JAL incident at Haneda Airport
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Translation of a Kyodo News Report follows.
Runway Monitoring Function" is working properly, but air traffic controllers may have missed the indication.
Friday, Jan. 5, 17:36
In the accident at Haneda Airport involving the collision of a Japan Airlines and a Japan Coast Guard aircraft, the "runway occupancy monitoring support function," which alerts air traffic controllers on the screen when another aircraft approaches the runway where the landing aircraft is approaching, was found to be working properly at the time of the accident. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) revealed this information on January 5. It is believed that the Coast Guard aircraft was stopped for approximately 40 seconds after entering the runway, and it is now possible that the air traffic controllers overlooked the alert display.
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism explained that the air traffic controllers did not give permission for the Coast Guard aircraft to enter the runway. The pilot of the JAL plane also stated that he could not see the Coast Guard plane, raising suspicions that multiple factors, including human error, were behind the accident.
The MLIT official stated, "It is unclear whether the air traffic controllers were watching the screen, but there is no rule requiring them to stare at the screen at all times.
According to MLIT, the support function, which flashes the entire runway in yellow and turns the aircraft display red on the screen of the display used by air traffic controllers when a wrong approach is detected, was decided to be installed after a series of wrong approaches in Japan in 2007, and all four runways at Haneda were in operation by March 2011.
Runway Monitoring Function" is working properly, but air traffic controllers may have missed the indication.
Friday, Jan. 5, 17:36
In the accident at Haneda Airport involving the collision of a Japan Airlines and a Japan Coast Guard aircraft, the "runway occupancy monitoring support function," which alerts air traffic controllers on the screen when another aircraft approaches the runway where the landing aircraft is approaching, was found to be working properly at the time of the accident. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) revealed this information on January 5. It is believed that the Coast Guard aircraft was stopped for approximately 40 seconds after entering the runway, and it is now possible that the air traffic controllers overlooked the alert display.
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism explained that the air traffic controllers did not give permission for the Coast Guard aircraft to enter the runway. The pilot of the JAL plane also stated that he could not see the Coast Guard plane, raising suspicions that multiple factors, including human error, were behind the accident.
The MLIT official stated, "It is unclear whether the air traffic controllers were watching the screen, but there is no rule requiring them to stare at the screen at all times.
According to MLIT, the support function, which flashes the entire runway in yellow and turns the aircraft display red on the screen of the display used by air traffic controllers when a wrong approach is detected, was decided to be installed after a series of wrong approaches in Japan in 2007, and all four runways at Haneda were in operation by March 2011.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 5th Jan 2024 at 09:19. Reason: Excessively large font size removed
Turn on closed-captions; much of it is translated, though there are portions which are not. Mostly interesting was that it appears to be a literal translation from Japanese and has some interesting idiomatic descriptions of events, but not hard to follow given the nature of the event.
Goosebumps, I was trying to imagine, I would sit on this seat there, for 7 minutes with the roaring fire on my window and smoke slowly but surely filling the cabin.
I am not sure I would be able to sit there patiently (who can?). Extreme respect for the passengers. Big balls indeed, if I may say so.
Only after he(she?) with the smartphone started to move to the front left door, I understood: The evacuation from that left aft-wing seat to the front door was
extremely fast and fluent. Bravo to Cabin Crew and Passengers again.
And we have possibly adjust our time spamps in this thread. That pax was out of the plane at 7:03 and it was only possible because the cabin before him was
emptied already orderly. So the evacuation must have started much earlier than those "8 minutes". Also first sprays of foam on the window are at 6:00.
Before that the fire was much more frightening for opening that rear left door.
Extremely useful video record!
I am not sure I would be able to sit there patiently (who can?). Extreme respect for the passengers. Big balls indeed, if I may say so.
Only after he(she?) with the smartphone started to move to the front left door, I understood: The evacuation from that left aft-wing seat to the front door was
extremely fast and fluent. Bravo to Cabin Crew and Passengers again.
And we have possibly adjust our time spamps in this thread. That pax was out of the plane at 7:03 and it was only possible because the cabin before him was
emptied already orderly. So the evacuation must have started much earlier than those "8 minutes". Also first sprays of foam on the window are at 6:00.
Before that the fire was much more frightening for opening that rear left door.
Extremely useful video record!
