JAL incident at Haneda Airport

[waito]

Sequence of Events with pictures

AL516 crash on 02-JAN-2024
incomplete sequence of events

version 5-JAN-2024 1432z
Timestamps are Tokyo local time. GMT is 9 hours behind (17:00L is 08:00z)
sources:

• CCTV1 of airport; recording 1 published by TV station,
• CCTV2 of airport; recording 2 published by "SinglePreference" on YT, state of accuracy and breach unknown
• R/T transcript from Ministry of transport, published by AvHerald, OCR and edit by me
• Flight Radar 24 incident Flight JAL516 replay
• unknown cam from inside a taxying plane abeam C5

see end for details.

JAL516: The Airbus A350 on Approach to Haneda
JA722A: The Coast Guard Dash-8 Q300 preparing for departure

METARS:

RJTT 020900Z 33008KT 9999 FEW020 07/04 Q1016 NOSIG=
RJTT 020830Z VRB03KT 9999 FEW020 SCT090 08/04 Q1016 BECMG TL0900 30006KT=

J2253/23 NOTAMN
Q) RJJJ/QLRAS/IV/NBO/A/000/999/3533N13947E005
A) RJTT B) 2312271500 C) 2402211500
E) REF AIP SUP 225/23 ITEM TWY:2,3,4,5,6,7,10,11,12,13,33,38,44,54
TWY-CL-LGT FOR M1,R1,W11(BTN W AND R1)-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR E10(BEHIND SPOT 53)-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR D5-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR A(BTN W AND A2),A(INT OF W1),A1,A2(INT OF A),W1
-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR A16-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR K(BTN SPOT 304 AND C),R(INT OF K)-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR R(BTN K AND Y),R(INT OF Y)-PARTLY U/S
STOP-BAR-LGT FOR C1 THRU C14-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR T12,T14,Q,Q1,Q2-U/S
TAXIING-GUIDANCE-SIGN FOR T12,T14,Q,Q1,Q2-U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR C(INT OF C3),C(INT OF C5)-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR T(BTN T2 AND SPOT 909),T(INT OF T4),T(INT OF T6)
-PARTLY U/S
TWY-CL-LGT FOR C3(INT OF RWY 16L/34R)-PARTLY U/S
RAPID EXIT TWY INDICATOR LGT FOR D5-U/S




17:43:02 (4m25s before impact):

R/T (JAL516): "Tokyo TOWER JAL516 spot18."
(assumed to be the first call of JAL516 on TWR frequency)

R/T (Tokyo TOWER): "JAL516 Tokyo TOWER good evening RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/7, we have departure"

At this time, the A350 is already on Final at ~11.3NM out from TDZ:




17:43:12:

R/T (JAL516): "JAL516 continue approach 34R."


17:43:26:

R/T (DAL276): Tokyo TOWER DAL276 with you on C, proceeding to holding point 34R

R/T (Tokyo TOWER): DAL276 Tokyo TOWER good evening. taxi to holding point C1.

R/T (DAL276): Holding point C1, DAL276


17:44:32 (calculated from CCTV2 video 0:53 relative to impact timestamp) :

The Tailplane Top of Dash-8 appears in CCTV2 Video taxying behind Terminal 2 Position 66 or 67 (from CCTV point of view). The plane is covered by the terminal, just Tailplane with light can be seen. Dash-8 must be on Twy G or H, abeam Twy R

The CCTV covers this area:



(another Google picture available but exceeds max in posts)


17:44:49 (calculated from CCTV2 video 1:10):

Dash-8 comes in full view after having passed behind terminal 2 pos 68 (from CCTV view) shortly before turning into Twy C:






17:44:56 (2m31s before impact):

R/T (Tokyo Tower): JAL516 RUNWAY 34R cleared to land wind 310/8

A350 at this time of issued Landing Clearance: ~6 NM from TDZ and FR24-ALT ~1700ft:




17:44:57 (calculated from CCTV2 video 1:18):
Dash-8 turns right into C (Twy C assumed from Radio call). Now it's taxying parallel to Rwy 16L and opposite the approaching traffic.:






17:45:01:

R/T (JAL516): Cleared to land RUNWAY 34R JAL516.


