JAL incident at Haneda Airport
Paxing All Over The World
From earlier footage analysis, we learnt the Dash entered the runway some 45 seconds before impact. It seems possible that,with dust3tl touch down, the approaching 350 may not have shown up clearly as lining up for 34R? In daylight the view would have been different.
Regading observations that the nose of the 350 was not more damaged by the vertical stab of the Dash, might that be due to the JAL pilot operating making an instinctive move of the control? There would probably have been only a second or two to realise the Dash was there. If the control was moved to the right, this may have avoided the tail, whilst starting the line that eventually took the off the runway.
Regading observations that the nose of the 350 was not more damaged by the vertical stab of the Dash, might that be due to the JAL pilot operating making an instinctive move of the control? There would probably have been only a second or two to realise the Dash was there. If the control was moved to the right, this may have avoided the tail, whilst starting the line that eventually took the off the runway.
I'll be interested in knowing where the crew of the Coast Guard plane was from. I understand that they have a big base at HND, but given the Earthquake response, I think it's possible the crew were from another part of the country and may have been unfamiliar with operating from HND. While it seems they weren't given a clearance to enter the runway, everything else is still to be answered, did they know they were on the runway, did they intend to be on the runway?
Massive kudos to the JAL crew for remaining as much directional control as they could (with no nose gear), the aircraft has clearly come to rest on the sea wall side of the runway, if they deviation had of occurred earlier and more severely the outcome would have been much different.
Massive kudos to the JAL crew for remaining as much directional control as they could (with no nose gear), the aircraft has clearly come to rest on the sea wall side of the runway, if they deviation had of occurred earlier and more severely the outcome would have been much different.
I think this will be THE atc instruction, moments before this accident .
Audio is very poor, so I tried my best to reliably transcript it.... this is my best shot (no pilot reply recorded):
==> BUT those wanting to give it a shot, listen to the audio in attached zip-file, before opening the 'spoiler' with my transcript
.
Audio is very poor, so I tried my best to reliably transcript it.... this is my best shot (no pilot reply recorded):
==> BUT those wanting to give it a shot, listen to the audio in attached zip-file, before opening the 'spoiler' with my transcript
.
I also believe you're right about the instruction and "abeam" could have used more clarification. That said, there was no mention of runway, as in "Runway 34R, Line up and wait".
You do know how many incidents and near misses involving runway incursions are a result of crews getting lost and ending up on a runway thinking it's a taxiway right, something far more likely to occur if a crew is unfamiliar with said airport.
Last edited by Bbtengineer; 3rd Jan 2024 at 02:39.
One thing that nobody has considered yet is the ATC transcript and the calls made that provide some situational awareness of what has unfolded here.
Was the A350 given a landing clearance with the DHC-8 on the runway?
Was the A350 told to expect a late landing clearance due traffic?
Was the A350 crew informed that traffic is about to roll on the same runway?
Was the DHC-8 informed that traffic is at X miles, expect a late take off clearance?
One thing I know the Japanese ATC were good for is communicating what was happening on the ground. I recall numerous times ATC telling me what was happening with traffic on the runway, and all of us were on the same frequency so we knew what was happening even if it wasn't broadcast!
Discussions on lighting and HUD is a distraction from the fundamental lack of situational awareness that has occurred in this accident!
Was the A350 given a landing clearance with the DHC-8 on the runway?
Was the A350 told to expect a late landing clearance due traffic?
Was the A350 crew informed that traffic is about to roll on the same runway?
Was the DHC-8 informed that traffic is at X miles, expect a late take off clearance?
One thing I know the Japanese ATC were good for is communicating what was happening on the ground. I recall numerous times ATC telling me what was happening with traffic on the runway, and all of us were on the same frequency so we knew what was happening even if it wasn't broadcast!
Discussions on lighting and HUD is a distraction from the fundamental lack of situational awareness that has occurred in this accident!
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Japanese news is reporting a serious discrepancy between what the Coast Guard Pilot claims he was instructed to do and what the ATC says they instructed him to do. Therein lies the key to the accident.
One thing that nobody has considered yet is the ATC transcript and the calls made that provide some situational awareness of what has unfolded here.
Was the A350 given a landing clearance with the DHC-8 on the runway?
Was the A350 told to expect a late landing clearance due traffic?
Was the A350 crew informed that traffic is about to roll on the same runway?
Was the DHC-8 informed that traffic is at X miles, expect a late take off clearance?
One thing I know the Japanese ATC were good for is communicating what was happening on the ground. I recall numerous times ATC telling me what was happening with traffic on the runway, and all of us were on the same frequency so we knew what was happening even if it wasn't broadcast!