Japanese TV is showing this new uncut recording which seems to accurately document the time from the aircraft coming to a stop, to the passenger leaving the aircraft (about 7 mins). It also shows firefighting foam hitting the windows before the passenger has left the seat. Showing fire crews had arrived by the time an evacuation was initiated. I could be wrong but this may be one of the first times we have ever had a recorded video from the moment an aircraft has crashed, to the moment of evacuation. I'm sure it will feature in training materials around the world.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBLf...nnel=ANNnewsCH
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBLf...nnel=ANNnewsCH
And, a taxing aircraft should announce "taking the active runway 34R" to give the actual pilots who are likely merely watching the autopilot a mental chime to possibly go around.
When referring to QF1 in 1999, I wonder if VHOED191006 in post #524 was also referring to the emergency landing and subsequent evacuation of Qantas A380 flight QF32, VH-OQA, on 4 Nov 2010? It is worth reading the ATSB report into that incident as some of it is relevant to this accident:https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications...ir/ao-2010-089
There was no fire after landing, but fuel leaking from wing with plenty of potential for outbreak of a fire, and of course #1 engine kept running despite various efforts of the crew to shut it down (see the report). A rough timeline following landing:
~35min: airstairs brought to aircraft.
~50min: first passenger disembarked.
~110min: last (passenger?) off the aircraft.
~3 hours: engine #1 finally shut down with the use of firefighting foam spray directly into engine inlet.
The Australian ABC Four Corners had an objective review of the incident which is available on YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-4FBN8OTkk
Watch from around 28:00 to 31:40 for coverage of the evacuation and process of shutting down the engine.
The ATSB makes reference to four previous examples when engines couldn't be shut down. So including QF32 and potentially now also JAL, that is SIX cases! Is it time for airliner manufacturers to start thinking about alternative emergency shutdown arrangements for engines when control from the cockpit has failed? For example, is it a case of considering "smart valves" that are able to detect a major casualty and autonomously shut own fuel flow? This has been investigated and possibly implemented on warships. I realise that would be a non-trivial feature to implement in airliners.
Revision: I remembered there was indeed the QF1 incident in 1999 mentioned by VHOED191006 in post #524. Less risk of fire in that case: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_1
There was no fire after landing, but fuel leaking from wing with plenty of potential for outbreak of a fire, and of course #1 engine kept running despite various efforts of the crew to shut it down (see the report). A rough timeline following landing:
~35min: airstairs brought to aircraft.
~50min: first passenger disembarked.
~110min: last (passenger?) off the aircraft.
~3 hours: engine #1 finally shut down with the use of firefighting foam spray directly into engine inlet.
The Australian ABC Four Corners had an objective review of the incident which is available on YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-4FBN8OTkk
Watch from around 28:00 to 31:40 for coverage of the evacuation and process of shutting down the engine.
The ATSB makes reference to four previous examples when engines couldn't be shut down. So including QF32 and potentially now also JAL, that is SIX cases! Is it time for airliner manufacturers to start thinking about alternative emergency shutdown arrangements for engines when control from the cockpit has failed? For example, is it a case of considering "smart valves" that are able to detect a major casualty and autonomously shut own fuel flow? This has been investigated and possibly implemented on warships. I realise that would be a non-trivial feature to implement in airliners.
Revision: I remembered there was indeed the QF1 incident in 1999 mentioned by VHOED191006 in post #524. Less risk of fire in that case: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qantas_Flight_1
The reason why I bring up QF1 is that, whilst there was indeed no risk of fire, I recall reports of smoke/a mist entering the cabin. The ATSB report say that it took 20 minutes for an evacuation. With that, how can the Captain be completely satisfied without knowing the extent of the damage of the aircraft?
Maybe this is the time to go back to basics.
What does it mean when Tower gives a landing clearance of "CLEARED TO LAND"?
Worse still, when an aircraft calls Tower at 8nm final in the USA and the Tower says:" You are number 3 runway XX, Cleared to land"? Is the runway really cleared? How did we end up with this meaningless practice that is now a norm?
What does it mean when Tower gives a landing clearance of "CLEARED TO LAND"?
Worse still, when an aircraft calls Tower at 8nm final in the USA and the Tower says:" You are number 3 runway XX, Cleared to land"? Is the runway really cleared? How did we end up with this meaningless practice that is now a norm?
In other countries and certainly the USA that clearance is predictive, and no where near as safe.
FlightlessParrot:
."My understanding, subject to correction, is that cabin crew are expected to wait for communication from the flight deck."
Depends on the airline.
As Fortissimo has said at least some have an SOP that the Cabin crew can self-initiate if there's no immediate comms with the Flight crew and there's a clear threat to life.
."My understanding, subject to correction, is that cabin crew are expected to wait for communication from the flight deck."
Depends on the airline.
