originally Posted by aox

It is noticeable in the published transcript that two landing aircraft are advised of one departure, but the shortly to depart aircraft is not advised about a relevant landing that was approved just before it joined the frequency. Something like you will be number one departure after one landing could have been useful in this circumstance.

Originally Posted by jumpseater

People need to stop suggesting ways of making frequencies busier and easier to miss transmissions or have them stepped on, and repeated, and stepped on again etc etc. It’s not just at busy international airports, the same thing is just as likely at a regional single runway airport where an ATCO can be doing delivery/ground/tower and airfield vehicles simultaneously. The controller in this Haneda event from published transcripts has given an unambiguous, clear ICAO compliant, taxi clearance to the CG aircraft to taxi to the C5 hold. The aircraft has read it back correctly. If the controller wanted the aircraft to line up he would have said “ABC123 via C5 enter runway XX, line up and wait.”

Kind regards for all of this helpful information. Consider the Dash-8 pilot's potential mindset:

"Damnit, we're still not yet No. 1 for takeoff and I've been sitting here for 45 minutes trying to get takeoff clearance. Don't they understand that the golden hour saves lives and people are trapped by an earthquake? We lost an hour / need to be there, not here!" He's potentially salivating for takeoff clearance and misinterprets what was said (hearing what he wanted to hear - i.e, You're Number One.) That's all the lizard brain (legal term) heard under pressure and in the moment, perhaps. From that point forward, he decided he'd been cleared, lined up, and spent 53 seconds waiting for "cleared to takeoff.' That he expected, knowing the controller knew he was military and had just said "You are number one". Magic number to a stressed and tired mind?

All of the other Swiss cheese ends there, possibly. Could we prevent runway incursions with a call out? Simple, no electronics relied on, and perhaps not requiring read-back by Tower, just an announcement "Taking the active 34R". Like an uncontrolled airport. My runway, all.

Wouldn't that make it rote and prevent something like this (multiple incursion incidents?.)

I'll stop posting for awhile and stay in my lane. But, if I was parked in the Number One lane on a freeway, with mechanical problems (or waiting for a call that never came) I'd sure as hell love to announce it outright to all other motorists, than be forced to rely on blinking hazard lights, especially in a fog.

[MLHeliwrench]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Except we as controllers do not explain the reason why we issue instructions , What you suggest is perfectly fine and sometimes done in small regional airports, but not in major ones. Follow the standard phraseology and everyone will be fine.

@ Bergerie1 : our paths probably have crossed then .
I am also convinced of that , and as you correctly say, in our business we tend to wait for accidents to change and mandate things. Maybe that accident here , as the 3 others recent similar close calls in the US , will help moving things forward . I am curious to see if the discussion will re-open now. But it will involve installing a CDTI , and retrofit has currently zero chances of being accepted by the airlines.,

A pilot acting on their own - contrary to their acknowledged and read back instruction - can not be fixed with changes to regulations or aircraft equipment. Sometimes humans mess up. Sometimes that has massive deadly consequences.

Training the humans to do better and making sure they are well rested is key. Also training humans to defensively cross check/monitor what the other humans are doing aground you is key.