17:45:11 (2m16s from impact)

R/T (JA722A): TOWER JA722A C.

R/T (Tokyo Tower): JA722A Tokyo TOWER Good evening, No.1, taxi to holding point C5


17:45:19 (2m08s before impact):

R/T (JA722A): Taxi to holding point C5 JA722A No.1, Thank you.


17:45:40:

R/T (JAL179): Tokyo TOWER JAL179 taxi to holding point C1.

R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL179 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.3, taxi to holding point C1

R/T (JAL179): Taxi to holding point C1, we are ready JAL179.


17:45:43 (calculated from CCTV2 02:04) (1m34s before impact):

Dash-8 in the middle of turning left into C5 (C5 confirmed from Transport Ministry). The wing tip strobe lights are now switched on.





At this time the A350 is 3.6NM from TDZ and FR24 ALT 1100ft:




17:45:56:

R/T (JAL166): Tokyo TOWER JAL166 spot 21.

R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.2, RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/8, we have departure, reduce speed to 160 knots.


17:46:06:

R/T (JAL166): Reduce 160 knots RUNWAY 34R continue approach, JAL166 good evening


17:46:19 (timestamp roughly estimated!)
assumed DASH-8 crossing the Stop Bar at Holding Point C5:
(Google picture available but exceeds max in posts)


The A350 in this case is roughly 2NM from TDZ and in the 600ft region:



17:46:27 … during ~12s (calculated from CCTV2 02:48-3:00) (1m00s before impact):

Without ever stopping, Dash-8 enters Rwy, turns left onto Direction Rwy 34R


17:46:47 (calculated from CCTV2 03:08):

Dash-8 completed line-up and stopped moving. Positioncloser to entry from C5 than entry from C6. A bright light in the nose area became visible during lineup (unknown when switched on)
Open Question: The runway incursion remains undetected by any of the ATC alert systems or is overlooked
Start of the 40s phase of no moving






17:47:23

R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166, reduce minimum approach speed

R/T (JAL166): JAL166


17:47:27:

CCTV2 shows: Dash-8 starts to make a small move forward less than 1 second before impact, which coincides with the later statement of the Dash-8 Captain to just have started the takeoff.


17:47:27
A350 being recorded on unknown camera passing Twy C5 just a split second before impact:


Fireball Orange Light appears, when A350 nose is one A350 length (67m) away from centerline Twy C5:



17:47:27 (and CCTV2 03:48)

Impact of landing JAL516 A350 into waiting JA722A Dash-8




State from open discussion (nothing confirmed):
The main Gear was most likely on ground but struts not yet compressed (spoilers)
The pitch angle was likely in the region 2-3° nose up, the nose was still in the de-rotation process
The upper region of the nose cone must have hit the Dash-8 Horizontal Stab first. If the Vertical Stab was also hitting the nose cone or was deflected by fuselage is unknown
During ongoing impact, the A350 engine inlets must have impacted the Dash-8 main wings
The Main Wing near its Root of the A350 maybe contacted the vertical stab of the Dash-8 instead of nose cone
The impact speed was in the 120KN region (Groundspeed)

17:47:56 (timestamp from CCTV1, time-alignement unchecked):

A350 is leaving CCTV1's frame with roughly viewer estimated speed of 80KN on the Runway. The Nose gear is missing and the nose section down to the Runway surface
(lost the source)


=== End of Sequence at this time ===






Sources:

CCTV1: was livestream replay, I can't find it anymore

CCTV2:

JA772A + JL516 CRASH EXTENDED FOOTAGE - Tokyo Airport HND/RJTT (youtube.com)

by SinglePreference

You Tube

unknown CAM:

You Tube

6:18-6:24

[glekichi]

Originally Posted by VHOED191006

I think it's worth pointing out that in the modern Airbus aircraft, the purser can activate the evacuation alarm that the flight crew usually activates. There's a switch on the evacuation panel on the overhead which allows the pilots to elect that both the Captain and Purser can activate the alarm, or the Captain only.