As Fortissimo has said at least some have an SOP that the Cabin crew can self-initiate if there's no immediate comms with the Flight crew and there's a clear threat to life.
FlightlessParrot:
."My understanding, subject to correction, is that cabin crew are expected to wait for communication from the flight deck."
Depends on the airline.
As Fortissimo has said at least some have an SOP that the Cabin crew can self-initiate if there's no immediate comms with the Flight crew and there's a clear threat to life.
."My understanding, subject to correction, is that cabin crew are expected to wait for communication from the flight deck."
Depends on the airline.
As Fortissimo has said at least some have an SOP that the Cabin crew can self-initiate if there's no immediate comms with the Flight crew and there's a clear threat to life.
If the timing of this video is correct, my question is: where did this 8 minutes to open the door come from? The passenger filming starts running up the aircraft about 6:30 mins after impact. The seats they pass are empty from what I can tell. So, has there been some sort of confusion? Did it actually take 8 minutes for all passengers to leave, and 18 minutes for the Captain to leave?
On another point. If it is that the pilot the the dash did think he had a line up clearance from that initial call, maybe the investigators will look at recommending that line up and take off clearances should only be given when the aircraft is actually at the hold point and stationary - not mid taxi?
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This is probably totally spurious information, but there were three consecutive go-arounds at Haneda on 34L three days prior to this accident. At approximately 16:30 (local) on December 30th I noticed an aircraft departing from Haneda on a straight-ahead flight path, which is highly unusual. I whipped out the phone to check FR24 and saw that it was flight NH 284 (A321 from Tokushima) on a go-around. On re-checking FR24 before posting this, I noticed that the two preceding aircraft, NH 468 and SFJ 14 also had to go-around and all three landed 30+ minutes later on 34R. This may be a completely normal occurrence, but with runway incursions at Haneda uppermost in our minds, it might be useful to know what was going on. Obviously, this was pre-quake so entirely different circumstances. Please forgive me if this is irrelevant, I was curious at the time so made a note of the event.
This is a classic Swiss cheese event. The Coast Guard Dash 8 is a small and quite poorly lit up aircraft. It had been taxiing from the Coast Guard facility for over 20 minutes to get to the other end of the aerodrome and in a hurry to get to Niigata. ATC and the a/c are both speaking non-native English and hence it is quite likely the Dash 8 heard what it wanted to hear...namely you are #1 for departure and thus clear to enter the runway and line up. The stop bars on RWY 34R/16L are currently inop and notam'ed. RWY 34R had been primarily used for departures in the hours prior to the accident. This JAL flight was the first landing on 34R for some time. The F/O of the Dash 8 may well have looked over his shoulder and seen an approaching a/c but assumed it was turning to approach 34L.
Haneda at night is like Disneyland when it comes to the amount of lights on the ground and trails of approaching aircraft. It is eerily like a video game. The first result of this accident will be the removal of Coast Guard aviation assets out of Haneda to a more suitable location like Atsugi AB. It makes no sense for their rinky-dink fleet of small propellor driven aircraft to be based at a major global airport. I do sincerely feel for the survivor from the Dash 8. Trying to do his best to save lives he has made a fatal mistake...not all of his own making. ATC in Japan is under the control of the JCAB..and this is where I would be shining a very bright light. The JCAB is regarded by many practitioners as an elitist and often high-minded bunch of aviation wannabes.
Haneda at night is like Disneyland when it comes to the amount of lights on the ground and trails of approaching aircraft. It is eerily like a video game. The first result of this accident will be the removal of Coast Guard aviation assets out of Haneda to a more suitable location like Atsugi AB. It makes no sense for their rinky-dink fleet of small propellor driven aircraft to be based at a major global airport. I do sincerely feel for the survivor from the Dash 8. Trying to do his best to save lives he has made a fatal mistake...not all of his own making. ATC in Japan is under the control of the JCAB..and this is where I would be shining a very bright light. The JCAB is regarded by many practitioners as an elitist and often high-minded bunch of aviation wannabes.
On another point. If it is that the pilot the the dash did think he had a line up clearance from that initial call, maybe the investigators will look at recommending that line up and take off clearances should only be given when the aircraft is actually at the hold point and stationary - not mid taxi?
Besides the somehow created assumption, the pilot does not report either at the landing point or on the runway, so there is more than one mental omission or skip.
