JAL incident at Haneda Airport
From LiveATC
0844:27 The JAL A350 is cleared to land.
0844:40 JA722A are told by the tower that they are no.1 (a taxi instruction - but maybe misunderstood?) and to hold short at C5. Cannot hear their reply. [Edited: I initially heard it as C1... and I work in Japan]
0845:30 A second JAL is cleared to land 34R no.2 "we have one departure". reduce speed 160kt
0846:55 Fire reported on the runway.
0844:27 The JAL A350 is cleared to land.
0844:40 JA722A are told by the tower that they are no.1 (a taxi instruction - but maybe misunderstood?) and to hold short at C5. Cannot hear their reply. [Edited: I initially heard it as C1... and I work in Japan]
0845:30 A second JAL is cleared to land 34R no.2 "we have one departure". reduce speed 160kt
0846:55 Fire reported on the runway.
Last edited by glekichi; 3rd Jan 2024 at 00:00.
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C5/C6 appear to be close to the TDZ markings.
Pegase Driver
ATC Watcher,
He’s quite correct that A/C fitted with ADSB OUT are visible on flight radar while on the ground if the transponder is on.
He’s also correct that TCAS is inhibited below 900ish ft but that’s not really relevant. We sometimes get a TCAS target with the orange (TA) symbol from a/c on the ground visible on the ND but never a TA or RA.
He’s quite correct that A/C fitted with ADSB OUT are visible on flight radar while on the ground if the transponder is on.
He’s also correct that TCAS is inhibited below 900ish ft but that’s not really relevant. We sometimes get a TCAS target with the orange (TA) symbol from a/c on the ground visible on the ND but never a TA or RA.
Anyway none of these are relevant to this accident. For me why ATC was not aware that the Dash was on the runway is more important.
Time: 08:47:18
Lat/Lon: 35.541982 139.803538
GS: 124 kts
Baro alt: 0 ft (96ft corrected)
MCP alt sel: 3008 ft
VS: -576 fpm
RSSI: -9 dBFS
Comment:
This is the last position data received. This position is 64m prior to the piano keys on RWY 34R and 2m right of centerline.
There are no ADS-B messages received over the next 4 seconds. At 124 kts that puts the aircraft 252m further down the runway, or just past the first set of touchdown indicators.
This indicates that something disabled the position data in the ADS-B source in those 4 seconds.
The collision therefore likely occurred at the C2/C3 intersection position along RWY 34R.
Lat/Lon: 35.541982 139.803538
GS: 124 kts
Baro alt: 0 ft (96ft corrected)
MCP alt sel: 3008 ft
VS: -576 fpm
RSSI: -9 dBFS
Comment:
This is the last position data received. This position is 64m prior to the piano keys on RWY 34R and 2m right of centerline.
There are no ADS-B messages received over the next 4 seconds. At 124 kts that puts the aircraft 252m further down the runway, or just past the first set of touchdown indicators.
This indicates that something disabled the position data in the ADS-B source in those 4 seconds.
The collision therefore likely occurred at the C2/C3 intersection position along RWY 34R.
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Closer view
I don’t have posting privileges here so I cannot add a link but there is a video that shows a closer view of the plane already on fire before it comes to a stop on the runway under Noticias Del Mundo 24H on X.
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On this video (link below) between 6:18 - 6:24 there seems to be a sequence of video where the landing aircraft passes the camera and crashes immediately (lights from flames visible). The video source (perhaps another aircraft taxiing in the opposite direction) rolls forward and C5 sign is visible. This puts collision just past C5.
and some seconds further right
Last edited by waito; 2nd Jan 2024 at 19:11. Reason: nore pix
Two things to note from the #257 video: i) after the collision there is a large fire just behind the nose of the A350 - burning fuel loaded section of the -8 dragged by the mlg? or maybe just that area coated in burning fuel ejected from the the -8 by the impact. ii) the A350 is not nose down in this video so mlg intact at that time and collapsed later after degradation by this fire - tyres destroyed then metal contact with the runway?
Slide deployed properly, but since the nose gear collapsed during the impact with the Dash, the tail is higher, so the slide is in a steaper angle.
There is no collision warning system on the ground. As soon as you touch down, those systems switch off. How would you navigate on the ground otherwise?
There is no collision warning system on the ground. As soon as you touch down, those systems switch off. How would you navigate on the ground otherwise?
I recall an LH flight used it's TCAS in the Linate ground collision to avoid running into the debris on the runway if I remember correctly they didn't have the departing aircraft on their TCAS.
id like to think Airbus are not that complacent. If I worked for them I'd like to understand where the fire started and how it spread. If the fire handles worked (or weren't used) and the fuel tanks were leaking then a brandy and bed. If not, espresso and a night studying logic diagrams. There is always something to learn / improve.
Given that latest video is authentic we now know:
The Dash 8 was not about to enter from Twy C5! We can rule that out.
IF it was about to enter, then from Twy C6 - and at an angle. But I think entry of C6 was too far down the rwy to explain the very near impact from latest video
Most likely the Dash 8 Coast Guard aircraft already had entered from C5 and was lined up waiting stationary.
So from a visibility standpoint it was harder to detect for the A350 crew. When the incursion started and in motion, they were further away.
The Dash 8 was not about to enter from Twy C5! We can rule that out.
