JAL incident at Haneda Airport
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When the camera zooms in on the live footage, there are no signs of evacuation from 4L slide. At 1:25 evacuation begins and approx. 30 people slide down during one minute, some falling on top of each other. After that one minute later only three cabin crew members abandon plane via 4L. It seems that only 1R and 1L were used for evacuation due to height, but when the fumes breached the cabin, part of the people realized that they will not make it and jumped down from 4L. How likely is that these 30 people were the last ones and all other 350 people managed to leave safely via 1L and 1R?
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Perhaps it would be helpful to integrate the aircrafts RAAS system with its transponder so that when an aircraft is on an active runway, with weight on wheels, it's transponder reflects that. Then update all TCAS systems to instruct a go-around below a certain height if an aircraft is detected on the active runway ahead.
Last edited by JG1; 5th Jan 2024 at 11:47.
Design philosophy ?. The report that an engine (RH #2) continued to run disturbs me and aside from hampering the evacuation and perhaps fire services approach to the A350, must have kept the Flight Deck occupied.
Far back (example United 232) and much earlier, essential services were deliberately not routed in groups. I am questioning whether the normal engine fuel control which might well operate the HP fuel and spar valves has the same routing as the Fire shut off handle to spar valve.
Perhaps a learned fellow has such knowledge.
Underbelly scrapes are not so uncommon and this one, to render such an essential service inoperative, is a serious concern.
Cable, digital or not are seldom run along the lower fuselage belly of aircraft and more likely just below cabin floor or above ceiling and fire pull handle control run would logically run the later undamaged route, or not?
Far back (example United 232) and much earlier, essential services were deliberately not routed in groups. I am questioning whether the normal engine fuel control which might well operate the HP fuel and spar valves has the same routing as the Fire shut off handle to spar valve.
Perhaps a learned fellow has such knowledge.
Underbelly scrapes are not so uncommon and this one, to render such an essential service inoperative, is a serious concern.
Cable, digital or not are seldom run along the lower fuselage belly of aircraft and more likely just below cabin floor or above ceiling and fire pull handle control run would logically run the later undamaged route, or not?
Is that all the 34R/16L Stop Bars or just the ones for Taxyway C5 which were out of service ?
How is it that such items can be out of service for so long that they make it to Notams, rather than being fixed pronto. Does Haneda not have an electrician on the staff ?
How is it that such items can be out of service for so long that they make it to Notams, rather than being fixed pronto. Does Haneda not have an electrician on the staff ?
Last edited by WHBM; 5th Jan 2024 at 12:22.
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That this accident was a domestic flight, with the majority of passengers Japanese, no doubt assisted the orderly evacuation. The key being they understood the crew's instructions. Were this an international flight, especially on one of the Gulf carriers (because of their passenger and crew demographic) this would certainly not have been the case, the opposite would have been true. Additionally there would have been major problems with passengers with mobility issues. It's normal for Gulf carriers to fly to US destinations with 50 or more wheelchair passengers, all of whom not being native English speakers. Reference EK521, that took over 9 minutes to evacuate the passengers, and it was immediately apparent what had happened, the aircraft had crashed and an immediate evacuation was required. There was chaos in the cabin.
An Easy Fix - the EYES have it
The obvious next step to preclude a recurrence of what's an easily repeatable accident is quite obvious. It is far too hard to discern an aircraft on a tyre-blackened runway at night. It will simply be lost amidst a sea of white lights (HIAL, runway lighting, Centreline lighting, distance to run boards etc etc).
Wire in a rapidly pulsing Magenta/Orange/Cyan sequenced Vertical fin-top strobe to illuminate when the transponder is activated (i.e. upon entering the active departure runway). Make the strobe WOW de-activated upon lift-off.
It could avoid much grief. It may also assist an aircraft on approach for its own line-up in poor vis (i.e. the next on finals to land).
It's a cheap and almost guaranteed fix.
Wire in a rapidly pulsing Magenta/Orange/Cyan sequenced Vertical fin-top strobe to illuminate when the transponder is activated (i.e. upon entering the active departure runway). Make the strobe WOW de-activated upon lift-off.
It could avoid much grief. It may also assist an aircraft on approach for its own line-up in poor vis (i.e. the next on finals to land).
It's a cheap and almost guaranteed fix.
Sequence of Events
ok, my first version of this, without pictures at this time (better overview)
Please critically crosscheck and point out miscalculations and errors
============================================================
JAL516 crash on 02-JAN-2024
Incomplete Sequence Of Events
version 5-JAN-2024 1134z
Timestamps are Tokyo local time. GMT is 9 hours behind (17:00L is 08:00z)
sources of info will follow
JAL516: The Airbus A350 on Approach to Haneda
JA722A: The Coast Guard Dash-8 Q300 preparing for departure
17:43:02 (4m25s before impact):
R/T (JAL516): "Tokyo TOWER JAL516 spot18."
(assumed to be the first call of JAL516 on TWR frequency)
R/T (Tokyo TOWER): "JAL516 Tokyo TOWER good evening RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/7, we have departure"
At this time, the A350 is already on Final at ~11.3NM out from TDZ:
17:43:12:
R/T (JAL516): "JAL516 continue approach 34R."