It sounds like the entire PA and alerting system was crippled by the accident and this really needs to be looked into. It definitely added a lot of time to the evacuation.
The chief purser would normally contact the flight deck to inform them of smoke in the cabin, but to do this they would also usually communicate with other cabin at other stations to gather the correct information for the crew.

So step one would probably be to try to contact other stations... and this didn't work.. maybe a minute trying this amongst shouting commands to the passengers to remain seated.
Then attempting to contact the flight deck... no contact possible.
Engine still obviously running.
Then attempt to initiate the evacuation and find the evac switch is not working.
Then locate megaphone and commence the evacuation while evaluating which doors are useable.
Cabin crew at the rear probably not getting messages all the way from the front immediately if at all throughout the event.

Its an absolute cluster fk scenario yet the job was done. The normal procedures couldn't be followed yet they figured it out.
(Yet some still ASSuming that because of culture they sat there and did nothing while waiting for instruction from the cockpit... really?)

The captain taking a further 10 minutes to get out: As previously mentioned they probably worked on shutting down the engine a little longer.. but also.. I've disarmed all the doors on a 787 by myself on a ferry flight and that alone took a good amount of time. Making your way through a smoke filled cabin and actually checking every row for anyone left behind? That alone would likely take close to 10 minutes to do properly on this sized aircraft.

By all means learn from what happened, there are almost always better options in hindsight, but people jumping up and down about the evac being too slow based on the information at hand... wow..

[Tetsuo]

Originally Posted by waito

Thank you.
I'm not yet convinced. Video I saw is very unsteady in lights, so instead of another lights come on, it could be just atmospheric influence or video quality.
Please somebody else check the mentioned situation on this good quality video with full 1440 resolution on a good monitor.
https://youtu.be/6NbVdIoJsHY?t=223
Is close to the timestamp 3:47/48 of the collision

Here the tails starts to be lit at 3:44 from this angle. Dash 8 tail is the white shape between arrows. JAL in circle. Screenshot from 3:43 and 3:44. It's very faint almost dark at 3:43.

[51bravo]

waito, this is the best resolved record I have seen so far. I must correct my mental picture with the visibility from the tower (agree this is not the view from the tower, but almost). In contrast to the view from the A350 deck at short final, this white bright patch of taxi light is not drown in any light orgy but firmly sitting within the dim runway edge lights as something which does not belong there at this point of time. In reality it must have been an eye catcher for the experienced day to day professional, if only he would have turned his head into that direction for a second or two.

(not blaming the tower crew, there are many tasks and the usable window to call R/T for a Go Around was maybe only the first 10 seconds of the 30 seconds where the taxilight was bright, just a pity thought, a slice of chese if you want which could have saved the day.)

[Loose rivets]

Small observation from link below. After entering, the -8 crosses the centreline a little, swings back onto say, 310° before the light dimes as it settles on ~340°. Time from that settled moment I'm getting 38 seconds to impact. Imagining putting brakes on and gathering thoughts, it's not as much time as I'd fussed over.

You Tube

I thought I'd read every post but I'm still bewildered as to how the captain was miraculously detached from that half-second of massive kinetic energy 'exploding' into his charge. 'Limping away'!? Parts of his aircraft were accelerated from nothing, or almost nothing, to over a 100kts in half a second. Frankly, I just don't see how it was possible to be removed from being strapped into a seat, to being in what might as well be another universe.

[jumpseater]

Originally Posted by WHBM

Is that all the 34R/16L Stop Bars or just the ones for Taxyway C5 which were out of service ?

How is it that such items can be out of service for so long that they make it to Notams, rather than being fixed pronto. Does Haneda not have an electrician on the staff ?