IF it was about to enter, then from Twy C6 - and at an angle. But I think entry of C6 was too far down the rwy to explain the very near impact from latest video
Most likely the Dash 8 Coast Guard aircraft already had entered from C5 and was lined up waiting stationary.
So from a visibility standpoint it was harder to detect for the A350 crew. When the incursion started and in motion, they were further away.
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id like to think Airbus are not that complacent. If I worked for them I'd like to understand where the fire started and how it spread. If the fire handles worked (or weren't used) and the fuel tanks were leaking then a brandy and bed. If not, espresso and a night studying logic diagrams. There is always something to learn / improve.
I’m with you longhaul. The 350’s I flew had dual HUDs. SOP required their use for all takeoffs and landings. At night, I couldn’t get the dimness low enough for my liking and found it quite distracting at airports with busy ground lighting/traffic. Dash 8’s aren’t well illuminated from behind either, so if they were lined up would be hard to see through the HUD. I’m assuming of course the JAL birds had HUDs.
Understood, thanks.
Never had that issue with the B737 HUD, but maybe the Airbus HUD does not dim to the same level and stay visible.
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Former gaijin JAL flight attendent here, many years ago. Mostly NRT and NGO in Japan and foreign long-haul locations.
Since some of you were wondering about the smooth evacuation, I want to share my knowledge on this:
During a crash landing the cabin crew performs- what we endearingly referred to as "Banana-Pineapple-Juice"
Brace for Impact
Panic Control
Judgement
Coordination
Evacuation
So Panic Control is to tell the PAX to stay calm/seated whilst assessing the outside condition and judging if door is useable. I believe that's what the crew did first.
Then if situation is dangerous, you may initiate evacuation, without waiting for thr pilot's command and coordinate the flow of PAX to your door of if door inop, block door and redirect to other useable exit. Evacuate everyone from your station/ door, check cabin for any remaining PAX that need help, leave last.
Much practice was done at the Haneda JAL training centre!
Japanese PAX are most wonderful to work with as they are very obedient and willing to cooperate.
It can be presumed that they followed all instructions promptly during the evacuation without making a fuss or showing their fear or panic outwards.
That said, they are lucky that enough exits were useable to allow evacuation before the flames exploded and they are lucky that there seemingly was noone who needed special assistance with mobility.
Examplary crew and PAX effort, but so unneccessary to loose the lives of the rescue plane's crew.
Since some of you were wondering about the smooth evacuation, I want to share my knowledge on this:
During a crash landing the cabin crew performs- what we endearingly referred to as "Banana-Pineapple-Juice"
Brace for Impact
Panic Control
Judgement
Coordination
Evacuation
So Panic Control is to tell the PAX to stay calm/seated whilst assessing the outside condition and judging if door is useable. I believe that's what the crew did first.
Then if situation is dangerous, you may initiate evacuation, without waiting for thr pilot's command and coordinate the flow of PAX to your door of if door inop, block door and redirect to other useable exit. Evacuate everyone from your station/ door, check cabin for any remaining PAX that need help, leave last.
Much practice was done at the Haneda JAL training centre!
Japanese PAX are most wonderful to work with as they are very obedient and willing to cooperate.
It can be presumed that they followed all instructions promptly during the evacuation without making a fuss or showing their fear or panic outwards.
That said, they are lucky that enough exits were useable to allow evacuation before the flames exploded and they are lucky that there seemingly was noone who needed special assistance with mobility.
Examplary crew and PAX effort, but so unneccessary to loose the lives of the rescue plane's crew.
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ADS-B Transponders
Yes you are right , but as you know ADS-B is a separate box from a transponder , using either the 1090 squitter or UAT format , it is not a kind of transponder. As to using TCAS on the landing phase (i.e. below 1000 Ft RADALT ) , not only the RAs are inhibited but the rather poor azimuth resolution of TCAS does not permit to distinguish between an aircraft holding short and one actually on the runway, so no use even if you get a TA.
Anyway none of these are relevant to this accident. For me why ATC was not aware that the Dash was on the runway is more important.
Anyway none of these are relevant to this accident. For me why ATC was not aware that the Dash was on the runway is more important.
Dear ATC Watcher,
good that you corrected your earlier comment on ADS-B and Transponders. Still you are wrong about the “separate box” as a generality. A modern general aviation transponder (as the one I fly with) has ADS-B (Out and/or IN) integrated since a few years……… And further, the ADS-B information IS transmitted on the 1090 MHz transponderfrequency…….
Cheers
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For me why ATC was not aware that the Dash was on the runway is more important
There is no techical device or softver that could substitute rule:
one runway, one language, one frequency.
Migthy knows what investigation will say more.
Last edited by SINGAPURCANAC; 2nd Jan 2024 at 20:32.
Given the length of an A350 and the latest video that Tetsuo linked to, this should be impact zone. It also rules out that the Dash 8 entered via C6 (assuming they did not turn wrong way and backtrack on 34R)
My Conclusions based on this state of knowledge:
My Conclusions based on this state of knowledge:
- Dash-8 had fully entered the runway. Most likely they entered via C5 more than
107 Seconds before the impact. Or even a lot earlier via C4 - Other video showed they were more or less standing still.
- This was not a dynamic situation.
- Tower was unaware?
- A350 crew was absolutely unaware I think. The A350 pitch before impact was not suggesting they desperately tried to go around and "jump over" the dash 8
Last edited by waito; 2nd Jan 2024 at 20:29.