17:43:26:
R/T (DAL276): Tokyo TOWER DAL276 with you on C, proceeding to holding point 34R
R/T (Tokyo TOWER): DAL276 Tokyo TOWER good evening. taxi to holding point C1.
R/T (DAL276): Holding point C1, DAL276
17:44:32 (calculated from CCTV video 0:53 relative to impact timestamp) :
The Tailplane Top of Dash-8 appears in CCTV Video taxying behind Terminal 2 Position 66 or 67 (from CCTV point of view). The plane is covered by the terminal, just Tailplane with light can be seen. Dash-8 must be on Twy G or H, abeam Twy R
17:44:49 (calculated from CCTV video 1:10):
Dash-8 comes in full view after having passed behind terminal 2 pos 68 (from CCTV view) shortly before turning into Twy C
17:44:56 (2m31s before impact):
R/T (Tokyo Tower): JAL516 RUNWAY 34R cleared to land wind 310/8
A350 at this time of issued Landing Clearance: ~6 NM from TDZ and FR24-ALT ~1700ft:
17:44:57 (calculated from CCTV video 1:18):
Dash-8 turns right into C (Twy C assumed from Radio call). Now it's taxying parallel to Rwy 16L and opposite the approaching traffic.
17:45:01:
R/T (JAL516): Cleared to land RUNWAY 34R JAL516.
17:45:11 (2m16s from impact)
R/T (JA722A): TOWER JA722A C.
R/T (Tokyo Tower): JA722A Tokyo TOWER Good evening, No.1, taxi to holding point C5
17:45:19 (2m08s before impact):
R/T (JA722A): Taxi to holding point C5 JA722A No.1, Thank you.
17:45:40:
R/T (JAL179): Tokyo TOWER JAL179 taxi to holding point C1.
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL179 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.3, taxi to holding point C1
R/T (JAL179): Taxi to holding point C1, we are ready JAL179.
17:45:43 (calculated from CCTV 02:04) (1m34s before impact):
Dash-8 in the middle of turning left into C5 (C5 confirmed from Transport Ministry). The wing tip strobe lights are now switched on.
At this time the A350 is 3.6NM from TDZ and FR24 ALT 1100ft:
17:45:56:
R/T (JAL166): Tokyo TOWER JAL166 spot 21.
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.2, RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/8, we have departure, reduce speed to 160 knots.
17:46:06:
R/T (JAL166): Reduce 160 knots RUNWAY 34R continue approach, JAL166 good evening
17:46:19 (timestamp roughly estimated!)
assumed DASH-8 crossing the Hold Short Line in C5
The A350 in this case is roughly 2NM from TDZ and in the 600ft region:
17:46:27 … during ~12s (calculated from CCTV 02:48-3:00) (1m00s before impact):
Without ever stopping, Dash-8 enters Rwy, turns left onto Direction Rwy 34R
17:46:47 (calculated from CCTV 03:08):
Dash-8 completed line-up and stopped moving. Positioncloser to entry from C5 than entry from C6. A bright light in the nose area became visible during lineup (unknown when switched on)
Open Question: The runway incursion remains undetected by any of the ATC alert systems or is overlooked
Start of the 40s phase of no moving
17:47:23
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166, reduce minimum approach speed
R/T (JAL166): JAL166
17:47:27:
CCTV shows: Dash-8 starts to make a small move forward less than 1 second before impact, which coincides with the later statement of the Dash-8 Captain to just have started the takeoff.
17:47:27
A350 being recorded passing Twy C5 just a split second before impact:
Fireball Orange Light appears, when A350 nose is one A350 length (67m) away from centerline Twy C5:
17:47:27 (and CCTV 03:48)
Impact of landing JAL516 A350 into waiting JA722A Dash-8
State from open discussion (nothing confirmed):
The main Gear was most likely on ground but struts not yet compressed (spoilers)
The pitch angle was likely in the region 2-3° nose up, the nose was still in the de-rotation process
The upper region of the nose cone must have hit the Dash-8 Horizontal Stab first. If the Vertical Stab was also hitting the nose cone or was deflected by fuselage is unknown
During ongoing impact, the A350 engine inlets must have impacted the Dash-8 main wings
The Main Wing near its Root of the A350 maybe contacted the vertical stab of the Dash-8 instead of nose cone
The impact speed was in the 120KN region (Groundspeed)
17:47:56:
A350 is leaving another CCTV's frame with roughly viewer estimated speed of 80KN on the Runway. The Nose gear is missing and the nose section down to the Runway surface
Please critically crosscheck and point out miscalculations and errors
============================================================
JAL516 crash on 02-JAN-2024
Incomplete Sequence Of Events
version 5-JAN-2024 1134z
Timestamps are Tokyo local time. GMT is 9 hours behind (17:00L is 08:00z)
sources of info will follow
JAL516: The Airbus A350 on Approach to Haneda
JA722A: The Coast Guard Dash-8 Q300 preparing for departure
17:43:02 (4m25s before impact):
R/T (JAL516): "Tokyo TOWER JAL516 spot18."
