JAL incident at Haneda Airport

[MichaelKPIT]

Originally Posted by glekichi

All of the initial actions were hindered by multiple system failures.
My understanding is the megaphone was used because both the primary and secondary systems used to initiate an evac in the first place had both failed so something else had to be done.

Even when deciding to evac after being unable to contact the flight deck you would normally communicate this with the other cabin crew that this is happening, but the channels for doing this had also all failed.
How is L4 supposed to know that L1 is evacuating if they cannot tell them, or vice-versa.
Almost nothing could be done according to the procedures in place. It seems literally every step needed to be done by alternate means. That's one hell of a scenario.
Yet some here, even those who have worked in Japan, sit and accuse them of inaction and/or a lack of initiative, based on race/culture.
I'm only a pilot so my understanding in this area may be deficient compared to a cabin crew member, but my wife is also a cabin manager at a Japanese airline (not JAL).

I agree with you - it was a terrible situation. The chain of decisions of whether or not to evac is a discussion of its own in this case, and you're absolutely right - a lot had already failed by that point. But a lot of people in this chain have mentioned the megaphone and my gut instinct, from my training and hearing my wife's, is that finding/reaching for it is wasting valuable seconds when "shouting" is what's been ingrained into you. As a pilot you know them as Memory Items, as cabin crew they form part of our "30 second review" every time we sit on a jumpseat. (Interestingly we were trained that the PA system is NOT a no-go item; announcements can be made with the megaphone!) And I hope your wife is doing OK - this kind of thing really hits home to those of us in the airline community.

[EDLB]

I think nobody blames the cabin crew. They did successful what they were trained for and had a lucky outcome. What is questionable, the training they got. To wait on the evac. with brocken down comms even so all visual hints from the outside requested immediate action, is dangerous. The situation in a burning plane deteriorates quick.

[PAXboy]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

But the alerts are made very eye catchy just there for that very reason , also most systems are coupled with an audio alert, ( not sure if this one was) but maybe disabled due too many false alerts ,I have seen that too many times before. The main problem with these systems is that there is no standard. Every manufacturer makes its own logic displays and alerts , some are better than others. Time to standardize, also the procedures .

As far as I know this is the reason that the Master Caution system was developed in the flight deck. One alarm for level of warning - silence - then identify which warning it is?

As the Stop Bars were U/S, perhaps a set of old fashioned crowd barriers with physical stop signs and battery powered red lights? Then use other entry/exits till repaired.

[DIBO]

Originally Posted by PAXboy

As the Stop Bars were U/S, perhaps a set of old fashioned crowd barriers with physical stop signs and battery powered red lights? Then use other entry/exits till repaired.

They were U/S on C1 thru C14... so close the runway then??

[waito]

Originally Posted by jumpseater

@waito, Again, there is no such thing as a hold short line.

It is a stop bar and or holding point. The distinction here is particularly relevant with this accident.

Hey jumpseater

thank you, the "stop bar" was the word I was missing! I wanted to show this picture in the Sequence Post (but had to leave it away cause Picture limit was busted). In it, laymen can't see a Holding Point, but this line(s). I'll now stick with Stop Bar at the Holding Point. The Holding Point is the main Term for Pilots, sure. Thanks again for remind me of the correct wording.



Detail for laymen: The earlier Bar is usually for Low Visibility Operations to keep more distance from the ILS signals (I haven't checked this particular one in C5), the last one is the normal one for weather like in that afternoon.

[Avman]

Originally Posted by DIBO

They were U/S on C1 thru C14... so close the runway then??

No, not close the runway, but once dark only use the runway exclusively for arrivals! They do have other options available for departures.

[waito]

Originally Posted by Easy Street

with the A350 fuselage being 6m wide, the vertical stab will have contacted the fuselage rather than the wing.

That was my train of thought as well. I just did not want to overly detail it in my short summary in that big list. And maybe it could withstand the side deflection from fuselage, then we're probably seeing a impact mark near the wing root. Notice the damage in the left wing. But we can't be sure.