Has it not occurred to you or any other of the Monday morning quarterbacks, that if an item of lighting, or as here sections are Notamed out of use, the resolution for those is not merely having an electrician on the staff. That, is why they haven't been fixed pronto.

You can tell who hasn't worked in either an ATC or aerodrome operational role, but you can't tell them much.

[woocash]

Originally Posted by WHBM

Is that all the 34R/16L Stop Bars or just the ones for Taxyway C5 which were out of service ?

How is it that such items can be out of service for so long that they make it to Notams, rather than being fixed pronto. Does Haneda not have an electrician on the staff ?

It does not matter, because:

​​​​​​​Stop Bar Lights Operations
1) Stop Bar Lights are installed at each RWY holding position associated with
RWY16L/34R
2) Stop Bar Lights will be operated when the visibility or the lowest RVR of theRWY16L/34R is at or less than 600m.
3) Stop Bar Lights on TWY C1, C2, C13 and C14 are controlled individually by
ATC
4) Stop Bar Lights on TWY C3 THRU C12 are not controlled individually by
ATC.
5) During the period Stop Bar Lights operated, TWY C3 THRU C12 are not
available for departure aircraft.

[Iron Duck]

Originally Posted by JP7000

But they didn't explain at all what they were doing or what was happening using any words whatsoever. If they had explained that to us, people would have been able to see hope"

This is important. No matter how culturally compliant or not people may be, in a high stress situation such as this you must keep them informed and in particular give them a plausible reason for any delay or inaction, if you want to prevent fight-or-flight chaos.

[Loose rivets]

2) Stop Bar Lights will be operated when the visibility or the lowest RVR of theRWY16L/34R is at or less than 600m.

Which implies to me that the old check of 'Approach Clear' is still very much part of the game.

[glekichi]

Originally Posted by woocash

It does not matter, because:

I actually think this will be the biggest take away from this accident.
Stop bars or some other runway incursion prevention system must be used at all times.
To think, at an airport like Haneda, the only protection against an erroneous line-up is the controller seeing it.... I'm blown away.

[Easy Street]

Originally Posted by waito

The Main Wing near its Root of the A350 maybe contacted the vertical stab of the Dash-8 instead of nose cone

I think the maximum possible lateral offset between the aircraft was 1.2m (calculations in my earlier post based on DH3 wingspan vs A350 engine spacing) and if so, with the A350 fuselage being 6m wide, the vertical stab will have contacted the fuselage rather than the wing. Although it's hard to say for sure, the extent of radome damage suggests a direct hit on the vertical stabiliser; if there had been any offset then perhaps the damage would have been more of a 'slice' from the horizontal stabiliser than the extensive circular damage pattern.

Originally Posted by Loose Rivets

I thought I'd read every post but I'm still bewildered as to how the captain was miraculously detached from that half-second of massive kinetic energy 'exploding' into his charge. 'Limping away'!? Parts of his aircraft were accelerated from nothing, or almost nothing, to over a 100kts in half a second. Frankly, I just don't see how it was possible to be removed from being strapped into a seat, to being in what might as well be another universe.

The Dash-8, or at least its fuselage and cockpit, hardly moved. I don't see any evidence of parts of any significance being accelerated to 100kts. The impacts, firstly on the stabiliser and then on the wings, were almost certainly so energetic as to disrupt the structure (in layman's language, rip the tail and wings off) before any sustained accelerative force could be transmitted to the fuselage. Essentially the fuselage was left sitting where it was as the A350 ploughed on through. The instantaneous acceleration (jolt) would have been massive, but very brief. I suspect the deaths of the other crew members will either have been due to being directly contacted by the A350 NLG and/or the damage it caused, or by being incapacitated/trapped and then burned. The captain's survival is certainly miraculous.