TV Asahi (see video) had a reporter on board the A350 during the accident.
news.tv-asahi.co.jp/news_society/articles/000331050.html
Footage taken by passengers from inside the plane shows that the left wing is severely damaged and on fire even before the plane comes to a complete stop. 3 minutes after touchdown the other engine starts to burn brightly (see footage). The Asahi reporter witness says that the CA's were repeating "Please stay calm" "It is fine", whereas some of the passengers in the back were screaming at them (in Osaka dialect) "Why? (nandeyanen = why not do something, why are you unreasonable?)". Video shows CA's shouting please keep your head down, please don't bring your baggage, we request your cooperation. One of the CA's were witnessed to shout "Captain captain can you hear me?" but there was no response as the intercom did not work. This prevented the CA's from communicating with each other and reduced situational awareness. One of the CA's shouted to a person in white, "The engine is on fire", the person in white shouted back "which engine?" and they began discussing with each other (the person in white is the chief purser).
The expert commentator says "The crew succeeded in preventing the initial panic of the passengers (this is where a lot of the effort was concentrated), if they start to panic then we lose control of the situation". JAL implied that it took time to evaluate which exits are safe and which are not.
After the evacuation was completed, the captain went row by row and found additional passengers left on the plane (too scared to move?) and made them leave. He was last to leave the plane, at that point 18 minutes had passed since touchdown. Once on the ground, one of the passengers engaged in a discussion with a person who appeared to be the captain (=the last person off the plane). He said, during the approach the runway was clear, but at the last moment a white shadow was seen for an instant (apparently this conversation occurred 20 minutes or so after the accident).
Poor translations mine.
news.tv-asahi.co.jp/news_society/articles/000331050.html
Footage taken by passengers from inside the plane shows that the left wing is severely damaged and on fire even before the plane comes to a complete stop. 3 minutes after touchdown the other engine starts to burn brightly (see footage). The Asahi reporter witness says that the CA's were repeating "Please stay calm" "It is fine", whereas some of the passengers in the back were screaming at them (in Osaka dialect) "Why? (nandeyanen = why not do something, why are you unreasonable?)". Video shows CA's shouting please keep your head down, please don't bring your baggage, we request your cooperation. One of the CA's were witnessed to shout "Captain captain can you hear me?" but there was no response as the intercom did not work. This prevented the CA's from communicating with each other and reduced situational awareness. One of the CA's shouted to a person in white, "The engine is on fire", the person in white shouted back "which engine?" and they began discussing with each other (the person in white is the chief purser).
The expert commentator says "The crew succeeded in preventing the initial panic of the passengers (this is where a lot of the effort was concentrated), if they start to panic then we lose control of the situation". JAL implied that it took time to evaluate which exits are safe and which are not.
After the evacuation was completed, the captain went row by row and found additional passengers left on the plane (too scared to move?) and made them leave. He was last to leave the plane, at that point 18 minutes had passed since touchdown. Once on the ground, one of the passengers engaged in a discussion with a person who appeared to be the captain (=the last person off the plane). He said, during the approach the runway was clear, but at the last moment a white shadow was seen for an instant (apparently this conversation occurred 20 minutes or so after the accident).
Poor translations mine.
Equally, donning a life jacket and jumping off the ship because it was on fire is not necessarily the best option. It is vitally important to thoroughly assess the situation before acting, thereby ensuring your actions are the best possible for a successful outcome. It appears the crew did this and therefore the outcome was successful even though it may appear to the uninitiated to be a flawed plan due to perceived delays.
Kudos to the captain for walking the aircraft and finding passengers terrified and hiding in shock.
Pegase Driver
Translation of a Kyodo News Report follows.
Runway Monitoring Function" is working properly, but air traffic controllers may have missed the indication.
Friday, Jan. 5, 17:36
In the accident at Haneda Airport involving the collision of a Japan Airlines and a Japan Coast Guard aircraft, the "runway occupancy monitoring support function," which alerts air traffic controllers on the screen when another aircraft approaches the runway where the landing aircraft is approaching, was found to be working properly at the time of the accident. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) revealed this information on January 5. It is believed that the Coast Guard aircraft was stopped for approximately 40 seconds after entering the runway, and it is now possible that the air traffic controllers overlooked the alert display.
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism explained that the air traffic controllers did not give permission for the Coast Guard aircraft to enter the runway. The pilot of the JAL plane also stated that he could not see the Coast Guard plane, raising suspicions that multiple factors, including human error, were behind the accident.
The MLIT official stated, "It is unclear whether the air traffic controllers were watching the screen, but there is no rule requiring them to stare at the screen at all times.
According to MLIT, the support function, which flashes the entire runway in yellow and turns the aircraft display red on the screen of the display used by air traffic controllers when a wrong approach is detected, was decided to be installed after a series of wrong approaches in Japan in 2007, and all four runways at Haneda were in operation by March 2011.