Discussions on lighting and HUD is a distraction from the fundamental lack of situational awareness that has occurred in this accident!
Was the A350 given a landing clearance with the DHC-8 on the runway?
Was the A350 told to expect a late landing clearance due traffic?
Was the A350 crew informed that traffic is about to roll on the same runway?
Was the DHC-8 informed that traffic is at X miles, expect a late take off clearance?
One thing I know the Japanese ATC were good for is communicating what was happening on the ground. I recall numerous times ATC telling me what was happening with traffic on the runway, and all of us were on the same frequency so we knew what was happening even if it wasn't broadcast!
Discussions on lighting and HUD is a distraction from the fundamental lack of situational awareness that has occurred in this accident!
I think we can reasonably suppose the JAL flight was given clearance to land on the runway.
I think we can also reasonably suppose the landing clearance was not cancelled based upon the actual position of the Dash 8.
What remains, at least for me, is why the landing clearance was not cancelled based upon the actual position of the Dash 8, regardless whether the Dash 8 was cleared to be in that position or not.
Acc some info JAL 350s have a tail and belly mounted cameras that can be viewed by the passengers through the IFE system.
Does anyone know if the footage from those cameras is recorded for possible later use, like an accident as this? Tks
Does anyone know if the footage from those cameras is recorded for possible later use, like an accident as this? Tks
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Eh?
This board would be a lot better if people didn’t declare shoot down suggestions with cast iron (often wrong) “certainties”.
In such a case, peceived time pressure would compound the SA failing, bringing forward final TO check items. All that is needed is a failure to look out the window, there was an aircraft less than 2nm away on final to the same runway, and TAWS should have been displayed to the pilots and to the tac crew.
Being home plate, in this case would act against the crew not necessarily for them.
It is easy to lose SA, it is harder to realise that it has occurred, and it is challenging to recover from it. As flight crew, we are dealing with this every hour of every day, only have to get it wrong once to make up for all the years of getting it right.
I would think that the toll in this case is 6; the captain of the coast guard aircraft will find it difficult to survive the awareness of the consequences of a simple failure of SA. A sad day all round.
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Anyone want to bet the fire crews responded to the fire on the runway,at the initial impact location.and expended all of their water which allows a containable fire to get out of control.
The A350 wasn't on fire at first, it's the remains the other aircraft.
The A350 wasn't on fire at first, it's the remains the other aircraft.
In such a case, peceived time pressure would compound the SA failing, bringing forward final TO check items. All that is needed is a failure to look out the window, there was an aircraft less than 2nm away on final to the same runway, and TAWS should have been displayed to the pilots and to the tac crew..
I agree about the Captain's difficulty in being able to cope with this incident, particular with their culture.
I used to teach English to Japanese ATC staff in a regional airport control tower. Some of them had worked at Haneda, and we often discussed their experiences, difficulties, successes and problems with using varieties of world English. Part of the problem will surely lie in miscommunication related to use of language, as has been hinted at above.
I think this will be THE atc instruction, moments before this accident .
Audio is very poor, so I tried my best to reliably transcript it.... this is my best shot (no pilot reply recorded):
==> BUT those wanting to give it a shot, listen to the audio in attached zip-file, before opening the 'spoiler' with my transcript
Attached zip with the audio clip containing 3 times the instruction: original / slowed down / stretched.
Audio is very poor, so I tried my best to reliably transcript it.... this is my best shot (no pilot reply recorded):
==> BUT those wanting to give it a shot, listen to the audio in attached zip-file, before opening the 'spoiler' with my transcript
Spoiler
Attached zip with the audio clip containing 3 times the instruction: original / slowed down / stretched.
One thing that nobody has considered yet is the ATC transcript and the calls made that provide some situational awareness of what has unfolded here.
Discussions on lighting and HUD is a distraction from the fundamental lack of situational awareness that has occurred in this accident!
Discussions on lighting and HUD is a distraction from the fundamental lack of situational awareness that has occurred in this accident!
Second, the discussions on this thread related to the HUD are EXACTLY about situational awareness.
Has the frequency been listened to all the way through? This message would exist anyway, whether or not there is a subsequent instruction to the same aircraft.
I'm not saying there is or might be, but don't assume one found snippet on its own as the whole lot unless it's also clear there is nothing else. And the other frequency.
Last edited by aox; 3rd Jan 2024 at 05:38.
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Apologies if anyone has already suggested this, but I reckon this aircraft entered at Charlie 4 and rolled up to stop abeam Charlie 5 (note the white light visible on the DHC8 moving forward for quite some time before it comes to a stop), and that ties with the instruction to 'taxi abeam Charlie 5, as mentioned above. Terrible miscommunication/misunderstanding if so. Feel for my Japanese friends in aviation.