(assumed to be the first call of JAL516 on TWR frequency)
R/T (Tokyo TOWER): "JAL516 Tokyo TOWER good evening RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/7, we have departure"
At this time, the A350 is already on Final at ~11.3NM out from TDZ:
17:43:12:
R/T (JAL516): "JAL516 continue approach 34R."
17:43:26:
R/T (DAL276): Tokyo TOWER DAL276 with you on C, proceeding to holding point 34R
R/T (Tokyo TOWER): DAL276 Tokyo TOWER good evening. taxi to holding point C1.
R/T (DAL276): Holding point C1, DAL276
17:44:32 (calculated from CCTV video 0:53 relative to impact timestamp) :
The Tailplane Top of Dash-8 appears in CCTV Video taxying behind Terminal 2 Position 66 or 67 (from CCTV point of view). The plane is covered by the terminal, just Tailplane with light can be seen. Dash-8 must be on Twy G or H, abeam Twy R
17:44:49 (calculated from CCTV video 1:10):
Dash-8 comes in full view after having passed behind terminal 2 pos 68 (from CCTV view) shortly before turning into Twy C
17:44:56 (2m31s before impact):
R/T (Tokyo Tower): JAL516 RUNWAY 34R cleared to land wind 310/8
A350 at this time of issued Landing Clearance: ~6 NM from TDZ and FR24-ALT ~1700ft:
17:44:57 (calculated from CCTV video 1:18):
Dash-8 turns right into C (Twy C assumed from Radio call). Now it's taxying parallel to Rwy 16L and opposite the approaching traffic.
17:45:01:
R/T (JAL516): Cleared to land RUNWAY 34R JAL516.
17:45:11 (2m16s from impact)
R/T (JA722A): TOWER JA722A C.
R/T (Tokyo Tower): JA722A Tokyo TOWER Good evening, No.1, taxi to holding point C5
17:45:19 (2m08s before impact):
R/T (JA722A): Taxi to holding point C5 JA722A No.1, Thank you.
17:45:40:
R/T (JAL179): Tokyo TOWER JAL179 taxi to holding point C1.
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL179 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.3, taxi to holding point C1
R/T (JAL179): Taxi to holding point C1, we are ready JAL179.
17:45:43 (calculated from CCTV 02:04) (1m34s before impact):
Dash-8 in the middle of turning left into C5 (C5 confirmed from Transport Ministry). The wing tip strobe lights are now switched on.
At this time the A350 is 3.6NM from TDZ and FR24 ALT 1100ft:
17:45:56:
R/T (JAL166): Tokyo TOWER JAL166 spot 21.
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.2, RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/8, we have departure, reduce speed to 160 knots.
17:46:06:
R/T (JAL166): Reduce 160 knots RUNWAY 34R continue approach, JAL166 good evening
17:46:19 (timestamp roughly estimated!)
assumed DASH-8 crossing the Hold Short Line in C5
The A350 in this case is roughly 2NM from TDZ and in the 600ft region:
17:46:27 … during ~12s (calculated from CCTV 02:48-3:00) (1m00s before impact):
Without ever stopping, Dash-8 enters Rwy, turns left onto Direction Rwy 34R
17:46:47 (calculated from CCTV 03:08):
Dash-8 completed line-up and stopped moving. Positioncloser to entry from C5 than entry from C6. A bright light in the nose area became visible during lineup (unknown when switched on)
Open Question: The runway incursion remains undetected by any of the ATC alert systems or is overlooked
Start of the 40s phase of no moving
17:47:23
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166, reduce minimum approach speed
R/T (JAL166): JAL166
17:47:27:
CCTV shows: Dash-8 starts to make a small move forward less than 1 second before impact, which coincides with the later statement of the Dash-8 Captain to just have started the takeoff.
17:47:27
A350 being recorded passing Twy C5 just a split second before impact:
Fireball Orange Light appears, when A350 nose is one A350 length (67m) away from centerline Twy C5:
17:47:27 (and CCTV 03:48)
Impact of landing JAL516 A350 into waiting JA722A Dash-8
State from open discussion (nothing confirmed):
The main Gear was most likely on ground but struts not yet compressed (spoilers)
The pitch angle was likely in the region 2-3° nose up, the nose was still in the de-rotation process
The upper region of the nose cone must have hit the Dash-8 Horizontal Stab first. If the Vertical Stab was also hitting the nose cone or was deflected by fuselage is unknown
During ongoing impact, the A350 engine inlets must have impacted the Dash-8 main wings
The Main Wing near its Root of the A350 maybe contacted the vertical stab of the Dash-8 instead of nose cone
The impact speed was in the 120KN region (Groundspeed)
17:47:56:
A350 is leaving another CCTV's frame with roughly viewer estimated speed of 80KN on the Runway. The Nose gear is missing and the nose section down to the Runway surface
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My translation relative to clock "Time elapsed since immediately after the collision". Sorry it's colloquial Japanese and confused.
00:07 (seconds) Adult passenger "Hurry..." (plane is still moving)
00:12 Child "What? What is this smell?
Man: "It's fine, it's fine"
00:16 Child "Where is the fire?"
Man: garble garble explanation
Child: "What? I'm scared!"