The postings around FlyingRoland posts are a good base for detail discussion, he provided excellent drawings

[SINGAPURCANAC]

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Yes and also known to look for scapegoats and punish them . Just Culture has not yet been translated in Japanese.

Shall we open the pull how final report in such safety environment will be?

1. If captain of DH8 survives injuries, than late copilot was guilty-taxing without coordination, not obeying commands, rules and SOPs ( in some countries autopsy will find alcohol in his body..)
2.There were no mistakes in Senior level management in ATC, Airport, Japan Airlines neither Coast Guard.
3. All equipment, necessary for safe, orderly and efficient air traffic, were bought and operational at the moment of disaster and status of them properly notified for operational service.
4. Especially, disaster committee underlines that all budget for aviation safety was approved by appropriate Ministry and there was no political obstacle for improvement of safety in aviation- that is strict policy of minister itself.
5. Government will establish special group that will in near future suggest further improvements in all aviation aspects.
...

[EDML]

Originally Posted by SRMman

Interesting that the so called slice damage to the A350 engine intake cowls is markedly to their inner edge, with little or none to the corresponding outer edges.

Given that the Dash 8 wingspan is greater than the distance between the A350 engines one would think that as the A350 ran into the smaller aircraft's wing trailing edge there would obvious slice damage to both sides of both engines......?

Larger by how much? You will need to add the diameter of the engines (3m fan) to that distance.

Edit:
I just checked: The distance between the engines is 21m. The outer distance is therefore around 25m. Wingspan for the DHC8-300 is around 27.5m.
Maybe the inner sides of the nacelles ripped of the wings before the outer sides of the nacelles contacted the wings (due to the aspect ratio).

[waito]

Now with my analysis of the Dash-8 taxi route, I became clear to me, that

1. It was a constant motion and also through C5 until the lineup on Rwy 34R
2. The strobes had come on early on C5 (I wonder if XPDR was brought from STBY to an active mode as well)
3. From entering C5 with strobes until turning into runway, the A350 was between ~3.6NM to ~2NM away

So first question, was it possible for the A350 crew to see the Dash-8 during these 30s? Was there hindering factors like the discussed assumption of HUD's usage? This question is now a question of contributing factors.
Second question, why did the Dash-8 Crew miss to see the incoming A350, which for sure was very illuminated? They had a chance to notice it a longer period of time, including their taxi portion on C.

Let me express my opinion that the A350 crew is the least one to have missed anything important to my knowledge so far.

[Dani]

Originally Posted by glekichi

Its an absolute cluster fk scenario yet the job was done. The normal procedures couldn't be followed yet they figured it out.om what happened, there are almost always better options in hindsight, but people jumping up and down about the evac being too slow based on the information at hand... wow..

There are perfect and easy procedures in such a case: Each cabin attendant takes over and starts evacuation. Every crew member learns the first lession of emergency drill: If you have fire, smoke or structural damage, you open the doors (if it's safe) and start the evacuation by yourself. No order from the cockpit necessary. Asian culture of obediance doesn't allow for individual decision making.
If this would have happened in a western aircraft, some strong men or family fathers would have overrun the cabin attendants and opened the doors by themselves, irrespective of fire present or not. It would have been a nightmare.
Having smoke and not starting an evacuation is a no go. I imagine that most slides would have been perfectly well suited for an evacuation, except those four in front and behind the wing. But firefighters kept a curtain of water and foam, so most parts of the fuselage were free of fire at this stage.

[vanHorck]

A question I have, when would the landing lights on the A350 have come on? Before of after the Dash-8 started entering the runway? Landing lights would surely have given much more visibility to the landing aircraft?

[DIBO]

Originally Posted by SRMman

Interesting that the so called slice damage to the A350 engine intake cowls is markedly to their inner edge, with little or none to the corresponding outer edges.

Sure about that??

[waito]

Originally Posted by vanHorck

A question I have, when would the landing lights on the A350 have come on? Before of after the Dash-8 started entering the runway? Landing lights would surely have given much more visibility to the landing aircraft?

