JAL incident at Haneda Airport
For sure it was no option here to touch and go climbing over the Dash-8 after liftoff, because it was right on the t/d zone
Not sure if the link will really take you to the view I've set up, but if it does, here's a Google Maps 3D satellite view that should give an idea of the view of the relevant aiming point markers on the subject runway:
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ha...bG1t?entry=ttu
It's hard to imagine what would prevent ATC from seeing an aircraft at that position, for nearly a minute, except just not looking.
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ha...bG1t?entry=ttu
It's hard to imagine what would prevent ATC from seeing an aircraft at that position, for nearly a minute, except just not looking.
This post #432 was a while back, but what does "cultural command gradient" refer to? Old case but copilot of KLM 747 in Tenerife collision was apparently hesitant in speaking up forcefully over whether clearance had been given to take off. Would have thought CRM training as a result of that loss would mean 'no' pilots are now hesitant to speak up if they sense something not OK?
They were given an unambiguous clearance to taxi to holding point C5, and they read it back correctly.
With that clearance they should have taxied to holding point C5 via the cleared route and stopped at the holding point.
I can't help wondering though if adding "No.1" to the outbound aircraft's taxi clearance might have set positive expectation bias in the Coastguard crew that they'd be the first movement (in or out) once they reached c5.
I personally think that a combination of the Dash-8 flight deck environment ( workload/ distraction etc) and possibly the Tower environment ( workload/ distraction etc) added to the stop bars being out is all it took. There are many things left to come out that we are unaware of at this stage, eg we could find out pertinent information around training either on the flight deck or in the Tower, or Fatigue in either the Tower or flight deck, or shift change over in the Tower, lots of possibilities. I have a lot of faith in the Japanese to provide an excellent report so hopefully we can get some good learnings to prevent further loss of life.
Not sure if the link will really take you to the view I've set up, but if it does, here's a Google Maps 3D satellite view that should give an idea of the view of the relevant aiming point markers on the subject runway:
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ha...bG1t?entry=ttu
It's hard to imagine what would prevent ATC from seeing an aircraft at that position, for nearly a minute, except just not looking.
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ha...bG1t?entry=ttu
It's hard to imagine what would prevent ATC from seeing an aircraft at that position, for nearly a minute, except just not looking.
Allright, Computer instead Smartphone does it better.
Your link opens a position too high.
I adjusted as good as possible:
There was no hold short command, please read the transcript.
They were given an unambiguous clearance to taxi to holding point C5, and they read it back correctly.
With that clearance they should have taxied to holding point C5 via the cleared route and stopped at the holding point.
They were given an unambiguous clearance to taxi to holding point C5, and they read it back correctly.
With that clearance they should have taxied to holding point C5 via the cleared route and stopped at the holding point.
... which is technically a holding short of the runway. But literally your're right, i didn't quote the instruction correctly.
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Japanese ATC is very strict and rigid especially at Haneda. Thus an aircraft receives an instruction that is all that it has permission to do. An instruction to taxi to Holding Point C-5 is just that. The aircraft has to stop at the holding point and wait for its next instruction.
From the transcript it seems that the Coastguard flight received that instruction and acknowledged it. To ATC's mind that means the instruction is understood and will be followed correctly.
To ATC if the stop bar to the runway entrance is inoperable then the crew WILL KNOW about it and take it into account. Once the instruction is issued and understood the aircraft is temporarily dismissed from mind. There is no need to check if the aircraft is following the instruction correctly - this scenario is inconceivable.
The number 'No.1' given to the coastguard is a standard Japanese practice of numbering departures and arrivals. It means only No. 1 Departure NOT No.1 movement. Thus Nos. 1,2,3 arrivals could all happen before No. 1 Departure. Once again it's a standard Japanese practice and is familiar. The JAL pilots (apart from the issues of not being able to see the Coastguard aircraft) would not expect to find an aircraft on the runway as they had been cleared to land. That means no other aircraft on the runway.