[bobstay]

Originally Posted by JP7000

06:39 Passenger angrily to another passenger: "You don't take out luggage!" (very rude and confrontational form)

It's heartening to hear of passengers preventing others from taking their hand-luggage. Granted the cabin crew had been shouting non-stop not to do that, but passengers taking that message on board sufficiently to berate other passengers about it is a good sign. Maybe the message is starting to get through.

[jumpseater]

Originally Posted by waito

17:46:19 (timestamp roughly estimated!)
assumed DASH-8 crossing the Hold Short Line in C5:
(picture available but exceeds max in pros)

@waito, Again, there is no such thing as a hold short line.

It is a stop bar and or holding point. The distinction here is particularly relevant with this accident.

Hold short is an instruction that can be used by ATC where there is no defined holding point, it is not a clearance or a specific location. In my experience I have never heard "hold short" used at night or in low visibility procedures, this is because it is inexact. A vehicle or aircraft given a hold short instruction means it can be stopped 1m, 15m 200, or whatever from the specified location. Critically the instruction means it has to stop before getting to the specified location.UK CAP413 Ch4
HOLD SHORT**
Stop before reaching the specified location.

NOTE: Only used in limited circumstances where no defined point exists (e.g. where there is no suitably located holding point), or to reinforce a clearance limit.

C5 is a designated holding point on a taxiway with a stop bar and stop bar/holding point paint markings. The stop bar is annotated in the notams not a hold short line.

If you read and understand the above you'll also realise that ironically if 722 had been given a 'hold short' instruction, (at night its highly unlikely to be given anyway), the accident might not have happened, because the aircraft would have been prompted to stop at some point prior to reaching the C5 holding point.

[MichaelKPIT]

Originally Posted by glekichi

Then attempt to initiate the evacuation and find the evac switch is not working.
Then locate megaphone and commence the evacuation while evaluating which doors are useable...

It's the "locate the megaphone" part I'm having trouble with here. I have gone through F/A training with a major US carrier, admittedly more than 20yrs ago, but my wife is still current on another major US carrier, and the "grab the megaphone" bit only happens after the psgrs are out. If it's safe you get the first aid kit, megaphone, flashlight (which I believe now is already in your hand, although it wasn't when I did my training) and follow the people down the slides. Once the decision has been made that an evacuation is in order it's pretty much "open the doors, pull the manual inflation handle and shout like hell!" (The pulling of the manual inflation handle is trained into you so it becomes automatic - the slides SHOULD have inflated by themselves, but if it's trained and automatic then the step doesn't get missed.)

[sunnySA]

Originally Posted by jumpseater

Originally Posted by waito

17:46:19 (timestamp roughly estimated!)
assumed DASH-8 crossing the Hold Short Line in C5:
(picture available but exceeds max in pros)

@waito, Again, there is no such thing as a hold short line.

It is a stop bar and or holding point. The distinction here is particularly relevant with this accident.

Hold short is an instruction that can be used by ATC where there is no defined holding point, it is not a clearance or a specific location. In my experience I have never heard "hold short" used at night or in low visibility procedures, this is because it is inexact. A vehicle or aircraft given a hold short instruction means it can be stopped 1m, 15m 200, or whatever from the specified location. Critically the instruction means it has to stop before getting to the specified location.UK CAP413 Ch4
HOLD SHORT**
Stop before reaching the specified location.

NOTE: Only used in limited circumstances where no defined point exists (e.g. where there is no suitably located holding point), or to reinforce a clearance limit.

C5 is a designated holding point on a taxiway with a stop bar and stop bar/holding point paint markings. The stop bar is annotated in the notams not a hold short line.

If you read and understand the above you'll also realise that ironically if 722 had been given a 'hold short' instruction, (at night its highly unlikely to be given anyway), the accident might not have happened, because the aircraft would have been prompted to stop at some point prior to reaching the C5 holding point.

I’d be interested in 3 things.
1/. listening to the instructions from the Ground controller prior to handing over to the Tower controller.
2/. for the Dash 8 details time out of the system (finish) as they reached the holding point ?
3/. Intercom communications between Tower and First responders including the Fire Fighters at the airport. In particular was only the A350 mentioned or were both aircraft mentioned in the initial communicate to all out the fire trucks?