Runway Monitoring Function" is working properly, but air traffic controllers may have missed the indication.
Friday, Jan. 5, 17:36
In the accident at Haneda Airport involving the collision of a Japan Airlines and a Japan Coast Guard aircraft, the "runway occupancy monitoring support function," which alerts air traffic controllers on the screen when another aircraft approaches the runway where the landing aircraft is approaching, was found to be working properly at the time of the accident. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) revealed this information on January 5. It is believed that the Coast Guard aircraft was stopped for approximately 40 seconds after entering the runway, and it is now possible that the air traffic controllers overlooked the alert display.
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism explained that the air traffic controllers did not give permission for the Coast Guard aircraft to enter the runway. The pilot of the JAL plane also stated that he could not see the Coast Guard plane, raising suspicions that multiple factors, including human error, were behind the accident.
The MLIT official stated, "It is unclear whether the air traffic controllers were watching the screen, but there is no rule requiring them to stare at the screen at all times.
According to MLIT, the support function, which flashes the entire runway in yellow and turns the aircraft display red on the screen of the display used by air traffic controllers when a wrong approach is detected, was decided to be installed after a series of wrong approaches in Japan in 2007, and all four runways at Haneda were in operation by March 2011.
But the alerts are made very eye catchy just there for that very reason , also most systems are coupled with an audio alert, ( not sure if this one was) but maybe disabled due too many false alerts ,I have seen that too many times before. The main problem with these systems is that there is no standard. Every manufacturer makes its own logic displays and alerts , some are better than others. Time to standardize, also the procedures .
Pegase Driver
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Japan Airlines has apologized after two pets died in the accident
Japan Airlines has apologized after announcing that they were unable to rescue two pets that had been checked-in on the flight from Sapporo to Tokyo that caught fire after a collision with another airplane.
“On JAL flight 516, there were two instances of checked-in pets. Unfortunately, we were unable to rescue the checked-in pets. We offer our deepest condolences.”
“Regarding the checking in of pets, we take this responsibility with the understanding that we are taking care of a member of our customer’s family. We deeply apologize for the immense worry and inconvenience this incident has caused to our customers, their families, and all related parties.”
Japan Airlines has apologized after announcing that they were unable to rescue two pets that had been checked-in on the flight from Sapporo to Tokyo that caught fire after a collision with another airplane.
“On JAL flight 516, there were two instances of checked-in pets. Unfortunately, we were unable to rescue the checked-in pets. We offer our deepest condolences.”
“Regarding the checking in of pets, we take this responsibility with the understanding that we are taking care of a member of our customer’s family. We deeply apologize for the immense worry and inconvenience this incident has caused to our customers, their families, and all related parties.”
In the UK it is a requirement of the aerodrome controllers to keep an eye on the traffic, even if the instructions issued are perfectly safe and compliant.
"Aerodrome controllers shall maintain as far as practicable, a continuous watch by visual observation on all flight operations on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome as well as vehicles and personnel on the manoeuvring area. Visual observation shall be achieved through direct out-of-the-window observation, or through indirect observation utilising a visual surveillance system which is specifically approved for the purpose by the CAA"
"Aerodrome controllers shall maintain as far as practicable, a continuous watch by visual observation on all flight operations on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome as well as vehicles and personnel on the manoeuvring area. Visual observation shall be achieved through direct out-of-the-window observation, or through indirect observation utilising a visual surveillance system which is specifically approved for the purpose by the CAA"
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given all these runway incursions in the US and other places, have no airports considered the low tech solution of light beams across all runway entrances, that combined with ADSB to show who's landing, will sound an alarm? It's about as low-tech as you can get but also low cost and easy to implement and doesn't rely on anything installed on the aircraft
but as with the Air Canada in SFO nearly landing on the 3 widebodies waiting on taxiway I'm amazed in 2024 that the Mk1 eyeball and multitudes of flashing lights are used to control and land aircraft. The Wright brothers could identify with this aspect of operations, even if everything else has moved on a century.
but as with the Air Canada in SFO nearly landing on the 3 widebodies waiting on taxiway I'm amazed in 2024 that the Mk1 eyeball and multitudes of flashing lights are used to control and land aircraft. The Wright brothers could identify with this aspect of operations, even if everything else has moved on a century.
Or, they could put down those little rubber hoses like at the old gas stations and it can ring a bell when someone drives over it? I'd rather understand why the high-tech options were not working or were not available/installed.