Depending on the aircraft, but common is (in laymens terms)

Descending below 10000ft (3000m) bright wide angle lights come alive for other air traffic
At Landing Clearance the front focussed landing lights come on (think of it as "high beam"). Here this could have happened at latest 17:45:01 when A350 read back the clearance. They were 6NM out at this time and the Dash-8 was on Twy C facing the approach path more or less in front of them.

[SLF3]

Isn't it interesting how the story unfolds?

Two days ago the cabin crew were heroes, the evacuation was an examplar of how it should be done, and the asian culture was the reason everyone survived.

Today the cabin crew f**ked up, the Asian culture let them, and it was only chance that led to a happy ending.

Maybe we do need the accident report after all.

[xcris]

Originally Posted by waito

Now with my analysis of the Dash-8 taxi route, I became clear to me, that
So first question, was it possible for the A350 crew to see the Dash-8 during these 30s? Was there hindering factors like the discussed assumption of HUD's usage? This question is now a question of contributing factors.
Second question, why did the Dash-8 Crew miss to see the incoming A350, which for sure was very illuminated? They had a chance to notice it a longer period of time, including their taxi portion on C.

1) Of course "it was possible" (...if they knew it was there, if they paid extra attention to look for it, if, if, etc., etc., etc.), but obviously, they didn't see it, since they continued the approach in a normal manner and ran into it! (unless they were suicidal)
2) What about "they didn't miss seeing it, but just not looking for it"? Obviously, again, they were mentally assured that they were CLEAR for take-off and committed to it, otherwise they didn't enter an active runway (unless they were suicidal). Most probably they did scan the approach path, but just out of the routine. 34R and 34L are parallel, I bet it is hard to distinguish in a quick scan, during the night, a 2-3 miles out plane on which one path it may have been. And they had the radio, and on the radio, unfortunately, nothing happened since it already happened, but they were not there! Just another link in the chain to disaster.
The question bothering me is: Why they just stood for almost 40" on the runway, if they (really) thought they were cleared for take-off?
Dash-8 is a small aircraft and a rolling take-off is easy, even if you have to turn on the strobes, turn on the transponder (as speculated), and so on.
They really thought they were clear for t/o? Or just to enter the runway? Or neither of those?
(I will not take Dash-8's captain declarations for granted, at this point. Why? Well, simply because he is contradicted on all said by the facts...)

[ATC Watcher]

Originally Posted by SLF3

Isn't it interesting how the story unfolds?
.....it was only chance that led to a happy ending.

and a Captain that reportedly went back inside to check every row and found back some terrorized Pax still in there

Maybe we do need the accident report after all.

+1 ! . but who needs a final report in PPRuNe?

[xcris]

Originally Posted by vanHorck

A question I have, when would the landing lights on the A350 have come on? Before of after the Dash-8 started entering the runway? Landing lights would surely have given much more visibility to the landing aircraft?

Landing lights were on long before it became relevant (read 'useful to see something in front of them').
First, the landing lights (wing mounted), most likely were put on while descending below 10000', or earlier. Then the landing light mounted on the front gear came on, once the gear was down (at least 6 miles out). Maybe the runway turnoff lights as well, at the same time. However, it doesn't matter, they were ON and they were of any use to prevent this accident.

[Iron Duck]

Originally Posted by xcris

1)(I will not take Dash-8's captain declarations for granted, at this point. Why? Well, simply because he is contradicted on all said by the facts...)

There's what the Captain says, and the evidence of what his aircraft did. The evidence is that the aircraft taxied straight onto the runway and lined up, then waited for 30+ seconds, and then (perhaps) started rolling in the final second before the collision. From this we can infer that its crew believed not only that they were clear to line up and hold, but also to take off, either when ready or when cleared. The 30 second wait? Spoof instructions? Only the CVR can reveal this, but whatever happens its contents are going to embarrass someone, and this is difficult.

[JT Eagle]

For what it may be worth, here's a photo from above and behind of JA722A taken a few years back from the Haneda train.
JT