[SRMman]

Interesting that the so called slice damage to the A350 engine intake cowls is markedly to their inner edge, with little or none to the corresponding outer edges.

Given that the Dash 8 wingspan is greater than the distance between the A350 engines one would think that as the A350 ran into the smaller aircraft's wing trailing edge there would obvious slice damage to both sides of both engines......?

[woocash]

Originally Posted by glekichi

I actually think this will be the biggest take away from this accident.
Stop bars or some other runway incursion prevention system must be used at all times.
To think, at an airport like Haneda, the only protection against an erroneous line-up is the controller seeing it.... I'm blown away.

Actually according to the avherald the system was operating during the accident:

On Jan 5th 2024 the Ministry of Transport reported that the tower controller in charge stated in an interview, that after giving the taxi instructions to the DH8C he turned his attention towards other aircraft and did not notice the DH8C had taxied onto the runway. The runway monitoring system has been working properly. The DH8C stopped on the runway for about 40 seconds, it is possible that the controller missed the alert display, there is no rule requiring the controller to stare onto the screen all times, the screen would turn red and runway be flashing yellow (operative on all runways since 2011). Runway 34R is estimated to return to service on Jan 8th 2024.

​​​​​​​
Why was there no audio cue is interesting. I am guessing on too many false positives, hence the audio was turned off and controllers ultimately learned to ignore the blinking indicator.

[DIBO]

Originally Posted by Easy Street

The Dash-8, or at least its fuselage and cockpit, hardly moved. I don't see any evidence of parts of any significance being accelerated to 100kts.

Indeed, see attached mp4 (via .zip as per upload requirement), the red circle marks the Dash8 with nosewheel taxilight and vertical tail (LH side) clearly visible. A350 approaching with nosewheel light and LH wingroot landinglight clearly visible.
Dash8 taxilight does not move until completely overran by A350 'nosewheel light'. And even then only moves 'slightly', about the same time the A350 nosewheel light seems to tumble and disappear.

[glekichi]

Originally Posted by MichaelKPIT

It's the "locate the megaphone" part I'm having trouble with here. I have gone through F/A training with a major US carrier, admittedly more than 20yrs ago, but my wife is still current on another major US carrier, and the "grab the megaphone" bit only happens after the psgrs are out. If it's safe you get the first aid kit, megaphone, flashlight (which I believe now is already in your hand, although it wasn't when I did my training) and follow the people down the slides. Once the decision has been made that an evacuation is in order it's pretty much "open the doors, pull the manual inflation handle and shout like hell!" (The pulling of the manual inflation handle is trained into you so it becomes automatic - the slides SHOULD have inflated by themselves, but if it's trained and automatic then the step doesn't get missed.)

All of the initial actions were hindered by multiple system failures.
My understanding is the megaphone was used because both the primary and secondary systems used to initiate an evac in the first place had both failed so something else had to be done.

Even when deciding to evac after being unable to contact the flight deck you would normally communicate this with the other cabin crew that this is happening, but the channels for doing this had also all failed.
How is L4 supposed to know that L1 is evacuating if they cannot tell them, or vice-versa.
Almost nothing could be done according to the procedures in place. It seems literally every step needed to be done by alternate means. That's one hell of a scenario.
Yet some here, even those who have worked in Japan, sit and accuse them of inaction and/or a lack of initiative, based on race/culture.
I'm only a pilot so my understanding in this area may be deficient compared to a cabin crew member, but my wife is also a cabin manager at a Japanese airline (not JAL).

[glekichi]

Originally Posted by woocash

Actually according to the avherald the system was operating during the accident:



Why was there no audio cue is interesting. I am guessing on too many false positives, hence the audio was turned off and controllers ultimately learned to ignore the blinking indicator.

Ooft. Ok. Thats not going to go down well.