00:26 Woman (wife?): "Calm down calm down"
00:31 Cabin attendant: "It's fine please calm down, it's fine please calm down"
00:40 Child: "I want to get out now!"
Man: "I know I know, calm down"
(narrator explains that the plane came to a stop 30 seconds after the beginning of the video. Interviewed man: "It did not feel like a collision, it felt like the rattle you normally get at touchdown was stronger than usual, after touchdown there were several additional rattles. The man filming this video sat near the emergency exit at the aisle seat, next to him his daughter and wife, he began filming because he felt this information will be useful for future accident preparation)
00:49 CA shouts: "Please cover your nose and mouth"
00:54 Man: "Do you have a towel? Wait a moment, wait a moment"
01:00 Child makes tortured sounds and starts to cry
01:06 Man: "Use this to cover your nose"
01:10 Wife: "It's fine"
01:13 CA shouts: "Please cover your nose and mouth and stay low"
01:18 Passenger woman: "Come soon, come soon" (i.e. help us)
(outside can't be seen because of the fire)
01:23 Child: "Help me"
01:28 Woman: "Come soon"
01:31 CA shouts: "Please cover your nose and mouth and stay low"
01:37 Passenger: "I'm scaaaared"
01:40 CA shouting so loudly I can't decipher what she's saying
02:03 CA: "Don't take out your luggage! Don't take out your luggage, we're trying to verify the situation"
02:08 Passenger: "Situation garble garble" (as if to say they don't understand the situation? or what do you mean trying to understand the situation?)
Interview: "At this point people began to panic, but the CA's said please cover your nose and mouth and stay low so people regained their composure"
02:49 Child: "Papa get ready to get out"
02:52 CA shouts: "Please cover your nose and mouth. Please don't take out your luggage! Stay low."
03:11 Child: "God please help me. God."
03:27 CA "Please stay low!"
03:30 Passenger to child "It's fine"
03:32 Child shouts to CA in formal Japanese: "Please let us out!"
03:36 Wife: "It's fine calm down"
03:40 Child shouts in formal: "Please let us out now!"
03:45 CA "Please don't take out your luggage!"
Narrator "At 3:48 smoke begins to fill the cabin"
Interview "Were there many passengers trying to take out their luggage?" "No around me there were none that I could see. People were sitting down and staying low"
"It wasn't a situation where the door could be immediately opened?" "The CA's were telephoning (using mobile phone?) each other but I overheard them saying "The door won't open." "Can I open the emergency door?""
04:35 Child "Open it!"
04:39 Different male passenger: "Let's keep low for the moment"
Different female passenger: "I'm sorry"
Man: "Smoke will tend to rise up so we should keep low"
04:44 Man: "The smoke is tremendous"
Different passenger: "It's fine it's fine. If we follow the CA's instructions all will be well"
Baby's cries can be heard in background.
05:02 CA: "Please cover your nose and mouth."
05:08 CA: "Cockpit garble garble"
05:18 CA: "Please tell me which door to open!"
05:24 CA: "Please tell me which door to open!"
05:29 CA: "It's not open! R3 is not open! (or can't be opened!)"
05:30 CA: "L3 negative!"
05:34 CA: "Is the front door open?"
05:48 CA: "Can the back be opened?"
(people coughing in the background)
05:43 CA: "May I open R3?"
05:47 Passenger: "A fire truck has come!"
05:50 CA: "May I open R3?"
05:57 CA: "I can't verify the front!" (i.e., can't verify whether the front door is open or not)
06:13 CA to passenger: "We're now putting the fire out so it's fine"
Interview: This was the point where the smoke became unbearable. "My lungs felt stung by the tremendous smoke. I felt prepared to die. If I kept inhaling this smoke I felt I would die in a few minutes and everyone else would die too"
06:20 CA: "Please everyone to the front!"
06:31 Passenger angrily "Don't take out your luggage!" (rude form)
06:34 Passenger angrily "Don't take out your luggage!" (rude form)
06:36 CA: "Please don't take your luggage"
06:39 Passenger angrily to another passenger: "You don't take out luggage!" (very rude and confrontational form)
06:40 Man: "Go! Hurry up" (rude form)
06:41 Different man: "The front is almost empty" (rude form)
06:44 "Hurry!"
06:45 CA: "Go to the very front"
07:00 CA: "Please put your luggage down. Two at a time. Please sit"
07:10 Child: "I'm scared" (at the ground)
07:22 PA system: "Please distance yourself from the plane"
Interview: "Once they said to evacuate I started to run as fast as possible. I thought only about how to escape. I got out using the slide at the front left side. I understand that they had to keep saying calm down and stay low. But they didn't explain at all what they were doing or what was happening using any words whatsoever. If they had explained that to us, people would have been able to see hope"
00:07 (seconds) Adult passenger "Hurry..." (plane is still moving)
00:12 Child "What? What is this smell?
Man: "It's fine, it's fine"
00:16 Child "Where is the fire?"
Man: garble garble explanation
Child: "What? I'm scared!"
00:26 Woman (wife?): "Calm down calm down"
00:31 Cabin attendant: "It's fine please calm down, it's fine please calm down"
00:40 Child: "I want to get out now!"