From the transcript it seems that the Coastguard flight received that instruction and acknowledged it. To ATC's mind that means the instruction is understood and will be followed correctly.
To ATC if the stop bar to the runway entrance is inoperable then the crew WILL KNOW about it and take it into account. Once the instruction is issued and understood the aircraft is temporarily dismissed from mind. There is no need to check if the aircraft is following the instruction correctly - this scenario is inconceivable.
The number 'No.1' given to the coastguard is a standard Japanese practice of numbering departures and arrivals. It means only No. 1 Departure NOT No.1 movement. Thus Nos. 1,2,3 arrivals could all happen before No. 1 Departure. Once again it's a standard Japanese practice and is familiar. The JAL pilots (apart from the issues of not being able to see the Coastguard aircraft) would not expect to find an aircraft on the runway as they had been cleared to land. That means no other aircraft on the runway.
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NHK is now reporting all three JAL cockpit crew are saying the runway was clear during the approach and landing and they were unaware for a couple of minutes that the sudden issues had resulted from a collision (with an unseen aircraft).
Psychophysiological entity
Not being sure the aircraft had stopped makes a certain sense - given #2 must have been clearly audible.
This strangely long 45 seconds would be quite normal to TWR thinking CG is holding at C5 Stop bar. However, knowing the lights were not working might make them not so confident that the CG was complying.
C5 is an odd little place to stop, I'd imagine the tails of large aircraft would be hanging over C6. I wonder if the CG crew used it regularly. If so, the taxiway curvature, junction and little island on their right would make them very at home with the topology and very unlikely for there to be an incursion just because the lights were out of service.
Lining up and then realising something is seriously wrong due to question marks about the verbal exchanges could easily fill half a minute. However, that doesn't tie in with the captain saying 'my aircraft exploded'. If in fact this is true. The 45 seconds is certainly puzzling.
This strangely long 45 seconds would be quite normal to TWR thinking CG is holding at C5 Stop bar. However, knowing the lights were not working might make them not so confident that the CG was complying.
C5 is an odd little place to stop, I'd imagine the tails of large aircraft would be hanging over C6. I wonder if the CG crew used it regularly. If so, the taxiway curvature, junction and little island on their right would make them very at home with the topology and very unlikely for there to be an incursion just because the lights were out of service.
Lining up and then realising something is seriously wrong due to question marks about the verbal exchanges could easily fill half a minute. However, that doesn't tie in with the captain saying 'my aircraft exploded'. If in fact this is true. The 45 seconds is certainly puzzling.
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Not sure if the link will really take you to the view I've set up, but if it does, here's a Google Maps 3D satellite view that should give an idea of the view of the relevant aiming point markers on the subject runway:
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ha...bG1t?entry=ttu
It's hard to imagine what would prevent ATC from seeing an aircraft at that position, for nearly a minute, except just not looking.
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ha...bG1t?entry=ttu
It's hard to imagine what would prevent ATC from seeing an aircraft at that position, for nearly a minute, except just not looking.
Let me see if I am understanding this tragedy of errors...
1) Confusing radio calls. (at least to the CG pilots obviously).
2) Seemingly half the airport equipment is inop especially the stop bars at C5.
3) CG pilots park on an active runway for 45 seconds after missing an A350 on approach ~3 miles out as they turned onto the runway.
4) Even from the perfect vantage of the tower, no one noticed an aircraft parked on an active runway for 45 seconds.
5) It took 8 minutes to open the first door on the A350.
6 It took 18 minutes to evacuate the A350.
7) It took fire services 6 minutes to arrive.
8) Neither of the other two airliners holding at C1 noticed the CG aircraft on the active runway for 45 seconds.
9) Neither pilot in the A350 saw the CG aircraft for 45 seconds.
That is a lot of holes in a lot of cheese.
1) Confusing radio calls. (at least to the CG pilots obviously).
2) Seemingly half the airport equipment is inop especially the stop bars at C5.