Man: "I know I know, calm down"
(narrator explains that the plane came to a stop 30 seconds after the beginning of the video. Interviewed man: "It did not feel like a collision, it felt like the rattle you normally get at touchdown was stronger than usual, after touchdown there were several additional rattles. The man filming this video sat near the emergency exit at the aisle seat, next to him his daughter and wife, he began filming because he felt this information will be useful for future accident preparation)
00:49 CA shouts: "Please cover your nose and mouth"
00:54 Man: "Do you have a towel? Wait a moment, wait a moment"
01:00 Child makes tortured sounds and starts to cry
01:06 Man: "Use this to cover your nose"
01:10 Wife: "It's fine"
01:13 CA shouts: "Please cover your nose and mouth and stay low"
01:18 Passenger woman: "Come soon, come soon" (i.e. help us)
(outside can't be seen because of the fire)
01:23 Child: "Help me"
01:28 Woman: "Come soon"
01:31 CA shouts: "Please cover your nose and mouth and stay low"
01:37 Passenger: "I'm scaaaared"
01:40 CA shouting so loudly I can't decipher what she's saying
02:03 CA: "Don't take out your luggage! Don't take out your luggage, we're trying to verify the situation"
02:08 Passenger: "Situation garble garble" (as if to say they don't understand the situation? or what do you mean trying to understand the situation?)
Interview: "At this point people began to panic, but the CA's said please cover your nose and mouth and stay low so people regained their composure"
02:49 Child: "Papa get ready to get out"
02:52 CA shouts: "Please cover your nose and mouth. Please don't take out your luggage! Stay low."
03:11 Child: "God please help me. God."
03:27 CA "Please stay low!"
03:30 Passenger to child "It's fine"
03:32 Child shouts to CA in formal Japanese: "Please let us out!"
03:36 Wife: "It's fine calm down"
03:40 Child shouts in formal: "Please let us out now!"
03:45 CA "Please don't take out your luggage!"
Narrator "At 3:48 smoke begins to fill the cabin"
Interview "Were there many passengers trying to take out their luggage?" "No around me there were none that I could see. People were sitting down and staying low"
"It wasn't a situation where the door could be immediately opened?" "The CA's were telephoning (using mobile phone?) each other but I overheard them saying "The door won't open." "Can I open the emergency door?""
04:35 Child "Open it!"
04:39 Different male passenger: "Let's keep low for the moment"
Different female passenger: "I'm sorry"
Man: "Smoke will tend to rise up so we should keep low"
04:44 Man: "The smoke is tremendous"
Different passenger: "It's fine it's fine. If we follow the CA's instructions all will be well"
Baby's cries can be heard in background.
05:02 CA: "Please cover your nose and mouth."
05:08 CA: "Cockpit garble garble"
05:18 CA: "Please tell me which door to open!"
05:24 CA: "Please tell me which door to open!"
05:29 CA: "It's not open! R3 is not open! (or can't be opened!)"
05:30 CA: "L3 negative!"
05:34 CA: "Is the front door open?"
05:48 CA: "Can the back be opened?"
(people coughing in the background)
05:43 CA: "May I open R3?"
05:47 Passenger: "A fire truck has come!"
05:50 CA: "May I open R3?"
05:57 CA: "I can't verify the front!" (i.e., can't verify whether the front door is open or not)
06:13 CA to passenger: "We're now putting the fire out so it's fine"
Interview: This was the point where the smoke became unbearable. "My lungs felt stung by the tremendous smoke. I felt prepared to die. If I kept inhaling this smoke I felt I would die in a few minutes and everyone else would die too"
06:20 CA: "Please everyone to the front!"
06:31 Passenger angrily "Don't take out your luggage!" (rude form)
06:34 Passenger angrily "Don't take out your luggage!" (rude form)
06:36 CA: "Please don't take your luggage"
06:39 Passenger angrily to another passenger: "You don't take out luggage!" (very rude and confrontational form)
06:40 Man: "Go! Hurry up" (rude form)
06:41 Different man: "The front is almost empty" (rude form)
06:44 "Hurry!"
06:45 CA: "Go to the very front"
07:00 CA: "Please put your luggage down. Two at a time. Please sit"
07:10 Child: "I'm scared" (at the ground)
07:22 PA system: "Please distance yourself from the plane"
Interview: "Once they said to evacuate I started to run as fast as possible. I thought only about how to escape. I got out using the slide at the front left side. I understand that they had to keep saying calm down and stay low. But they didn't explain at all what they were doing or what was happening using any words whatsoever. If they had explained that to us, people would have been able to see hope"
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The FO was probably the one who read back “taxi to holding point Charlie 5”. I can’t believe that both the Captain and FO heard a non-existent clearance to takeoff, or taxi into position. The FO should have stopped the Captain from taxing onto the runway.
That this accident was a domestic flight, with the majority of passengers Japanese, no doubt assisted the orderly evacuation. The key being they understood the crew's instructions. Were this an international flight, this would certainly not have been the case, the opposite would have been true.
Now the French are not stereotypically known for calm compliance and following commands. Nor was there a single common language. And yet they all got out as the fire developed. If I may say so, a sight quicker than we now read happened in Tokyo.
JP7000, thank you that much, I wondered what has been said and shouted through the cabin and all the time no single English announcement, strange - but OK - all alive :-)!
Btw - Kudos to the Captain also from me (would assume also kudos to some helping not named Cabin crew member) - at that time +18 min the smoke inside would be quite heavily developed.
Btw - Kudos to the Captain also from me (would assume also kudos to some helping not named Cabin crew member) - at that time +18 min the smoke inside would be quite heavily developed.
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WHBM
Aviation Investigation Report A05H0002 (TSB of Canada):
https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-r.../a05h0002.html
See 1.15.3, re: the evacuation. Aren't there some significant differences with regard particularly to the greater level of shock and uncertainty at Haneda, and daylight conditions (among other factors which could fairly be seen as complicating the JAL accident)?
Aviation Investigation Report A05H0002 (TSB of Canada):
https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-r.../a05h0002.html
See 1.15.3, re: the evacuation. Aren't there some significant differences with regard particularly to the greater level of shock and uncertainty at Haneda, and daylight conditions (among other factors which could fairly be seen as complicating the JAL accident)?
I agree with you, we need to wait and see. All these aspects will be analysed and clarified in the report.
Given the circumstances, the 90 seconds mark was not possible to begin with. None of the 3 exits used in evacuation were at an optimal angle to achieve 2 pax per second rate. Those are dual lane slide (type A doors) and the calculation of timings takes into consideration that rate.
To put this evacuation into perspective, few people know that even during a full scale simulation of an evacuation...there are injuries. Now, we are talking about a real accident where a full plane was evacuated by the cabin crew using 3 exits out of 8 (none of the 3 in optimal conditions to achieve 2 pax per second rate) and there are no serious injuries. Did it take longer than 90 seconds? Yes, but many aspects need to be taken into consideration and we do not have the facts even if some of us have the expertise.
Given the circumstances, the 90 seconds mark was not possible to begin with. None of the 3 exits used in evacuation were at an optimal angle to achieve 2 pax per second rate. Those are dual lane slide (type A doors) and the calculation of timings takes into consideration that rate.
To put this evacuation into perspective, few people know that even during a full scale simulation of an evacuation...there are injuries. Now, we are talking about a real accident where a full plane was evacuated by the cabin crew using 3 exits out of 8 (none of the 3 in optimal conditions to achieve 2 pax per second rate) and there are no serious injuries. Did it take longer than 90 seconds? Yes, but many aspects need to be taken into consideration and we do not have the facts even if some of us have the expertise.
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ok, my first version of this, without pictures at this time (better overview)
Please critically crosscheck and point out miscalculations and errors
============================================================
JAL516 crash on 02-JAN-2024
Incomplete Sequence Of Events
version 5-JAN-2024 1134z
Timestamps are Tokyo local time. GMT is 9 hours behind (17:00L is 08:00z)
sources of info will follow
JAL516: The Airbus A350 on Approach to Haneda
JA722A: The Coast Guard Dash-8 Q300 preparing for departure
17:43:02 (4m25s before impact):
R/T (JAL516): "Tokyo TOWER JAL516 spot18."
(assumed to be the first call of JAL516 on TWR frequency)
R/T (Tokyo TOWER): "JAL516 Tokyo TOWER good evening RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/7, we have departure"
At this time, the A350 is already on Final at ~11.3NM out from TDZ:
17:43:12:
R/T (JAL516): "JAL516 continue approach 34R."
17:43:26:
R/T (DAL276): Tokyo TOWER DAL276 with you on C, proceeding to holding point 34R
R/T (Tokyo TOWER): DAL276 Tokyo TOWER good evening. taxi to holding point C1.
R/T (DAL276): Holding point C1, DAL276
17:44:32 (calculated from CCTV video 0:53 relative to impact timestamp) :
The Tailplane Top of Dash-8 appears in CCTV Video taxying behind Terminal 2 Position 66 or 67 (from CCTV point of view). The plane is covered by the terminal, just Tailplane with light can be seen. Dash-8 must be on Twy G or H, abeam Twy R
17:44:49 (calculated from CCTV video 1:10):
Dash-8 comes in full view after having passed behind terminal 2 pos 68 (from CCTV view) shortly before turning into Twy C
17:44:56 (2m31s before impact):
R/T (Tokyo Tower): JAL516 RUNWAY 34R cleared to land wind 310/8
A350 at this time of issued Landing Clearance: ~6 NM from TDZ and FR24-ALT ~1700ft:
17:44:57 (calculated from CCTV video 1:18):
Dash-8 turns right into C (Twy C assumed from Radio call). Now it's taxying parallel to Rwy 16L and opposite the approaching traffic.
17:45:01:
R/T (JAL516): Cleared to land RUNWAY 34R JAL516.
17:45:11 (2m16s from impact)
R/T (JA722A): TOWER JA722A C.
R/T (Tokyo Tower): JA722A Tokyo TOWER Good evening, No.1, taxi to holding point C5
17:45:19 (2m08s before impact):
R/T (JA722A): Taxi to holding point C5 JA722A No.1, Thank you.