3) CG pilots park on an active runway for 45 seconds after missing an A350 on approach ~3 miles out as they turned onto the runway.
4) Even from the perfect vantage of the tower, no one noticed an aircraft parked on an active runway for 45 seconds.
5) It took 8 minutes to open the first door on the A350.
6 It took 18 minutes to evacuate the A350.
7) It took fire services 6 minutes to arrive.
8) Neither of the other two airliners holding at C1 noticed the CG aircraft on the active runway for 45 seconds.
9) Neither pilot in the A350 saw the CG aircraft for 45 seconds.
That is a lot of holes in a lot of cheese.
[QUOTE=waito;11567750]Allright, Computer instead Smartphone does it better.
Your link opens a position too high.
I adjusted as good as possible:
Not sure what you mean by "Computer instead Smartphone does it better." I'm looking at it on a Mac with two 30" 4K monitors.
I selected the higher and more distant view to illustrate the height of the tower in comparison to the intervening structures.
I can't tell, since your view doesn't show the tower itself, how close it is to the actual view from the tower, but I accept that you got it as close as possible given the limitations of the Google satellite view. It still seems to me that the Dash 8 should have been clearly visible to ATC. Assuming, of course, that it was fully lit up, including landing lights, because the crew thought they had clearance for TO.
Your link opens a position too high.
I adjusted as good as possible:
Not sure what you mean by "Computer instead Smartphone does it better." I'm looking at it on a Mac with two 30" 4K monitors.I selected the higher and more distant view to illustrate the height of the tower in comparison to the intervening structures.
I can't tell, since your view doesn't show the tower itself, how close it is to the actual view from the tower, but I accept that you got it as close as possible given the limitations of the Google satellite view. It still seems to me that the Dash 8 should have been clearly visible to ATC. Assuming, of course, that it was fully lit up, including landing lights, because the crew thought they had clearance for TO.
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I'm only 1km away and at night it's very hard to see aircraft taxiing away from me. Someone posted a longer length video of the whole incident from the terminal and when you watch closely you can see the -8 lining up almost a minute before impact. I had to watch several times to make it out as there's no strobes visible, jut a couple of faint lights amongst many more.
Just for consideration, here's a view approximating the reverse azimuth back to the tower:
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ha...bG1t?entry=ttu
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 4th Jan 2024 at 07:00. Reason: Remove unwarranted aggressive response
I had a hard time picking out the CG aircraft in the video from the terminal surveillance camera, also. And now that you mention it (and without reviewing it) I don't remember seeing landing lights.
Just for consideration, here's a view approximating the reverse azimuth back to the tower:
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ha...bG1t?entry=ttu
Just for consideration, here's a view approximating the reverse azimuth back to the tower:
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Ha...bG1t?entry=ttu
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 4th Jan 2024 at 07:01. Reason: Edit quote
From the transcript it seems that the Coastguard flight received that instruction and acknowledged it. To ATC's mind that means the instruction is understood and will be followed correctly.
To ATC if the stop bar to the runway entrance is inoperable then the crew WILL KNOW about it and take it into account. Once the instruction is issued and understood the aircraft is temporarily dismissed from mind. There is no need to check if the aircraft is following the instruction correctly - this scenario is inconceivable.
To ATC if the stop bar to the runway entrance is inoperable then the crew WILL KNOW about it and take it into account. Once the instruction is issued and understood the aircraft is temporarily dismissed from mind. There is no need to check if the aircraft is following the instruction correctly - this scenario is inconceivable.
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Inconceivable? What is “inconceivable” occurred not only in this accident but also in many other accidents and incidents. Recent examples: (1) KBOS near collision between JetBlue and Hop-a-Jet, (2) KHOU mid-air collision between Hawker and CJ, (3) KJFK near collision between AA 777 and DL 737. In all these examples, ATC instructions were correctly read back and then not complied with. Putting an aircraft “temporarily out of mind” based solely on a correct read back is a very dangerous mindset that has no place in ATC. The “C” in ATC has to mean more than just verifying read backs.