17:45:40:
R/T (JAL179): Tokyo TOWER JAL179 taxi to holding point C1.
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL179 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.3, taxi to holding point C1
R/T (JAL179): Taxi to holding point C1, we are ready JAL179.
17:45:43 (calculated from CCTV 02:04) (1m34s before impact):
Dash-8 in the middle of turning left into C5 (C5 confirmed from Transport Ministry). The wing tip strobe lights are now switched on.
At this time the A350 is 3.6NM from TDZ and FR24 ALT 1100ft:
17:45:56:
R/T (JAL166): Tokyo TOWER JAL166 spot 21.
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.2, RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/8, we have departure, reduce speed to 160 knots.
17:46:06:
R/T (JAL166): Reduce 160 knots RUNWAY 34R continue approach, JAL166 good evening
17:46:19 (timestamp roughly estimated!)
assumed DASH-8 crossing the Hold Short Line in C5
The A350 in this case is roughly 2NM from TDZ and in the 600ft region:
17:46:27 … during ~12s (calculated from CCTV 02:48-3:00) (1m00s before impact):
Without ever stopping, Dash-8 enters Rwy, turns left onto Direction Rwy 34R
17:46:47 (calculated from CCTV 03:08):
Dash-8 completed line-up and stopped moving. Positioncloser to entry from C5 than entry from C6. A bright light in the nose area became visible during lineup (unknown when switched on)
Open Question: The runway incursion remains undetected by any of the ATC alert systems or is overlooked
Start of the 40s phase of no moving
17:47:23
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166, reduce minimum approach speed
R/T (JAL166): JAL166
17:47:27:
CCTV shows: Dash-8 starts to make a small move forward less than 1 second before impact, which coincides with the later statement of the Dash-8 Captain to just have started the takeoff.
17:47:27
A350 being recorded passing Twy C5 just a split second before impact:
Fireball Orange Light appears, when A350 nose is one A350 length (67m) away from centerline Twy C5:
17:47:27 (and CCTV 03:48)
Impact of landing JAL516 A350 into waiting JA722A Dash-8
State from open discussion (nothing confirmed):
The main Gear was most likely on ground but struts not yet compressed (spoilers)
The pitch angle was likely in the region 2-3° nose up, the nose was still in the de-rotation process
The upper region of the nose cone must have hit the Dash-8 Horizontal Stab first. If the Vertical Stab was also hitting the nose cone or was deflected by fuselage is unknown
During ongoing impact, the A350 engine inlets must have impacted the Dash-8 main wings
The Main Wing near its Root of the A350 maybe contacted the vertical stab of the Dash-8 instead of nose cone
The impact speed was in the 120KN region (Groundspeed)
17:47:56:
A350 is leaving another CCTV's frame with roughly viewer estimated speed of 80KN on the Runway. The Nose gear is missing and the nose section down to the Runway surface
Please critically crosscheck and point out miscalculations and errors
============================================================
JAL516 crash on 02-JAN-2024
Incomplete Sequence Of Events
version 5-JAN-2024 1134z
Timestamps are Tokyo local time. GMT is 9 hours behind (17:00L is 08:00z)
sources of info will follow
JAL516: The Airbus A350 on Approach to Haneda
JA722A: The Coast Guard Dash-8 Q300 preparing for departure
17:43:02 (4m25s before impact):
R/T (JAL516): "Tokyo TOWER JAL516 spot18."
(assumed to be the first call of JAL516 on TWR frequency)
R/T (Tokyo TOWER): "JAL516 Tokyo TOWER good evening RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/7, we have departure"
At this time, the A350 is already on Final at ~11.3NM out from TDZ:
17:43:12:
R/T (JAL516): "JAL516 continue approach 34R."
17:43:26:
R/T (DAL276): Tokyo TOWER DAL276 with you on C, proceeding to holding point 34R
R/T (Tokyo TOWER): DAL276 Tokyo TOWER good evening. taxi to holding point C1.
R/T (DAL276): Holding point C1, DAL276
17:44:32 (calculated from CCTV video 0:53 relative to impact timestamp) :
The Tailplane Top of Dash-8 appears in CCTV Video taxying behind Terminal 2 Position 66 or 67 (from CCTV point of view). The plane is covered by the terminal, just Tailplane with light can be seen. Dash-8 must be on Twy G or H, abeam Twy R
17:44:49 (calculated from CCTV video 1:10):
Dash-8 comes in full view after having passed behind terminal 2 pos 68 (from CCTV view) shortly before turning into Twy C
17:44:56 (2m31s before impact):
R/T (Tokyo Tower): JAL516 RUNWAY 34R cleared to land wind 310/8
A350 at this time of issued Landing Clearance: ~6 NM from TDZ and FR24-ALT ~1700ft:
17:44:57 (calculated from CCTV video 1:18):
Dash-8 turns right into C (Twy C assumed from Radio call). Now it's taxying parallel to Rwy 16L and opposite the approaching traffic.
17:45:01:
R/T (JAL516): Cleared to land RUNWAY 34R JAL516.
17:45:11 (2m16s from impact)
R/T (JA722A): TOWER JA722A C.
R/T (Tokyo Tower): JA722A Tokyo TOWER Good evening, No.1, taxi to holding point C5
17:45:19 (2m08s before impact):
R/T (JA722A): Taxi to holding point C5 JA722A No.1, Thank you.
17:45:40:
R/T (JAL179): Tokyo TOWER JAL179 taxi to holding point C1.
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL179 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.3, taxi to holding point C1
R/T (JAL179): Taxi to holding point C1, we are ready JAL179.
17:45:43 (calculated from CCTV 02:04) (1m34s before impact):
Dash-8 in the middle of turning left into C5 (C5 confirmed from Transport Ministry). The wing tip strobe lights are now switched on.
At this time the A350 is 3.6NM from TDZ and FR24 ALT 1100ft:
17:45:56:
R/T (JAL166): Tokyo TOWER JAL166 spot 21.
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.2, RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/8, we have departure, reduce speed to 160 knots.
17:46:06:
R/T (JAL166): Reduce 160 knots RUNWAY 34R continue approach, JAL166 good evening
17:46:19 (timestamp roughly estimated!)
assumed DASH-8 crossing the Hold Short Line in C5
The A350 in this case is roughly 2NM from TDZ and in the 600ft region:
17:46:27 … during ~12s (calculated from CCTV 02:48-3:00) (1m00s before impact):
Without ever stopping, Dash-8 enters Rwy, turns left onto Direction Rwy 34R
17:46:47 (calculated from CCTV 03:08):
Dash-8 completed line-up and stopped moving. Positioncloser to entry from C5 than entry from C6. A bright light in the nose area became visible during lineup (unknown when switched on)
Open Question: The runway incursion remains undetected by any of the ATC alert systems or is overlooked
Start of the 40s phase of no moving
17:47:23
R/T (Tokyo Tower):JAL166, reduce minimum approach speed
R/T (JAL166): JAL166
17:47:27:
CCTV shows: Dash-8 starts to make a small move forward less than 1 second before impact, which coincides with the later statement of the Dash-8 Captain to just have started the takeoff.
17:47:27
A350 being recorded passing Twy C5 just a split second before impact:
Fireball Orange Light appears, when A350 nose is one A350 length (67m) away from centerline Twy C5:
17:47:27 (and CCTV 03:48)
Impact of landing JAL516 A350 into waiting JA722A Dash-8
State from open discussion (nothing confirmed):
The main Gear was most likely on ground but struts not yet compressed (spoilers)
The pitch angle was likely in the region 2-3° nose up, the nose was still in the de-rotation process
The upper region of the nose cone must have hit the Dash-8 Horizontal Stab first. If the Vertical Stab was also hitting the nose cone or was deflected by fuselage is unknown
During ongoing impact, the A350 engine inlets must have impacted the Dash-8 main wings
The Main Wing near its Root of the A350 maybe contacted the vertical stab of the Dash-8 instead of nose cone
The impact speed was in the 120KN region (Groundspeed)
17:47:56:
A350 is leaving another CCTV's frame with roughly viewer estimated speed of 80KN on the Runway. The Nose gear is missing and the nose section down to the Runway surface
Maybe a small addition, especially after captain mentioning a white shadow just before the impact as per the news story about evacuation (post #684). If you carefully watch the video showing the 40 secs stop of Dash 8 on the runway, you can see that the landing lights of JAL516 first lit the tail of Dash 8 about 4 secs before impact. So they had about 4 secs to see the "white shadow".
Edit: I think I misunderstood Tetsuo 's hint. So wiping out my following answer.
Please somebody else check the mentioned situation on this good quality video with full 1440 resolution on a good monitor.
Last edited by waito; 5th Jan 2024 at 17:11. Reason: misunderstanding
@waito The flash above the Dash-8 around 3:48 is IMHO from fuel vapors finding fresh air above the impact site after the crash. The air movement from the A350 might contribute to better fuel air mixing.
Last edited by EDLB; 5th Jan 2024 at 13:57.
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EDLB: Yes, was very mindful that the last thing you want is an unintended shutdown. Hence my comment about this being "non-trivial". I guess airport fire services now know they could 'drown' an engine in foam if necessary. I haven't read anywhere yet how the running JAL engine was actually shut down, but may have missed that in skimming earlier posts.
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Maybe a small addition, especially after captain mentioning a white shadow just before the impact as per the news story about evacuation (post #684). If you carefully watch the video showing the 40 secs stop of Dash 8 on the runway, you can see that the landing lights of JAL516 first lit the tail of Dash 8 about 4 secs before impact. So they had about 4 secs to see the "white shadow".
In the same video published on AVHerald there is an orange flash on the lhs of the 350, just after the cockpit passed that point. This happens a frame or two before the main explosion. Maybe this is the tail of the DASH8 cutting into the fusalage just behind exit L1?
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Photo of aircraft and Tokyo in the background.
From https://www.airliners.net/photo/Japa...-941/7449651/L
From https://www.airliners.net/photo/Japa...-941/7449651/L
From https://www.airliners.net/photo/Japa...-941/7449651/L
From https://www.airliners.net/photo/Japa...-941/7449651/L